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**CUBA**

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ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A-1NEW YORK TIMES  
14 SEPTEMBER 1979

## In a Diplomatic Corner

### Handling of Issue of Soviet Force in Cuba Raises Doubt About the Administration's Grip on Policy

By RICHARD BURT

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 13 — The Carter Administration, in the opinion of informed officials, may have painted itself into a diplomatic corner in the way it disclosed the existence of a Soviet brigade in Cuba and then insisted that it had a combat role.

**News** Eventually, with some cooperation by Moscow, there may be a face-saving solution, but for the moment, at least, the impression is building in the Government that the Administration has made negotiations on the question of the brigade more difficult, jeopardized the strategic arms treaty and raised new questions about its ability to deal with the Soviet Union and its critics in Congress at the same time.

Not the least source of potential embarrassment to the Administration is that a reassessment of the intelligence information involved may show that the Moscow could have been partly correct when it insisted in *Pravda* this week that the unit

had only a training function and had been in Cuba since the early 1960's.

Under heavy pressure from Congress to appear tough and to smooth the way for Senate approval of the second phase of the treaty with the Soviet Union to limit strategic arms, Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance used strong words last week in criticizing the presence of the Soviet troops. "The status quo is unacceptable," he told the press.

Now officials in the State Department and other agencies suggest that the Administration may have picked a fight it cannot win. If, as the Russians insist, the brigade has been in place since 1962, the officials feel that it may be all but impossible to convince them to remove it or even to agree to cut back substantially on its activities. The most likely result, the officials speculate, is an understanding that would prohibit the brigade from being used in offensive military operations outside Cuba.

Most officials believe that such an outcome would be certain to draw heavy fire from conservatives on Capitol Hill, among them Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington.

Possibly in recognition of the apparent weakness of the American position, senior Administration aides including Mr. Vance have sought to defuse the issue somewhat by shying away from the strong public comments that were heard at first. The low-key approach is probably more conducive to a diplomatic settlement, but many officials are troubled over the effects that the Administration's handling of the affair is likely to have on relations with Moscow and the ability to grapple with other foreign-policy problems.

If, as some officials contend, the Administration has picked an issue that is unlikely to be resolved easily, that would be an ironic result, for the officials maintain that the whole affair stems largely from the White House's desire to gain

Senate approval of the strategic arms limitation treaty and to add to President Carter's political luster.

Last year, when it was disclosed that Moscow had sent a squadron of MIG-23 fighter-bombers to Cuba, Mr. Carter took pains to play down the issue and it was soon forgotten. Contrasting that episode with the troop issue, a White House aide commented, "This time, with SALT at stake, we felt we had to come out swinging."

The officials say there are a number of adverse consequences that could emerge from the Administration's handling of the Cuban affair. Of special concern to the many State Department officials focusing on the likely impact on Moscow is that the Soviet leadership must now be badly confused by the Administration's behavior, particularly after the mild way Mr. Carter reacted to the MIG's.

#### Impact on the Larger Issue

At the White House officials are discouraged over the effect on the Administration's ability to deal with the Russians on the larger problem of Cuban military intervention around the world. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Mr. Carter's national security adviser, is known to have wanted to use the issue of the brigade as a means of highlighting the Soviet-Cuban military relationship. Furthermore, some at the White House are concerned that the Administration, by exaggerating the issue of the brigade, may have undermined its arguments against Soviet military aid to the Cubans and their increasingly assertive role in the third world.

With regard to the more immediate problem of the impact on the Senate debate on the arms treaty, Mr. Carter has urged the Senate not to link the two issues, but leading senators, including Frank Church, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, oppose this position.

The White House aides believe that once some form of understanding is worked out restricting the role of the troops in Cuba, Senator Church and other pro-treaty senators will forget the issue. On the other hand, Senator Russell Long, the influential Louisiana Democrat, announced yesterday that the Cuban affair had led him to oppose the treaty and Senator Jackson warned the White House today that any effort to rationalize the Soviet combat presence in Cuba would lead to the defeat of the arms accord.

Unlike the situation in the celebrated missile crisis 17 years ago, it is questionable whether the tempest over the Soviet troops can be resolved in a way that both satisfies critics of the Administration and enhances Mr. Carter's credibility. In the view of many officials close to the problem, the Administration's major task is less in finding a way to win a foreign policy victory for the President than in insuring that a defeat is a limited one.

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ON PAGE A-11

NEW YORK TIMES  
14 SEPTEMBER 1979

## Jackson Says U.S. Seeks Deal With Soviet on Cuba

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 13 — Senator Henry M. Jackson said today that he believed the Carter Administration was trying to work out with the Soviet Union "some rationalization" for resolving the problem of a Soviet brigade in Cuba without forcing its removal.

"That will go over like a lead balloon," the Washington Democrat said, insisting, as he did two days ago, that the Soviet Union was building a "Fortress Cuba" and that the United States had to demand the withdrawal of the brigade's 2,000 to 3,000 soldiers and of the warplanes sup-

plied by the Soviet Union to the Cubans.

Another source, a former government official who has been briefed on the situation, said it was possible that the brigade might consist of Soviet advisers who assembled once or twice a year for maneuvers and might have done so for years.

### A Possible Formula Is Suggested

The former official, who asked not to be identified, said Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance and Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin of the Soviet Union might be seeking a formula by which Moscow would affirm that its troops had only a training mission, that no combat exercises would be held, and that the tanks

and other heavy equipment would be under Cuban control.

Administration officials refused to discuss what Mr. Vance and Mr. Dobrynin had talked about, and the former official said he had no inside information. Mr. Vance and Mr. Dobrynin, who met yesterday and Monday, will confer again tomorrow.

There was a great deal of speculation today about a possible resolution of the problem, which has already jeopardized Senate approval of the strategic arms limitation treaty with the Soviet Union.

Yesterday, a State Department official, identified today by news agencies as David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, listed for a few reporters the possible missions that the Soviet brigade might have in Cuba. One of several was the possibility that it had a training function, he said.

Since the Soviet Communist Party newspaper, Pravda, had said that the Soviet troops are in Cuba only in an advisory capacity, this suggested the outline of a compromise. But Mr. Newsom stressed that no final determination had been made.

At the State Department, Mr. Vance was reported concerned about the attention given to the possibility that the brigade had a training mission.

Hodding Carter '3d,' the department spokesman, was instructed to say that "we are still examining our intelligence reports to determine as precisely as possible the capability, the mission and time the brigade has been in Cuba."

### Assessment to Be Made Public

"We believe it has been there for a considerable time," he said. "The hypothesis in this morning's papers is but one of a series of possibilities. I can personally think of 15 or 20."

"We are in the midst of very delicate negotiations and we are not going to speculate further," he said. "When the issue has been resolved, we will make fully clear our assessment of the situation and the basis on which our judgments have been made."

Mr. Vance has insisted that the negotiations be allowed to take place without any publicity, for fear the public glare would make it more difficult to reach a satisfactory arrangement.

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NEW YORK TIMES  
14 SEPTEMBER 1979

## Cuban Bunion, American Hotfoot

The longer the controversy continues over 3,000 Soviet combat troops in Cuba, the clearer it becomes that the chief damage the United States may suffer would be self-inflicted. American security would be substantially diminished, not enhanced, if the SALT treaty is killed in the effort to force withdrawal of the Russian brigade, even if the effort succeeded. It would be like trading a nuclear bomb for a hand grenade.

This realization evidently has finally dawned on Chairman Church of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who led the pack threatening to hold up SALT, although previously he had opposed any kind of linkage. Senator Church has returned to his earlier position by joining with Senator Javits, the committee's senior Republican, to go ahead with hearings to prepare the treaty for Senate floor debate. They will leave the Cuban negotiations to the President and Secretary Vance, as they should.

There are other ways to resolve the immediate conflict. Russian troops appear to have been in Cuba for years. A military threat to the United States has not materialized overnight just because Washington, belatedly, has learned of their presence. The immediate question concerns the newly discovered Soviet headquarters, evidently created last fall, to command the

3,000 troops as a unit: What is its purpose? If it is in fact a first step toward strengthening the brigade and giving it an offensive capability, that is something that Secretary Vance should work to head off in his talks with Ambassador Dobrynin.

The United States should not ignore the general Russian effort to use Cuba and Cuban troops as proxies in a bid to enlarge Soviet influence around the world. If the Soviet Union wants to expand the cooperative element in the Soviet-American relationship, military competition must be reduced, not intensified. The sensitivity of Cuba to Americans makes it an obvious place for Russia to tread carefully, as the excitement of recent days has shown.

It will take time to make progress on the linked issues of Soviet military activity in Cuba and the future of the entire Soviet-American relationship. Rash acts of retaliation are not likely to be helpful. Neither are the exaggerations that Senator Jackson now uses as sticks against SALT. And neither is Ronald Reagan's arresting proposal that the United States "should not have any further communications with the Soviet Union" until the troops go home. Neither peace nor peace of mind can be achieved by amputating a foot to treat a bunion.

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PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER  
14 SEPTEMBER 1979

## 'Spy station' in Cuba really phone hookup

By Saul Friedman  
*Inquirer Washington Bureau*

WASHINGTON — A picture in the current Time magazine that purports to show a "Soviet-built intelligence station in Cuba" actually depicts a facility put up in 1957 — before the Castro regime — by International Telephone & Telegraph Corp (ITT).

"That facility has been used ever since it was built for telephone communication between Cuba and the U.S. and an occasional television show," said an ITT spokesman here, laughing at what he called "Time's goof."

Time's picture editor, Arnold Drapkin, said that the color photograph "came from a non-government source, and we checked it with the best authorities in the field."

Asked whether the authorities were in government, in the communications industry or in intelligence work, Drapkin declined further comment.

But the ITT spokesman, Bernard

Goodrich, said that even a superficial examination of the equipment in the photograph shows that it could not be used for the purpose Time reported.

The caption says the photograph, which helped illustrate Time's cover story, "The Storm Over Cuba," shows "a section of an advanced electronics monitoring complex atop a limestone hill east of Havana. Facing north and east, the large antennas eavesdrop on U.S. and international civilian, military and space satellite electronic and voice messages and picture relays."

Carlos Ciano, first secretary of the Cuban mission to the United States, said that he saw the facility many times while driving toward the beach in the late 1950s.

He placed the facility at Guanabacoa, about 20 miles outside Havana, and said, "as far as I know, it was built by Americans and we used it for telephone communications with the states and to watch television."

Goodrich said the station was built in 1957 by the Cuban Radio Co., then an ITT subsidiary, which has since been taken over by the government.

During Castro's rule, however, communications through the facility have remained largely unbroken.

Goodrich said the big, dish-shaped antennas at the site are able to send or receive telephone and television signals bounced off the upper atmosphere between Cuba and Miami.

He noted that the dishes are fixed, which means they cannot follow and eavesdrop on moving communications satellites, as Time alleged.

Another structure in the photograph, not built by ITT, is a microwave tower, Goodrich said. But he added that its range was limited and that it could be used only for communications within Cuba.

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ON PAGE 33

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS  
14 SEPTEMBER 1979

# Both nations protect their interests

By JOSEPH VOLZ

**W**ASHINGTON (News Bureau) The uproar about a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba has overshadowed the fact that the 3,000 Russian soldiers and 2,500 advisors squirrelled away in Fidel Castro's Communist stronghold represent only a fraction of the total Russian forces stationed outside the Soviet Union. American military analysts do not have the precise figures, but estimate that the total is over 600,000 — and they believe that the number is growing.

U.S. military experts wring their hands at this apparent indication of Soviet plans for military expansion. Yet they concede that the United States has well over 400,000 military personnel scattered around the world — including 2,203 troops stationed in Cuba at the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay.

But officials here make two distinctions between the overseas deployment of American and Soviet military forces. Unlike the Soviets, American troops are sent abroad publicly, not surreptitiously. And while the Soviets are sending more troops abroad, the number of American soldiers overseas has been declining.

In addition to stationing more troops abroad, the Soviets are using the troops of friendly Communist countries as proxies in the international arena. For example, there are 38,000 Cuban troops in Angola and Ethiopia combined, and 100,000 or so Vietnamese troops in Cambodia.

This development, which U.S. military advisors find unnerving, comes at a time when U.S. allies in Europe and Asia seem intent on avoiding foreign military entanglements.

Both the United States and Russia have more troops in Europe than anywhere else. U.S. troops are centered in the Nato nations and the Soviet troops are in the Warsaw Pact countries. The Russians have 590,000 troops in Eastern

Europe while the United States has 312,477 troops committed to Nato.

There are also 4,755 more troops from the United States in Turkey, which borders on the Soviet Union and serves as an important U.S. base for electronic spying, as Cuba serves as the Soviet Union's base for electronic monitoring of the United States.

A glance at the map above showing Russian soldiers stationed outside the Soviet Union indicates the major areas of Moscow's interest — the oil-rich Middle East, the Mediterranean basin and southern Africa.

Soviet outposts in Afghanistan (2,000), Iraq (1,200) and Syria (2,500), along with the troops within the Soviet Union, give Moscow a northern ring around the oil deposits in the Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabian peninsula. Add to that the Soviet forces in Ethiopia (1,000, plus 18,000 Cubans), South Yemen (1,100 Soviets plus an equal number of Cubans) and Soviet naval forces operating out of Aden, in south Yemen, and the encirclement is just about complete.

In the Mediterranean, the important Soviet bases are in the North African

countries of Algeria (1,000) and in Libya (1,700), two oil-producing Arab states led by Marxist military dictators. The Kremlin's effort to dominate Southern Africa is centered in Angola, where 300 to 500 Soviet "advisors" are working with a like number of East Germans to aid the 20,000 or so Cuban troops fighting there.

Aside from its commitments to Western Europe, most American military forces overseas are stationed in the Far East — Japan and Okinawa (46,000), South Korea (38,000) and the Philippines (14,283). And, like the U.S. forces assigned to Nato, the Americans in the Pacific are there to protect U.S. allies, such as South Korea, Japan and the Philippines.

Still, despite this vast deployment of military forces abroad by both superpowers, the combat brigade in Cuba is viewed here as a special case for alarm. Cuba is, after all, only 90 miles from the coast of Florida. This raises the fear that it could be made into a powerful base from which the Soviets could block shipping in the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico and the entire Eastern seaboard. With his steady stream of belligerent, anti-U.S. rhetoric, Cuban Premier Fidel Castro does little to dampen this fear.

The Cuban army is equipped with the latest in Soviet military hardware. In addition, it is known that he wants offensive weapons, which could pose a serious threat to the United States. It was Castro's hunger for such weapons that led to the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.

It's no wonder, then, that the disclosure of Soviet combat troops in Cuba, coming as it did at the very time when Castro was denouncing "Yankee imperialism" before the 94 nations attending the conference of so-called non-aligned nations in Havana, created such a hubbub on Capitol Hill. But as the United States and Russia negotiate over the Cuban troop issue, Congress should keep in mind that the Russian brigade in Cuba is only a small part of the much larger picture of Soviet forces stationed abroad.

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ON PAGE 6

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS  
14 SEPTEMBER 1979

# Capitol hits waffling on Soviet troops

By JOSEPH VOLZ

Hints that the State Department may be softening its position on the 3,000 Soviet combat troops in Cuba drew harsh criticism from Capitol Hill yesterday, prompting Carter administration officials to insist that the President's position on the issue has not changed.

"Although we are still examining intelligence reports... We do believe the (Soviet) brigade has been there (in Cuba) for some length of time... (and) that it does have a demonstrated combat capability," said White House Press Secretary Jody Powell. As to the suggestion that the Russian troops might simply be a "training" unit, Powell said, "That runs counter to the evidence we have."

Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.), an outspoken opponent of the proposed SALT-2 strategic arms limitation treaty with the Russians and a hawk on the Cuba troops issue, warned that any effort by the administration to "rationalize" the continued presence of Russian

troops in Cuba "will go over like a lead balloon" on Capitol Hill.

"The issue is Fortress Cuba," Jackson said, adding that any effort to make out that the Soviet troops constitute anything other than a combat brigade

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Military analysts say that the Soviet Union has more than 600,000 troops stationed outside Russian borders. See Joseph Volz' report on Page 33.

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will not work. "The intelligence (on the issue) is hard... it is a combat brigade... that won't hold water," he added.

#### Baker presses for action

Senate Republican Leader Howard H. Baker Jr. (Tenn.), a possible GOP presidential contender next year, said the time was fast approaching when the President must say how he plans to resolve the Cuba troops issue.

But yesterday, after Newsom's comments were published State Department spokesman Hodding Carter 3d, accused

reporters of making more of the matter than is warranted. He said the U.S. position that the Soviets have a combat unit in Cuba has not changed.

Carter said Newsmen discussed many possibilities at the luncheon and the "training unit" study was "not intended as a trial balloon." He conceded, though, that a combat unit can have "more than one mission" but declined to comment on whether the Soviet unit could be training the Cubans, too.

There were reports that Secretary of State Vance was trying to devise some kind of formula short of forcing the Soviets to send their troops home.

#### No recent buildup

Many intelligence experts, noting that the troops have been there for several years and that there has been no recent buildup, view the matter purely as a political question. One high intelligence expert said: "Carter is just using candor. He's found out about this long-standing problem and felt he had to tell the public about it. But whatever he does will be a political, not military, decision. This is no Cuban missile crisis."

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 10CHICAGO TRIBUNE  
14 September 1979

## Fighting SALT with symbols...

A brigade of soldiers, armed with ordinary rifles and artillery pieces, has become the decisive element in the Senate's evaluation of an agreement to restrain the growth of two nuclear arsenals already capable of incinerating much of the planet.

Stated bluntly, this latest turn in the SALT debate might seem to be evidence that otherwise reasonable people cannot work long with MIRVs and megadeath and mutually assured destruction [MAD] without going mad themselves.

None of the convoluted arguments hastily erected by SALT opponents really make a logical connection between the discovery of Soviet combat troops in Cuba and the question whether the arms agreements negotiated with the Soviet Union enhance our security.

Does anyone deny that the Soviet Union delights in challenging the West and seeing what it can get away with? What has locating a small contingent of troops to do with the intelligence methods that will allow us to learn whether the Soviets are engaging in the enormous effort it would take to cheat on the treaty to any significant degree? When the Wall Street Journal warns that ratifying SALT would be ratification of "the vacillating foreign policy record of the Carter administration," are we to believe the troops in Cuba have turned SALT into the ultimate popularity poll on a troubled presidency?

The Soviets' brazen taunt of putting armed forces in Cuba does raise serious questions, but they have nothing to do with whether the U. S. strategic position would be strengthened by an all-out nuclear arms race. The real connection between SALT II and the Soviet troops is neither mad nor rational—it is a relationship between a symbol and a symbol.

The SALT II treaty has always seemed to its opponents the symbol of a self-indulgent fantasy—that we can avoid financial and personal sacrifice in building our national defense by signing pieces of paper with the Soviets. Their specific arguments against the agree-

ments never had much force. By the time the troop issue arose, they had all been fairly well swept aside. The only issue remaining was the fear that the U.S. would use the treaty as an excuse for declining to spend what was necessary to remain as strong as our adversaries.

Then came the disclosure of the Soviet forces in Cuba, and it was a powerful symbol, too: It revived thoughts of the 1962 missile crisis, when the United States faced the Soviet Union down. But this time it was likely that when we got nose to nose with the Russians it would be a long time before anybody blinked. The U. S. had declined in the world. It was not even willing to express outrage.


SALT II, then, has become the symbol of the temptations and the Soviet troops the symbol of the terrible challenge we face. Paradoxically, however, if we are finally to come to terms with the responsibilities we inherited after World War II, we must learn to be very worldly about symbols. We cannot rely on overwhelming nuclear forces to carry our burden as leader of the West, so we must depend instead upon realism, cunning, and resolve. We must assess agreements and associations coldly in the light of what advantage they confer upon the West. We must meet challenges as calculatingly as they are raised up against us.

The preservation of the ideal of liberty against the large and petty tyrannies of the world leaves us no tolerance for complacency or terror. Where there is advantage, as there is in SALT II, we must seize it. Where there is a threat, we must meet it surgically and not simply beat our breasts about what the very existence of the threat means for America's role in the world. America's role will take care of itself just fine if we can steel ourselves against the illusion that freedom can be protected cheaply, and at the same time recognize symbols for what they are, the creatures of nightmares, demons that get in the way of survival in the harsh, daylight world.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A10THE WASHINGTON POST  
14 September 1979

A SOVIET-BUILT INTELLIGENCE STATION IN CUBA. This photograph, obtained by TIME, shows a section of an advanced electronics monitoring complex atop a limestone hill east of Havana.

Facing north and east, the large antennas eavesdrop on U.S. and international civilian, military and space satellite electronic and voice messages and picture relays.



© TIME Magazine

## ITT Official Points Out Time's 'Goof'

Knight-Ridder

A picture in the Sept. 17 issue of Time magazine, purporting to show a "Soviet-built intelligence station in Cuba," actually depicts a facility put up in 1957—before the Castro regime—by International Telephone & Telegraph.

"That facility has been used ever since it was built for telephone communication between Cuba and the U.S. and an occasional television show," said an ITT spokesman here, laughing at what he called "Time's goof."

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kin, said the color photograph "came from a nongovernment source and we checked it with the best authorities in the field."

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ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A-1WASHINGTON POST  
9 SEPTEMBER 1979

# The 'Brigada': An Unwelcome Sighting in Cuba

By Don Oberdorfer  
Washington Post Staff Writer

On Friday, Aug. 17, a U.S. spy satellite in orbit over the Caribbean trained its high-powered lenses on a tract of rugged country near the southern coast of Cuba. The pictures transmitted electronically to the ground were examined by photo interpreters in offices scattered around Washington. They revealed the tanks, artillery, trucks and tents of a military unit on field maneuvers.

The photographs were of grave significance, for a reason known only to a handful of U.S. intelligence officials: A few days before, they had been tipped off that a Soviet combat unit stationed near Havana planned maneuvers across the island at the time and place where the satellite cameras trained their lenses for high-resolution zoom shots.

On Aug. 20, another satellite mission over Cuba found the maneuver area deserted and the heavy artillery equipment parked once more in two inconspicuous areas a few miles west of Havana that are the suspected base camps of a Soviet brigade.

The pictures of the Russian guns of August, together with confirming data that still are secret, ended an internecine argument of long standing among U.S. intelligence agencies and officials. Most of the skeptics and the doubters now agree that a Soviet combat force of several thousand men has been stationed in Cuba for many months—perhaps for many years.

This unavoidable conclusion has touched off a new Soviet-American confrontation, endangered the embattled strategic arms limitation treaty between the superpowers, and has posed a new challenge to the sagging political fortunes of President Carter.

Last Friday afternoon, three weeks after satellite photographs ended an argument and began a new crisis, a somber Carter appealed to the nation from the White House for "calm and a sense of proportion" in equal measure with "firmness and strength."

In the public metaphor of high officialdom, the prob-

lem of finding a unit of 2,000 to 3,000 Russian soldiers on a Caribbean island of 10 million persons and 190,000 Soviet-equipped Cuban troops was a "jigsaw puzzle" of excruciating difficulty. While there is no doubt that the challenge was formidable, it is also true that only a few people and a tiny fraction of American intelligence resources were devoted, until recently, to fitting together this unexpected and unwelcome picture.

The origins of the Soviet effort are obscure, but top officials of several U.S. intelligence agencies suspect that the starting point was the Russian buildup of 1962—17 years ago—when Moscow put offensive missiles, bombers and about 20,000 first-line troops in Cuba.

The resolution of that missile crisis, perhaps the most dangerous superpower confrontation of the nuclear age, required the removal from Cuba of the Soviet offensive weapons and of all Soviet forces associated with the missiles and bombers. According to those who have studied the diplomatic exchanges and understandings—some of which have never been made public in full detail—there was no agreement covering Soviet ground forces in general.

Nor was there much attention to the subject then or in most of the years since. An official who recently reviewed the record of highly confidential U.S. deliberations and action in the missile crisis, a stack of documents several inches thick, could find only 1½ pages which made reference to Soviet ground troops. A top Central Intelligence Agency official said last week, "Soviet ground forces in Cuba have not been a priority item . . . they weren't considered a threat to the United States."

It was well known in Washington and no secret in Havana that hundreds of Soviet military advisers—1,500 by one estimate—were left behind in 1962. Beginning in the early 1970s, there were also well-documented reports that some of these troops were on hand to guard and operate a large and highly sophisticated Soviet electronic eavesdropping station established on the Caribbean island.

CONTINUED

On the basis of retrospective hints, high officials now believe it is plausible and possible that a Soviet ground combat unit has remained in Cuba, under the nose of the United States, since the buildup and the withdrawal of 1962. The evidence is slender and inconclusive, however.

Beginning at least a decade ago, U.S. intelligence received periodic and fragmentary reports of Soviet ground force units of a few thousand men in Cuba. These reports were not taken at face value and raised no alarm signals at the top of the government. CIA officials said it is doubtful, in fact, that they ever got to the top.

One reason was that in the late '60s and early '70s, the intelligence community (like the rest of the government) was obsessed with Vietnam. Intelligence "assets," both human and technological, were directed at that part of the world; there was little left over for intelligence operations aimed at Cuba.

By the mid-'70s the Vietnam adventure had ended but there was still interest in Cuba. The National Security Agency picked up references to a Soviet "brigada" in Cuba in 1976. But nothing was done about it; the information, in effect, was ignored.

Several explanations are now being offered.

First, the analysts didn't know what to make of references to a brigade. It is an aberrational form of military unit in the Soviet army. Most Soviet ground forces are organized into regiments and divisions. Only four "brigades" were known to exist in the entire 1,800,000-man army—a ceremonial unit in East Berlin, a unit in East Germany, and two units in Mongolia, whose functions are still unknown.

So the intercepted "brigada" chatter out of Cuba set off no alarm in the intelligence community in 1976. Analysts assumed that somebody was mistaken or confused.

Second, the Soviets went to unusual lengths to conceal the presence of their ground unit among the Cubans. The Russian colonel in charge and his men, who are believed to serve tours of two to three years in Cuba, were never mentioned in public by either Moscow or Havana.

The brigade was split between two separate locations resembling Cuban camps a few kilometers from one another near Los Palacios, 60 miles west of Havana, rather than camped together in recognizable Soviet style. The unit maintained a high degree of radio silence and only rarely conducted maneuvers, according to American officials.

Third, there was very little U.S. interest in the subject. Without indications of "sufficient weight to warrant a presumption" of a Soviet combat unit in Cuba, "we weren't looking for it," according to presidential national security affairs adviser Zbigniew

Brzezinski. Until this summer, the National Security Agency, which is a very large organization, had only one analyst assigned fulltime to material from Cuba.

The first break in the process of discovery came in early 1978, when "a happy accident" brought to U.S. intelligence within a few days two specific pieces of information about a Soviet brigade in Cuba. An intensified study was ordered. It produced photographs of modern Soviet military equipment deployed in camps near Los Palacios and photographs of a Soviet training mission at a Cuban gunnery range in the western part of the island.

From this evidence, officials at the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency drew the wrong conclusion. They ruled that the military equipment was assigned to Cuban, instead of Soviet, forces and that the "brigade" bivouac areas were Cuban camps. Some lower-level U.S. intelligence officials strongly disagreed with that assessment.

Late in 1978, U.S. concern over the arrival in Cuba of modern Mig23 combat aircraft prompted the first U.S. spy plane flights over the island since Carter called them off in 1977 as a gesture of goodwill to Havana. The Mig23 incident heightened U.S. interest and surveillance, but the overflights were not continued on a regular basis.

In March this year, a White House memo signed by Brzezinski ordered CIA Director Stansfield Turner to assess the size, location, capabilities and purposes of Soviet ground forces in Cuba. One of the practical results was to send NSA's lone Cuban analyst back-through the agency's voluminous computerized files for bits of pertinent information. After a second White House memo a month later, other intelligence organizations joined the search.

By mid-June the NSA analyst completed a study which, in retrospect, was a landmark in the search for the Russian brigade. For the first time an accumulation of evidence argued convincingly that, at a minimum, a Soviet brigade headquarters had been established in Cuba.

The study set off a fierce dispute within the intelligence field, in part because of its implications for U.S. policy. NSA and Army intelligence argued that a combination of photography, signal intelligence and a rare bit of human intelligence pointed unmistakably to the presence of a clandestine Soviet brigade. According to informed sources, CIA, DIA, State Department, Air Force and Navy intelligence chiefs disagreed.

The basic information was available to all the agencies, and thus the issue was one of interpretation and evaluation. With Carter signing the long-awaited SALT II treaty with Soviet

President Leonid Brezhnev in Vienna in mid-June and the administration preparing for a battle royal over Senate ratification, the political implications of belatedly discovering Soviet combat troops in Cuba were grave. According to a senior intelligence officer, his superiors said repeatedly, "We've got to save SALT, whatever you do keep that in mind."

An early July review of the intelligence did nothing to resolve the deadlock. NSA and the Army were even firmer in their insistence that there were strong and precise indications of a Soviet combat force. Other agencies were unmoved. The compromise result, engineered by CIA's Turner, was a mid-July agreement that a Soviet force was present as a separate unit, not part of an advisory group. But there was no agreement on the size, organization or mission of the Soviet force.

During the July deliberations the Army argued that the official report should take note of the purposes of the Soviet unit, including the possibility that its mission is to guard existing or potential nuclear weapons. According to an official present at the coordinating meeting, Turner telephoned a high Army officer to argue against any such statement, even as a dissenting view.

"We heard only one end of the conversation, but that consisted of firm statements that Army was being unreasonable and that it should fall off . . . He [Turner] in effect ordered them to cave in" and the Army did so, the participant reported. A CIA spokesman, asked about the incident, said Turner had intervened to keep "gratuitous speculation" out of the coordinated intelligence report.

One result of the mid-July coordinated report was a memo from Carter to Turner directing stepped-up intelligence surveillance to determine the nature and purpose of the Soviet ground unit, if one in fact existed, and authorizing a diversion of resources

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from other areas of the world if necessary. A very heavy effort involving satellite photography and other highly sophisticated technology was mounted. The same concentration of effort, if carried out on a worldwide basis for a year, according to an informed official, would cost about \$100 billion, nearly as much as the entire Department of Defense budget.

Another result of the intelligence controversy and compromises of July was a series of leaks to members of Congress and news organizations. On July 11, Sen. Richard Stone (D-Fla.) questioned the Joint Chiefs of Staff about Soviet forces in Cuba, and on July 15 he began a series of public charges about Soviet military activities there. On July 20, ABC News reported that Soviet combat forces were in Cuba. These reports attracted little

public attention, and were denied in essence by official spokesmen.

Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 17, reported that there was no evidence of a "substantial increase" in the size of the Soviet military presence in Cuba over the past several years. He added that apart from the Soviet military advisory group, "our intelligence does not warrant the conclusion that there are any other significant Soviet military forces in Cuba." The same language was used by Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance on July 27 in replying for the administration to a letter from Stone.

These cautiously hedged statements did not define such terms as "significant" nor did they reveal that a crash effort had been mounted at presiden-

tial directive because of strong indications of a Soviet brigade in Cuba. Stone called the Vance letter "a whitewash." Another official said the Vance-Brown statements contained part truths which are commonplace in public statements on controversial intelligence studies.

In the early part of August, the intelligence drive paid off with a report that the Soviet brigade planned maneuvers across the island near the middle of the month. Also, in early August, perhaps in response to such findings, Carter directed, through Brzezinski and Turner, that intelligence on Soviet forces in Cuba be stepped up to "highest priority."

It was this effort that paid off on Aug. 17, in a fraction of a second and the snap of a shutter high above the Cuban countryside.

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# Chapter 2:

## Response: Avoiding a Crisis Tone

By Martin Schram

Washington Post Staff Writer

While satellite pictures of the Soviet brigade in Cuba were being analyzed in Washington, the president of the United States was floating down the Mississippi aboard the old paddlewheeler, the Delta Queen.

Jimmy Carter didn't need any more bad news. His U.N. ambassador, Andrew Young, had just resigned in a flap over Young's contacts with the Palestinians. That incident set off recriminations between American blacks and American Jews.

Robert Strauss, Carter's Middle East envoy, was in a jurisdictional dispute with Cyrus R. Vance, the secretary of state, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security affairs adviser.

There was the continuing bad news from the public opinion polls; his energy program and his SALT pact were embattled in Congress; there was lingering fallout from the Cabinet breakup.

It was not until Aug. 23 that the president was informed about the brigade in Cuba. That day he was in Hannibal, Mo., where he reminisced about the Mark Twain era.

The night before, press secretary Jody Powell had explained that the president was on top of his job and that "it doesn't mean a damn bit of difference where the president is — in the White House or on the banks of the Mississippi."

In any case, the report on the brigade reached Carter as part of the daily intelligence briefing he received from the CIA.

The information was sent to Carter via a mobile communications center set up on the Delta Queen. It was a secure communications channel.

Carter sent word back to Brzezinski in Washington that all of the information on Soviet ground forces in Cuba should be assembled and that an interagency meeting should be held at the White House to discuss the matter.

Almost a week later, that meeting was held. As a senior administrator official recalls it, it was of no importance that it took so long to pull together the military, intelligence and diplomatic records and data.

"This was something of significant concern to us," he said, "but it was not a matter of imminent crisis or danger. The troops had been there for some time. It was just that now we had to address it diplomatically."

The group that met in the Situation Room in the basement of the White House consisted of top-level officials from the intelligence community, the State and Defense departments and the National Security Council.

For the officials gathered around the table, it had already been an August far more eventful than they had envisioned or wanted. Vance had been forced to interrupt his vacation at Martha's Vineyard once before for a quick 24-hour visit to Washington to see Strauss, Vice President Mondale, and Brzezinski in a meeting that was part show-and-tell and part showdown.

Now, on Aug. 28, was back again, his vacation officially over, and awaiting him was the diplomatic snarl over the Soviet ballerina who was sitting on an Aeroflot airliner grounded at New York's Kennedy airport, and the undiplomatic snarl of details in Time magazine about the in-fighting of Strauss versus Vance versus Brzezinski, which read like Strauss and Brzezinski versus Vance, which infuriated the secretary of state.

For Vance, the Soviet brigade in Cuba was the issue of first priority. The officials decided to press the matter through diplomatic channels.

On the afternoon of Aug. 29, Undersecretary of State David D. Newsom called Soviet Deputy Ambassador Vladilen Vasev (Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin was on home leave in the Soviet Union.) Newsom told Vasev that the United States had conclusive evidence of the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba, and that this was a matter of great concern to the United States. He said that Vance would want to address the matter with Dobrynin upon his return.

In conjunction with the Newsom-Vasev meeting, officials at the U.S. diplomatic interest section in Havana were directed to take the matter up simultaneously with the Cuban foreign ministry. But it turned out that the U.S.

section chief in Havana, Wayne Smith, was unable to obtain an appointment with the Cuban officials until Sept. 1. By that time the presence of the brigade had become public knowledge.

Carter administration officials initially had planned to postpone the disclosure of the brigade, hoping to deal with the matter first through quiet diplomacy. "There was never going to be a way to hold it," said one official, "only a question of whether you could hold it temporarily until you had a reply from the Russians. If so, you would have been able to go to the public with some disturbing news but some Russian reply."

But this was not to be.

On Aug. 27, the National Intelligence Daily, a classified U.S. government document with a daily circulation to several hundred officials with top security clearance—including the Senate and House Intelligence committees—carried an account of the confirmation that the Soviet brigade was operating in Cuba.

On Aug. 30, in the State Department an interagency meeting of undersecretaries and assistant secretaries was held to decide how and when the matter should be made public. They decided that a few key members of Congress would be informed later that day and that the next day, State Department spokesman Hodding Carter would announce, in a manner that would convey concern but no sense of crisis or alarm, that the presence of the Soviet brigade had been confirmed and that U.S. concern had been expressed to the Soviets, and that the diplomatic negotiations were proceeding.

The State Department spokesman would handle it rather than the White House press secretary because, the Carter officials agreed, this would help keep the matter relatively low key so that it would not be viewed as an issue of crisis proportions. "The idea was to keep the president away from it," said one administration official.

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But events moved faster than did the administration. For on the same day that the officials were discussing how to make the information public, a representative of Aviation Week magazine queried both the departments of State and Defense about the confirmation that a Soviet brigade was in Cuba, an action indicating that the publication had a detailed account of the intelligence report.

That afternoon, Undersecretary of State Newsom began contacting members of Congress.

He called Sen. Richard Stone (D-Fla.), who had been raising questions about the presence of a Soviet brigade in Cuba more than a month ago. Stone, who was home in Tallahassee at the time, recalls that Newsom told him: "We've concluded our gathering of the intelligence information and we're ready to tell you what we've learned."

But Stone says he told Newsom not to bother. "I said, 'Don't tell me let's do it in person when I get back to Washington'."

Newsom also telephoned Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Frank Church (D-Idaho) and ranking committee Republican Jacob Javits (N.Y.), House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Clement Zablocki (D-Wis.) and ranking Republican William Broomfield (Mich.), Senate Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd (D-W. Va.) and Senate Minority Leader Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.). Pentagon officials contacted Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John Stennis (D-Miss.) and House Armed Services Committee Chairman Melvin Price (D-Ill.).

Of all the calls, the one to Church is the one that will be remembered—because it was through Church that the world would first hear of the presence of the Soviet brigade.

Church earned a reputation for being a foreign policy liberal and a dove on Vietnam; and he has been finding out now that these liberal credentials are doing him no good in conservative Idaho, where he is expected to have a difficult time winning reelection next year.

As Church recalls Newsom's call, "he said that he wanted me to know that the existence of this brigade had been confirmed. He said he wanted me to know before I read it in the newspapers within 24 to 48 hours." Church says he took this to mean Newsom thought it would be leaked to the press. And that, he says, is one reason why he decided to tell the press.

The other reason, Church says, is that it was his committee that issued the statement in July, based on testimony from Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, that there was no Soviet buildup in Cuba, a statement that certainly was misleading, in retrospect, if not untrue.

So an hour later, Church called the secretary of state. He asked for some more data and then he says he told Vance he intended to make the information public. Church says Vance's only response was: "I know, you'll use your best judgment in what you say."

Church rounded up a few local reporters and invited them to join him in the living room of his home in Idaho. There he unloaded to the assembled Idaho reporters one of the year's major foreign policy stories.

His words were clearly hard line.

He called for "the immediate removal of all Russian combat units from Cuba."

Church now bristles at suggestions that he publicized the information (before the State Department spokesman could) for his own political reasons. He has seen those comments from Senate colleagues and he calls them "cheap shots."

He says: "I can't believe the president intended to keep the matter secret. I made it public because I thought it best that the information come from someone in a public responsibility, not just leaked by an anonymous source."

Meanwhile, back at the White House, presidential advisers bristle at the thought of what Church did. They see him as having set a crisis tone to a matter that deserved moderate and restrained handling.

"There is not the feeling here that the way Church behaved was excusa-

ble for our own political situation," said one senior White House official. "If he was going to put a statement out, he could have been more responsible. The way he said it put pressure on other liberal and moderate senators to match it."

President Carter was back from his riverboat working vacation and on his way home to Plains, Ga., for the Labor Day weekend, unaware at the time that Church was taking care of his foreign policy public relations for him. White House officials say they had not heard from either Vance or Church what the Idaho senator was about to do.

The next morning, on Aug. 31, the president discussed the matter by telephone with Vance. The president decided to try to salvage the low-keyed approach and said that Vance should handle the matter by issuing a statement. Carter went for a walk through downtown Plains, which consists of a single row of shops, mostly devoted to selling Jimmy Carter souvenirs, and he repeatedly refused to comment on questions about the Soviet brigade, saying only that Vance would do the talking back in Washington.

Despite the low-key efforts of the president and his advisers, the tone had been set. Several days later, Church was announcing that he was postponing the hearings on SALT II so his committee could "deal immediately" with the issue of the Soviet brigade.

Some Senate liberals and moderates who supported the strategic arms limitation pact joined with more conservative SALT critics in saying they doubted the pact would be approved if the question of the Soviet brigade was not resolved satisfactorily.

Newspaper editorials around the country were sounding a hard line. The Wall Street Journal, in an editorial headlined "Exploding Cigar," suggested that perhaps the Soviets would give the United States assurances that the troops were not for offensive purposes by sewing medic patches on top of the soldiers' artillery insignia.

And the president, back on the job in Washington, concluded on Friday that his lowkey battle was lost and he had to speak out before, as one aide said, "senators got so far out on a limb against SALT that they couldn't get back."

On Friday afternoon, the president strode into the press room of the White House and, as television cameras covered the event, Carter declared:

"This is a time for firm diplomacy, not panic and not exaggeration."

The president had a political problem.

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# Chapter 3:

## Dilemma: Saving SALT II

### TROOPS IN... 16.5 NN—

By Walter Pincus and George C. Wilson  
By the end of last week, two things were clear.

First, despite the publicity, despite the handwrapping in the Senate and the president's concern over this "very serious matter," no one in the military or intelligence communities regarded the Soviet troops in Cuba as a military threat to the United States. The mysterious "brigade" is an insignificant military force, no larger in fact than the forces maintained by the United States inside Cuba—at the Guantanamo Navy base.

Second, regardless of its military insignificance, the "brigade" was a political issue ripe for exploitation by opponents of the SALT II Pact and by liberal senators, such as Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Frank Church (D-Idaho), who are running for reelection in conservative constituencies.

Less clear was the lesson for the U.S. intelligence community. Did its failure to turn up the brigade sooner demonstrate serious weaknesses in its capabilities? There was much disagreement among the analysts themselves on that point.

It was also not clear how Carter could end the affair. The Russians could easily resolve his political problem by withdrawing the brigade. But that may not be their response.

A few hours before Carter addressed the issue on Friday, two Soviet government analysts, on a visit from Moscow, were having breakfast in Washington with a group of reporters and editors.

This issue of the brigade, one of them said, was a "trifling" matter — purely a "domestic political issue" for the Americans.

Why make such a big fuss about Russians 90 miles off American shores? asked the other, when there are American troops in Norway which directly abuts the Soviet Union? He could have underscored the point, but didn't, that the Americans also have 4,700 troops on Russia's southern flank in Turkey and 2,200 in Cuba itself at Guantanamo.

He said the Soviet military in Cuba was there to train Castro's troops in how to use new technology equipment and traced its origins back to the early 1960s.

The current uproar, he said, was a provocation and purely a "domestic political issue" for the United States. He suggested it had been aimed to reveal possible reasons the U.S. government wanted to extract new concessions from the Soviet

Union as the price of SALT II; or SALT II opponents had forced the issue out as a means of delaying Senate consideration. He also proposed that the U.S. intelligence community had come up with old information to embarrass Cuban President Fidel Castro on the eve of the non aligned nations summit in Havana.

In any of those instances, the Soviet visitor insisted, it would be difficult to see the removal of Russian troops that he insisted had been in Cuba for years without any U.S. concern.

If SALT II were endangered by the troop presence in Cuba, he was—unhappily—prepared to see the treaty delayed. He added that he believed had the Cuban issue not developed, something else would have emerged to sidetrack the treaty.

Whether this will turn out to be the official position of the Soviet government after its representatives discuss the troop issue at the State Department this week remains to be seen.

There are some U.S. officials who fear the anger about the Soviet brigade will spill over to SALT II itself, imperiling its chances of approval.

Reelection realities have already heated up the issue, with Sen. Church, the target of a conservative "Anybody But Church" political action committee in Idaho, suddenly putting some distance between himself and SALT II by stating there is "no likelihood whatever that the Senate would ratify the SALT treaty as long as Russian combat troops remain" in Cuba.

To save SALT II, President Carter—who fervently wants the treaty to be ratified—must find a way to persuade the Soviets that their troops in Cuba must be decimated somehow, or removed, and at the same time convince wavering senators that the same troops are not enough of a military threat to justify voting against the treaty. This is why Carter and his allies are trying to dig a firebreak between SALT II and the troops, as the first of many strenuous tasks forced upon them by the Soviet military presence in Cuba and the failure to detect it sooner.

"We are not dealing with a strategic crisis nor are we dealing with a direct and over military threat directed at the United States," said national security affairs adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski in digressing that firebreak before a group of out-of-town editors invited to the White House Friday morning.

"The issue is of a different nature," he said. "It involves the stationing of Soviet combat forces in the Western Hemisphere in a country which at the same time is pursuing an internationally active revolutionary role. It is more, therefore, of a political problem."

Perhaps closer to the current situation was the flurry in 1970 over the prospect that a Soviet Navy shore facility was being built on an island in Cuba's Cienfuegos Bay. The construction of a soccer field was the hint at what was afoot and the Nixon administration protested to Soviet Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin.

According to the account published by former president Richard M. Nixon in his autobiography, "RN," Dobrynin was told the U.S. government had told the press "we did not yet know whether there actually was a submarine base in Cuba . . . in order to give the Soviets an opportunity to withdraw without a public confrontation."

As Nixon relates it, two weeks later Dobrynin returned with a note saying the Soviets were doing nothing that violated understandings made at the time of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and "after some face-saving delays, the Soviets abandoned Cienfuegos."

Late last year, when there were allegations raised that the Soviets had supplied nuclear-capable Mig 23 aircraft to the Cuban air force, the Carter administration raised the question with the Soviets. The response, in a note, was that the planes were not equipped to carry nuclear bombs. The aircraft remained in Cuba and the controversy subsided.

More recently, there were reports that a Soviet naval fleet was heading toward Cuba with submarines capable of carrying nuclear missiles. In this case the fleet avoided landing at Cuba.

As Brzezinski told the reporters Friday, however, the current flareup is over "more . . . of a political problem" than a military one. Thus the solution more likely will be a political rather than a military one.

The Cuban issue raises some tough problems for the Soviet leadership if they are looking to make a concession. Unlike 1962, when they bowed to U.S. pressure and removed medium-range missiles, heavy bombers and their 20,000-man division, Soviet strategic power today is considered the equal to that of the American force. Thus the Russians stand to lose some face if they appear to give in.

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That perception will be even greater because unlike the Cienfuegos and MiG 23 incidents—which could have involved violations of the 1962 understandings—there's nothing between the U.S. and Soviet governments that would bar the stationing of combat troops in Cuba.

Finally, the Soviets must consider the reaction from Cuban President Castro to any move they make.

When the Soviets in 1962 decided to remove their missile forces, Castro reportedly "was furious," according to a recently published account of the crisis by David Detzer. Detzer goes on to recount that Castro "refused initially to give up the Il-28s [bombers] which the Russians had turned over to him."

Detzer wrote that only continued threats of an American invasion convinced Castro he had to return the planes to the Soviet Union.

The Soviets have already toyed with one possible area for trading in the current situation. In a Moscow broadcast Friday beamed in English to the United States, it was noted that the American Navy base at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, with its 2,200 men, is "a dagger pointed at the heart of the young republic."

Military leaders from the Joint Chiefs of Staff down agree that the Soviet troops pose no direct threat to the United States or its Caribbean allies, partly because the Soviets have not deployed the ships and planes to Cuba for taking their troops anywhere to create mischief.

Known hardliners, including those no longer inhibited by active duty status, are agreeing with Brzezinski's assessment that the Soviet troops present no "direct and overt military threat."

Retired Army Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, a frequent spokesman for the hardline American Security Council, said that the direct military threat from the Soviet brigade would be the least of his worries if he were still advising the joint chiefs as director of the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency, a post he held from 1974 to 1976.

"Of course they're not going to invade Miami," Graham scoffed. "What I would tell the chiefs, if I were still there, is that the 3,000 troops "are a strong indication that the Soviets have at least contingency plans to put nuclear weapons in Cuba" because they traditionally use such outfits for that purpose."

Another retired intelligence leader, who declined to be quoted by name, said "damned if I can see that it makes any military difference. An organized formation of 3,000 men poses no possible menace to the U.S. proper. This is a nonevent; militarily "it's Republicans vs Democrats."

While such assurances undercut any "Russians are coming" scare talk that may come out of this latest U.S.-Soviet confrontation over the military use of Cuba, they do not answer the tougher question of how the U.S. intelligence agencies failed to detect the Russian combat brigade for so long.

Once more American intelligence was found wanting at the very moment the president was trying to persuade Congress and the country that the Soviets would be caught if they cheated on SALT II's limits on nuclear weapons.

One intelligence agency's warning against sending the USS Pueblo off North Korea to eavesdrop got mislaid in the Pentagon shortly before the ship was captured in 1968. The congressional hearings on the Israeli attack on the USS Liberty spy ship in 1967 revealed that a lot of information went to the wrong place and much of it was never read.

Pentagon civilian leaders complained the intelligence agencies failed to warn them that the Yom Kippur War of 1973 was coming. The Central Intelligence Agency did not foresee the deposing of the shah of Iran in time to do much about it.

And now, after first denying Sen. Richard Stone's assertions that there were Soviet combat troops in Cuba, the Carter administration has admitted he was right after all: that U.S. intelligence had finally found combat troops that may have been in Cuba since 1962.

Some senators were quick to assert that if U.S. intelligence agencies could not find Russian troops off the American coast, they certainly could not find strategic missiles hidden in Russia. "If they can't find the nose of Russian troops, how can they count the noses of Russian missiles?" asked Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.), a leading critic of SALT II.

Vance, Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Calif.) and intelligence officials themselves insist that is a vast difference between counting noses and counting giant missiles, and that the Cuban experience has no relevance to the SALT verification issue.

Nevertheless, inside the intelligence agencies, there is bitterness and dismay over the latest humiliation.

Several analysts at the working level said that even when they sent evidence about the Soviet combat force it was either ignored, suppressed or misrepresented by Carter administration officials. The Defense Intelligence Agency, they said, refused to accept the evidence until the very end of the internal debate. One analyst claimed "Vance was lying and we knew he was lying" when he wrote Stone that there was only a Soviet command structure for a brigade that had not been fleshed out with troops.

Other intelligence Officers asserted that their superiors at the top are asking them to do more with less, virtually guaranteeing gaps especially in low priority areas like Cuba. Partly through imposed reforms and partly through lack of money and people officers said, intelligence from places like Cuba is gathered almost exclusively by mechanical means—primary satellite photography and electronic ferreting by ships and planes flying around, but not over, Cuba.

"There's just no substitute for having a guy who can walk along a fence and tell you whether the troops inside the wire were speaking Spanish or Russian," said one U.S. official. He said this lack of "human intelligence" handicapped the effort to find out what was going on in Cuba.

Also, to the dismay of some professionals within the intelligence community, CIA was so shaken by the disclosures of its "excesses," such as plot to kill Castro, that it made no systematic attempt to interview Cuban refugees about Soviet activities on the island.

Given those difficulties, some administration leaders reject the charge that taking so long to find the Soviet brigade in Cuba represented an "intelligence gap." On the contrary, these officials contend, finding troops that the Soviets went to such lengths to hide really is an intelligence coup for the United States.

Beyond the argument over "intelligence gap" and its impact on SALT II, many present and former intelligence executives fear that the way the troop evidence was finally disclosed leaves little room for an acceptable U.S.-Soviet compromise.

"We haven't left them much of an exist," was the way retired Lt. Gen. Samuel V. Wilson, former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency and a longtime student of the Soviet military, described the Cuban situation as he sees it today, from outside government.

Inside government there is support for Wilson's concerns that the public nature of the dispute and the heat attached to it made more difficult the chances for the Soviets to agree to an accommodation.

At the White House, State and Defense departments, officials are tight-lipped about what they hope to accomplish.

"We're not going to talk about what we want," one said, "because if conditions become public they almost automatically become unacceptable."

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## Russians in Cuba Pose New Threat To SALT Agreement

### Linkage.

Democratic Senator Richard Stone is from Florida, which is why he maintains a special vigil over Cuba, which is why he first brought up the question of 2,000 to 3,000 Soviet combat troops in Cuba, which is why the Pentagon finally confirmed the presence of a command structure for the Soviet brigade, which is why some senators who recall the missile crisis of 1962 demanded that Moscow get its troops out of Cuba, which is why the Senate may refuse to take up the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty with the Russians until the troops are withdrawn, possibly halting up the SALT agreement for months, which is why President Carter was abruptly faced last week with a major, delicate test of domestic and foreign policy.

He must persuade the Kremlin that the threat to SALT is possibly fatal (just when chances for ratification were looking good) unless the troop issue is defused. Then he must persuade key Senate conservatives, and liberals, that the compromise — assuming there is one — is honorable and SALT should be approved. Those are not tall orders, they are towering.

Mr. Carter promised "firm diplomacy" but warned against "panic" and "exaggeration." The Soviet troops, he said, were no military threat to the United States, but their presence "in a country which acts as a Soviet proxy" made the issue serious and sensitive. The State Department called in the Soviet chargé d'affaires to express its displeasure.

The military importance of the latest "presence" is unclear, Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance said. Lacking air or sealift capability, it isn't covered by a Russian pledge, after the 1962 missile crisis, not to reintroduce offensive nuclear missiles or planes to Cuba, or by Moscow's agreement in 1970 to extend that ban to sea-based nuclear systems. Maj. Gen. George J. Keegan Jr., retired Air Force chief of intelligence, said the Pentagon has known about the combat force for five or six years. But Henry A. Kissinger said nobody told him when he was Secretary of State, and Lieut. Gen. Daniel Graham, former head of the Defense Intelligence agency, said there was no evidence of the combat unit during his tenure. Secretary Vance said the unit



C.I.A. Director Stansfield Turner (left) with Senator Frank Church before Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Russian troops in Cuba.

which is separate from the 1,500 to 2,000 Soviet military advisers and technical personnel in Cuba, includes motorized rifle battalions, tank and artillery battalions and combat and service support units. He said its character became clear recently through the assembling of a "jigsaw puzzle" of previously known information.

The unit's mission, it was speculated, might include guarding an electronic listening post, protecting Fidel Castro from potential coup attempts and/or symbolizing Soviet willingness to defend Cuba from external attack.

Influential Senators, headed by the Majority Leader Robert Byrd of West Virginia and the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, said the ratification debate on SALT II would be held up until a satisfactory Soviet response was received. A critic of the treaty, Senator Robert Dole, Republican of Kansas, said he would push an amendment this week declaring that consideration of the treaty would not be in order until President Carter reports in writing that Soviet combat troops have been removed or that Soviet troops remaining there "pose no threat to the security or foreign policy interests" of the United States and its Latin American allies. Senator Church said that unless the issue is "satisfactorily resolved," he does not believe the Senate will be prepared to

ratify the treaty. Senator George McGovern, Democrat of South Dakota, said that to reject the treaty would be "to inflict punishment on ourselves," but he agreed that SALT II now was linked with the troop issue.

First reactions from Moscow were relatively low-level — commentaries by Tass and Moscow Radio, charging that anti-SALT "hardliners" had invented the Cuban troops issue. In Havana, the Prensa Latina press agency said Washington was trying to discredit Cuba during the conference of so-called nonaligned nations.

On the real business of SALT — curbing nuclear weapons capable of hitting United States and Soviet territory — President Carter sent to Congress his plans for 200 mobile MX missiles. At a cost of \$3 billion, they would be deployed on above-ground circular "race tracks," ready to duck into buried shelters for launching in case of Soviet attack. In addition, the Administration wants to station new nuclear missiles capable of reaching the Soviet Union on the territory of West Germany and other NATO allies. Urging the Europeans to accept them and to build up their own defenses, Mr. Kissinger warned against depending on United States pledges to hit the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons if Moscow attacks Europe. He said he didn't believe such pledges even when he was making them in his former capacity as Secretary of State. Later, he backtracked slightly, saying his "seraphic eloquence" had been misinterpreted.

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## Where Was Our Man in Havana?

To keep track of what is going on in Cuba, the U.S. employs both the most advanced and the most ancient technology: ELINT (electronic intelligence) and HUMINT (human eyes and ears). Apparently there was not enough of either in the case of the belatedly discovered Soviet brigade.

For an ongoing broad survey of the terrain below, CIA Director Stansfield Turner and other U.S. intelligence chiefs rely on spy satellites. Using precision-tooled, high-resolution lenses, a satellite can take a remarkably clear photograph of a one-foot object from 100 miles overhead. The pictures, which are recorded in black and white, color or infra-red, may be transmitted almost instantaneously to ground stations in the U.S. The satellite is also equipped with electronic listening devices that can pick up military and government radio messages and store them on endless miles of tape.

If more information on a particular area is needed, aircraft can be called upon to supplement the satellite. The needle-sleek Lockheed SR-71 (Blackbird), which flies more than three times as fast as sound at above 85,000 ft., makes occasional photo-reconnaissance runs over Cuba. The old stand-by, the U-2, also goes on photographic and electronic "ferreting" missions, but it remains almost 20 miles high and well outside Cuban airspace to keep from being shot down.



Turner testifying about Cuba

Despite all the electronic wizardry, human snooping is still needed to fill in gaps. But the task of infiltration is formidable in a tightly controlled garrison state like Cuba, where local security forces are reinforced by Soviet ones. Not even Cubans are allowed to go near the Soviet command post, east of Havana.

It was at least ten years ago that U.S. intelligence first got an inkling that a Soviet combat unit might possibly be in Cuba. But the nation was embroiled in the Viet Nam War, and intelligence was largely focused on Southeast Asia; Cuba had low priority. After the war, intelligence operations were reassigned both in the field and in Washington, where it takes many people and much equipment to sort out incoming information. Cuba watching was increased, but not significantly. Even so, evidence emerged

confirming the presence of a mysteriously active Soviet headquarters.

Shortly after President Carter took office in January 1977, he canceled the SR-71 flights over Cuba as part of a general policy of cutting back intelligence operations. The flights were not resumed until November 1978, when American intelligence began to fear that the Soviet MiG-23s stationed in Cuba might be capable of carrying nuclear weapons. But satellite and SR-71 photos did not clear up the matter. It took HUMINT to do the job. An agent with access to the MiG airfield was sent in to take a snapshot of a friend who just happened to be standing in front of a MiG engine. The picture revealed an intake valve used only on non-nuclear planes.

Last spring U.S. intelligence pressed harder to find out more about the Soviet command post. Though Soviet combat troops had not been sighted, part of the intelligence community felt that the headquarters signified their presence. In mid-July increased reconnaissance finally revealed the troops. They were in Soviet uniform and were operating Soviet equipment, but were they Soviets or Cubans? Satellites were sent in for a closer look. This time the photos revealed that the troops were indeed Soviets.

Why did it take U.S. intelligence so long to reach a not so remarkable conclusion? The intelligence did not seem to be faulty so much as underused. Explained Ray Cline, former Deputy Director for Intelligence of the CIA and now executive director for studies at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies: "It's one of the really great intelligence problems: where to put your talent and your time." In recent years, intelligence has concentrated on the areas of greatest concern: the Middle East and SALT. Given higher priority in Washington, the Soviets could have been detected much sooner. The best intelligence that money can buy still depends on basic political judgments.

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COVER STORY

# The Storm over Cuba

*Soviet troops, Senate fury, and suddenly SALT is endangered*

It was his first news conference in almost three months and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance looked far more somber than usual. Just a few days earlier, it had been confirmed and publicly revealed that a combat brigade of between 2,000 and 3,000 Soviet troops is stationed in Cuba—a disclosure that in turn produced a storm of angry reaction in the Senate. Although the State Department had emphasized that the Soviet force "poses no threat to the U.S." Vance now assessed the situation in more ominous terms. In a solemn voice he told reporters, "We regard this as a very serious matter, affecting our relations with the Soviet Union. The presence of this [combat] unit runs counter to long held American policies . . . I will not be satisfied with maintenance of the status quo."

Two days later, as the tempest grew, Jimmy Carter took to television, both to endorse the Vance warning and to call for "calm and a sense of proportion." Said the President: "We consider the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba to be a very serious matter and that this status quo is not acceptable." In the terse five-minute statement, Carter confirmed that "we are seriously pursuing this issue with the Soviet Union." But the Soviet force, he stressed, is not an assault force and does not have the capability to attack the U.S. Concluded the President: "This is a time for firm diplomacy, not panic and not exaggeration."

In the Senate, where many key figures face difficult re-election campaigns, the news of the Soviet troops came at a most sensitive political moment—right in the middle of the SALT II treaty debate. SALT's opponents immediately linked the troops and the treaty, demanding to know how the Soviets could be trusted in an arms-control agreement when they made provocative military moves in the Caribbean. And how could the U.S. claim to be able to monitor weapons development deep inside the Soviet Union when it could get caught by surprise by a Soviet combat brigade 90 miles from Florida? Suddenly and improbably, what should have been a minor diplomatic squabble with the Soviets—one that could have been handled quietly and with minimum strain—had escalated into a major domestic political issue, strained U.S.-So-

viet relations and endangered SALT II. Gloomed Senator Henry (Scoop) Jackson, an avowed SALT foe: "Unless I have misread the mood of my colleagues, SALT II is dead unless those Soviet troops are taken out of Cuba."

An even louder voice of protest was that of Democrat Frank Church of Idaho,

PHOTO—BLACK STAR



**"This status quo is not acceptable."**

chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and thus formal sponsor of the SALT treaty. Church, who first made public the Soviet move on Aug. 30, dramatically postponed the SALT hearings for a day in order to summon Vance and CIA Chief Stansfield Turner to testify about the combat brigade. Said Church: "There is no likelihood that the Senate would ratify the SALT II treaty as long as Soviet combat troops remain in Cuba."

"It tempts me to say, 'I told you so,'" purred Senate Republican Leader Howard Baker, who had previously differed with Church in his estimate of Soviet intentions. Added Baker: "You've created a crisis. Now what are we going to do about it?"

That was a question that might puzzle both Carter and Vance. For although the Soviet troop presence mightily angered the Senate, the Soviets had broken no treaty or law—after the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, they agreed only to station no offensive weapons in Cuba—and the existence of Soviet combat forces in Cuba had long gone unchallenged. This left Vance with very little leverage, except for the Soviet desire for a SALT treaty, to negotiate a Soviet withdrawal. Indeed, after protesting, the State Department received only a noncommittal note from Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. According to White House aides, this message "closed no doors" and indicated that the Soviets were willing "to discuss our concerns." U.S. policymakers could only await the more definitive response that would come in face-to-face meetings with Soviet Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin. When the issue of the troops erupted, the veteran Soviet diplomat was vacationing in the U.S.S.R. He then had to delay his return to Washington because of the death of his father. Though Vance asked that Dobrynin return as soon as possible, he was not expected in the U.S. until this week.

Meanwhile, the Soviet press ignored Vance's speech, and there was no sense of crisis in Moscow. In Havana, where Cuban officials generally interpreted the uproar as an attempt to mar the summit conference of non-aligned nations, nobody even answered a protest by Wayne Smith, the head of the U.S. Interests Section. One Cuban Foreign Ministry official quipped: "Americans see Russians everywhere." In friendlier countries too there was little alarm over the Cuban situation.

Not many details are known about the Soviet brigade, which according to the State Department is composed of motorized rifle battalions, tank and artillery battalions, and combat and service support elements. Significantly, it has no independent airlift or sealift capability.

According to U.S. intelligence sources, the brigade occupies barracks in two locations in Cuba, one of which is near a Soviet-built and Soviet-run electronics information-gathering installation. Because the brigade's areas have been declared strictly off-limits for Cubans, it has been very difficult for the U.S. to slip in spies

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to gather intelligence on the spot. The brigade has a totally separate command from the Soviet advisers who have been located in Cuba since the early 1960s. Washington has long known about and accepted the fact that Cuba plays host to an estimated 2,000 Soviet military advisers, plus about 50 pilots who have been flying defense patrols for the Cuban air force. In addition, an estimated 8,000 Soviet civilians are involved in almost every aspect of the Cuban economy and government.

Washington has even known that Soviet soldiers have been killed in Cuba. A marble and gilded granite memorial was dedicated outside Havana 18 months ago to the "International Soviet Soldier" who gave his life to Cuba between 1961 and 1978. There are 62 Soviet names on the memorial. Some of these deaths, according to intelligence sources, occurred during flight training, armor accidents and possibly in combat against pockets of anti-Castro opposition.

Although there had been indications for some time of the existence of Soviet troops in Cuba, what had not been known was the organization of those troops into a combat brigade. Clues and hints to that effect began appearing in the spring, as did reports that the number of Soviet troops was increasing. In March, for example, the National Security Council staff had asked the intelligence community for more information on Cuba. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski had speculated that there must have been more Soviet activity on the island than was immediately apparent, primarily because some 40,000 Cuban troops were in Africa and a number of Soviet



**"We regard this as  
a very serious matter."**

and that he had many anti-Castro exiles among his constituents. As late as July 27, the State Department appeared to deny to Stone the very existence of the brigade. In a letter drafted and approved by a number of high intelligence officials, Vance stated flatly that "there is no evidence of any substantial increase of the Soviet military presence in Cuba over the past several years or of a Soviet military base." But Stone's pressure prompted the Administration to launch an extensive review of Cuban affairs. In his letter, Vance assured Stone that Carter had "directed that we give increased attention to the situation and monitor it closely. This is being done."

Because of the presidential directive, the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies intensified their scrutiny of Cuba. Spy satellites, for instance, were directed to hover over the island and take extensive series of photographs. Although the U.S. had been picking up bits of information about the presence of Soviet combat troops on the island for at least three years, the fragmentary data did not appear conclusive. One problem was that developments inside Cuba were assigned a relatively low priority by the intelligence community: it was much more concerned, for example, with what Cuban troops have been doing in Africa.

A thorough review of the Cuban situation yielded new information and a reappraisal. A crucial breakthrough came when a U.S. spy satellite discovered the Soviet troops participating as a unit in maneuvers on Aug. 17. Had the Soviets been merely guard units, there would have been no reason for them to take part in war

**A SOVIET-BUILT INTELLIGENCE STATION IN CUBA.** This exclusive photograph, obtained by TIME, shows a section of an advanced electronics monitoring complex atop a limestone hill east of Havana.

Facing north and east, the large antennas eavesdrop on U.S. and international civilian, military and space satellite electronic and voice messages and picture relays.


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## FOREIGN RELATIONS

S-115



Leaving the Senate hearings, Cyrus Vance is flanked by Jacob Javits (left) and Frank Church. Vance "simply said that he knew I would use my best judgment."

games. Previously gathered material was now scrutinized again. Suddenly clues that had seemed irrelevant became significant.

The results of this latest analysis—conclusions drawn by the entire intelligence community—were on Vance's desk when he returned from vacation on Aug. 28. Vance demanded an explanation from the Soviet chargé. The Administration was hoping it could keep the information quiet until Ambassador Dobrynin returned to Washington. But the new assessment appeared in a CIA summary that is classified top secret but is relatively widely circulated.

The Administration decided that key Senators should be briefed. A secure telephone call was placed to Idaho for Frank Church, who was back home mending his political fences because he faces a strong conservative opposition. Startled by the revelation, Church said to his briefer, "I don't think I can keep this under my hat."

"We didn't expect you to," the briefer somewhat mysteriously replied.

Church then called Vance and told

him that he was going public with the news. According to the Senator, Vance did not discourage this but merely cautioned that it could be dangerous to exaggerate the significance of the Soviet brigade. Recalled Church later: "Vance simply said that he knew that I would use my best judgment."

While U.S. intelligence is now keeping watch on the Soviet forces in Cuba, it is still far from clear how much of an increase in forces there has been, or when the combat brigade was organized. And there is only speculation about the purpose the brigade has been serving. Among the theories:

► The brigade ensures Havana's security by serving as a "trip wire" that would quickly draw the U.S.S.R. into a conflict over Cuba. Not only is this supposed to deter the U.S. from invading Cuba, but it also helps Castro to deploy some of his army and air force in Angola and Ethiopia. Church backs this theory and cites evidence that Soviet combat manpower in Cuba began increasing in 1975, just as

Cuban forces first were being deployed in Africa. Said Church: "Castro may have reached an understanding with Moscow that as part of the price for Cuban participation in Africa, a Soviet brigade should be deployed in Cuba—an insurance against retaliation from the U.S."

► The brigade provides security for a major electronic intelligence installation that is designed to monitor American radio and microwave transmissions. An Administration official last week described the installation as "one of the biggest the Soviets have in the world."

► The brigade serves as a "Praetorian Guard" to prevent attacks on Castro and other top Cuban Communists by potential dissident factions, particularly within the military.

► The brigade has been teaching Cuban soldiers how to use Soviet-made military equipment and how to employ Soviet battlefield tactics. This help probably would have become especially important once Cubans began fighting in Africa.

Whatever the Soviet brigade's role is, vocal Senators want it out of Cuba and have pressed Carter to demand this of Moscow. Declared Senator Stone: "The President should invoke the Monroe Doctrine and oppose the establishment of what constitutes a Soviet military base in our hemisphere." The U.S., however, deploys troops in some countries bordering the U.S.S.R. For example, Turkey hosts 5,048 American military personnel, many of whom are airmen. Norway posts 13 Marine guards at the American embassy, and there are 113 Air Force personnel who are on exchange duty. Both these countries are allied with the U.S. in NATO. At the peak of the U.S. involvement in Iran, the number of U.S. military advisers in that country totaled about 1,000.

Church postponed the SALT hearings for one day to allow his panel to "deal immediately" with the developments in Cuba. His colleagues believe that he might bottle up SALT indefinitely if he does not get satisfaction on Cuba. Senator John Stennis of Mississippi announced that his Armed Services Committee also wanted to interrogate Vance and Turner about Cuba. Even Senators who still favored SALT worried about this linkage of the two problems. Said New York's Jacob Javits, the Foreign Relations Committee's ranking Republican: "The issue of the Soviet troops could have a very profound effect on whether the treaty could be ratified or not." Fretted one senior White House aide last week: "SALT was on course without this Cuba thing. But this is troubling. It's the joker in the deck." One major difficulty is that the length of time it took the American intelligence community to discover the Soviet brigade has raised doubts in the Senate about the ability of U.S. agencies to catch potential Soviet cheating on SALT. A main issue in the arms control debate has been whether the U.S. would be able to verify compliance with the treaty's terms.

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Scoop Jackson wanted to know if "the professional ability of the intelligence community" was to blame for taking so long to gather "intelligence about these troops." He also wondered if there had been "a failure of judgment on the part of the Executive" in assessing and acting on the intelligence data. As a member of the Armed Services Committee, Jackson plans to put these questions to Vance, Turner and other Administration witnesses this week.

In response to the critics, the intelligence community's defenders argue that it is more difficult to identify small units than to detect the tests of rockets. Said one analyst: "The Cubans and the Soviets use the same equipment. Our devices pick up the gear and the men, but they can't tell us their nationality."

Perhaps the basic danger posed to SALT II by the discovery of the Soviet brigade is that a number of Senators see it as new evidence of provocative Soviet behavior around the world, even though some combat troops have been in Cuba for some time. This makes these Senators uncomfortable about entering into a very important agreement with Moscow in one area while Kremlin policies appear to be challenging the U.S. in the Middle East, Africa, Southeast Asia and elsewhere. Said Tennessee's Howard Baker, a SALT critic: "During the entire SALT proceedings, both the Soviet Union and the U.S. have argued that there is no linkage between SALT II and adventurous Soviet policy throughout the world." Baker has disagreed with that position and thus was delighted that the Cuban affair led some of his colleagues to begin considering SALT in the perspective of Moscow's global behavior. Gloated Baker: "Now at least, on the basis of what is happening in Cuba, there is linkage." Added Jackson: "This comes back to the fundamental issue. Can there be an arrangement of trust between the Soviet Union and the U.S.?"



Mississippi's John Stennis

Questions concerning Cuba.

SALT's backers acknowledge that the dismay in Congress over the Soviet brigade has given the initiative, at least temporarily, to the treaty's opponents. This has dramatically reversed the situation that existed when Congress recessed for its August vacation, after holding almost a month of SALT hearings. Sentiment then had been building in favor of the treaty. The threat of crippling amendments had faded, and a number of undecided Senators seemed prepared to vote for the treaty if it were accompanied by an increase in defense spending. The Administration went along with that and was reported last week to be readying a request for an additional \$4 billion in defense funds.

Now, with Church raising obstacles, Majority Leader Robert Byrd of Virginia has begun talking about delaying full Senate consideration of SALT II until December or later. The original timetable called



Minority Leader Howard Baker

What will you do about the crisis?

for the treaty to be reported out of the Foreign Relations Committee by mid-October, debated by the full Senate for about a month and then put to a vote. Any significant slippage in this schedule will mean that Senate consideration of SALT II will overlap the 1980 election campaign. This could make a number of Senators facing re-election reluctant to vote for the controversial treaty.

Though the Soviet brigade seems to have upset many Senators, it has been pointedly observed that among those taking the toughest line are two who have hardly been known as hawks: Richard Stone and Frank Church. To some degree, their outrage might well be the product of local political calculations. Not only is Stone elected from a state that contains an estimated 500,000 Cuban émigrés but Church represents a state that is traditionally highly conservative. In his bid next year for a fifth term, he faces a very determined, well-financed right-wing opposition, which is already barraging him on such special issues as abortion restric-



Florida's Richard Stone

Few paid attention to his early warning.

tions and gun control. Church is most noted for his foreign policy stands, however, and he appears particularly vulnerable because of his votes for the Panama Canal treaty and his attempts to restrict the activity of U.S. intelligence agencies. He has also not been helped by a remark he made a few years ago upon returning from a visit to Cuba: he referred to Fidel Castro as a personal friend. By raising an uproar about the Russians in Cuba, Church will improve his standing in Idaho. Said one Church backer in Boise last week: "Frank has changed from a dove to a superhawk and that's already helping him out here. His frontier instincts of survival are still sound; he knows how to draw a bead on a target."

While the rhetoric has soared in Congress, the Administration has struggled to keep the out-of-control issue in perspective. Said a senior White House aide: "We're not trying to make it into a confrontation for the sake of confrontation. We're not trying to shove it up Moscow's nose." He stressed that "you don't want to treat this as another Cuban missile crisis," which it certainly is not. There was not even a hot-line contact between Carter and Soviet Communist Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev. Although the Administration to some extent triggered the uproar by briefing Church on the intelligence report, it apparently did not expect that he would use the material as forcefully as he did. Complained a top White House aide, perhaps unfairly in view of what Church was told when given the secret report: "The President has found Church's handling of it personally offensive and irresponsible. If you can't brief the head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in advance without having him spread it around like this, then the whole process is wrecked. If you can't trust him, whom can you trust?"

The White House probably would have preferred Church to handle the matter in the same way that Carter discussed

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it at a Wednesday breakfast with Democratic congressional leaders. Although he seemed somewhat out of step with his Secretary of State, who was treating the issue with gravity, the President appeared to view it almost lightly. He emphasized to his guests that the Soviet brigade "posed no threat" to the U.S. He added that at the time of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, Moscow had some 20,000 troops in Cuba and remnants of that force have remained there ever since. According to one of the breakfast participants, the President speculated that the Soviet brigade could be "deeply embarrassing to Castro when he is trying to palm himself off as a neutral. The President felt that it was advantageous to us to expose [the brigade] at this time to embarrass Castro." This was a reference to the meeting of the nonaligned nations. Carter almost certainly was only trying to find a bright side to the controversy, but his remark about embarrassing Castro seemed to coincide strangely with speculation by a number of observers that the Administration had released the information about the Soviet brigade to discredit Castro among the nonaligned nations.

**A**dministration officials have also stressed that the presence of the brigade is not a violation of America's bilateral understandings with the Soviets on Cuba. This refers primarily to the agreements that were reached after the 1962 missile crisis (see box).

Even so, the existence of the brigade does represent a challenge if only because of the controversy it has stirred. Now that U.S. intelligence has positively identified the Soviet force as a combat unit, and the unit has been permitted to become a *cause célèbre*, and Carter and Vance have declared that the status quo cannot be maintained, something is going to have to be done. Explained a senior British diplomat in London: "Whether he or Brezhnev planned it that way or not, President Carter is now clearly in a test of strength with the Kremlin." Echoing this assessment was Senate Minority Leader Baker. Said he: "Unless we show substantial resolve and tell the Russians that it's imatical to our interests to allow 3,000 combat troops to remain in Cuba, in effect we will be letting the Soviets thumb their noses at us."

The feeling was widespread in Washington last week that such a test should never have been allowed to develop. High Administration sources conceded that the dossier on the Soviet troops fell between bureaucratic stools. The matter should have been investigated much earlier, said the officials, and then secretly taken up with the Soviets before Capitol Hill even learned about it.

But the two Senators who turned the spotlight on the issue disagreed with the contention that it should have been kept quiet. Church argued that when Moscow

sent its combat forces to Cuba, it knew that the U.S. would find out about them sooner or later and react. Said Church: "Now that time is upon us. If we acquiesce, we will be borrowing trouble for the future. The brigade might become a division, and Cuba would become a Soviet base."

Stone maintained that he deliberately raised the issue of the Soviet forces to measure whether the Carter Administration had the will power to take firm action. This is something that he felt would be crucially relevant to SALT II, should Washington ever discover that Moscow is cheating. Said Stone: "What good is verification of SALT if we lack the will power to require compliance? If we lack such will power, it will be very difficult for me to consider voting for SALT's ratification."

If indeed the whole question has turned into a test of the Administration, it has come at a time when Capitol Hill,

the Soviet unit that allows Washington to appear tough, gives Moscow a face-saving retreat and restores momentum to the SALT ratification process. The Administration is appalled by the notion that the Senate might use SALT for leverage in dealing with Moscow over the brigade. Said Brzezinski to TIME White House Correspondent Christopher Ogden: "It's no response to the Soviet Union to kick SALT down the drain. It's a chicken way out." The best way out, stressed Brzezinski, would be a three-pronged approach: ratification of SALT II, increased defense spending and a readiness to compete with Moscow around the globe. But he also warned that "if the Soviets are not sensitive to our concerns, we will be less sensitive to theirs."

It is almost certain that when Vance sits down with Dobrynin, the Secretary will find the Soviets very touchy on the subject of Cuba. Having had to bow to U.S. pressure during the 1962 missile crisis was monumentally humiliating, and Soviet leaders vowed that they would never again be subjected to such disgrace. The huge buildup of the entire Soviet military establishment dates from that time. Thus the Administration is not likely to ask Moscow to withdraw its combat unit from Cuba completely. According to a top White House official, the nub of the problem is not the individual troops themselves, but their presence as an organized combat unit. What the Administration wants is for the brigade to be broken up. The official stressed, however, that the U.S. will not offer any concessions to the Soviets in return. There was absolutely no consideration being given, for example, to the U.S.'s withdrawing some of the 1,841 sailors and 432 Marines from its Guantánamo naval training base, located in Cuba, 500 miles from Havana. If the Soviets prove adamant about their brigade, some Administration aides hinted that the U.S. could try to apply pressure to points on the globe where Moscow is particularly sensitive. One possibility that has been mentioned is Afghanistan, where some 80 Soviet advisers have been killed in the mounting struggle between the Moscow-backed regime and Muslim insurgents.

Whatever solution is eventually found for the problem of the brigade, the bargaining with Moscow is certain to be tough. Anticipating this, New York's Senator Javits echoed the keep-calm approach that Carter advocated in his TV address. Said Javits: "We don't know a good deal about the basis on which these troops are in Cuba. There is simply too much at stake to jump to conclusions. An issue like this lends itself too easily to jingoism and demagoguery. But now is the moment to look at the entire situation calmly and diplomatically—and above all, to refrain from exacerbating it."

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# CUBA: APPEAL FOR CALM

Seventeen years after the Cuban missile crisis, Washington was trying to avert another eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation with Moscow over a Soviet military presence on the Communist island 90 miles off Florida. Despite some heated rhetoric on Capitol Hill, the longstanding posting of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba did not seem to constitute a serious threat to the U.S. or its allies in Latin America. But the troops did pose a clear political problem for President Carter—and a major obstacle to Senate ratification of the strategic arms limitation treaty. Even some liberal supporters of SALT II seemed to waiver. And Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Frank Church predicted "no likelihood whatever" of Senate passage

Precisely what Carter could or would do was unclear. If the Soviet troops have, indeed, been in Cuba for years, Moscow can hardly be accused of violating the spirit of SALT at a critical moment. And the unit in question was scarcely a tenth the size of the Soviet force based on Cuba in the years before the 1962 missile crisis—without provoking a U.S.-Soviet confrontation. Accordingly, while some senators called for complete removal of the brigade, Administration experts suggested that a downgrading of their equipment or command system might do. "It is the combat nature of the units which is a matter of very serious concern to us," said Vance. At a White House war-gaming session, even hawkish national-security adviser Zbigniew Brze-



Terry Arthur—Camera 5

*Senator Church and CIA chief Turner: The Soviet troops may spell defeat for SALT*

until the latest Cuban controversy is "satisfactorily resolved."

Caught between the imperatives of diplomacy and the realities of domestic politics, the Administration took a determinedly moderate approach but couched it in stern language. At a bare-bones news briefing, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance added little to what was already known about the Russian unit—a force of 2,000 to 3,000 men, tanks and artillery. And he sought to play down the danger by disclosing that they had been in place for years—perhaps since the 1960s—although U.S. intelligence just lately confirmed their presence (page 30). "We regard this as a serious matter affecting our relations with the Soviet Union," Vance said. "I will not be satisfied with the maintenance of the status quo." He urged ratification of SALT as "a matter of fundamental importance," but acknowledged that the Soviet troops could cause its defeat..

zinski agreed that Carter should move cautiously.

Some Administration officials talked about stepping up economic and diplomatic pressure on Moscow, and making it clear that SALT II was at stake. But they firmly denied any plan for U.S. military action. "It's just like Iran; people are going to be asking why he doesn't do something about it," grumbled one of the President's senior advisers. "He is doing something about it, but in a restrained way. That doesn't sound very sexy, but we can't afford to back the Russians into a corner."

**TRADE-OFF?** Vance prepared to meet early this week with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin in an effort to work out a compromise designed to get both sides off the hook gracefully. One possibility: to redeploy U.S. troops currently stationed abroad in exchange for a Soviet withdrawal from Cuba. But Vance won't be discussing any

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trade-off's until Dobrynin answers some hard questions about the brigade's purpose, how long it has been in Cuba and general Soviet intentions now that the issue is public. The White House is hoping the issue can be resolved promptly to minimize the impact on SALT. Privately, however, senior officials expect it will take at least a week for Vance and Dobrynin to find a compromise that will, as one puts it, "satisfy our requirements and also provide a solution which the Soviets can live with."

However sensible that approach may be diplomatically, it provided new ammunition for foes of SALT—and made the word "linkage" unavoidable even for some liberals who support the treaty despite their objections to the expansion of Soviet power around the world. After closed-door appearances by Vance and CIA director Stansfield Turner before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chairman Church declared that the two issues could no longer be separated (a stand nicely calculated to impress conservative constituents back in

Idaho). Sen. Jacob Javits, the committee's ranking Republican, and Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd continued to hope that the treaty would be considered on its own merits, and Byrd blocked a resolution by Republican Sen. Bob Dole of Kansas to suspend SALT hearings until the Cuban issue is resolved.

**QUESTIONS:** If nothing else, the belated disclosure of the Soviet brigade reopened the question of U.S. ability to verify SALT II, a subject that had earlier been set to rest for many doubters by secret intelligence briefings. "How good is our intelligence?" asked Senate Minority Leader Howard Baker. "How capable are we at verifying the presence of Russians 90 miles away, let alone the presence of missiles in Russia?" But Democratic Senators Alan Cranston and Joseph Biden and Republican Charles Percy argued that it was easier to keep tabs on missile placement and test firings than on the precise identification and function of enemy troops. Still, the Senate Intelligence Committee scheduled hearings this week to determine whether there was a serious "intelligence failure" in the Cuban affair.

Carter did what he could to keep the ratification process moving. He finally announced his plan for 200 proposed MX mobile missiles—a \$33 billion system of "racetrack" courses that would make the number of missiles verifiable but keep their precise location secret. And the President let it be known that he would ask for almost \$4 billion in additional military appropriations to insure a 3 per cent increase in the defense budget after inflation, although some opponents of SALT have demanded an even greater increase.

At the weekend, the President also spoke out on the Soviet brigade—emphasizing that the Russians did not have the airlift or sealift capability to stage an assault outside Cuba. The matter should not interfere with passage of SALT II, he told a group of visiting editors, and later declared that "firm diplomacy, not panic and not exaggeration" was required. But that would hardly satisfy critics who demanded sterner action—and nobody knew it better than Jimmy Carter.


DAVID M. ALPERN with  
FRED COLEMAN, JOHN J. LINDSAY and  
THOMAS M. DeFRANK in Washington

## THE U.S.'S BLINDEYE

Why didn't the U.S. Government know sooner that there was a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba? The answer is that it wasn't really looking all that closely. "It was a matter of resources," explained one intelligence expert last week. "When you have intelligence targets in 150-plus countries, you wind up having certain priorities." Echoes another intelligence official: "We haven't been trying hard in Cuba for quite a long time."

Shortly after taking office, President Carter reduced surveillance of Cuba. Partly to improve relations with Fidel Castro, he suspended the regular SR-71 reconnaissance flights that had been carried out over Cuba. He also cut back the number of Cuban specialists at the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency, leaving the CIA with fewer than four full-time Cuba-watchers.

**EAVESDROPPING:** At the same time, however, the U.S. was improving the sophisticated telecommunications-eavesdropping system that monitors Cuban radio and telephone traffic. It was this system that provided the first clue to the Soviet Army unit. Early this year, it began intercepting Russian voices in Cuba that referred repeatedly to a brigade stationed there. For several months, the understaffed Cuba specialists in the intelligence community didn't quite know what to make of it. Then, in July, Carter ordered a step-up in Cuban surveillance. At least one U.S. spy satellite was shifted in its orbit to provide fuller coverage of Cuba, and telecommunications monitoring was increased. The new satellite pictures disclosed Russian units on maneuver, while the added communications monitoring confirmed that the tanks were manned by experienced Russian crews. By the end of August, the intelligence com-



**Grounded: The SR-71**

since the early 1960s, though the controversial combat brigade is believed to have begun filtering in shortly after Cuban troops began fighting in Angola in 1975. "This was not a case where two or three troopships landed and an armored brigade marched ashore," says an analyst.

**NO EVIDENCE:** But even while intelligence experts were sifting through data indicating a Soviet buildup, officials of both the DIA and CIA told the House Armed Services Committee at least twice in the past year that "nothing is going on in Cuba," according to Rep. Samuel Stratton, a member of the committee. And just a month before the intelligence community decided that a Soviet brigade was indeed there, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance wrote to Sen. Richard Stone of Florida that there was "no evidence of any substantial increase of the Soviet military presence in Cuba." Vance defended his statement last week on the ground that "at the time ... there was not sufficient evidence to conclude that there was a combat presence there."

Nonetheless, the White House maintained last week that there hadn't been a failure of intelligence. Once Cuba was given a high priority, said a Carter aide, "the intelligence services performed well." Still, serious questions remain as to why the U.S. didn't consider Cuba important enough to monitor more closely. And though intelligence officials dismiss the notion that the Soviet troops are in Cuba to guard a Russian eavesdropping station, they have yet to explain just why the troops are there.

ALLAN J. MAYER with  
KIM WILLENSON and THOMAS M. DeFRANK in Washington

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 39NEW YORK DAILY NEWS  
9 September 1979

# A new Cuban crisis?

By JAMES WIEGHART

**W**ASHINGTON — If ordinary Americans are somewhat bewildered over the swirl of events centering on Cuba, their confusion and consternation are matched at even the highest levels of the Carter administration.

Cuban President Fidel Castro's hard-line anti-American rhetoric at the meeting of the nonaligned nations in Havana last week, coupled with the State Department's sheepish disclosure that United States intelligence recently confirmed that a Soviet combat brigade (up to 3,000 troops) has been stationed in Cuba for almost a decade, has thrown the foreign policy establishment into a tizzy.

The developments raised a series of provocative questions for U. S. analysts, who have thus far been able to come up with few definitive answers. Among them are:

- Why did Castro, after campaigning hard for the resumption of relations with the U. S. and the lifting of the U. S. trade embargo, decide to harshly denounce "Yankee imperialism" in his opening remarks to the 94 nation nonaligned conference in Havana?

- Why did Castro, who has tried mightily to depict himself as the independent leader of the Third World revolutionary movement, make such an obvious effort to tilt the nonaligned conference into the Soviet camp, thereby undermining his own claim of independence from big power manipulation?

- Why did the Soviet Union, after backing off in major showdowns with the U. S. in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and in the 1970 abortive effort to build a nuclear sub at the Cuban port of Cienfuegos, decide to run the risk of souring relations with the U. S. again by maintaining a brigade of combat troops in Cuba?

- What are the Soviet combat troops doing in Cuba anyway? With from 1,500 to 2,000 Soviet military advisers and technicians and more than 60,000 Soviet civilian workers and advisers already in Cuba, why was the presence of a Soviet combat brigade deemed necessary?

- How could U. S. intelligence agencies fail to spot for up to 10 years the deployment of a 3,000-troop Soviet military unit in Cuba? Even as recently as mid-July — only six weeks ago — U. S. intelligence agencies informed Secretary of State Cyrus Vance that it had no evidence that the Soviets had deployed a combat unit in Cuba.

The most obvious potential casualty in last week's upheaval was the U. S.

Soviet strategic arms limitations treaty (SALT-2), which is now awaiting ratification by the Senate. There is little likelihood that SALT-2, which is the number one foreign policy goal of both Carter and Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev, can win Senate approval unless the Soviet troops are withdrawn from Cuba, according to Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Frank Church (D-Idaho).

In his first public statement on the matter Friday, President Carter tried to defuse the issue, by calling on the Congress and the public to remain calm and let the quiet process of diplomacy deal with the problem. "This is a time for firm diplomacy, not panic and not exaggeration," Carter said.

The irony of it all is that, whatever its purpose, the Soviet brigade in Cuba, even though it is 90 miles off the coast of Florida, poses no conceivable threat to U. S. security. Speculation as to the brigade's mission ranges widely. Some analysts believe its function is to protect, even from the Cubans, a series of sophisticated Soviet electronic monitoring stations that have been erected there. Others guess that it serves as an elite personal guard to protect Castro from a coup. With 40,000 of his 100,000-man army spread across Africa, Castro's home force is somewhat depleted.

All of those possibilities have been rejected by senior U. S. analysts, who feel that the long duration of the brigade's assignment in Cuba and its relative inactivity indicate that it serves a training and tripwire function. The troops are there to assist in training Cubans and to reassure Castro that an attack on Cuba will also be an attack on Soviet troops, thereby assuring a Soviet response.

**A**S FOR U. S.-CUBAN relations, which have run the gamut from threatening to conciliatory, there is little question that the steady movement toward normalization — highlighted by the suspension of U-2 spy flights by Carter in 1977, the establishment of liaison offices in Havana and Washington last year and the release by Castro of several thousand political prisoners since late 1978 — would be chilled somewhat.

But national security officials were not surprised or unduly concerned by Castro's harsh "Yankee imperialists" rhetoric at the nonaligned conference, explaining that Castro, as the self-styled head of the international revolutionary movement, could be expected to do little else.

Regarding Castro's efforts to tilt the nonaligned movement toward Moscow,

American experts feel that this simply hurt Fidel's credibility within the movement, where he is increasingly seen as a puppet for the Soviets. Having gained their freedom from colonialism, Western style, most of these nations are not now anxious to trade it in for the neo-colonialism offered by the Russians.

*James Wiegart is chief of The News Washington bureau.*

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A-3

WASHINGTON POST  
9 SEPTEMBER 1979

# Troops in Cuba: The Issue Changes and Stays the Same

So the Soviets have troops in Cuba, and the politicians are alarmed, and the SALT pact's imperiled, and we're menaced because there they are, only 90 miles away.

Clearly their presence poses a direct threat to the United States, alters the balance of power in the Caribbean and brings the Monroe Doctrine into play. The buildup of these two to three thousand troops has taken place gradually and clandestinely. Like the missiles of a generation ago, they arrived hidden in the holds of ships. Something must be done.

Why we didn't know immediately about this new danger raises the most profound implications: An intelligence gap of frightening proportions exists, and something must be done about that.

What becomes news and why remains an arcane subject. In the case of news about Cuba with major U.S. domestic political import, a Florida politician normally begins sounding the alarm. So it was—with the missile crisis of 17 years ago, and so now with the—what?—crisis.

On Tuesday, July 15, Sen. Richard Stone (D-Fla.) publicly said he had information that the Soviet Union had placed what he called "combat-capable personnel" inside Cuba. He demanded that the Carter administration tell the nation what it knew about Russian troops there. If Stone's news made the papers, including *The Post*, I can't find it. That was the day of the Cabinet resignations, coming right after Carter's "malaise of the spirit" speech, and those events dominated the headlines.

The next Friday night ABC News broadcast a national TV report, in prime time, saying a brigade of Soviet troops, possibly numbering 6,000 men, had been moved into Cuba within recent weeks. Saturday morning, in a three-inch Associated Press story printed at the bottom of page A6, The Post first reported that news under a headline reading:

### Network Says Soviets Sent Brigade to Cuba

One week later, in another Saturday Page Six story, The Post referred to Stone's charges, but you had to look hard to find the reference, which came in a story about Fidel Castro's views on the new regime in Nicaragua. The 21st paragraph read: "Meanwhile, Sen. Richard Stone (D-Fla.) characterized as a 'whitewash' an assertion by Sec-

retary of State Cyrus R. Vance that 'there is no evidence of any substantial increase of the Soviet military presence in Cuba over the past several years or of the presence of Soviet military base.'"

## HaynesJohnson

# DÉJÀ VU

There the story rested as Carter went off on his voyage down the Mississippi, as the newsrooms emptied, as the pace of Washington in the summer slowed. And then, lo and behold, just as the Labor Day weekend began bringing life and the politicians back to the Capital, and just as a widely publicized conference of nonaligned nations was convening in Cuba, the story bloomed on page one of The Post under a headline:

**2,300-Man  
Soviet Unit  
Now in Cuba**

The source for this story wasn't the relatively unknown Stone of Florida, but Frank Church, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that old liberal-leaning softie who went to Cuba and conferred with Castro two years ago, who investigated CIA assassination plots against Castro and denounced them, who for years has been an advocate of easing Cold War tensions. Frank Church, who is up for reelection, had been home to Idaho, where they don't brook commies.

"The United States cannot permit the island to become a Russian military base, 90 miles from our shores," Church said sternly.

For the last generation the Soviet Union has supplied Cuba with half of its imports and nearly all of its sophisticated weaponry to back up an armed force of about 600,000, including reserves.

All this time Cuba has been a Soviet camp, and all the time Soviet military personnel and hardware—sometimes “offensive,” costly “defensive,” submarines and MIG fighters—have been implanted in and around there. During all this time the United States has had more armed forces (about 2,500) inside Cuba than the Russians have had. They’re at Guantanamo, our price for “guaranteeing” Cuban independence back in 1903.

But that was not the news this week in Washington. It was back to the Cold War. As a relic who survived those days, I found the rhetoric familiar—the threat, the intelligence failure, the Communist springboard for rebellion. But something was missing. Then I switched on the TV set to hear a presidential hopeful Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr. of Tennessee, speaking about the new Soviet threat. If we don't do something, he said, we're in danger of becoming a paper tiger.

Made me feel right at home

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE *A-22*WASHINGTON POST  
9 SEPTEMBER 1979

# Byrd Urges Colleagues Not to Link SALT to Cuban Situation

By Joanne Omang  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Senate Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd joined President Carter and national security affairs adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski yesterday in urging the Senate to avoid linking the fate of the strategic arms limitation treaty with the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba.

Byrd told reporters that the treaty had been "in rather good shape" after hearings ended in July but now would not get the two-thirds vote needed in the Senate for approval.

"But we're not voting on it today," he said. "All of this stampeding is what we need to avoid . . . The treaty could very well be in the interests of the United States, totally apart from the Cuban flap."

He said the presence of 3,000 Soviet combat troops in Cuba was "not comparable" to the 1962 crisis in which Soviet missiles were spotted on the island. "We don't know yet what their (the troops') mission is," Byrd argued.

Confirmation of the troops came only recently, though they apparently had been on the island for several years, but Byrd said, "I'm not prepared to say it's an intelligence failure."

Telling Russians from Cubans in identical uniforms "probably requires eyeball to eyeball intelligence" that is difficult to get in Cuba, he said.

Brzezinski was more outspoken, telling out-of-town editors Friday that it would be "fundamentally prejudicial to our interests to link SALT II to Soviet behavior elsewhere. It really is, I think, self-defeating and if I may go even further than that, escapist.

"I think those who are saying, 'Let's hold out on SALT II,' I think they are chicken out, frankly."

Transcripts of the interview were released yesterday. Shortly after Brzezinski spoke, Carter made the

same point to the editors. "SALT II ought to be panned on its own merits," he said.

Peaceful competition with the Soviets will continue for many years in trouble spots around the globe, Carter said, "and without a SALT agreement limiting strategic nuclear weapons, each one of those differences . . . is much more likely to become a major threat to our nation's peace."

Brzezinski stressed that intelligence agencies had not spotted the Soviet troop presence earlier because "we weren't looking for it." Whatever the original reasons for the placement of 3,000 men there, he said, they may have changed by now. "Sometimes, even in a love affair, do you know the exact motives your are dealing with?"

You don't. You can only judge by actions," he said.

"What is of concern to us is . . . the presence of an organized combat formation in the Western Hemisphere and in a country that is certainly pursuing very actively policies that are adverse to us . . ."

Byrd said he would try to bring SALT to the Senate floor by Nov. 1, by which time "the dust should have settled" from the troops fracas. Debate should not go past Thanksgiving, he said.

Asked by the editors about the future of ousted U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young, Carter reiterated his confidence in the man he fired and said, "I would welcome Andy in any major position." He speculated that

Young will go to the private sector rather than stay in government and added, "He is very supportive of me and his voice will be heard."

Brzezinski, turning to the question of Cuban involvement in Nicaragua, characterized the new Sandinista revolutionary government as "an amalgam of radical and progressive movement." Although "a significant wing" of the Sandinista movement was trained in Cuba, he said, "there are very different elements in it, some of which, doubtless, are very sympathetic to (Cuban premier Fidel) Castro . . . but some of whom are not."

"We believe that there is a possibility that the outcome in Nicaragua will be a government that is responsive to the plurality of Nicaraguan life," he said. To assume it will be pro-Castro, he said, "may end up in a self-fulfilling prophecy."

Byrd was asked to assess the political impact of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) being freed by his family to announce for the presidency next year. "He has given a signal that keeps his options open," Byrd said. He added that he presumed Kennedy would weigh the possible consequences to Democratic Party unity of a strong challenge to an incumbent Democratic president.

Carter is getting mixed reviews in West Virginia, Byrd said. "They give him good marks on foreign policy . . . (but) on domestic issues they don't think he has done so well."

Byrd said those views are consistent with his own, but he noted that current issues are "so thorny, so difficult and so universal that it would be extremely difficult for any president to have high marks."

Byrd repeatedly has said it is too early to write Carter off for reelection because of the immense power of an incumbent and of Carter's strong image "as a good and honorable man."

# 'We Are Confident Of Our Ability to Defend' the Nation

*Here is the text of President Carter's speech yesterday on the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba:*

I want to take a few minutes to speak to you about the presence of the Soviet combat brigade in Cuba.

The facts relating to this issue have been carefully laid out by Secretary [of State Cyrus] Vance, both in his public statement and in his testimony before the Congress.

The facts, in brief, are as follows:

We have concluded as the consequences of intensified intelligence efforts that a Soviet combat unit is currently stationed in Cuba. We have some evidence to indicate that such a unit has been in Cuba for some time, perhaps for quite a few years.

The brigade consists of 2,000 to 3,000 troops. It's equipped with conventional weapons such as about 40 tanks and some field artillery pieces and has conducted training as an organized unit. It is not an assault force. It does not have airlift or seagoing capabilities and does not have weapons capable of attacking the United States.

The purpose of this combat unit is not yet clear. However, the secretary of state spoke for me and for our nation on Wednesday when he said that we consider the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba to be a very serious matter and that this status quo is not acceptable.

We are confident about our ability to defend our country or any of our friends from external aggression. The issue posed is of a different nature. It involves the stationing of Soviet combat troops here in the Western Hemisphere, in a country which acts as a Soviet proxy in military adventures in other areas of the world like Africa.

We do have the right to insist that the Soviet Union respect our interests and our concerns if the Soviet Union expects us to respect their sensibilities and their concerns. Otherwise, relations between our two countries will inevitably be adversely affected.

We are seriously pursuing this issue with the Soviet Union and we are con-

sulting closely with the Congress. Let me emphasize that this is a sensitive issue that faces our nation — all of us. And our nation as a whole must respond, not only with firmness and strength, but also with calm and a sense of proportion. This is a time for firm diplomacy, not panic and not exaggeration. As Secretary Vance discusses this issue with Soviet representatives in the coming days, the Congress and the American people can help to ensure a successful outcome of these discussions and negotiations by preserving an atmosphere in which our diplomacy can work.

I know I speak for the leadership in Congress with whom I have met this afternoon, as well as for my own administration, when I express my confidence that our nation can continue to show itself to be calm and steady as well as strong and firm.

Thank you very much.

*National Security Affairs Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski made the following remarks at a meeting with out-of-town editors yesterday morning:*

Let me just make a few introductory remarks and then I am at your service to answer any questions that you may wish to pose.

I think it is useful to note that the posturing of Cuba as a nonaligned country is fundamentally ridiculous.

Castro is a puppet of the Soviet Union and we view him as such. Throughout the world there isn't one instance in which Castro has deviated from official Soviet policy in any respect whatsoever. Castro economically is totally dependent on subventions from the Soviet Union. The \$3 billion annual Soviet economic aid to Cuba represents one-quarter of Cuba's gross national product.

Soviet industrial projects in Cuba account for 30 percent of Cuba's electric power output; 95 percent of Cuba's steel production; 100 percent of Cuba's sheet metal output and the bulk of Cuba's sugar harvest mechanization; approximately three-fifths of Cuba's

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imports come from the Soviet Union; and so does virtually all of Cuba's oil at a 40 percent discount from the average OPEC prices.

The Soviet Union purchases 72 percent of all Cuban exports and arranges for East European nations to buy Cuban sugar at prices well above world prices. In fact, I wonder how the Jamaicans, for example, react to the fact that the Cubans get five times over the world price for sugar.

Militarily, Cuba is entirely dependent on the Soviet Union. Soviet military support for Cuba goes far beyond Cuba's defensive needs, as witnessed by the fact that the large proportion of the military equipment supplied to Cuba is used by Cubans in combat abroad and far from Cuba.

The Soviet Union supplies to Cuba

jet fighters, transports, submarines, missile patrol boats, attack helicopters, and antisubmarine patrol boats.

Cuba provides the manpower and since 1975, it has been converting its armed forces from a primarily defensive role to one capable of offensive operations far from Cuban shores. In keeping with that, Cuba deploys forces—combat troops I mean—and advisers in Africa where it acts as a proxy for Soviet military intervention. It does so in the Horn of Africa, in the Yemen and elsewhere.

In effect, Cuba is an active surrogate for foreign policy which is not shaped by itself, and is paid for this by economic and military support on a scale that underlines Cuba's status as a dependent client of the Soviet Union.



By James K. W. Atherton—The Washington Post

CIA Director Stansfield Turner and Sen. Byrd confer in Byrd's office.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A1-8THE WASHINGTON POST  
8 September 1979Carter Urges a 'Sense of Proportion'

# U.S. Firm on Soviet Unit

By Martin Schram

Washington Post Staff Writer

President Carter pledged yesterday to use "firm diplomacy" to deal with the newly disclosed presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba and cautioned against "panic" and "exaggeration" at home.

The "status quo is not acceptable," Carter said, adding that Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance soon will be negotiating with the Soviets about the once-secret brigade.

"We are confident about our ability to defend our country or any of our friends from external aggression," Carter said. "All of us ... must respond not only with firmness and strength, but also with calm and a sense of proportion."

The president's remarks were addressed as much to the Senate as to the Soviets, although Carter did not mention the pending strategic arms limitation treaty, which is in new trouble in the Senate because of the situation in Cuba.

"This is a time for firm diplomacy, not panic and not exaggeration," Carter said.

The president was prompted to deliver his first public pronouncement on the Soviet brigade, according to a senior aide, by numerous statements by senators that SALT II would not be approved if the brigade were allowed to remain in Cuba.

The president particularly was concerned, the aide said, because several senators with hard-line positions on the issue were liberals and moderates who had been counted as SALT II supporters.

Carter declared that the presence of

the Soviet brigade is "a very serious matter," and added:

"We do have the right to insist that the Soviet Union respect our interests and our concerns if the Soviet Union expects us to respect their sensibilities and their concerns. Otherwise, relations between our two countries will inevitably be adversely affected."

By publicly defining the goal of the negotiations with the Soviets only as changing the "status quo," the president carefully avoided specifying what diplomatic outcome is needed to ease the situation in Cuba. He specifically declined to answer questions from a reporter about whether the United States would insist on the removal of the Soviet combat force.

Carter repeated statements by Vance earlier this week that the Soviet force consists of 2,000 to 3,000 troops equipped with conventional weapons, including about 40 tanks and some field artillery pieces.

The president said there is evidence that the unit has been operating in Cuba "for some time, perhaps for quite a few years."

He then went on to describe what the force is not.

"It is not an assault force," he said. "It does not have airlift or seagoing capability and does not have weapons capable of attacking the United States."

"The purpose of this combat unit is not yet clear."

In recent years, the Soviets have used Cuba as a listening post to monitor telephone calls placed from the United States, but U.S. intelligence officials have said they do not believe that a Soviet brigade would be needed

to defend the Soviet-built and Soviet-run intelligence network.

In remarks earlier yesterday, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's national security affairs adviser, called President Fidel Castro's contention that Cuba is not aligned with the Soviet Union "fundamentally ridiculous."

"Castro is a puppet of the Soviet Union and we view him as such," Brzezinski said, adding "there isn't one instance" in which Castro has acted contrary to Soviet policy around the world.

In remarks to newspaper editors, Brzezinski said that economically, Cuba is "totally dependent" on the Soviet Union. He cited statistics, including \$3 billion in Soviet economic aid supplied to Havana each year, one-quarter of the Cuban gross national product.

"Militarily," Brzezinski added, "Cuba is entirely dependent on the Soviet Union."

He concluded: "In effect, Cuba is an active surrogate for a foreign policy which is not shaped by itself, and is paid for this by economic and military support on a scale that underlines Cuba's status as a dependent client of the Soviet Union."

Hours before Carter spoke to reporters at the White House he discussed the troops situation with 14 members of Congress in the Cabinet Room.

Among those present was Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Frank Church (D-Idaho), who first disclosed publicly that the presence of the Soviet combat brigade had been confirmed by U.S. intelligence.

Church said that Carter spoke of a "crisis atmosphere developing through the press, and of the way everyone has treated the matter."

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Carter mentioned no names, Church said, but spoke critically of several proposed resolutions that would bar approval of the arms limitation treaty as long as the Soviet combat force remains in Cuba.

White House officials have been privately critical of Church's disclosure of the brigade, believing that he did so to bolster his hard-line credentials in Idaho, where he faces a reelection battle next year.

Carter told the congressional leaders that there was "no way to know how long" the Soviet brigade had been in Cuba, and said there was no "intelligence failure" in the delay in detecting it. Rather, he said, it resulted from a decision to allocate U.S. intelligence resources in other countries.

According to some who attended the meeting, Carter said the United States has a great deal of trouble getting good intelligence from Cuba. Sen. Barry M. Goldwater (R-Ariz.), one of those present, agreed, saying it was easier to get information from the Soviet Union. Goldwater is vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

He told Carter this was the Soviets' test of the president's mettle.

Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd (D-W. Va.) made the longest statement of the meeting, arguing that there was far from sufficient information available to declare that a crisis was at hand.

Several of those present said later that Carter received a generally sympathetic hearing from the group.

Reacting to Carter's later remarks, Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) said he wanted bold leadership. Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), suggested that Carter should have engaged in some "big stick" diplomacy.

"The president's speech was unsatisfactory," said Lugar. "We need a call for leadership and a sense that the president is prepared to respond. . . . The president reacted slowly, almost passively."

"I think the president ought to have said to the Soviets, calmly, 'Get these troops out or no SALT II,'" Helms said. "I think Jack Kennedy would have already told the Soviets, 'Get the troops out or no SALT II.'"

"The president needs to be given time for diplomacy to work, time to obtain accurate information. I don't think it's time for a crisis atmosphere," Byrd said, adding that SALT II should not be "held hostage" by the troops situation.

"I still have expectations for calling the treaty up this year," he said.

Church said he did not think he was exaggerating the situation by saying there is no hope for Senate approval of the treaty if the troops remain.

"I think it's important that the Russians should know from the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee that these two issues are related," Church said. "The Senate will not ratify the SALT treaty while Russian combat troops remain in Cuba. We do have to draw the line on Soviet combat troops somewhere."

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A1-10THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)  
11 September 1979

# Russia Denies Troop Charges

## Insists Force In Cuba Not Combat Unit

By Henry S. Bradsher  
Washington Star Staff Writer

The Kremlin has denied U.S. statements that a Soviet brigade in Cuba is a combat unit, throwing into doubt the possibility of amicably settling a tense confrontation between Moscow and Washington.

Only a few hours after Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance opened discussions with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin on the troop issue, the Soviet Union rejected as "utterly without foundation" the idea that it had sent a combat force to Cuba.

Instead the Soviet Union insisted that the troops are only a training mission and had been in Cuba for 17 years in a role that threatens no one. This first public Soviet comment, published in the form of an editorial in today's edition of *Pravda*, the Soviet Communist Party newspaper, came after a week of agitation in the United States.

It said the troop issue was fabricated by those who wanted to undermine Cuba's prestige during last week's meeting of nonaligned nations in Havana. The issue is being used by American opponents of the new strategic arms limitations treaty, SALT II, *Pravda* said.

The Soviet position amounted to an indirect attack on the credibility of President Carter, who last Friday personally warned that a serious problem exists because of the combat troops' presence. *Pravda* seemed to imply that the Soviet Union did not intend to yield to Carter's attempt to change the situation by firm but quiet diplomacy.

Instead, the editorial appeared to insist that the Carter administration back down and admit that it was wrong in identifying the troops as a combat brigade.

The Soviet stand could leave Carter with a major domestic political problem. Pressure has been building on Capitol Hill for the administration to do something to get the troops out of Cuba.

The *Pravda* editorial was distributed in Moscow after Dobrynin had met with Vance for 106 minutes without resolving the problem. The timing suggested that Dobrynin had first delivered privately the same message of rejecting the U.S. intelligence finding on combat troops.

A spokesman for Vance later issued a terse comment on the editorial:

"The question of the Soviet units in Cuba is under discussion in diplomatic channels and we will make no comment on the contents of these discussions," the spokesman said. "As to the editorial in *Pravda*, it is not a helpful contribution to the resolution of this problem."

Vance and Dobrynin planned another discussion of the thorny issue, but as of early today, it was uncertain whether it would be held today or tomorrow.

Their initial exploration yesterday of the confrontation left a need for each side to review positions before resuming efforts to find a way of reconciling American concern and Soviet sensitivity.

Carter has said the status of the Soviet combat brigade in Cuba must be changed, even though the troops do not pose a direct threat to the United States.

Vance was believed to have discussed with Dobrynin what kind of changes the United States has in mind. Dobrynin presumably needed to report the U.S. position to the Kremlin and get its reactions before resuming the dialogue.

Administration officials have avoided specifying publicly whether they seek removal of the 2,000 to 3,000 troops from Cuba or something else like assurances on their purpose and possible employment. What kind of assurances would be acceptable in the heated U.S. political atmosphere surrounding the issue was uncertain.

Senior officials remained tight-lipped on the subject after yesterday's meeting. But on Capitol Hill, several senators reiterated calls for a firm position that could remove a possible obstacle to approval of the new strategic arms limitations treaty, SALT II.

Earlier, Vance visited Capitol Hill to brief the Senate Armed Services Committee at a closed meeting on the Soviet troops and the reported failing of U.S. intelligence agencies to detect them. He refused to talk to reporters about the sensitive talks with Dobrynin, but one committee member, Sen. Roger Jepsen, R-Iowa, indicated the secretary of state would take a tough line with the Soviet diplomat.

Because the Soviets have taken the attitude that their troops are in Cuba only as training missions, Moscow has not conceded any reason for the United States to be worried by their presence. The administration is therefore wary of demanding concessions that the Soviets might feel they have no need to grant — that might even be considered demeaning for a superpower to concede.

Vance and Dobrynin discussed the problem in the secretary's office the day after the ambassador returned to Washington from Moscow.

After the meeting State Department spokesmen refused to describe the atmosphere or contents of yesterday's meeting. Dobrynin looked affable as he drove into and out of the State Department basement garage to use a private elevator to Vance's seventh-floor office. He waved to journalists waiting outside the building but did not speak with them.

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Spokesman Hodding Carter said before the meeting that Vance intended "to make sure that the Soviet Union understands we view the matter very seriously."

Carter had emphasized the seriousness Friday by calling on the American people to respond to the situation "not only with firmness and strength, but also with calm and a sense of proportion. This is a time for firm diplomacy, not panic and not exaggeration."

Vance and Dobrynin were accompanied in their discussion by only one other person, Marshal Shulman, Vance's adviser on Soviet affairs.

Shulman has acquired the reputation in the administration of trying to work out disagreements with the Soviet Union by calm discussion rather than heated confrontation. This approach has sometimes been contrasted with a more forceful stand toward the Soviets by National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski.

But the administration is united in taking a cautious approach to the Soviet brigade question. Brzezinski told newspaper editors last week that, "with firmness, resolve, but also restraint, we can work this problem out . . . I'm confident that, if there is mutual restraint and mutual recognition that each side has to be sensitive to the concerns of the other, we will work this out."

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ON PAGE 1THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
12 September 1979

# Cuban foray endangers key Kremlin goals

By David K. Willis  
Staff correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor

Moscow

Despite Moscow's decision to deny flatly the "arrival" of Soviet combat troops in Cuba, the Kremlin still faces trouble on two key issues in Soviet-American relations.

Since the Carter administration does not accept the denial, the United States Senate will not either. This means:

- The Kremlin still faces suspension of the SALT II ratification debate in the Senate — and the Soviets badly want the treaty ratified as soon as possible.

- The Senate and the House have new reason to be wary of moving to grant the Soviet Union most-favored-nation trade status along with China — that is, to grant Moscow the same low tariffs on imported goods given almost all other countries.

The Soviets are upset that the administration has moved with relative speed to extend similar status to Peking. The Carter administration now is holding back on submitting the formal legislation to the Congress on China (despite Chinese pressure) to give it time to try to solve the Soviet issue.

The US decision to stick to its position that Soviet troops in Cuba are organized into a brigade, with a combat command structure, complicates both issues.

The *Pravda* denial, given unusual prominence over four columns in the lower left corner of Page 1 on Sept. 11, specifically denied "the arrival" of organized Soviet combat units and called contentions that such units had arrived "totally groundless."

For 17 years, *Pravda* said, Soviet "military personnel" had been training Cubans to operate Soviet military equipment. "Neither the number nor the functions of the said Soviet personnel have changed throughout all these years," *Pravda* said, adding that it "does not present and cannot present any threat to the United States" in size or function.

Western observers in Moscow said the extremely careful wording appeared to leave open the possibility that Soviet troops in Cuba were, in fact, serving under a combat command structure.

*Pravda* gave two reasons for the publicity over the issue in the US.

1. The American press, "clearly on a signal" (implying that the press acted at the behest of the Carter administration), was using the issue to try to undermine Cuban prestige at the time of the nonaligned conference in Havana. *Pravda* called Cuba one of the "most active and authoritative member-states of the nonaligned movement." Other states, such as Yugoslavia, view Cuba as totally aligned with Moscow.

2. The "outray" was being used by those in the US as "trying to prevent the ratification of the SALT II treaty and, in any case, to complicate the process of its ratification."

Western diplomatic sources here say the Soviets have been silent until now to see just how seriously the White House treated the new intelligence disclosures on Cuba. Any threat to SALT is a matter of deep concern here. But the Soviets have also been reading President Carter's recent calls for calm and reason.

Sources say that the Soviets had troops fighting in Ethiopia and have troops now in Afghanistan. They have advisers in Mozambique and in Aden, South Yemen.

Sources agree that the troops in Cuba have no ability to attack other countries by sea or by air. Nor were troops explicitly forbidden by the US-Soviet understandings after the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962.

Some sources recall that the Soviets also flatly denied the presence of offensive missiles in Cuba when first questioned in 1962. "Frankly, I don't know why they have combat forces in Cuba today," one Western source said. "Maybe we should wait and see."

There is no confirmation here for a New York Times report that the troops are protecting a massive Soviet eavesdropping operation on US communications.

Announced administration policy is to be "evenhanded" on trade toward Moscow and Peking.

But the publicity around the troops-in-Cuba issue now makes it harder for advocates of giving the Soviets most-favored-nation status to push their case. The issue was linked to Jewish emigration in 1974 by Sen. Henry Jackson (D) of Washington and Rep. Charles Vanik (D) of Ohio.

So far the Soviets have refused to indicate — as required under the Jackson-Vanik amendment of that year — that they are letting out more Jews (though, in fact, they are: Jews have been leaving the USSR at a record rate of more than 4,000 a month for some time). When Representative Vanik suggested last year that the President grant the Soviets a one-year waiver from the legislation, the Soviets rejected the idea.

The trade issue has come to have considerable symbolic meaning for the Soviets. In fact, most Soviet exports to the US are raw materials, unaffected by high industrial tariffs. But the Kremlin demands equal treatment with the rest of the world.

# Frank Church: Hero or Villain, Or a Politician?

By MARTIN TOLCHIN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 11. — Frank Church is a man in the middle. The Idaho Democrat is a firm advocate of a nuclear arms treaty, which pleases the White House, but he is also demanding the immediate withdrawal of Soviet combat troops from Cuba, and insisting that until they are withdrawn the Senate will not approve the arms treaty.

This does not please the White House, which says that the treaty should be considered on its own merits. Thus the question that has arisen here is whether Mr. Church, the influential chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is President Carter's ally, or an adversary seeking quick political profit.

Senator Church contends that he helped the Administration by disclosing the existence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba, and insisting that the Senate would not approve the arms treaty until those troops were withdrawn.

"This could easily have been made to appear far more sinister if political opponents of the Administration had been the first to reveal it, and had coupled the revelation with charges that the Administration was engaged in an attempted cover-up," he said in a recent interview outside the Senate Caucus Room, where he was conducting a hearing on the treaty.

## Easier to Bargain With

Senator Church said that he simply made a "realistic assessment," and noted that "no other senator has publicly disagreed with that assessment." He also points out that he would be far easier for the Administration to negotiate with than would the treaty's opponents.

The White House and State Department have differing views on the role that Senator Church is now playing in linking the arms treaty and the Soviet brigade.

A senior Presidential aide said yesterday that the White House believes that Senator Church "did as much as anyone to create the crisis" and said that some of Mr. Carter's aides had accused Mr. Church of demagoguery and of having political motives.

The State Department, on the other hand, believes that, whatever the Senator's political motivation, his role has been a stroke of luck, because it was better for the Administration to have the Senator speak out on the issue than one of the leading Republican senators.

Although the White House apparently fears that Senator Church, a liberal who has supported the arms treaty, could prove as unyielding as conservative Republicans in demanding the withdrawal of the Soviet forces, the State Department regards him as a man who has been willing to compromise.

## Disarming Right-Wing Foes

The Senator's stance has not hurt him at home, where it enables Mr. Church to look tough and decisive, places some distance between himself and President Carter, and disarms right-wing opponents who have placed a high priority on his defeat in 1980.

Although the liberal Senator thus far has neither a primary nor Republican opponent, he is considered vulnerable in the conservative state and among conservatives because of a voting record that won a 90 percent rating in 1976 from Americans for Democratic Action.

The Senator has gone through it all before. It was 1962, when Mr. Church was in his first Senate re-election campaign, and the Kennedy Administration had denied reports of a Soviet missile base in Cuba. The Senator had traveled to Guantánamo, at the Government's invitation, and had returned to Idaho to campaign up and down the state denying the reports.

When the reports were finally confirmed, President Kennedy not only was on the telephone immediately, but also sent a military plane to Boise to return the junior Senator to Washington, to confer on the problem. The gesture of sending the aircraft, with much fanfare, took some of the discomfort out of Senator Church's awkward position.

## No Military Plane

This summer, Senator Church was again campaigning for re-election, this time supporting the Administration's denial of reports of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba. When those reports were confirmed, however, not only was there no military plane to bring him back to Washington, but President Carter also waited a week before returning his urgent telephone calls. This time, however, Mr. Church was no longer a junior Senator, but chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee.

A White House press aide said today that he was unaware of the Senator's attempts to reach the President, but he added that since the Senator had announced his position at a news conference before placing the call, the return call may have been considered unnecessary.

There is little love lost between the Administration and the Senator, who had opposed Mr. Carter in some of the 1976 Presidential primaries.

Mr. Church had relied on the testimony of Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense, who had told the Foreign Relations Committee on July 17 that there was no evidence to support reports of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba.

## Gets the News in Boise

On the evening of Aug. 30, while Senator Church was at home in Boise, he received a telephone call from David Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, confirming the presence of the brigade.

Mr. Church then telephoned Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance in Washington, and told Mr. Vance that the presence of the Soviet troops had implications for the arms treaty, should be made public, and that he intended to do so. Mr. Vance had no objections, and Senator Church held a news conference an hour later, at 8:30 P.M.

The Senator then made the first of two calls to the President, who was traveling in Atlanta and Tampa. He called again the following morning, when the President was vacationing in Plains, Ga., but Mr. Carter failed to return the call until two days after he returned to Washington on Sept. 5.

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ON PAGE A-1NEW YORK TIMES  
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# Jackson Insists Soviet Withdraw Planes in Cuba

## Otherwise, He Says, Arms Treaty Will Be Defeated

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 11 — Senator Henry M. Jackson, a leading critic of the strategic arms limitation treaty, said today that the accord would go "down the tubes" unless the Soviet Union withdrew not only its combat brigades from Cuba but also the planes it had supplied Havana and unless it agreed to provide no more submarines.

In a television interview and a subsequent speech on the Senate floor, Senator Jackson accused the Soviet Union of trying to turn Cuba into a "fortress-state capable of threatening the United States."

His remarks in effect broadened the debate over the discovery of a Soviet brigade of 2,000 to 3,000 soldiers into a sweeping attack on the close relations between Moscow and Havana.

### Demands Broadened by Senator

Senator Frank Church, who is the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and several others have said the arms treaty with the Soviet Union would be defeated if the combat brigade was not withdrawn. But Senator Jackson said he wanted more than just the withdrawal of the brigade, thereby complicating problems for the Carter Administration.

"The time for the United States to reaffirm its position on what Soviet behavior we will not tolerate in this hemisphere is now," the Washington Democrat said in the Senate.

"As a beginning," he said, "we must insist on no less than the following: One, Soviet combat units must be removed from Cuba; two, Soviet high-performance ground-attack aircraft must be removed from Cuba, and three, under no circumstances should the Soviet Union be allowed to provide Cuba with additional submarines, or other naval forces with the reach to threaten our ports or our shipping."

### Monroe Doctrine Invoked in House

In the House of Representatives, an amendment, adopted by a voice vote on a bill extending export controls, would allow the President to restrict trade with the Soviet Union because of the combat brigade in Cuba.

Proposed by Representative Peter A. Peyer, Democrat of New York, the amendment authorizes the President to restrict exports to any nation he found in violation of the Monroe Doctrine. The doctrine, established in 1823 by President James Monroe, forbids foreign interference in the Western Hemisphere.

Representative Peyer, noting that the United States supplied wheat to the Soviet Union, said, "Let's find out what's important to the Russians."

The Administration said little today on the situation.

Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, who met yesterday with Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin of the Soviet Union, made a report this morning at the White House to Defense Secretary Harold Brown, Adm. Stansfield Turner, Director of Central Intelligence, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security adviser. Mr. Brzezinski then informed President Carter.

Despite an editorial in *Pravda*, the Soviet party daily, that qualified American statements about the combat brigade in Cuba as "totally groundless," the Administration stuck to the view that a negotiated solution was possible.

Officials said Mr. Vance had told Ambassador Dobrynin about the Administration's concerns and expected a reply tomorrow. Mr. Dobrynin was understood not to have taken the tough line of the *Pravda* editorial.

Later today Mr. Vance went to the Senate to confer with Senator Robert C. Byrd, the majority leader, and with Senator Church, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. At lunch, Mr. Vance briefed former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, who said Mr. Vance had his "full support."

"The presence of the Soviet combat unit is unacceptable," Mr. Kissinger said. "How the presence is ended is the subject of negotiations, and I don't think I ought to go into tactics."

### Administration Hoping for Time

The Administration evidently hoped that Congress would give it enough time to negotiate an acceptable solution. The Administration opposes the kind of speeches given by Senator Jackson on the ground that they tend to put the Soviet Union in the position of appearing to bow to an ultimatum.

Ronald Reagan, a potential contender for the Republican Presidential nomination next year, said the United States "should not have any further communications with the Soviet Union" until the combat forces in Cuba "are sent back to Russia." He said, "Détente must be a two-way street or there is no détente."

Appearing on the CBS television program Tuesday Morning, Senator Jackson said that, if the Soviet Union did not comply with his demands, the United States could pursue many courses "in which the Soviets have a lot at stake."

Alluding to the strategic arms limitation treaty, for which approval is now pending in the Senate, he said: "Our relationship between our country and the Soviets will deteriorate. It means SALT is down the tubes."

### Jackson Called U.S. an Appeaser

Mr. Jackson, who has said that the United States seems to be appeasing the Soviet Union, called in his Senate speech for "a national consensus behind our determination that we will not allow the Soviets to turn Cuba into a fortress-state capable of threatening the United States, our allies and friends in this hemisphere, and our vital lines of communication."

Mr. Vance told reporters that he hoped the troops issue "can be resolved in a way that is satisfactory to the United States."

"It is in the interest of both nations that this matter be satisfactorily resolved and that it be satisfactorily resolved in the near future," he said after a meeting with President Séso Séko Mobutu of Zaire.

Senator Byrd urged the Senate in a floor speech to "avoid a panic atmosphere." He said, "We're still in the process of determining the facts."

Senator Donald W. Riegle Jr., Democrat of Michigan, also called for calm. "This is neither a time nor a situation in which hysteria or exaggerated responses by either side are warranted or useful," he said.

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# Soviet Troop Talks Continue Amid a Swirl of Controversy

By Don Oberdorfer  
and Walter Pincus  
*Washington Post Staff Writers*

Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance and Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin today will continue their negotiations on Soviet troops in Cuba amid new political controversy on the subject.

Vance, in a brief exchange with reporters at the State Department, continued his tight-lipped policy of avoiding comment on the talks. He would say only that he hopes the dispute can be resolved in the near future "in a way that is satisfactory to the United States." He did not define what that resolution might be or when it might be achieved.

Despite a hard-hitting attack on the U.S. position in *Pravda*, the Soviet Communist Party newspaper, senior American officials continued to express optimism about an eventual settlement of the issue with the Soviets.

There is no indication that Carter administration leaders have reached agreement on what terms would be acceptable here. Several senators have demanded a verified withdrawal of the Soviet combat brigade that the United States reports is now in Cuba, but President Carter and Vance have been vague on what Washington would consider a minimum acceptable result, saying only that the "status quo" is unacceptable.

Meanwhile, U.S. intelligence analysts privately voiced concern that the slow but steady growth of Soviet military systems and facilities in Cuba over the past few years represents a more serious challenge to the United States than the combat brigade.

"The brigade is only one part of a general increase," was the way one intelligence analyst described the Cuban situation. "Everything they have done is small in itself, but they are building a 'Fortress Cuba' that down the road has strategic significance for us."

The analyst ticked off the rearming of Cuban army units, beginning in 1976; the installation in 1977 of an advanced electronic antenna capable of eavesdropping on U.S. satellite transmissions; new construction of naval port facilities in Cienfuegos Bay, starting that same year; the arrival of advanced MiG-23 fighter-bombers in 1978; and the supplying of one training and one ocean-going submarine this year, along with a fleet of 24 two-engine turboprop military transport planes.

Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.), one of the most outspoken anti-Soviet figures in Congress, charged in a Senate speech that a major upgrading of Cuba's military capabilities over the past two years has begun the development of "Fortress Cuba." Jackson demanded that Soviet high-performance ground attack aircraft as well as Soviet combat units be removed from Cuba and said the United States must insist that no more Soviet submarines or threatening naval forces be supplied to the island state.

Former California governor Ronald Reagan, the front-running contender for the Republican presidential nomination, said in Sacramento that the United States "should not have any further communications with the Soviet Union" until the troops are sent back to Russia, according to United Press International.

Former secretary of state Henry A. Kissinger, on the other hand, said the Cuban troops question "is a subject for negotiations" with the Soviets. After a lunch meeting with Vance, Kissinger said the question is "in no sense a partisan issue" and expressed support for Vance's objectives in "a very delicate negotiation."

Senate Minority Leader Howard H. Baker Jr. (Tenn.), who is expected to be a contender for his party's presidential nomination, said he would give the Carter administration 10 days to resolve the situation before urging another course of action, which he did not specify.

On the broader issue of growing Cuban military strength, the 1977 resumption of construction of a naval facility at Cienfuegos Bay and the transfer to the Cubans this year of the two diesel-powered Soviet submarines are cited by several analysts as the type of "pinprick" that could develop into a serious problem for the United States.

The Cienfuegos site was considered in 1970 as a proposed facility for Soviet navy vessel servicing, according to the Nixon administration. Nixon has claimed he halted the Soviet plan through diplomatic pressure.

According to the State Department, the new Cienfuegos construction "is virtually complete" and consists of "a number of naval support-type buildings and a deep-water pier."

It is far too large for just two submarines, and U.S. intelligence analysts expect the facility to serve additional subs supplied to the Cubans and perhaps Soviet vessels as well.

"Down the road these increased navy elements will require us to guard our flank," one analyst said yesterday. He pointed out that Cuban-Soviet subs could provide coverage of the U.S. bases at Charleston, S.C., and Kings Bay, Ga., that serve as home ports for Poseidon submarines, which carry strategic missiles.

"They will begin to tie down our resources," the analyst added, describing how U.S. destroyers would be required to watch the Cuban subs.

The MiG-23 fighter aircraft, though introduced into the Soviet air force in 1971, presented a stepped-up capability for the Cubans when they arrived last year.

Some of the air craft are interceptors, but some are MiG-23Fs that in Europe are considered capable of carrying nuclear bombs.

It was the arrival of this latter model that late last year caused a flurry of concern that the Soviets were violating the 1962 settlement of the Cuban missile crisis.

CONTINUED

Under that agreement, the Soviets promised not to introduce into Cuba any offensive weapon systems. Last December, the Soviets told the Carter administration the new Mig23s did not violate that understanding, and U.S. intelligence was said to have verified that the aircraft were not wired to carry nuclear weapons.

The 24 Antonov-26 military cargo planes that apparently arrived in Cuba this year are 10 years old. Models previously had been sold or given to such diverse countries as Yugoslavia and Bangladesh. When configured to carry paratroopers, the plane can handle only 34 to 40. In itself the fleet presents no major threat to Western Hemisphere countries, but it could be used to support guerrilla movements, U.S. officials say.

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## Long Is Opposing SALT Pact, Citing Soviet 'Bad Faith'

By Robert G. Kaiser  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Sen. Russell B. Long (D-La.), one of the most influential members of the Senate, announced yesterday that he would vote against the SALT II pact, declaring that it cannot be verified and that Soviet combat troops in Cuba demonstrated Soviet bad faith.

Though Long had spoken critically of SALT II in the past, the Carter administration had hoped for his vote, and most of its optimistic projections for Senate approval of the arms treaty assumed Long's eventual support.

Without Long, administration officials acknowledged last night, the task of finding 67 senators to support SALT will be vastly more difficult. Long is presumed to carry substantial influence with a key bloc of moderate southern Democrats who remain undecided on SALT.

The fact that Long cited the presence of Soviet combat troops in Cuba as a reason for his decision on SALT was particularly painful for the Carter administration, which is both divided and dispirited by the flap set off by recent intelligence findings that a combat-capable Soviet brigade is in Cuba.

Until this was revealed late last month, White House strategists thought their campaign for SALT II was going well. They felt that political momentum was building behind the treaty, and that moderate figures like Russell Long were likely to come down in favor of it.

"If there is one guy who can put his finger up in the wind and say how it's blowing, Russell Long is him."

one administration official said last night. This source said it was especially significant that Long would exploit the flap over troops in Cuba to announce opposition to SALT II.

Long revealed his decision in an interview with columnist Carl Rowan on WDVM-TV in Washington. "If I had any doubts about it [SALT II], and I didn't have much," Long told Rowan, "my doubts were removed by the last indication down there in Cuba that the Russians are not keeping their faith on the agreement they made with President Kennedy."

Long said that at the end of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the Soviets agreed to remove their missiles from Cuba and not to station offensive weapons there in the future. "I don't think the agreement contemplated that they were going to have [combat] troops in Cuba," Long said.

The Louisiana Democrat, who is chairman of the Finance Committee, also criticized the treaty: "I think we could get a better agreement," he said. "And it appears to me this agreement is not going to prevent an arms race. It's simply going to be part of an arms race."

"I don't believe the thing is verifiable."

Long's decision to oppose SALT means, as one administration official put it last night, that "we [the administration] can't afford to lose too many more Democrats," and have any hope of winning the necessary two-thirds Senate approval for the treaty.

White House hopes for moderate southern support for the treaty now must ride on Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), who has been pressing the Carter administration to increase defense spending significantly if it wants his vote for the arms pact.

Nunn is one of a group of senators meeting early this morning with President Carter to urge him to spend more for defense. Thus far, Nunn has expressed dissatisfaction with the administration's plans for an expanded defense budget.

Another southerner, Richard Stone (D-Fla.), harshly criticized SALT II in a Foreign Relations Committee

hearing yesterday. The administration now considers Stone a likely "no" vote.

Both Long and Stone voted for the Panama Canal treaties last year and both are running for reelection in 1980.

Administration lobbyists reckon that without those two, they must get the votes of Lawton Chiles (D-Fla.), plus both Alabama senators (Howell Heflin and Donald Stewart, both Democrats), Nunn and Herman Talmadge (D-Ga.), and Robert Morgan (D-N.C.). Chiles and Morgan may be inclined to back the treaty, and the others remain undecided and skeptical.

Virtually all the swing senators have continued to say they are formally undecided on the treaty.

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# Carter's Cuba stand draws skepticism

## Critics say Washington hasn't proved charges

By James Nelson Goodsell  
Latin America correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor

Growing skepticism is surfacing over Washington's insistence that there are Soviet combat troops in Cuba.

There is no doubt that the troops are there. But there is some question over their actual purpose, just how long they have been there, and whether this is not simply a flap that has been blown way out of proportion.

Within elements of the intelligence community, the issue now is being compared with the Carter administration's charge that Cuba was involved in the invasion of Zaire's Shaba province by Katangese rebels 18 months ago — a charge that proved totally incorrect.

The comparison is not entirely valid. But the skepticism over Mr. Carter's handling of the Soviet troop issue is similar to that which arose over his handling of the earlier Cuba issue. "If he [Mr. Carter] has some good, solid information that anything really has changed in Cuba," commented one intelligence official, "then why doesn't he come up with it?"

Moreover, intelligence officers are as divided today as they were then — although the skepticism this time has come more slowly than the skepticism did in April-May, 1978.

But there can be no mistaking the doubts now being expressed by elements in intelligence circles in Washington.

It is not overlooked that the administration has actually given no proof on the presence of the Soviet troops. The Kennedy administration in 1963 supplied photographic evidence that the Soviet Union was installing missiles in Cuba. This time no photographs of Soviet troops on Cuban territory have been presented.

This does not necessarily mean that the troops are not there. But it is being asked in Washington why the Carter administration has so far failed to give convincing proof.

Even more fundamental is the question of why the flap has developed at this particular time. Certainly it is not giving the Carter administration any help in its efforts to win Senate approval for the strategic arms limitation treaty. In fact, the Cuban troops issue is hurting the administration's efforts.

It is generally recognized that Soviet troops have been in Cuba all along — that ever since the early 1960s there has been a Soviet troop presence on the Caribbean island. And intelligence people say that there have been at least 2,000 Soviet troops in Cuba at any given time since then.

That was the point made Sept. 12 by former senator Mike Mansfield, currently the Carter-appointed US Ambassador to Japan. Mr. Mansfield, who was in the US Senate when earlier flaps with Cuba developed, indicated that at the time of the Cuban missile crisis an understanding was reached that up to 2,000 Soviet troops could remain stationed in Cuba.

The Carter administration makes the distinction, however, that the Soviet troops in Cuba at this time are members of operational units, i.e., combat troops. But such a distinction is seen by some in the intelligence community as simply splitting hairs. All Soviet troops in Cuba, it is reasoned, are combat-ready and could easily be put into operation if the occasion warranted.

The Soviet Union, in a particularly detailed analysis of the situation, reported Sept. 11 that the Soviet troops were in Cuba as part of a training force, a comment that some intelligence people in Washington note is much like that used by the US in its description of US military advisory groups in, say, a Latin American country.

It all goes back, say the skeptics in the intelligence community, to a question of why the Carter administration is making such a fuss over the Soviet troop presence.

Was the administration trying to upstage the Havana conference of nonaligned nations? It hardly seems likely that the administration wanted to scuttle the SALT treaty ratification. So, then, why the issue at this time?

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## U.S. Probes Soviet Unit's Role in Cuba

By Don Oberdorfer  
Washington Post Staff Writer

U.S. intelligence is examining the possibility that a Soviet brigade in Cuba may be there to demonstrate large unit tactics and field maneuvers to Cuban soldiers, a senior State Department official said yesterday.

Such a mission would seem to give some credence both to U.S. official statements that the Soviet force is a cohesive unit with combat armaments, and to Soviet counter-statements that it is "a training center" with no combat role.

The U.S. official, who spoke to reporters on condition that he not be named, said this is only one of several possible missions for the Soviet brigade that are under study by U.S. intelligence. State Department officials denied that disclosure of this possibility was a "trial balloon" designed to point the way to a likely settlement of the U.S.-Soviet dispute.

As Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance and Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin met for the second time on this issue at the State Department, U.S. sources said major points of discussion have been the nature and functions of the Soviet troops in Cuba.

One possible method of resolving the dispute, which has jeopardized ratification of the strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT II) and threatens to damage relations between the superpowers, is to define clearly a non-combat role for the Soviet force. Such a settlement, if accepted by both sides, could leave the Soviet troops and most or all of their equipment in Cuba, but without the status of a "combat unit" in U.S. eyes.

Some U.S. senators, particularly those opposed to SALT II, have made it clear that they will not be satisfied with any settlement less than the verified departure of the Soviet brigade. Other senators, however, would settle for a U.S.-Soviet agreement well short of this.

President Carter and Vance have been vague in their public descriptions of the requirement for a settle-

ment of the issue, saying only that "the status quo" of Soviet troops in Cuba is not acceptable. Some sources believe there is the definite possibility of a dispute within the administration over the terms if and when a potential settlement comes into view.

Vance told reporters at the Capitol, following a private briefing for Sen. John Stennis (D-Miss.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, that he expects to meet with the Soviet ambassador almost daily until the issue of the troops in Cuba is resolved.

Vance's remarks indicated that, despite a tough *Pravda* editorial Monday and Soviet polemics on the issue, American officials continue to believe there is a clear chance for a negotiated resolution. Continued Vance-Dobrynin negotiations day after day also may serve to cool down the crisis atmosphere in Washington on the politically touchy issue.

State Department spokesman Hodding Carter reiterated at a briefing for reporters that Soviet training troops have been in Cuba for sometime, and this does not run counter to U.S.-Soviet agreements.

Carter would not define the "combat role" to which the U.S. objects, except to say, "I am talking about what they are functionally able to do . . . with their associated equipment."

The United States has known since 1962 that the Soviet Union has had military advisers and training troops in Cuba, and since the early 1970s that additional Soviet military personnel were on the island to operate and guard a communications intercept facility. Despite isolated bits of intelligence dating at least to early 1976, according to State Department officials, U.S. intelligence has reached the conclusion only in recent weeks that a functioning Soviet brigade, armed and

organized as a combat unit, is in Cuba.

Since the intelligence finding was made public by Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho) following a State Department briefing two weeks ago today, U.S. analysts have redoubled their research into the history, activities and possible role of the Soviet brigade. Additional information from files of the intelligence agencies has done little to clarify the shadowy aspects and in some respects has complicated the search for complete and clear conclusions, according to informed officials.

The possibility that the Soviet brigade serves as a model for training Cuban troops in large unit maneuvers was attributed to U.S. military intelligence. It is given a certain plausibility by reports that some Cuban units in Africa are deployed in the same configuration as the Soviet unit in Cuba.

The senior State Department official said that other possible missions for the Soviet forces include a "trip-wire" against a possible U.S. invasion of Cuba, an expression of support for Cuban military activities in Africa, or a training device for Soviet troops assigned to tropical climates.

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# U.S. May Be Easing Stand On Troops

By Henry S. Bradsher  
and Lance Gay  
Washington Star Staff Writers

U.S. intelligence officials are weighing the possibility that the 2,000 to 3,000 Soviet troops in Cuba may be training Cuban forces for action in Africa, State Department officials said yesterday.

The suggestion that the Soviet troops in Cuba are there in a training rather than combat role raises the possibility that the Carter administration may be backing off on its contention that the troops are strictly a combat unit.

The intelligence officials stressed that the training role was only one of several possibilities being considered by U.S. officials.

On Capitol Hill yesterday, the troop issue was dramatically linked to SALT II as Sen. Russell Long, D-La., chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, said he would vote against it because the Soviets are "not keeping faith" on their agreement with President John Kennedy in 1962. That agreement ended a confrontation over nuclear missiles in Cuba.

Senate Minority Leader Howard Baker repeated a contention that President Carter "has days" to act to ensure the Cuban unit is withdrawn before the Senate acts to make specific conditions on the removal of Soviet troops before SALT II can be ratified.

The point in dispute between the two superpowers is not the Soviet soldiers' being in Cuba but the more complex issue of their capabilities and intentions.

State Department spokesman Hodding Carter III said yesterday that it is the capability of the troops to function as a combat unit that concerns the United States. But this approach to the problem quickly gets into semantics. It involves the question of whether a training mission also is capable of fighting.

A Pentagon spokesman, when asked how a combat unit is distinguished from a training mission, replied that a combat unit's sole mission is to fight, not to train others. The spokesman added that it becomes a complex matter of definitions whether a training unit can have its own tanks and rockets, as U.S. officials say the Soviets in Cuba have.

Administration officials have been reviewing the question of definitions since the Soviet Communist Party newspaper Pravda denied on Monday that any new troops had been sent to Cuba beyond the training mission that has been there for 17 years. But the administration has firmly pronounced itself on the combat nature of the troops and would now find it difficult publicly to reverse its evaluation by re-defining how a training mission might be equipped and act.

The Soviet Union has been insisting in recent newspaper articles and broadcasts on its right to maintain a military mission in Cuba. Hodding Carter noted yesterday that four U.S. administrations have accepted that right.

While U.S. officials grapple with the question of what distinguishes combat troops from a training mission, the Soviet Union is trying to switch international attention from its own troops in Cuba to the worldwide system of American military bases.

## Soviets Cite U.S. Precedents

A Soviet media campaign seeks to justify the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba in terms of what the United States does abroad. This adds a new complication to the U.S. insistence that changes be made in the Soviet troop presence.

The position taken by President Carter that the status of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba must be changed was discussed again yesterday by Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance in a two-hour luncheon meeting with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. Vance said later that he expected to continue meeting with Dobrynin, probably today and tomorrow, in an attempt to work out a solution to the problem.

Vance's spokesman earlier denied that there is any dispute over the facts of the Soviet presence in Cuba.

"We have no reason to doubt or reassess" the U.S. intelligence finding made last month that there are 2,000 to 3,000 Soviet combat troops in Cuba, Hodding Carter said. He was replying to reporters' questions about the Kremlin's denial that it has anything more than a military training mission in Cuba.

The Soviet Union had denied in 1962 that it was putting missiles in Cuba, U.S. officials have noted, but the United States then presented photographic evidence. The Soviet Union denied in 1970 that a submarine base was being built on the island, but it stopped work after American evidence was made public.

## No Specific Evidence

So far in the new confrontation between Moscow and Washington the administration here has declined to make public any specific evidence for its determination that Soviet troops that have been in Cuba for some years constitute a combat brigade.

An argument has arisen over the distinction between what the United States is prepared to accept as Soviet military actions in the Eastern and Western hemispheres.

Washington has never attempted to draw a line against the stationing of Soviet combat forces in such countries as Egypt from which they were later evicted. But the United States does object to having them in this hemisphere.

In a broadcast in English yesterday, Moscow Radio said that "the United States has arbitrarily declared a region of the world of vital importance for itself and is trying to dictate there, ignoring the sovereign will of other nations. It is not accidental that congressmen are now referring to the notorious Monroe Doctrine."

Soviet government newspaper Izvestia said that "more than 300 major U.S. military bases and over 2,000 smaller ones are still maintained on the territory of about 30 countries, dating back to cold war times. . . . The largest groupings of these U.S. forces are deployed . . . in West Europe and Asia — that is, at the approaches to the U.S.S.R. and other Socialist community states."

While the United States talks about increasing the strength of its forces in Western Europe, Soviet media said, "There are no fresh Soviet military units in Cuba."

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### Soviets Make SALT Link

One Moscow Radio broadcast to the United States added that, "together with the United States, the Soviet Union has traversed a very difficult road toward SALT II and it would be quite wrong-headed to suppose that this country is seeking to kill that treaty" by putting troops in Cuba.

According to available intelligence reports, the United States and the Soviet Union each has about half a million military personnel outside its own territory.

On Capitol Hill, Sen. Claiborne Pell, D-R.I., urged his fellow senators not to link the troop issue to SALT II.

"If the Soviets are in Cuba in order to underwrite renewed Cuban adventurism in that area, we must make it clear that that would be unacceptable to us," said Pell, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

"I find it difficult, however, to believe that the Soviets would be so foolish as to try to establish a base for such purposes in our backyard. I am therefore hopeful that we will be able to work out something with the Soviets that will adequately deal with our concerns."

Pell said he agrees with administration arguments that the Senate should not lay down any specific requirements for the withdrawal of troops at this time. Such a move, Pell said, could interfere with the administration's diplomatic negotiations.

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ON PAGE A-1NEW YORK TIMES  
13 SEPTEMBER 1979

# U.S. NOW CONSIDERS VIEW SOVIET FORCE IS TRAINING CUBANS

## SHIFT FROM 'COMBAT' THEORY

In Light of Moscow's Denial, Aides  
See Possibility Brigade Gets  
Troops Ready for Africa

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 12—The Carter Administration is considering whether the reported Soviet combat brigade in Cuba may have the mission of training Cuban forces for action in Africa, State Department officials said today.

Even though the possibility of the training function is only one of several theories being discussed, the fact that it is under consideration suggests a possible modification in the Administration's emphasis that the force of 2,000 to 3,000 soldiers was strictly a combat unit.

Intelligence officials said the United States learned from the monitoring of Soviet radio communications a year ago that a combat force designated as a "brigade" was in Cuba, but did not pursue the matter. The officials said indications of the presence of a brigade were first received in 1973 and 1976 and had been ignored in higher echelons of the Government. [Page A16.]

### Effort to Reconcile Pravda Account

Since Pravda, the authoritative Soviet Communist Party daily, was so categorical in asserting yesterday that Soviet military personnel were in Cuba solely for training purposes, the Administration has undertaken to see whether this can be reconciled with the evidence, officials said. There are arguments for and against the training theory, one official said. Part of the problem may be to define what a combat unit is.

With negotiations continuing today between Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance and Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin of the Soviet Union over the status of the brigade in Cuba, the Administration is focusing increasingly on the mission of the Soviet forces.

State Department officials said there was no disagreement within the Administration that the Soviet force consists of two rifle companies, one rocket artillery company, and one tank company.

Some military experts, the official

said, have raised the possibility that the force for some years has been a combat brigade with a training mission. The mission would be, it was speculated, to demonstrate and teach Cubans how to maneuver in unit strength.

The official said the 40,000 Cuban troops deployed in Africa, mostly in Angola and Ethiopia, were organized in units similar to the Soviet brigade. There are said to be no other Soviet brigade-type units except in East Berlin, in Mongolia and in Kamchatka Province in the Soviet Far East.

If indeed the Soviet force turns out to have had a training mission—and that is not definite, the official said—then the Administration may find itself facing a problem in the Senate.

From the time the existence of the brigade was first disclosed last week, the Administration has described it as a "combat unit." In the process, as officials now acknowledge, the Administration may have created for itself a semantic as well as a political problem of defining what constitutes a combat unit.

The description of the brigade as a combat unit springs from its command organization. The unit has not only combat-type battalions but also a command headquarters such as would normally be used to direct a brigade in combat.

The question is whether a unit organized as a brigade could not also be used as a military training group and whether, in this case, this is not the organizational approach followed by the Soviet Union. The United States follows a different approach of using combat-trained troops, which are organized in advisory rather than combat-type units in training foreign military forces.

Having emphasized the combat nature of the brigade, the Administration would now face a problem in persuading the Senate that the unit has a training role.

Senator Frank Church, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, for instance has said that unless the combat brigade was removed, the strategic arms treaty will not be approved by the Senate. It is doubtful that Mr. Church would accept an explanation that the force simply had a training mission.

State Department officials said speculation about the mission, aside from a possible training function, includes the following: a symbol of Soviet support while Cuban troops are in Africa; as a

"trip-wire" to insure Soviet support for Cuba in case of an invasion; and protection of Soviet communications.

Mr. Vance met with Mr. Dobrynin for two hours over lunch at the State Department to continue their discussions, begun Monday. During the day Mr. Vance went twice to Capitol Hill, to brief Representative Clement J. Zablocki, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, in the morning, and Senator John C. Stennis, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, in the afternoon.

Although the presence of the brigade has become a political issue threatening approval of the strategic arms accord, President Carter today again urged approval of the pact. Speaking to 125 religious leaders at a White House breakfast, he said rejection in the Senate could mean the end of a common Soviet-American effort "to find a way toward reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons from the face of the earth."

The Administration has carefully avoided stating what it wants the Soviet Union to do about the brigade in Cuba. President Carter and Mr. Vance have limited themselves to saying that the status quo is unacceptable. State Department officials said the words were deliberately ambiguous to allow flexibility in the negotiations.

Except for yesterday's Pravda editorial, the Soviet Union has been generally restrained publicly on the issue.

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ON PAGE A15

NEW YORK TIMES  
13 SEPTEMBER 1979

## Cuba Issue May Delay a Vote on Soviet Arms Pact

By CHARLES MOHR

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 12—What had been a tight and finely adjusted timetable for guiding the strategic arms treaty with the Soviet Union through the Senate will now be stretched by at least four weeks and possibly longer, Congressional sources said today.

This will give President Carter and his foreign policy advisers more time to negotiate a solution to the political problem posed by the recently reported presence of Soviet combat troops in Cuba, the sources said. But others in the Senate predicted that it might also cause a serious

timing problem that could make it difficult to obtain a vote on the controversial treaty this year.

Meantime, Administration witnesses told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the so-called racetrack basing system of the proposed MX intercontinental missile was consistent with the terms of the arms treaty and did not violate its prohibitions against deliberate concealment measures.

### Earlier Soviet Objections Recalled

The chief United States treaty negotiator, Ralph Earle 2d, testified that Soviet officials had earlier objected to reported American plans to deploy the MX mis-

siles between 1986 and 1989. Mr. Earle noted that Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet leader, had gone ahead and signed the treaty after raising the objection.

Senator Richard Stone, Democrat of Florida, told Mr. Earle that it would be preferable to seek to clarify the Soviet attitude toward the basing method for the 200 mobile missiles. Mr. Stone said that, otherwise, "you're going to be faced with an amendment" to the arms treaty.

When any such amendments might be voted on became less clear than ever today when it was confirmed that the Foreign Relations Committee would extend its consideration of the treaty, apparently because of the issue of Soviet troops in Cuba.

The committee had planned to begin "marking up," or considering modifications to, the treaty next Monday and to send the treaty and printed copies of the committee report to the Senate by Sept. 25. Recently that reporting date was adjusted to Oct. 2.

Now the schedule of hearings on the treaty has been extended into October. Well-informed sources said the committee now looks toward reporting the treaty to the Senate by Oct. 17 or 18.

One staff member of a senator who does not support the treaty said the new timetable was a formula for keeping the treaty from being voted on either in committee or in the full Senate while the Soviet troop issue remained unresolved. Some senators, including Frank Church, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, have said that the treaty cannot win approval until the troop issue is resolved.

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NEW YORK TIMES  
13 SEPTEMBER 1979

# Soviet Brigade: How the U.S. Traced It

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 12 — The United States Government received indications of the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba through overhearing the Russian word "brigada" in radio monitoring in 1973 and 1976, intelligence officials said this week.

A year ago, the Carter Administration received information, this time more specific, from radio interceptions, that a Soviet combat force designated as a brigade was garrisoned in Cuba, but it did not pursue the matter, the intelligence officials said.

It was not until the Carter Administration began to worry last spring about Cuban military involvement, through training and arms supplies, in the Nicaraguan revolution and in insurgencies in Grenada and El Salvador that it called upon the intelligence agencies to examine the Soviet military role in Cuba more closely.

## How Dispute Developed

In interviews over the last week with officials in the White House, Defense and State Departments, the Central Intelligence Agency and Congress, the emergence of the Soviet brigade as an intelligence problem and a political issue developed in this way:

Surveillance, stepped up in March and April, was intensified again in July and still again in August, ultimately producing what intelligence officials called "confirmatory evidence" — a chance reference in a monitored Russian radio message to a "maneuver" by the "brigade" scheduled for Aug. 17.

On that day, a camera satellite orbiting high over Cuba trained a powerful lens on a small area a few miles southwest of Havana and "sure enough," an intelligence officer recalled, "there was the brigade on maneuver with tanks, personnel carriers and mechanized infantry."

The radio signal had been a Soviet request to the Cuban Army for permission to use the San Pedro maneuver grounds, a few miles west of Havana's José Martí International Airport, to exercise the "brigade" composed of a rocket battalion, a tank battalion and two infantry battalions — totaling 2,300 to 3,000 men.

## Well-Camouflaged Area

San Pedro is several miles west of a large Soviet military complex where there is a well-camouflaged storage area as well as a headquarters commanded by a Soviet major general. The mile-square complex, called Lourdes, also includes large dish-shaped radar receiver terminals at a site called Torrens for intercepting communications from American missile tests and from satellites.

On Aug. 20, three days later, other American satellite photographs showed San Pedro empty and military equipment being stowed away at Lourdes. The troops and officers, it was determined, were garrisoned at two military camps nearby — the larger part eight miles east of Lourdes at Santiago de las Vegas, and the smaller one 11 miles to the east at Managua.

However, what began as a rather routine intelligence collection exercise has become a political issue centered on demands for linking the removal of the Soviet troops and approval of the nuclear arms treaty. Other aspects of the dispute involve United States prestige in the hemisphere, Soviet behavior in the overall East-West relationship and the question whether there was an "intelligence failure."

Despite intense concentration in recent weeks by intelligence officials and policy makers, and searching inquiries posed through diplomatic channels to the Soviet Union, many questions remain unresolved.

## The Mysteries Remain

Among the mysteries is how long the Soviet brigade has been stationed in Cuba and what its mission is. Last week the Soviet Embassy advised the State Department that a Soviet military advisory group had been in Cuba since 1962, had not changed in size or role and was the only Soviet military formation on the island. This has prompted some American analysts to wonder whether the advisory group has a double mission of training Cubans and forming up as a combat unit on occasion.

As for the suburban Havana facilities at Lourdes, Santiago de las Vegas and Managua, a senior intelligence official said, "We've known about those installations since Havana for years and have changed through the years."

Last week in an interview, Maj. Gen. George J. Keegan, a former Air Force intelligence chief, recalled having seen reports about the Soviet combat force "five or six years ago," but added that at the time he and other Pentagon officials were unable to persuade the State Department or the Central Intelligence Agency to focus attention on it. "We sort of forgot about it," he said.

Last week both former President Gerald R. Ford and his Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger, issued statements asserting that they had never seen intelligence reports indicating the presence of a Soviet combat force in Cuba in their time in office, which ended in 1976. According to intelligence officials, the bits and pieces of information assembled on the brigade in earlier year never were submitted to higher levels of the intelligence community, much less to policy makers.

One of the problems appears to have been semantic, since American military specialists repeatedly pointed out that a "brigade" was an abnormality in the Soviet Army and, as one remarked: "We said what should not be can not be."

## A Demonstration Brigade?

Now some of the American intelligence experts have begun to speculate that the brigade's primary mission was to demonstrate combat techniques in the brigade configuration of rocket, tank and infantry units used by the Cuban forces in Africa in recent years.

Somewhat parallel to this surmise is the idea that the Soviet unit may well have been in place for more than a decade, but that its "mission changed in the 1970's," as a Defense Department official put it, possibly in support of Soviet utilization of Cuban troops as proxy forces to reinforce leftist governments in Angola, Ethiopia and Southern Yemen.

The intelligence officials are still sifting the mass of signal interceptions, photographs and a few reports from the handful of American agents still available in Cuba, which they have accumulated about the Soviet command structure on the island.

They say there are also looking into files, much of them stored in computers, in an effort to trace the brigade's origins and to determine whether it was separate from the advisory group left over from the 1962 missile crisis. It is a classic intelligence operation in which old pieces of information that had no meaning when they first came to light suddenly acquire significance and help from a pattern of activity that makes sense. "But we still don't know how far back it goes and we're still not sure of all our facts," a top-ranking intelligence official said.

The intelligence officials, from the C.I.A., Defense Department and White House, have struck a defensive note in reviewing the actions that finally led to the discovery of the brigade. They contend on the one hand that they still do not consider it militarily significant and on the other hand that, until recently, they had been too busy concentrating limited technical surveillance resources on other more crucial targets to accumulate adequate information on the Soviet troops in Cuba.

These arguments were carried into hearings begun today by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on whether there was, as some of the panel members asserted last week, "an intelligence failure" surrounding the discovery of the Soviet troops.

"I think our people are very pleased," one Administration official said of the intelligence performance. "It was a team effort."

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"Our resources are finite in very real terms," he added in reference to the photo satellites. "You can only turn on the birds for so long or they wear out. The Russians know that, too."

As for the San Pedro maneuver discovery, he said it had been made more difficult by the fact that the Soviet Union had "pretty much re-equipped the Cubans so it's harder to tell who is driving the equipment." He said the Russians had also taken unusual measures to conceal their high degree of radio silence.

This official added that a year ago photographic surveillance of the Cuban military was limited to twice a month. Electronic monitoring was also restricted. This was stepped up last month to daily surveillance.

#### Role of Senator Stone

But just as the intelligence community had spent months and even years looking at the brigade without seeing it, so the Carter Administration's top policy makers also had difficulty facing the issue once the Soviet combat presence in Cuba began to emerge. But they had been given an early warning by Senator Richard Stone.

In January 1978, the Florida Democrat had asked President Carter to state American policy on Soviet military activities in this hemisphere and received a reply, made public at the time, that said:

"In particular, it has and will continue to be the policy of the United States to oppose any efforts, direct or indirect, by the Soviet Union to establish military bases in the Western Hemisphere."

In April, in the midst of the revolutionary activities spreading among Caribbean and Central American countries, Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security adviser, sent a memorandum asking Adm. Stansfield Turner, Director of Central Intelligence, to start a large-scale study of Soviet military activities in Cuba and Cuban military activities elsewhere.

One result of the study, which is still incomplete, was a report by a National Security Agency analyst of radio interceptions from Cuba that there was indeed a Soviet combat formation stationed near Havana, probably as a "brigade." That report was completed in June.

On July 17, according to Mr. Stone, a Senate staff aide tugged his sleeve as he was about to enter a Foreign Relations Committee hearing on strategic arms and told him about the National Security Agency report.

Senator Stone strode into the committee room during the second week of hearings on the strategic arms treaty signed with the Soviet Union in June. He asked Defense Secretary Harold Brown, who had prepared himself thoroughly on the treaty, but not on Cuba, what he knew about a Soviet brigade.

Perplexed, Mr. Brown replied that he was not aware of a change of Soviet military activities in Cuba. Pressed by Mr. Stone and by Senator Frank Church, the Idaho Democrat who heads the committee, Mr. Brown authorized them to issue a statement saying that aside from a military advisory group, "our intelligence does not warrant the conclusion that there are any other significant Soviet military forces in Cuba." The report was virtually lost in the welter of press accounts dealing with the Carter Cabinet and the treaty deliberations.

#### Request Made to Mondale

But Senator Stone was not satisfied. The next day, he asked Vice President Mondale to increase surveillance of Cuba, a request that was passed on to the intelligence community.

This represented the third increase in surveillance since spring, after a call by the National Security Council in March for an estimate of Soviet ground forces in Cuba, and Mr. Brzezinski's April request for a more general report on Soviet-Cuban relationships.

Asked today why the Carter Administration had not focused a year ago on the intelligence reports of a "brigade" instead of many months later, a White House official said, "We were interested at the time, but they were just snippets and later there was a larger accumulation of information."

#### Florida Senator Persists

Senator Stone, whose state lies 90 miles from Cuba at Key West, the closest point, continued to press for results, writing to President Carter on July 24.

Yet even though the intelligence accumulation on the Soviet combat force was building up, Senator Stone was advised in a letter from Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance on July 27, at the direction of President Carter, that "our intelligence does not warrant the conclusion that there are significant Soviet forces in Cuba."

Senator Stone immediately termed this "a whitewash."

A second letter from the Senator to the President on Aug. 10 appears to have had the effect of spurring still more intense technical surveillance of Cuba. In any case, Mr. Carter ordered "the highest priority" of reconnaissance about this time, the fourth increase since March, and the one that finally paid off with the decisive radio interception and the maneuver photograph.

But again, the Administration appears to have had difficulty translating its intelligence into useful political action.

#### Stone Gets Phone Call

By Aug. 24, exactly a week after the maneuver photograph of the troops was taken, an interagency task force concluded that the Soviet brigade did exist and was indeed a combat unit with a known command structure. David D. Newsom, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, called Senator Stone in Tampa, Fla., to tell him he was prepared to brief him on his "assertions" about the brigade.

The Senator said in an interview that he begged off, saying he did not want to be briefed "on the telephone" and would prefer to hear Mr. Newsom's account on his return to Washington after Labor Day. He also recalls that he spent part of the day in Florida with President Carter, who, incidentally, had been briefed about the brigade's maneuver the day before, but that the President never raised the subject.

The State Department was content to let matters stand as they were, a high-ranking Administration official said, until after Congress returned to Washington Sept. 4. That was the day Mr. Newsom set for briefing Senator Stone.

But on Aug. 27 the National Intelligence Daily, an Administration document widely circulated in the Government and Congress mentioned the brigade maneuver. Two days later, a copy evidently came into the hands of Aviation Week & Space Technology, whose editors began calling Administration officials for confirmation.

#### Quandary for Administration

This put the Administration in the position of having the information appear in the press before key members of Congress could be briefed.

As a result, the State Department leadership decided to call Senator Church, who had issued the July 17 statement on the strength of Harold Brown's authority that there was no Soviet brigade in Cuba. On Aug. 30, Mr. Newsom reached Senator Church in Idaho and told him what was known. Senator Church then called Secretary Vance and Senator Stone saying he was going to make it public.

However, Senator Church stunned Secretary Vance and other Administration officials by coupling the disclosure with the demand that the Soviet Union remove the brigade, a public ultimatum with which the Administration and the Soviet Union are still wrestling.

"It's all political now," a senior intelligence official said today with a sigh and a thin smile of relief. "We've done our job."

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**EDITORIALS**

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ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 5CHICAGO TRIBUNE  
8 September 1979

## Russians, Cuba, and SALT II

It was inevitable that our belated discovery of Soviet troops in Cuba would disrupt the SALT II debate. Ratification hearings by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have been postponed so the senators can hear testimony on the troops, and treaty opponents are using the opportunity to bolster their weakening attack on it.

There have been sarcastic questions suggesting that the U.S. can't expect to verify adherence to SALT II if we can't even spot a brigade of Soviet troops 90 miles offshore. Opponents are arguing that the treaty should be held up until the troops leave, or that it should be voted down outright because of this new evidence of Soviet aggressive intentions.

It does, indeed, seem more than a little odd that U.S. intelligence networks only recently learned that a combat-equipped unit of brigade size has been in Cuba for years [although we're not convinced that officials are being entirely candid about how long they have known].

But even if there was an intelligence failure, it is nonsense to compare it with SALT monitoring. The Cuban affair involves only the presence of Soviet personnel. Satellites can do amazing things these days, but they can't yet examine passports.

Development of a new missile, on the other hand, presents wide opportunities for monitoring. By the time it becomes

operational, a missile has been tested repeatedly in range of ground monitoring facilities. The construction of launchers, production plants, and control centers is easily photographed by satellites.

There is a more basic reason not to let a potentially aggressive Soviet presence in Cuba scuttle SALT II. The treaty is needed precisely because the Soviets are unreliable; if we had a warm relationship we would have little need for a SALT treaty. It is the kind of confrontation now developing over the troops that can lead to a nuclear faceoff—as happened only once previously during another dispute involving Cuba. SALT II is the best means we have for preventing such confrontations from escalating into a nuclear exchange.

Meanwhile, the presence of the troops is intolerable, as Secretary of State Vance has said. They came to the hemisphere in secrecy, which suggests only that their mission is to meddle in hemisphere affairs. They cannot be compared with U.S. troops stationed near Soviet borders—ours are there openly and in accordance with postwar understandings between East and West. Every effort must be made by the U.S. and Latin American and Caribbean countries to get the Russians out of Cuba.

But SALT II should be kept out of the dispute. The fact that the troops are there is proof that the treaty is needed.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 22THE WALL STREET JOURNAL  
11 September 1979

## REVIEW &amp; OUTLOOK

## Reject SALT Now

The discovery of Soviet troops in Cuba suddenly threatens to become the straw that breaks the back of the strategic arms treaty. Yet the only surprising thing is that anyone should be surprised. Didn't everyone know that the Soviet Union is engaged in a world-wide geopolitical offensive under the umbrella of its massive military build-up? And isn't it equally clear that the debate over SALT is really a debate over whether or not the U.S. will acquiesce to this imperial drive?

As the debate proceeds, both voters and their representatives are gradually awakening to the realities of our situation. The Cuban issue, and before it the Kissinger-Nunn position of linking support for the treaty to defense budget increases, have been useful steps in the educational process. As debate proceeds further, more people will recognize that the strategic arms negotiations are not incidental to the tipping military and political balance, but instrumental to it.

The treaty as it stands would ratify Soviet gains in central weapons systems. It would also ratify the vacillating foreign policy record of the Carter administration; after all, the administration itself bills the treaty as the centerpiece of its foreign policy. Above all, the treaty would stand in the way of future U.S. efforts to rectify the military balance. Rejecting it would be the clearest first step toward reversing the recent adverse trends. All of this is implicit in much of the recent discussion, and it is time the so-far timid critics grasped the nettle and called for a clear and unambiguous rejection.

It is first of all vital to recognize the enormity of the Soviet arms drive. As Henry S. Rowen details nearby, the Soviets are now outspending us by 45% on defense, and by 100% in military investment. This increasing Soviet power is before our eyes translating itself into greater boldness and greater political influence throughout the world. Cuba of course strikes close to home, but the threat to the Middle Eastern oil lines is even more significant.

We do of course have the option of accepting a Soviet imperium. It is hard to imagine us failing to retain enough power to make it inconvenient for them to land troops on Long Beach or Long Island. But with the Soviets already sending muscle men around our airports and tapping our phone calls, it is not so hard to imagine the U.S. evolving into a big Finland; there would still be elections, but the Soviets would have a practical veto over certain nominees. Our allies would suffer more. The result would be a worldwide erosion, already so evident in the plight of the Indochinese boat people, of those values for which Western civilization has stood: the idea of progress, economic growth, personal freedom, individual liberty.

The other option is to offset the Soviet arms drive with a military build-up of our own. Senator Nunn's proposed 4% to 5% real growth in spending, borrowed from a politicized Joint Chiefs, is a creditable start for the next fiscal year. But it will not close the gap. A realistic estimate would be that we need additional military spending of about 1% of GNP, moving over a few years from the current 5% to about 6%. This would still not bring us to Soviet spending levels, but it would make their ambitions for superiority expensive enough to stress their economic system. At that point, they might even become willing to talk about serious arms control.

It is no accident that the unparalleled Soviet military gains coincide with the era of arms negotiation. There is of course no treaty with a clause saying the U.S. can spend only so much on defense and the Soviets can spend 45% more. But the dynamics of the process—the attempt to reach a treaty more than the ultimate provisions—have curtailed American military programs. There is no more cogent statement of this than the melancholy testimony of Henry Kissinger reprinted alongside. Note well that Mr. Kissinger concludes that on the record the arms control process has restrained the U.S. without restraining the Soviet Union.

This result cannot be overcome simply by a tougher stance in the future, even if by some superhuman effort we could overcome the problems that arise when an open political system negotiates with a closed one. For we are left with provisions that limit U.S. technologies in ways that make them uneconomic to pursue. SALT-I killed the U.S. anti-missile program in precisely this way, and SALT-II threatens both the mobile ICBM and the cruise missile.

It is said that while the SALT-II provisions do not curb the Soviet arms drive, neither do they stop anything the Carter administration wants to build. This is far from clear, witness

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the reprinted remarks from Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov; obviously the Soviets believe the treaty outlaws the administration's MX missile because of professed difficulties in verifying how many are deployed.

It is said that there will be no renewal of the three-year protocol limiting ground and sea-launched cruise missiles to ranges of 600 kilometers—far less than the new Soviet SS-20 missile already threatening our European allies. Even SALT proponents concede these restrictions are so one-sided they cannot be accepted permanently. But at the very least, the protocol precedent, like the MX verification problem, creates huge bargaining chips for the Soviets. If SALT-III is to ignore the protocol precedent and ratify the MX, what else will we have to give up?

And if all this is laid aside, the fact remains that the Carter administration's plans do not call for a gap-closing effort. Lay aside, too, any of the predictable political effects on future efforts; in congressional budget committees the prospect of SALT-III is already being used to argue against new programs. Even if all this is overcome, SALT-II forecloses options that would be of extreme interest to any future administration interested in closing the gap. For example, it precludes cruise missiles based on short take-off-and-landing aircraft as an answer to the SS-20 in the European theater.

The real logic of the Nunn-Kissinger requests for more spending is precisely to demonstrate that a gap-closing effort can be mounted within the provisions of SALT. It is up to the administration to demonstrate this by coming up with real programs. So far the administration offers nothing except an offset to inflation to maintain its original plans. This leaves room for a few billion in concessions later, and perhaps the administration can come up with cosmetic concessions on the troops in Cuba. This would test whether Mr. Kissinger and Senator Nunn and Senator Church have the courage of their convictions.

\* \* \*

For arms control retains a diffuse popularity. In a nuclear era it is in fact an idea that cannot be permanently abandoned. But witnessing the negotiations over the past decade, real arms control can come only in a new military and political context, when the U.S. has reestablished its determination to avoid one-sided agreements. Many of the timid critics recognize this, but are unwilling to risk the unpopularity of saying so. So they say that we may have to cut off the current SALT talks, but never today, always tomorrow.

Mr. Kissinger, for example, wants the Senate to review Soviet behavior to see whether the negotiations need to be stopped. But in the past few years, Soviet-backed Marxist governments have taken over seven nations. How many would Mr. Kissinger allow before acting? Eight? Ten? Twenty?

Similarly, former UN Ambassador Moynihan, who obviously understands the dynamics, wants to stop SALT if the Soviets demonstrate they are not interested in real reductions. They have already, repeatedly and brutally, demonstrated that they are interested in no such thing.

Similarly again with the protocol. The only way we can avoid its renewal is simply to refuse, to scuttle the talks. If that is to be the ultimate outcome three years hence, why wait?

In fact, there will never be an easier time than now. With the Carter administration's clear record on foreign policy, and with a new election pending, there will never be an easier time to signal the need for change. With the Soviets so clearly on the march, there will never be an easier time to demonstrate linkage. With the treaty ratifying the Soviet building plans, there will never be an easier time to send the message that arms control means reductions. With the treaty not yet ratified, there will never be an easier time to insure that the protocol provisions do not become permanent.

There will never be an easier time to start a real national debate on meeting the Soviet challenge, perhaps to put arms control on a more solid future footing, and certainly to insure that we are not bullied and intimidated for the rest of this generation. This requires a sustained effort, and cannot be done with one stroke, but has to start sometime. The clearest, most meaningful and most essential starting place is the Strategic Arms Treaty. Between the clear opponents and the timid critics there are more than enough votes to reject the treaty and do it now; the Senators need only summon the courage to draw the obvious conclusion of their own logic.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 18THE BOSTON GLOBE  
12 September 1979

## Rhetoric on Cuba (continued)

To hear Sen. Frank Church, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee tell it, the presence of 2000 to 3000 Soviet combat troops in Cuba is all part of an elaborate test of the American will. If he's right, the Soviet test is surely peculiar. Rather than brazenly shipping troops into Cuba, the Soviets slipped them in and kept them well enough hidden in the countryside to escape American intelligence for several years. It is hard to see how American will can be tested by a challenge whose very existence is secret.

The whole notion of such a challenge simply doesn't wash, and Church has ill-served the country by using his prominence in foreign policy-making to build a confrontation whose resolution may well determine the fate of the SALT treaty.

Granted, the political pressures on the senator at home in Idaho are intense; he faces strong and conservative opposition. His pique at the Carter Administration, which told him a few months ago that reports of Soviet combat troops in Cuba were false, is understandable; he accepted that word and has now been embarrassed. Further, the episode does suggest weaknesses in US intelligence operations — weaknesses that, in this case at least, threaten important domestic political considerations more than our national security. And the presence of Soviet combat troops in Cuba certainly contradicts earlier US-Soviet understandings.

But Church's remarks have unwisely given support to

more conservative senators who would link troop removal to the SALT vote. His adamant declaration that the troops must go before SALT can be ratified have severely limited the negotiating room open to the State Department. As a domestic political matter the situation in Cuba must change before SALT is approved, but to insist on immediate removal of the troops sharply narrows the possibility for negotiating a face-saving retreat by the Soviets.

Church's declarations have strengthened a linkage between the Soviet troop presence and the SALT treaty that simply should not exist. Some say that the Cuban episode proves we can't trust the Russians and that the Senate should therefore reject SALT. But SALT is not premised on trusting the Russians; it is premised on being able to monitor them. To argue that if we cannot count Russian noses in Cuba, we cannot count Soviet missiles in Russia is foolish. Different types of surveillance are required and it is pretty clear that until recently we were not even trying hard to count Russian noses in Cuba.

If the SALT treaty is inadequate, the Senate should not accept it even if every Russian in Cuba is shipped home tomorrow. But if it does enhance our security, if it does set the stage for more substantial weapons reductions — and it does — then it should be accepted and the issue of the Soviet presence in Cuba should be resolved firmly but separately.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 18THE WASHINGTON POST  
13 September 1979

# No Combat Troops

THE TALKS HELD so far by Soviet and American diplomats have left the impression that the two sides are aiming to resolve their disagreement over Soviet troops in Cuba in a rather prompt and quiet way. The Kremlin denied the other day that "organized Soviet combat units" have newly "arrived" in Cuba, contending that its military personnel have been on the island for 17 years and are only training Cubans. The United States is evidently inclined to accept this explanation, if American intelligence determines on a continuing basis that the units found to be operating in a combat mode last month are no longer operating in that mode. That would mean at the least that, in the State Department spokesman's words, the units would be shorn of the "associated equipment" that makes them "functionally able" for combat. It also might mean clarifying, by verifiable agreement, a gray area that may exist between training and combat modes.

Moscow would save face by not having to admit that it either activated a brigade or took one out. Poorly placed to suddenly start objecting to an old training mission, Washington could claim it had foreclosed a politically disturbing combat presence.

If events actually are working out in this way, there will be loud objections. From the left, some Americans and many foreigners will say that the United States has no good reason dictating the form of the Soviet military presence in Cuba.

But in fact the United States has excellent reason. Everything about Cuba is politically and strategically

touchy, and has been for Fidel Castro's 20 years in power. The discovery and subsequent general awareness of a Soviet brigade come at a moment of fresh volatility in the Caribbean and of serious instability in overall Soviet-American relations and create a new and unsettling political fact. The United States need not apologize for a policy aimed at limiting new foreign military activity in its own back yard.

From the right, a good number of Americans are already suggesting that this is the time and place to draw the line against Soviet geopolitical expansion, and to compel Moscow to remove the troops. Some say this, by the way, ostensibly to help the administration ratify SALT, and others to kill SALT.

In fact, it is right and necessary to draw the line on a Soviet combat presence, however belatedly discovered and however currently innocuous. But is it sensible to take the long extra step of saying that the Soviet troops, even if shorn of combat capability, must be expelled? Acquiescence in continued Soviet training leaves intact the Cuban military activities supported by that mission. But neither the administration nor its critics have yet proposed a feasible and politically acceptable way to close them out.

The immediate problem is that of having found Soviet soldiers in a combat mode. This is what is unacceptable, and generally believed to be so. If the Soviets return their men to a training mode—and surely American intelligence, now that it's been alerted, can keep track—this affair can be put to rest. If the Soviets don't, that is another story.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
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13 September 1979

## The Cuban Connection

Over the past week, the news that there are perhaps 3,000 Soviet combat troops in Cuba has generated a vigorous boom of reaction among American politicians and pundits, who are now busy viewing with alarm, demanding rectification and discovering yet other examples of Soviet-Cuban influence and general disorder in the politics of the Western hemisphere. The Soviets seem annoyed at this sudden burst of energy; others are predicting cynically that it's not likely to last very long. Both reactions are to be expected. Nothing in American foreign policymaking of the past several years gives much cause to believe that the current show of concern has any deep roots or is likely to have much staying power.

The present furor began, of course, with the news about the troops' presence and their threat to the SALT treaty. But that was only the beginning.

Legislators and journalists began speculating that the troops were there to guard Soviet electronic surveillance facilities capable of monitoring vast numbers of American communications. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence announced hearings to see whether intelligence failures on our part had prevented us from knowing all this earlier. The President personally entered the fray to urge national calm and warn the Russians of the present danger to U.S.-Soviet relations, and the administration announced it was reviewing the whole issue of Cuban force buildups over the last several years.

Senator Henry Jackson called for the withdrawal of not only Soviet combat troops but Soviet armaments as well. Ex-President Gerald Ford announced that those Soviet troops sure hadn't been in Cuba during his term of office, while reports started circulating around Washington that what all those troops really signaled was the presence in Cuba of nuclear weapons.

Then the Latin American news began pouring in on other fronts as well. It happened that the nonaligned nations were holding their summit conference in that well known nonaligned capital, Havana, and President Castro carried out his previously formulated plan to lay some particularly virulent anti-American and pro-Soviet rhetoric on his assembled partners in neutrality. The timing was not terrific for detente. The administration freed four Puerto Rican terrorists who had been in U.S. jails for shooting five Congressmen and trying to kill President Truman; the released freedom fighters promptly began a round of rallies and press conferences, denouncing American imperialism and vowing to continue their fight for Puerto Rican liberation.

In Washington the administration, which had vigorously denied that there had been any Cuban-inspired funny business going on in the recent Sandinist coup in Nicaragua; warned Congress that it shouldn't deny aid to the new regime just because it was making some suspiciously Marxist-sounding noises. Over in nearby El Salvador, Sandinist-aided forces continued their escalating campaign against the current rightist government. And in Europe, we hear, observers are somehow taking the whole mess as a sign of the growing weakness of the West.

The American concern and attention are very loud and visible at the moment. But how can anyone, Soviets and Cubans included, take them very seriously? The troop buildup has been going on in Cuba for years. The Soviet surveillance of American citizens has repeatedly gotten attention on the front pages of American newspapers. For years the Cubans have been a major organizing force in the network of aid that supports anti-Western terrorist and guerrilla movements throughout Africa and Latin America. For years Cuba has been a chief agent of the anti-American rhetorical posture now spawning very concrete consequences for this country's relations with the Third World.

The administration has been in possession of all these rather obvious facts and has quite deliberately and consistently chosen to minimize their significance and refuse to allow them a significant place in determining American policy. Senator Church, it must be said, has been a loyal ally in the enterprise. What could the Soviets have thought of this, except that it is the Carter administration's settled intention to allow such behavior to continue? How can anyone believe that the administration has changed its fundamental convictions on this basic tenet of its foreign policy? How can the Carter people's present agitation be seen as anything but a piece of opportunism that will last no longer than the moment's political noise?

As long as the administration keeps acting so as to make this kind of perception plausible, it can expect nothing from the Soviets but their current habits of constant probing, reaching, and scrambling for more advantage. And as long as this continues, our foreign policy invites a whole succession of Cuban crises.

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CIA STUDIES

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10 September 1979

# Near-Term Oil Supply Adequate, Industry Study Says

NEW YORK (AP) — The world probably will avoid a repeat of this year's oil crisis over the next 18 months, but the outlook beyond that is not very good, according to two studies of petroleum supplies.

"Barring unforeseen negative developments, a continued improvement in the near-term world oil supply-demand balance can be anticipated," says a study released yesterday by Petroleum Industry Research Foundation, a non-profit research organization financed in part by the oil industry.

But, the study adds, "in 1981 the market outlook becomes potentially more troublesome" because increases in demand will surpass growth in supply.

That opinion is echoed in a recently released study of the oil situation by the Central Intelligence Agency, which says, "Although the current oil shortages may disappear when economic activity slows, they are likely to recur during the up-swing of the next business cycle."

Unless there is another crimp in the world's supply of oil — such as the revolution that crippled oil production in Iran for two months earlier this year — world oil supply should remain stable and possibly even increase a little through 1980, according to the reports.

At the same time, economic slowdowns around the world, particularly in the United States, will moderate demand, keeping oil markets in balance.

"The oil shortage which has plagued the U.S. and threatened other major importing countries for the past six months has begun to recede," according to the petroleum foundation report. "The restoration

of a balance between global oil supply and demand, ending the trauma of physical constraints on consumption, is now under way."

John Lichtblau, executive director of the industry group, warned that the balance is "precarious" and might be upset by further turmoil in the Middle East, particularly in Iran. Many oil executives say privately that resentment against the new Iranian government could build to revolution in the next few months.

"The political nature of the production function in several of the major OPEC countries renders supply inherently more unpredictable than demand," Lichtblau said.

On the other side of the supply-demand equation, however, "world oil demand is growing more slowly under the impact of a slowdown in economic activity and higher oil prices," according to the study.

The industry group predicts "oil consumption in non-communist countries will increase by 1 percent in 1979 and 0.6 percent in 1980," with strong growth in other countries balanced by a decline in demand in the United States as the recession takes hold.

But as the nation comes out of recession and world economies begin to regain steam in the early part of the next decade, the studies warn, oil supplies could become tight again.

The CIA report says that world oil production "probably will begin to decline in the 1980s," and while industrialized nations "somehow will adjust" to tighter supplies of energy, it will "require unprecedented rates of conservation" to do so.

ARTICLE APPEARS  
ON PAGE 21-17THE WASHINGTON POST  
10 September 1979

# Looking Ahead

## Rising OPEC Output Indicates Eased '80 Consumer Situation

By J. P. Smith

Washington Post Staff Writer

A new study of the world oil market finds that balance between supply and demand is being restored and the eased situation for consumers may continue through 1980.

The report by John Lichtblau, executive director of the Petroleum Industry Research Foundation Inc., says that world oil production continues to hold at record levels. Production by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries has climbed steadily since January; despite the loss of all or part of strife-torn Iran's crude oil.

"Restoration of a balance between global supply and demand, ending the trauma of physical constraints on consumption, is now under way," Lichtblau's report said. He adds that if OPEC does not cut back on production and if there are no severe political disturbances, next year could be free of shortages.

But in the following year, Lichtblau warns, "the market outlook becomes potentially more troublesome."

The "emerging new balance appears very precarious and could be unsettled by visibly unstable political forces in the Middle East on the supply side and unpredictable consumer reaction on the demand side," he said.

If OPEC maintains its second-quarter output of about 31.2 million barrels a day through the rest of this year, Lichtblau said, supplies in the noncommunist world "will be adequate and stocks at year end will be slightly higher than at the end of 1978."

Lichtblau's guardedly optimistic reading of world oil markets for the next year and a half is shared in many industry circles.

At Standard Oil Co. of California, Tom Burns said, "Our view is the combination of economic slowdown—which lowers oil demand—coupled with current levels of production will leave the world in supply-demand balance over the next six months."

The focus over the next year, however, is on Saudi Arabia, Iran and the actions of the consuming nations.

The Central Intelligence Agency, in a recent unclassified report, noted that 60 percent of the world's oil reserves are controlled by countries that have imposed arbitrary production ceilings.

Lichtblau's study, entitled "World Oil Perspective, 1979 to 1981," likewise focuses on production ceilings as the major factor in whether the world will move toward a marginal oil shortage or a glut.

Under optimistic conditions, Lichtblau said, OPEC would produce about 32 million barrels of oil a day. Under pessimistic conditions with Saudi Arabia cutting back oil output 1 million barrels a day, Iran reining in production 700,000 barrels, and others cutting back, Lichtblau said OPEC output could be down to 28.3 million barrels a day, a loss of 3.7 million barrels.

Lichtblau said, "If none of this volume [3.7 million barrels a day] is available in 1980, world supplies will not be adequate . . . if all the volume is available a modest surplus will exist throughout the year."

Saudi Arabia, the world's leading oil exporter, has twice this year agreed to raise production above its self-imposed 8.5-million-barrel-a-day ceiling. In January the kingdom announced it would produce up to 9.5 million barrels a day to make up for lost Iranian exports.

As Iran restored exports in the spring, the Saudis again lowered production to below 9 million barrels.

Then, after a series of contradictory statements, Saudi Arabia again raised production to its current 9.3 million barrels a day.

While the Saudis have never linked their production increase explicitly to movement on the Middle East peace settlements, many analysts in private say Riyadh may decide to reduce production again in October or November if the Saudis are not satisfied with U.S. efforts to win Israeli concessions on the Palestinian question.

The Saudi royal family and technocrats also are divided over whether Riyadh should continue to accumulate billions of dollars in surplus revenues that are eroded by inflation.

The result of these and other factors has left many intelligence and oil company analysts uncertain over Saudi intentions.

Iran, which was the cartel's second leading producer, poses similar uncertainties.

Despite murky reports and private warnings uttered by former Energy Secretary James Schlesinger and others that Tehran is now producing far less than it publicly declares, most experts as well as State Department officials say Iran is producing 3.7 million to 3.9 million barrels a day, about 3.1 million barrels of which are exported.

(Since the Iranian revolution, the U.S. share of Iranian oil exports has gone up, not down.)

Standard Oil Co. of Indiana's chief economist, Ted Eck, said, "It is widely believed their [Iran's] production capability is declining. The concern is that they have not been doing workovers"—essentially oil field maintenance.

At the State Department a more optimistic view is offered by a mid-level official who said, "Iran can produce 4 million barrels a day on a sustained basis. Uncertainties there are political, not technical."

CHICAGO DAILY CALUMET  
14 August 1979

# Weather To Be The Next Battleground?

By Edith Kermit Roosevelt

(A Panax Opinion Special)

History teaches us that a nation's future is often decided by a decisive breakthrough in weaponry - for example, the development of the crossbow by the British in the middle ages and the atomic bomb by America in World War II. An example in our own time may well be the development of weather weapons.

The concept of weather modification is not a new one. Nikola Tesla, a Yugoslavian-born scientist, discovered that the earth could be used effectively as a transmitter of electricity. In his experiments, he successfully lighted 200 electrical lamps from a distance of 25 miles without the use of wires. This ability to transmit electricity without the use of wires was important to his interest in weather modification because a great deal of controlled power is necessary to alter the jet stream in the upper atmosphere.

When Tesla died here in America in 1943, his papers were sent home to Belgrade, Yugoslavia, where, reportedly, they were made available to Russian scientists.

The United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in 1974, held hearings on proposed Weather Modification Treaties. In these hearings, the late Dr. Gordon MacDonald, former science advisor to President Johnson, outlined possible weather warfare methods such as steering hurricanes, manipulating the polar ice caps, creating guided tidal waves and modifying earthquakes.

The C.I.A. in a report entitled "Potential Implications of Trends in World Population, Food Productions and Climate" warned of the dangers an altered climate could create for the United States. Pointing out that the U.S. now provides nearly three-fourths of the world's net grain exports, the report states that if this should change substantially due to climate changes "massive migrations, sometimes backed by force, would become a live issue, and political and economic instability would be widespread."

There have been widespread reports of active weather alteration research conducted by the Soviet Union, and some U.S. government scientist speculate that the purpose of an elaborate construction project in the USSR is for the use of particle-beam technology to make massive changes in the weather. What is now being whispered in the intelligence community is that weather modification technology is being tested and a secret undeclared weather war is already underway.

For instance, one of those "freaks of nature" that took place off the coast of Newfoundland now seems to have been man-made. On April 2, 1978, a mysterious explosion damaged homes and cut off electrical power on Bell Island. The "freak nature" was really an extremely low frequency (ELF) standing columnar wave of electricity which collapsed and caused this localized electrical and structural damage.

This ELF vertical wave had been observed via satellite as it traveled across the Atlantic Ocean, and its trajectory was carefully followed by scientists at the Los Alamos Observatory. The standing columnar wave appeared to originate from Gomel, USSR, and was probably destined for a station located just east of Havana, Cuba. Scientific investigators connected with the Planetary Association for Clean Energy headed by Andrew Michrowski say that this Gomel facility has been known to emit these ELF signals either alone or in conjunction with a facility in Riga, Latvia. These signals began on Oct. 14, 1978, and their strength ranges up to 40 million watts, according to the PACE report. Communications Canada monitoring stations have determined that the pulse rate of the signals goes from 3.8 Hertz to 16 Hertz.

The PACE report which was issued late last year said that according to the U.S. Federal Communications Commission and Communications Canada, a radio station in Havana has been cooperating with the Soviet radio experiment since 1973. These PACE investigators point out that Bell Island is along the great circle route between a Tesla Magnifying Transmitter located at Gomel and the station located just east of Havana. The report also states, "It is well documented in articles, patents, lectures and notes of Nikola Tesla that the Tesla Magnifying Transmitter could, upon establishing terrestrial resonance, produce standing wave phenomena which could be manipulated to various ends, including weather control."

The question arises then of whether the Tesla technology is being used by the Soviets to create weather changes favorable to their strategic objectives. Part of the answer to that question might be found in the files of the Los Angeles Herald Examiner. In February, 1977, Stephen M. Aug wrote an article in which he reported that Russian scientists had interviewed Arthur H. Mathews, Tesla's former assistant who now lives in Quebec.

Perhaps the old saying "everybody complains about the weather but nobody does anything about it" is no longer true.

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TURKEY - U/2's

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ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A30THE WASHINGTON POST  
13 September 1979Soviet Concurrence Sought by Ankara

# Turkish Official Reiterates U2 Conditions

By Bradley Graham  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Turkey may yet allow the United States to fly U2s through its airspace in order to monitor Soviet compliance with the strategic arms limitation treaty, a senior Turkish diplomat here said yesterday.

In an effort to dispel a general impression in Washington that Turkey would resist the overflights, the official told reporters the flights would likely be approved if the United States could assure Turkey the Soviets would go along with them—something the Soviets so far have not been willing to do.

The official also sought to disprove earlier reports that Turkey had placed a price tag on the use of its airspace.

The remarks clearly left the doors open for an accord on the issue, although it was not the first time the Turks spelled out their conditions.

Since the loss of U.S. intelligence gathering posts in Iran, the use of the

high altitude U2s along Turkey's border with the Soviet Union has been seen as one of the principal ways of verifying Soviet compliance with SALT II. Verification of the highly technical provisions of the treaty is a sensitive issue in the Senate debate on ratification.

But the Turks have been touchy about U2 flights since CIA pilot Gary Powers, shot down in 1960 during a spy flight over the Soviet Union, revealed he had taken off from an American base in Turkey. The incident strained relations between Turkey and its huge neighbor, the Soviet Union.

Turkish reluctance about the flights seemed to deepen last June when Turkey's top military commander, upset by the refusal of the U.S. House of Representatives to endorse a \$50 million grant to Turkey, was quoted as saying his country would not permit the United States to fly the U2s over Turkey.

In the meantime, U.S. intelligence

experts have continued to consider a variety of means of checking up on the Soviets. A U.S. State Department official said yesterday that U2 flights "were still a possibility, although the United States is expected to rely on several surveillance methods."

The Turkish official termed the U2 flights still "a very sensitive" matter. He said the United States would have to provide Turkey with "precise information" showing that the proposed flights are "in line with the letter and spirit" of SALT before the Turkish government could approve them.

And, said the official, the United States must assure that the Soviets agree with that assessment.

U.S. officials maintain the proposed overflights are entirely in accord with SALT provisions on verification, but have been unable to give Turkey written assurances the flights are acceptable to Moscow.

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ON PAGE 2

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
13 September 1979

## Turks deny consulting Soviets

Washington

Contrary to published reports, Turkey is talking only to the United States and not to the Soviet Union about the US wish to use Turkish airspace for spy flights to verify the SALT II treaty with the USSR, senior Turkish Embassy officials said Sept. 12, according to Monitor correspondent John K. Cooley.

Some analysts have suggested that US pressure on the Russians to remove Soviet combat troops or intelligence installations from Cuba had led to new Soviet pressure on Turkey to close similar US installations there.

Turkish officials here insist that Turkey is not under Soviet pressure and is not consulting them. However, they add, Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit's government does want an answer to questions it asked the US last May about the proposed spy flights.

Turkey, they say, wants to hear from Washington whether the US and Soviets agree that such flights, from the British base of Akrotiri, in Cyprus, would conform to the letter and spirit of SALT II.

The US and Turkey are negotiating in Ankara for a new treaty providing US economic and military aid to Turkey's impoverished economy and previously embargoed military establishment. Turkey has said that continuous use of four US ground intelligence sites in Turkey to monitor the USSR are making "good progress."

Rep. Lee Aspin (D) of Wisconsin has proposed using US grain sales as leverage on Soviet policy regarding troops in Cuba or the import of oil technology. Instead of bargaining "a bushel of wheat for a barrel of oil" with OPEC (Organization Of Petroleum Exporting Countries) states, as often suggested, the US ought to consider wheat bargaining with the Russians, who will buy three or four times as much US grain this year as Arab oil states, Mr. Aspin said.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A1THE BALTIMORE SUN  
13 September 1979

# U.S. drops Turkish U-2 plan

## Use of spy planes to monitor SALT resisted by Soviet

From Wire Services

Washington—Faced with Turkish and Soviet resistance, the United States has put aside its plan to use overflights of Turkey by U-2 spy planes to monitor SALT II compliance by the Soviet Union, administration sources said yesterday.

But the sources, who declined to be named, said the Carter administration is still looking for alternative ways to collect data on Soviet missile tests, possibly using Turkish airspace.

The officials said Turkey was still waiting for the United States to assure it that the overflights conformed with both the U.S. and Soviet interpretations of the letter and spirit of the SALT II arms limitation pact signed last June.

The sources would give no details on possible alternatives, saying that publicity about the U-2 proposal had helped to torpedo the idea in Turkey.

The administration came up with the U-2 idea in response to the closing of intelligence bases in Iran. Those bases had the capability to "look" directly at Soviet testing sites and collect telemetry and other data from test missiles.

The idea was to have U-2 planes based in Cyprus or SR-71 planes based in the United States carry out monitoring over Turkish territory as needed.

Sources said the leak of the plan to U.S. news media before there had been sufficient opportunity to discuss it with Moscow may have made it impossible to carry out.

They said another press leak, about the presence of U.S. SALT monitoring installations in Norway, had caused immense damage to U.S. national interests and may have hurt plans to monitor SALT from that country.

The United States already has ground stations in Turkey, but the mountainous geography denies them a direct line of "sight" on the Soviet test site.

The U-2's would fly high enough along the Soviet border to overcome the mountains, if the Turks allowed them.

But when Warren Christopher, the deputy secretary of state, flew to Ankara last spring, he found Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit un receptive.

Mr. Ecevit told Mr. Christopher that the Turks would agree only if the United States obtained assurances from the Soviet Union that it considered the overflights acceptable under the SALT II provisions on verification.

"The Soviets have been no help" in supplying assurances, officials said yesterday.

The sources said the State Department still feels that the overflights are entirely in accord with the SALT provisions on verification.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 18NEW YORK TIMES  
13 SEPTEMBER 1979

## U.S. Won't Fly U-2's Over Turkey to Check Soviet on Arms Treaty

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 12 — The United States has given up the idea of using flights by U-2 reconnaissance planes over Turkey to verify Soviet compliance with the new strategic arms treaty, but Government officials said today that the Carter Administration hoped to use another type of aircraft to monitor the accord

with Moscow.

The officials said an earlier plan to use the U-2 over Turkey to monitor Soviet missile testing had been scrapped mainly because the plane posed political problems for the Ankara Government. The surveillance plane has been a sensitive issue in Turkish-American relations since 1960, when Ankara learned that American U-2's were flying over the Soviet Union from bases in Turkey without its knowledge.

More recently, the U-2 has figured prominently in the Senate debate over the arms treaty because it has been viewed as essential to monitoring Soviet compliance with restrictions on missile modernization.

The disclosure that the Administration

is seeking to use another type of aircraft to monitor the arms accord came after Sukru Elekdag, the new Turkish Ambassador here, clarified Ankara's position on the issue at a meeting with reporters this morning. Contrary to earlier reports, he said that Turkey was not seeking direct Soviet approval for any American flights but that it wanted the United States to assure Ankara that such practices were permitted by the arms accord.

He said that in earlier discussions with the Administration, Ankara had asked for assurances that flights over Turkey would be consistent with both American and Soviet interpretations of the "letter and the spirit" of the arms treaty. Mr. Elekdag said that Washington had not responded to the Turkish request so far.

A State Department official familiar with the issue declined to comment on whether the Administration had given Ankara assurances on the legality of the intelligence flights. Other aides, meanwhile, indicated that Washington and Ankara might agree soon on a formula for allowing American reconnaissance planes to operate over Turkey.

The officials would not identify the types of aircraft being considered for the U-2's role, but they said the planes were able to fly at high altitudes for extended periods.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A6

THE BALTIMORE SUN  
14 September 1979

### *U.S., Turkey still talking about overflights by U-2's*

Washington (Reuter)—The State Department said yesterday that talks were continuing about a proposal to send U-2 spy planes over Turkish air space to monitor Soviet compliance with the SALT treaty.

Answering reporters' questions, Hodding Carter III, a department spokesman, effectively denied press reports that the United States had given up plans for the U-2 flights.

"The subject is still under discussion in diplomatic channels," he said. "It follows from that that it has not been dropped."

At the same time, other sources said yesterday that the Carter Administration was negotiating with Turkey on the use of another type of aircraft to verify Soviet compliance with terms of the accord.

Last spring, Washington asked Ankara for permission to fly over Turkish territory to obtain data about Soviet missile tests.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 2

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
14 September 1979

# Inside the news—briefly

## US and Turkey discuss arms-monitoring posts

Ankara, Turkey

James V. Siena, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, began talks Thursday with Turkish ministers and military chiefs which are expected to cover the status of vital American listening posts in Turkey.

The present one-year provisional agreement on the US stations, important for monitoring Soviet compliance with the SALT II strategic arms limitation treaty, expires Oct. 9.

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**MISCELLANEOUS**

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE *A-3*NEW YORK TIMES  
13 SEPTEMBER 1979

## C.I.A. Director, Praised Briefly, Again Attacked

By RICHARD BURT

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 12.—Less than a year after he was criticized for having failed to anticipate the revolution in Iran, Adm. Stansfield Turner, the strong-willed Director of Central Intelligence, is again coming under attack.

In a handwritten note to Mr. Turner last November, President Carter said he was "dissatisfied with the quality of political intelligence" on volatile trouble spots, such as the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Officials report that, since receiving the Carter memorandum, Mr. Turner, together with other high-level intelligence aides, has started an extensive program to improve political reporting from sensitive regions.

According to both C.I.A. and White House officials, the program has begun to pay off, and policy makers praise Mr. Turner for the agency's performance during crises earlier this year in Nicaragua and Southeast Asia.

All the same, the 55-year-old retired admiral continues to generate controversy. The disclosure that a Soviet combat brigade has been in Cuba for some time has led to allegations that Mr. Turner, during debates among intelligence officials this summer, played down evidence of growing Soviet-Cuban military ties.

### Morale Problems Reported

Within the intelligence agencies, meanwhile, the recent departure of two of Mr. Turner's chief deputies has cast doubt on whether his efforts to reorganize and streamline the C.I.A. are succeeding. At the same time, Mr. Turner's continuing frictions with ranking aides in the White House and other parts of the Government are said to reflect a general feeling that the C.I.A. chief has been too eager to enter policy debates.

Mr. Turner has been at the center of controversy almost from the moment he took command of the C.I.A. in February 1977. While his efforts to centralize authority within the intelligence community reportedly angered officials in the White House and the Pentagon, his attempts to shake up the bureaucratic routine within the agency itself are said to have led to severe morale problems.

For the most part, Mr. Turner has brushed off these complaints. In a recent interview, he said that, despite a new spate of criticism, "I have never felt better." He called the morale problem within the agency "insignificant."

An area where foreign-policy officials said Mr. Turner deserved credit was the debate in the Senate over the new Soviet-American strategic arms treaty. Although Mr. Turner caused the White House great anxiety earlier this summer by refusing to take a public position on whether the accord could be adequately verified, he is said to have done an effective job at closed hearings before the Senate Intelligence Committee in July in convincing skeptical senators that the Administration could detect any Soviet cheating.

### 'Thirst for Publicity' Criticized

Yet many of the same officials who praised Mr. Turner for his performance in the arms treaty debate expressed concern over his approach on other issues. Some C.I.A. aides strongly criticized what one termed Mr. Turner's "thirst for publicity," his policy of making the agency more accessible to the press and his release of some intelligence reports to the public.

Questions are also emerging about whether Mr. Turner's attempt to reorganize the C.I.A.'s intelligence collection and analysis processes are working.

Soon after he took over the agency, Mr. Turner established the National Foreign Assessment Center, headed by Robert R. Bowie, a former Harvard University professor, which was charged with providing overall leadership for the thousands of analysts at the C.I.A. and other governmental agencies. Later in 1977, Mr. Turner created another new organization, the National Intelligence Tasking Office, which was meant to coordinate the intelligence-collection activities of the Government. The tasking office was led by Lieut. Gen. Frank A. Kamm, a retired army officer.

In recent weeks, however, both Mr. Bowie and General Kamm have resigned, amid suggestions that neither the foreign assessment center nor the tasking office had lived up to expectations.

Discussing his efforts to reorganize the intelligence establishment, Mr. Turner conceded he had encountered some problems, but observed that "introducing any new concept into the bureaucracy is hard."

SACRAMENTO UNION  
20 AUGUST 1979

Good intelligence is one of those things of national security you don't appreciate until it fails. Col. George Custer went into the Battle of the Little Bighorn expecting to meet 1,000 Indians; instead there were between 2,500 and 5,000. Gen. Douglas MacArthur's forces drove toward the Yalu River dividing North Korea and China, unaware that Chinese



STANSFIELD TURNER

troops were massing to attack. The Carter administration was caught napping as Iranian revolutionaries dethroned the shah.

Writer Tad Szulc made it abundantly clear in a series published in this newspaper last week that President Carter is determined to shake up the nation's intelligence apparatus so as to improve its efficiency and prevent further Iran-type failures. We wish him well, while urging him to "heal thyself." In Iran the problem was not always with the "producers" of intelligence—the Central Intelligence Agency and the American Embassy—but also with the "consumers." Even when pessimistic reports began to flow into Washington last fall, the White House in general and National Security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski discounted them in the belief that the shah was invulnerable.

But one of the basic drawbacks to the U.S. intelligence effort has

## Rejuvenating CIA Crucial role played by U.S. intelligence

been its scatter-gun approach to learning the military and economic potential of other nations. The Pentagon's National Reconnaissance Office operates the spy-in-the-sky satellites, while the Treasury Department collects foreign financial data.

AN EXECUTIVE ORDER by President Carter calling for reorganization gave CIA Director Stansfield Turner budgetary control over the intelligence community. This is an empire with a \$15 billion annual budget and tens of thousands of operatives, but it's clear that Admiral Turner has a long way to go to win the confidence of the administration and Congress.

There seems to be no question that the CIA no longer is involved in interference with the rights of other nations, such as assassination attempts on foreign leaders, or the rights of American leaders' citizens. This dirty linen was disclosed in congressional hearings in 1975 and 1976.

Such "rogue elephant" activities clearly have no place in U.S. intelligence activities. But there were indications that the CIA over-reacted to public criticism and demonstrated lack of initiative as it went about its duties, as in Iran where it did business only with the shah and his secret police, Savak.

WHETHER THE CIA shakes off morale problems and increases its efficiency will depend much on the outcome of a new "charter" being drafted by congressional oversight committees. Some members favor a new law that would require the president's personal approval of all major covert operations. This appears to be too cumbersome a process; more effective would be a joint congressional committee of limited size, along with the existing three-member citizens committee appointed by the president.

Such oversight procedures can and should be perfected. But there can be no letup in the administration's drive to build an innovative, coordinated intelligence apparatus that can keep track of the elements of power in the rest of the world.

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**Soviets in Cuba - Lots of Columns and  
Comments This Week**

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 8THE WALL STREET JOURNAL  
21 September 1979

## Carter Is Urged to Act on Soviet Brigade In Cuba, Possibly by Shelving SALT Pact

By KAREN ELLIOTT HOUSE  
And ALBERT R. HUNT*Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL*

WASHINGTON—Key congressional leaders bluntly warned President Carter that he must decisively respond to the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba, perhaps even by shelving the arms-control treaty.

Such a move by the White House would be a dramatic reversal of the President's insistence that the treaty shouldn't be linked to the Cuban controversy, and there isn't any indication that Mr. Carter will heed the lawmakers' advice. "Not at this stage," said one administration official.

But the suggestion is one sign of the mounting concern in Congress over the slow pace of U.S.-Soviet talks aimed at resolving the controversy. Congressional leaders came away from a White House meeting yesterday morning surprised and dismayed that apparently so little progress has been made in two weeks of top-level negotiations.

### Advice From Javits

The President, according to participants, told the lawmakers that the Russians are refusing to affirm the existence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba and don't show any receptivity to talk of removing the troops.

The White House contended that the President understands the seriousness of the situation and is prepared to act accordingly. Press Secretary Jody Powell quoted Mr. Carter as telling the lawmakers the controversy can be resolved through negotiations or "by action on our part." The President is "prepared to take whatever (unilateral) actions are appropriate," he added.

But lawmakers at the session said they weren't struck by the President's resolve. For instance, they noted, it was Sen. Jacob Javits (R., N.Y.), a key supporter of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, who implored Mr. Carter to warn the Soviets he is ready to shelve the treaty unless they show some flexibility.

At least one other highly influential Senator has advised the President to recommend that the Senate suspend consideration of the SALT II treaty until the presence of the Soviet brigade in Cuba is resolved. "It's

more and more unlikely that SALT will be voted on this year anyway," this Senator says. "And the treaty isn't going to pass unless this is resolved. So I don't think the administration would be losing anything and it might convince the Russians we're serious."

Even those Senators who didn't go so far as calling for a halt in the SALT debate warned Mr. Carter that the treaty can't be approved until the Cuban situation is satisfactorily resolved. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Frank Church (D., Idaho) said that before the Senate acts on SALT, it will demand "certification by the President that Soviet combat troops aren't in Cuba."

### Carter Asks for Time

For his part, Mr. Carter urged the lawmakers to give him more time. He said his administration is weighing a variety of options and asked lawmakers for their suggestions.

But time is running out for the President. Lawmakers at yesterday's session warned him that unless some progress is evident within the next week or so, he will come under increasing political criticism. After the White House meeting, Senate Minority Leader Howard Baker (R., Tenn.) said the situation "ought to have been dealt with by now." He added, however, that he has agreed to give Mr. Carter "a little more time."

The presidential briefing was designed primarily to persuade lawmakers and presidential contenders that criticizing the President at this time would only complicate negotiations with the Soviets.

Administration officials said Mr. Carter is acutely aware that he must appear decisive and strong in handling the controversy or risk escalating his political woes. National security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski is apparently urging the President to bargain tough and accept no solution rather than one that could be construed as a victory for the Kremlin. State Department officials privately insist that Mr. Brzezinski's advice is gratuitous and that an acceptable compromise still is possible. What Mr. Carter intends to do remains unclear.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE *A-2*NEW YORK TIMES  
21 SEPTEMBER 1979

# Vance Offers Ideas to Resolve Soviet Brigade Issue

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 20 — Administration officials said today that talks with the Soviet Union about its reported combat brigade in Cuba had taken a new turn, with Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance offering ideas for the first time on how to resolve the problem, which has jeopardized Senate approval of the strategic arms treaty.

The officials said that Mr. Vance's first four meetings with Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin of the Soviet Union, from Sept. 10 to 17, had been exploratory, with the envoy providing answers to specific questions about the location of the 2,000 to 3,000 troops, their mission, and the length of time they have been in Cuba.

"We are now in a position to begin discussing with the Soviet Union steps which could be taken to relieve — or to alter — the situation in a way that would be acceptable to the United States," an official said today before Mr. Vance's fifth meeting with the Soviet envoy.

### U. S. Proposals Are Not Revealed

The meeting, at the State Department, lasted an hour and an official said later that "the new phase" had begun. But he declined to describe the American proposals.

President Carter briefed Congressional leaders on the situation today without telling them what Mr. Vance was going to seek from the Russians. The Administration has stressed that the status quo in Cuba had to be changed, but has avoided seeming to issue an ultimatum to the Soviet Union.

Senator Frank Church, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, who was one of those at the session with Mr. Carter, said: "the two Governments appear to have reached that point in the negotiations where decisions are now to be made." Mr. Church has been in the forefront in the Senate in saying that the strategic arms limitation treaty, now before his committee, was dead unless the Soviet combat forces were removed.

### Church Looks for 'Certification'

Today, he said again, "I believe that the Senate will require a certification by the President that Soviet combat forces no longer are deployed in Cuba if the way is to be cleared for a consideration of the SALT treaty."

Senator Jacob K. Javits of New York, the ranking Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee, was more cau-

tious. He said, "The negotiations are in midcareer and one cannot tell how they will go" and "I do not believe this issue ought to be blown up as a major national crisis."

"This unit is no threat to the United States militarily," he said. "But it does offend United States sensitivity. And the Soviet Union has enough at stake with the United States so it ought to take account of our sensitivity."

The Republican leader of the Senate, Howard H. Baker Jr., who is a contender for the Republican nomination for the Presidency, said that he had told the President that the United States was being challenged "and you've got to meet this challenge."

He said Mr. Carter had asked "for a little more time" and Senator Baker agreed to avoid making any public recommendations for a while.

"We're talking about days," he said. "We're not talking about weeks. I don't think that the SALT treaty has a prayer in Hades of getting through the Senate unless the Russians do something to de-escalate this latest confrontation."

For Administration officials, the problem is that they are publicly committed to the finding of the intelligence community last month that a Soviet "combat" brigade is in Cuba and has been there for some time, perhaps since the early 1960's.

The Soviet Government has maintained, as stated Sept. 11 in the Communist Party daily Pravda, that the only Soviet troops in Cuba have been there since 1962 and have only a training mission.

The problem is to reconcile the two sides in such a way as to persuade the Senate to permit the arms treaty to go forward and not to foment a crisis over the issue.

Among the ideas discussed within the Administration have been the transfer of the Soviet brigade's heavy equipment, particularly tanks and artillery, to the Cuban Army and steps to insure that the Soviet brigade does not take part in combat maneuvers as it was doing in mid-August when it was photographed by an American satellite.

### Soviet Withdrawal Is Now Doubted

Administration officials have all but given up hope that the Soviet Union will withdraw the troops from Cuba. The emphasis has been on how to strip the unit of the combat capability, a capability that

the Russians publicly deny their troops have in Cuba.

Mr. Vance is expected to confer in New York, possibly next week, with Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko who is heading the Soviet delegation to the United Nations General Assembly session. Another meeting with Mr. Dobrynin is also planned in the next day or so.

The White House wants to be sure that the President does not appear to be weak in his handling of the situation. Reporters have been told that various options, short of outright military confrontation, are being studied as to how to retaliate against the Soviet Union if it refuses to change the situation.

Jody Powell, the White House spokesman, said the Administration was "pursuing the matter in an aggressive, very methodical manner."

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21 September 1979

# 14 Years in Cuban Jails

## American Endured Psychological Torture

By Art Harris  
Washington Post Staff Writer

His 14 years in Cuban jails began in solitary confinement with a steady diet of cornmush and maggots. He slept on a wooden bunk with no mattress and relieved himself through a hole in the floor. There were frequent interrogations beneath bright lights where guards fired rapid questions at him in Spanish he could not understand and asked him, among other things, "What do you want to say to us before we shoot you?"

"I was never afraid of that," said steel-nerved Lawrence K. Lunt, one of four Americans freed Monday after spending more than a decade imprisoned in Cuba on political and espionage charges. Nor did he blink, he said, when Cuban guards suggested that his Belgian wife, Beatrice, "was going crazy" raising their three sons alone.

"I knew it was nonsense," Lunt told reporters yesterday. "I knew she was leading as normal a life as she could."

These lies by guards were all part of the "psychological torture" Castro used in an attempt to break the Americans, said Lunt, who was never physically tortured. Transferred from jail to jail, he smuggled in magazines to keep abreast of life on the outside and banded together with other prisoners in educational seminars, those with more learning teaching those with less.

His faith in God, the works of Russian author Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the camaraderie of other political prisoners, twice yearly visits from his wife, and letters from friends helped him survive the years spent waiting and working in rock quarries.

Monthly packages of chocolates,

guava paste and writing materials delivered by the Belgian ambassador also buoyed his spirits, he said.

He even feigned interest in the propaganda lectures Castro used to try to rehabilitate the prisoners.

Lunt acknowledged that he had worked for the CIA, but said he was never paid. He declined to discuss details of the relationship.

He was 42 when arrested, a gringo rancher with 5,000 acres on the island, three young sons and a new wife. Leaving Havana to attend his parents' 50th wedding anniversary, Lunt was stopped at the airport and later jailed for spying. It was 1965.

In the early years, the State Department shrugged him off as a CIA matter, while the CIA denied that he was any of their business. All the while, of course, Lunt, a tired pawn in the chess game of international diplomacy, languished in Cuban jails.

He is 55 now, and many things have come to pass—Vietnam, men on the moon, women's liberation to name a few—but he says he is not bitter for the 14 years "taken away by the Communists." He regrets only "the exaggerated length of time lost with my wife and sons, missing their maturation."

"I have no regrets for what I did," said the former CIA contract employee. "I'm not bitter....My love of my country and all it stands for has been a sustaining factor in keeping the bitterness out of my heart, the feeling of being an American and all it entails."

Birds chirped merrily and sunlight streamed through the trees yesterday as the voice, a flat monotone that crowded out any hint of sentiment, trailed off and the mind sometimes wandered. Clad in the prison-issue wool pants he was given in Cuba (he said he hadn't had time to shop), Lunt sat on the Georgetown patio of his sister, Faith Titus, sipped from a glass of chocolate milk and piled on first a sweater, then a wool blazer because he had not yet adjusted to the northwesterly weather. When a police siren screeched through the stillness Lunt visibly winced.

"I hate that siren," said Lunt. "Everytime we were taken somewhere, we had an escort" with a siren.

In declining to discuss his relationship with the CIA, Lunt did say that he had been recruited by the agency during a trip to the United States, though "I never received any money" from them.

The son of a prominent New England psychiatrist who moved to Wyoming to ranch, Lunt briefly attended Harvard, and served as an Air Corps navigator in World War II and in the Air Force during the Korean War, he joined his father as a ranching partner for a time, then sold a small Rhode Island farm he owned in 1956 and set out with the grubstake, his wife and children to Cuba.

Why Cuba? "I wanted to find an undeveloped area where I could develop my own way; I was looking for a challenge and found it in a rundown ranch," he said of his former spread on the northern coast.

He began raising 350 head of cattle, experimenting with new breeding and farming techniques and paid five guajiros and their families "slightly more" than the going wages. In the final days of dictator Fulgencio Batista, whose oppressive policies offended him, he said he even aided Castro guerrillas.

When Castro later ordered hundreds of executions in 1960, Lunt suspected he had bet on the wrong horse. Nonetheless, as a large landowner in the early days of Castro's rise to power, he says he was tolerated because his ranching and farming activities were in keeping with the goals of the revolution.

None of that mattered, of course, when the Cubans arrested him for spying on May 26, 1965, and sentenced him to 30 years in prison. They had found anti-Castro Cubans hiding on his land, along with communication gear, sources say, and Lunt was reportedly keeping an eye on Soviet missiles he'd spotted in caves near the ranch.

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He spent the first few months in an interrogation cell in Havana, eating bread and milk for breakfast "well-cooked" maggots in the cornmeal mush for lunch, with soup and the same for dinner. It was the same fare behind bars at La Cabana, an old prison where the men slept stacked up on four-layer bunks. Sometimes they were fed a small fish, "mostly bones," recalled Lunt. Nowadays, he said, the fish is "used for fertilizer" and is "barely fit for human consumption."

"You get used to it," said Lunt, the scion of a wealthy family. "The way we are brought up eating different menus, I never thought I'd be able to adjust. But man's ability to adapt is incredible."

Cuban intellectuals and others political prisoners—that included three other Americans, all of whom were released Monday with Lunt—lived side by side with cockroaches, rats and bedbugs in "atrocious" conditions that hadn't improved in the 200 years since

La Cabana had been built, he said.

Every morning, guards came for the prisoners who were to be shot, and at 9 p.m. almost every night, Lunt heard the rifles crack. There were 15 to 20 executions each month in late 1965, he said. "We couldn't see them (shot), but we could hear the coup de grace."

In the first few years, he was allowed only Spanish books and magazines, but the prisoners soon discovered that by taping magazines and books to their bodies—along with tobacco leaves—they could fool the guards and keep up with the outside world. Families smuggled tape in with food bundles. When guards instituted naked body searches, prisoners outwitted them by sending the same naked prisoner in twice.

Lunt saw senseless brutality, too. Once, at a rock quarry on the Isle of Pines, a guard knocked him to the ground with the blade of his bayonet for no reason, Lunt said. When a fellow prisoner rushed to his aid, the guard shot him. The prisoner survived, Lunt said.

Nonetheless, the worse the conditions, the better the morale, he said.

But the physical conditions weren't nearly as difficult to cope with as the psychological techniques. Lunt described as "more exquisite torture . . . the Cubans have learned from the Russians."

They promised him that, "with a little cooperation, we can help you get out of prison. Tell us about your Russian affiliations," an affiliation which he said he never had. "They offered a sweet and gave you a sour," he said. He hung tough and made it for 14 years by "practicing self-control," getting regular exercise, studying and teaching other prisoners English and geography, and by praying.

"I've always had a great faith in God," he said. "What (also) keeps you going is the morale of fellow prisoners, loyalty of family and friends, and maintaining one's mental and physical health."

He called prison "a tremendous post-graduate course for me." Lunt said he read "everything from Shakespeare to the old philosophers of Europe." Illiterate prisoners, he said, not only learned basic grammar, but went on to speak French, German and Italian.

"Anyone who spends more than 10 years in prison," he said, "should find it an excellent chance for self-improvement."

In the early years, he was discouraged to meet other American prisoners who had heard little of him and the conditions, but he said his spirits never hit rock bottom. "I was born an optimist," he said. "I supposed I would be a long time in prison, but never as long as 14 years."

Gradually, over the years, while his wife raised their children in Brussels, prison conditions improved.

In the modern Combinado del Este prison he was watching television the day after President Carter pardoned four Puerto Rican nationalists, whose release Castro had set years ago as the price for the Americans' freedom. "We were all hoping Castro would keep his promise," said Lunt.

The next morning, the American prisoners were awakened at 3:30 a.m., ordered to pack in five minutes, and, 12 hours later, loaded into a Black Maria. They were taken to a comfortable holding cell where they were fastened up for eight days before being transferred to VIP quarters and "given the red carpet treatment—Russian pickles, ham, rum." Then they were put on a plane to the States.

He was not only shocked at bra-less women in T-shirts at the Miami airport, but was "appalled" by the varieties of food to choose from in supermarkets and the general "opulence of American life" after the austerity of Cuba.

The last few days of adjusting have been a "truly Rip Van Winkle experiment," he said.

His plans are now to be with family, perhaps to ranch in Wyoming.

Lunt was asked why he went back to Cuba after CIA officials warned him not to return during a visit to the United States in 1964. He went back, he said, "because I didn't want to leave those five men and their families who I knew were implicated with me."

Three of the five cowboys who worked his ranch spent from one to five years in jail, he said. The other two spent 10 to 12 years behind bars. Lunt and his ranch hands spent the first few years together before being split up.

The Cubans "felt I was a bad influence on them," he said, cracking a smile.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 1-2bTHE WASHINGTON POST  
21 September 1979

# U.S. Asking Soviets to Withdraw Cuba Troops

By Robert G. Kaiser  
and Don Oberdorfer  
Washington Post Staff Writers

The United States is asking the Soviet Union to withdraw its combat troops from Cuba as negotiations on the matter enter the crucial decision-making phase, President Carter reportedly told key lawmakers yesterday.

According to participants in the White House briefing for senior members of Congress, Carter added that a neat and complete withdrawal of the Soviet force is unlikely, given the complexity of the situation.

If the problem cannot be solved through negotiation, Carter continued, the United States is prepared to take "offsetting and compensatory" actions of its own. Administration officials said such U.S. contingency options, which have been under intensive discussion at the White House, would not be in the nature of a military threat. The possible countermoves under consideration were not disclosed to the lawmakers.

The president appeared to be upset, according to participants, with Soviet statements that it has only a long-standing military training center in Cuba, rather than a combat brigade as the United States insists. At one point

in the briefing, Carter is reported to have charged the Russians "lied" to the United States about the mission of the troop unit.

The White House briefing, which provided the most detailed report to date on the difficult and sensitive negotiations, came several hours before Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance met Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin in their fifth round of talks on the issue at the State Department.

An authoritative Carter administration official told reporters that the discussions up to yesterday were primarily a fact-finding exchange, with the United States asking "a series of

very specific questions" about the Soviet force in Cuba, and the Russians providing replies after consideration "at a very high level" in Moscow.

"We now have as much information as it is possible to derive" from the diplomatic exchange and from a thorough analysis of data available over the years to U.S. intelligence, according to the official, who declined to be quoted by name.

The negotiations are now entering a new phase in which Washington and Moscow will begin discussing steps "to relieve—or to alter—the situation in a way that would be acceptable to the United States," the official continued.

Carter is reported to have told the legislative briefing that the United States hopes for an answer from Moscow by the end of this week to the position that was presented by Vance to Dobrynin in their meeting yesterday. If this is not forthcoming, Vance will take the issue to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko in a meeting expected to take place late next week in New York, where Gromyko is attending the United Nations General Assembly.

With Senate approval of the strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT II) hanging on the successful resolution of the troops-in-Cuba issue, several of the lawmakers urged Carter to move quickly. After requests from the legislators, he agreed to brief them again in about a week.

Although it was widely assumed that the United States would ask for withdrawal of the 2,000 to 3,000 Soviet troops, until yesterday high officials had avoided any description of their objective in the negotiations other than to say with deliberate ambiguity that "the status quo is not acceptable."

Carter's remark about the difficulty of achieving the U.S. goal in neat and complete fashion seemed to hint at possible solutions well short of the maximum. One legislator said he obtained the impression that the Soviets have already ruled out a total withdrawal of what the United States describes as the combat unit.

The Soviets have publicly insisted that their force in Cuba is unchanged in its number or function over the past 17 years. A number of U.S. intelligence analysts now accept as a real possibility the Soviet Union's claim that its force has been in Cuba that long, but U.S. intelligence continues to insist that at least part of the force is organized and equipped as a combat unit.

Both Carter and his national security affairs adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, referred during yesterday's briefing to a 1969 fact-finding report to then President Nixon by Nelson A. Rockefeller, who was then governor of New York. After an official trip to Latin America, Rockefeller reported the presence of about 6,000 Soviet troops in Cuba. Some of the lawmakers took this reference to be a Carter administration suggestion that a Soviet combat force in Cuba dated back at least to 1969.

Much of yesterday's meeting was consumed by the comments of the legislators, including suggestions that Carter take a tough line in the negotiations and lawmakers' estimates of the impact on approval of SALT II.

By bringing Congress abreast of the negotiations, Carter was able to obtain firsthand a better sense of the legislative mood and desire as hard bargaining with the Soviets begins. Carter was also clearly bidding for bipartisan backing for his position and for the forbearance of the lawmakers while Vance pursues the U.S. objective in the secret talks.

It was also useful, from the White House viewpoint, that several lawmakers made strong public statements immediately after the meeting emphasizing the political gravity of the problem of the Soviet troops. Any chance

CONTINUED

~~that the Soviets will accommodate~~  
Washington is believed to rest on a calculation that such action is required in the interest of SALT II and the continuing working relationship of the nuclear super powers.

According to participants, Senate Minority Leader Howard Baker (R-Tenn.) told Carter he would give a little more time before taking a strong stand publicly about the troops issue. Baker, who is a contender for his party's presidential nomination, is also reported to have said this is Carter's "test" by the Soviet Union and urged the president to rise to it.

Chairman Frank Church (D-Idaho) of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who three weeks ago today first publicly disclosed the administration's conclusion that a Soviet combat brigade is in Cuba, is reported to have reiterated his position that SALT II cannot be approved without withdrawal of Soviet combat troops.

Church went on to say, according to participants in the meeting, that the Senate might attach understandings to SALT II saying that the treaty could go into effect only when Carter could certify that all Soviet combat troops had been removed, and saying that the United States retains the right to withdraw from the treaty if Soviet combat troops ever return to the Western Hemisphere.

Meeting reporters outside the White House after the unannounced early-morning meeting, Church called the current diplomatic negotiation "extremely vital" with "far-reaching effects upon our relationship with the Soviet Union."

He said a crucial issue is "the combat character of the [Soviet] force and the circumstances under which it is deployed."

Sen. Jacob Javits of New York, senior Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee, cautioned that the troops issue ought not "be blown up as a major national crisis" because everyone agrees that "this unit is no threat to the U.S. militarily." Javits added that "it does offend U.S. sensitivity" and that he is hopeful that the Soviets will realize this and take corrective action.

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ON PAGE 1

BOSTON GLOBE  
20 SEPTEMBER 1979

NEWS ANALYSIS

# A Cuba scenario

By William Beecher

**WASHINGTON**—The Carter Administration is considering borrowing a page from Hollywood in an attempt to settle the mounting political crisis over the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba.

According to a well-placed source, the technique is known in the movie business as "fade-in, fade-out." A dramatic scene appears on the screen and just as rapidly dissolves.

Applied to the explosive issue of Soviet troops—which the Russians claim are only in Cuba as military advisers and the Administration insists are there as a fully organized and armed combat brigade—the tactic would be to suggest that the shape and duties of the Soviets be changed to conform to Russia's public description.

Thus, the Soviets wouldn't publicly admit anything but they would be expected to:

—Disband the brigade garrisoned at two cantonments west of Havana.

Turn its tanks, artillery and armored personnel carriers over to the Cuban armed forces, which use the same type of equipment.

—Reassign some of the brigade's personnel, especially officers and noncommissioned officers, to advisory duties with the Cubans and discreetly call the others home in twos and threes.

The object of this compromise would be to avoid a humiliating admission and seeming retreat by the Russians, while taking into consideration President Jim-

my Carter's assertion that the "status quo" of the Russian brigade was "not acceptable."

The reason the Soviets might agree—and that is far from certain—is because the compromise might go a long way toward saving the imperiled SALT II, one source pointed out.

Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and an Administration-commissioned floor general on the treaty flight, has insisted that SALT will not be ratified unless the Russians pull out the combat forces.

Other senators are on the fence for other reasons: Some are unenthusiastic about the terms of the treaty, worried about the relative rise in Soviet military strength and aggressiveness, and disappointed at the Administration's unwillingness to pledge 5 percent defense budget increases in each of the next two years. They see the Cuban issue as a critical test of Carter's ability and resolve in dealing with the Russians and of Moscow's sensitivity to legitimate American concerns.

Assuming the "fade-in, fade-out" scenario is proffered to and accepted by the Russians, how might it be presented publicly, while allowing all sides to save face?

According to one knowledgeable source, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance could appear at a closed joint session of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees. He would detail the negotiated solution—stressing, however, the need to maintain secrecy for diplomatic and intelligence reasons.

He then could have Adm. Stansfield Turner, director of the CIA, perform a show-and-tell briefing, with reconnaissance photos of tanks leaving the Soviet truck parks and going to Cuban parks, and a discussion of intercepted communications confirming the transformed situation.

Turner might point out that although, partly because of a lack of attention and resources, the brigade slipped in and was undetected for a time, the United States now is determined to focus sufficient intelligence resources on Cuba to assure no

similar activities might elude immediate detection.

The President, perhaps at a press conference, could then respond to questions about inevitable press leaks of the Vance-Turner briefing by assuring the nation the issue had been satisfactorily resolved.

He could argue that discretion prevented him from a full airing of what had been agreed but that the relevant congressional committees had been briefed sufficiently to "satisfy any reasonable man."

If Church and a few others then stood up on the Hill and declared they were satisfied but had been pledged to secrecy, that might be enough to dissolve the crisis atmosphere.

Congressional critics, of course, might point out that if thousands of Soviet-military advisers remained in Cuba under any label, they could be quickly assembled into combat units, issued arms, and function as combat troops. But this has always been theoretically possible, and the United States has never raised a peep about Russian advisers in Cuba.

Sen. Henry Jackson (D-Wash.) has insisted that not only the brigade but also advanced Soviet MIG-23 fighter-bombers must go, that the Russians must agree not to provide any more submarines or other sophisticated warships to Cuba.

And Sen. Ernest Hollings (D-SC) wants SALT tabled while a select Senate panel investigates the broad sweep of Soviet and Cuban military activities around the world and what should be done about it.

If the concern in the Senate over Soviet activities in Africa, Asia, the Persian Gulf and the Western Hemisphere has not moderated by November, when the treaty is expected to go to the floor for debate, the whole issue might be put off until spring, Administration and Hill sources agree.

That would throw SALT and questions about the shifting balance of power right into the middle of the presidential primary campaign. Carter and possibly Sen. Edward Kennedy—if by then he is a declared candidate—would presumably be arguing for ratification, and most Republican candidates presumably would be opposing it. Peace, detente and defense would then emerge as a major issue of the 1980 presidential sweepstakes.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A1-7THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)  
21 September 1979

# U.S. Toughens Stand On Force in Cuba, To 'Act' if Talks Fail

By Phil Gailey  
Washington Star Staff Writer

President Carter has told a group of congressional leaders that the United States will take "whatever actions are appropriate" if the Soviet Union fails to negotiate an acceptable solution to the presence of Soviet combat troops in Cuba.

The administration reportedly is still holding out for a withdrawal of the combat force, but U.S. officials now think that is an unlikely prospect. Still, a high-level administration source insisted yesterday that the president will not settle for a "cosmetic" solution.

White House Press Secretary Jody Powell, reporting on the president's session with a group of congressional leaders yesterday, would not say what options Carter is considering. However, a top White House official later emphasized that military action is not among the options on the president's list.

In his meeting with the congressional group, Powell said the president reiterated his position that the status quo in Cuba is unacceptable and said the problem can be resolved through negotiations or "by action on our own."

Carter told them that the United States is prepared to act on its own if negotiations fail to resolve the controversy.

House Democratic Whip John Brademas, one of those present at the meeting, said later that Carter spoke of options "that would be unattractive from the viewpoint of the Soviet Union."

Carter invited the congressional leaders to the White House for an unannounced meeting yesterday after a Monday meeting of the National Security Council led to a fresh formulation of U.S. options. The session took place a few hours before Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin sat down for their fifth round of talks on the problem.

The president appealed to the congressional group for patience, to give him more time to negotiate a settlement. One of those present said the president seemed upset with the Soviets for their refusal to even acknowledge the combat character of their brigade in Cuba.

Powell said the talks with the Soviets "are moving in an appropriate fashion." The administration is "pursuing the matter in an aggressive, very methodical manner," he added.

He said no deadline has been set for resolving the problem, which threatens to take a toll in U.S.-Soviet relations. So far, the public position taken by the Soviets gives no indication of their willingness to yield to American pressure.

In appealing for more time for the negotiations, Carter explained that the process so far has concentrated on gathering intelligence data and posing specific questions to the Soviets. The talks are entering a crucial bargaining stage, he said.

"We are now in a position to begin discussions with the Soviets on steps which could be taken to alter the situation in a way acceptable to the United States," one administration official said following the briefing for the congressional leaders.

Members of the group agreed to restrain their public statements on the issue, but they repeated their warning that the presence of 2,000 to

3,000 Soviet combat troops in Cuba is endangering the SALT II treaty.

Sen. Frank Church, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, told reporters after meeting Carter that the Senate "will require certification by the president that Soviet combat forces are not in Cuba."

Church said "the two governments appear to have reached that point in the negotiations where decisions are now to be made."

Senate Minority Leader Howard Baker, a Republican presidential candidate, said he would give Carter "a little more time" to settle the controversy, but made it clear that his patience is wearing thin.

He said the Soviet troops in Cuba are only part of a pattern of Soviet military expansion and suggested that the United States should be equally concerned about the presence of Soviet MiG fighters and submarines in Cuba.

Carter is being challenged by the Soviets, Baker said, and how he rises to this "test" will have a great deal to do with determining whether the United States can restrain Russian adventurism in the Western Hemisphere.

At the request of some of the lawmakers, Carter promised to brief them again on the status of the negotiations in about a week.

Others attending the session included Sen. Barry Goldwater, R-Ariz., Sen. Ted Stevens, R-Alaska, and House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill.

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ON PAGE A1-27THE WASHINGTON POST  
21 September 1979

# Sense of Duty Behind Cuba's Global Role

By John M. Goshko and Walter Pincus  
Washington Post Staff Writers

The controversy over U.S. charges about a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba has obscured an important aspect of Cuba's role in international affairs: Fidel Castro's own 20 years of military diplomacy in the service of radical revolutionary movements around the world.

Because Castro's overseas activities usually have dovetailed with Soviet policy and profited from Russian financial and material support, there has been a tendency to regard his Cuban troops as communist-bloc "Gurkhas" hired out to Moscow in the service of Soviet expansionism.

In reality, though, the Cuban leader has not been a mere Soviet mercenary sending his soldiers across the globe at the Kremlin's dictate. Instead, Castro has chosen to involve himself in military conflicts beyond the confines of Cuba for reasons that transcend the rivalries between Moscow and Washington.

Thus, whatever settlement of the current crisis finally is reached between the two superpowers, none of it

is expected by U.S. experts to limit Castro's future military interventions in the civil wars and guerrilla revolutions of other countries.

Cuban military involvement in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East traces back almost to Castro's 1959 seizure of power.

As early as 1961, there was a handful of Cuban troops in Ghana giving training in guerrilla tactics; in 1963, Cuban tanks, other arms and more than 50 technicians arrived in Algeria to fight in the Moroccan border dispute; in 1965, about 250 Cuban military men went to Congo-Brazzaville to train a militia, and in 1973, about 200 Cubans went to South Yemen to provide both guerrilla and pilot training. Unconfirmed Israeli reports put Cubans in Syria that same year.

Over that same time period, small training groups of Cuban soldiers had worked in Guinea, Equitorial Guinea, Somalia, Zaire, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Iraq.

Thus precedent existed for the 20,000 Cubans who went to Angola beginning in 1975 and the 16,000 who arrived a year later in Ethiopia.

The approach was slightly different in the Western Hemisphere, Castro's backyard, but the pace was no less hectic.

Training for guerrillas from Latin and Central American countries was

begun in Cuba in the early 1960s; a Cuban-led guerrilla group, headed by Ernesto (Che) Guevara, Castro's close friend, was discovered and destroyed in Bolivia in 1967 while similar Cuban-backed efforts were being quashed in Venezuela, Peru and Colombia.

Although the Cubans have been reported by U.S. intelligence sources as taking high casualties from their African ventures, exact figures are not known. But whatever they are, the dead and wounded have not dampened the island's support for Castro's deployments.

The overseas military adventures are accepted by the Cuban people, according to U.S. intelligence, "as an international responsibility to assist wars of liberation."

The Cuban job market is also overflowing and overseas military service, with special family and pay benefits, has become a means of advancement in the Cuban revolutionary society.

The Sandinista movement dedicated to the overthrow of Nicaragua's Somoza regime began in Cuba in 1962. Similar groups, opposed to regimes in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, are represented in Cuba.

The Soviets provide direct and indirect financial aid to Cuba at a rate now pegged at \$3 billion a year by U.S. intelligence. Shipments of military equipment also have been stepped up recently. The reason, according to a recent Defense Intelligence Agency briefing to a House subcommittee, was that in the past Cuba got older weapons but now "Cuba has been taking delivery of newer weapons systems comparable to those received by Moscow's other allied states."

Some American politicians and intelligence analysts look on this stepup of aid and the discovery of a Soviet combat brigade as signs of a new, direct Kremlin challenge to a weakened President Carter. But many Cuban experts in the United States see it only as an extension of what has gone on in the past, inside and outside Castro's island.

A 1977 Pentagon-financed study of Cuban military activities in Africa and the Middle East underscored the nature of the Havana-Moscow relationship.

The study rejected the assumption that Castro's dispatch of thousands of combat troops to aid the Marxist forces in Angola in 1975 was "a radical and dangerous departure in Cuban foreign policy ... a calling-in of Cuban debts that led Cuban troops to fight as Moscow's all-purpose mercenaries in a war by proxy."

Instead, the study said that "Though Angola was unique in some respects, in others it matches a pattern of Cuban military diplomacy established over the past decade and a half." In terms of Africa, that Cuban policy goes back at least to the 1961 Ghana mission.

A year or two later, a boatload of Cuban tanks—obtained from Russia—and military personnel arrived in Algeria to fight in the Moroccan border war. While it wasn't until the mid-1970s that Cuban troops began showing up by the thousands in countries like Angola and Ethiopia, their tracks have been discernible in many of Africa's lesser conflicts as advisers to the radical side in all the ensuing years.

These African involvements have been part of a larger pattern that has seen the Castro regime, throughout its years in power, identify openly with what it regards as Third World "wars of liberation" against imperialism and offer military aid to "progressive" regimes and revolutionary movements.

At different times, the main thrust of this aid has been directed at different areas — Latin America in the 1960s, Africa and secondarily the Middle East in the 1970s and, in the upcoming years, possibly back toward Latin America, where increasing instability within Central America and the Caribbean could present Castro

with new targets of opportunity for military assistance activities.

In most cases there has been a natural community of interest between these Cuban activities and Soviet policy. By cooperating militarily with the Soviets, Castro unquestionably has been able to make partial repayment to Moscow for the massive financial and economic assistance that enables him to maintain Cuba as an independent communist bastion 90 miles from the shores of the United States. Soviet subsidies often pay for troop and weapons transportation and Soviet equipment is provided Cuban forces overseas.

Although Castro regards the Soviet Union as Cuba's natural ally, he has always been assertive of Cuba's right to chart its own course in foreign affairs.

Throughout Castro's years in power, the dominant, unchanging thread in this course has been the line enunciated by his most famous collaborator, the late Guevara, who said: "The duty of every revolutionary is to make revolutions."

In short, Cuba has been willing to involve itself in foreign military adventures, not solely because it's been told to do so by the Soviets, but because Castro and his closest associates believe deeply that it is their duty.

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In some instances, ~~the Cuban~~ blends easily with Soviet aspirations. That was the case in Angola where both Havana and Moscow emerged as natural allies of the Marxists contending for power in that country's civil war. But, as the Pentagon study notes, each took part for its own distinct reasons. The study said:

"Cuba had ample incentives of its own to send its troops to Angola, apart from any reasons the Soviets may have had, and independent of any Kremlin orders to do so. This is not to say that Cuba's behavior did not serve Soviet interests, but only to observe that Soviet behavior equally served Cuban interests — the two sets converged."

There have been instances when Soviet and Cuban attitudes about foreign military aid haven't come together so neatly.


The most recent striking example has been in Ethiopia, where Cuba, at Moscow's urging, enthusiastically committed massive forces to help the Ethiopians repel an invasion from neighboring Somalia. But when the Soviets and Ethiopians then asked for Cuban aid in quelling the secessionist movement in the Ethiopian province of Eritrea, the Cubans balked on the grounds that they considered the Eritrean rebels' cause as a possibly legitimate struggle for independence.

An even deeper schism occurred in the 1960s when Havana turned itself into a training center, refuge and source of arms for guerrilla movements trying to overthrow the governments of such Latin American countries as Venezuela, Colombia, Peru and Guatemala. In that period, Castro even tried unsuccessfully to promote the Latin American Solidarity Organization (known as OLAS after its Spanish initials) as a mechanism for fostering violent revolution throughout Latin America.


Such tactics ran directly counter to Soviet policy, which emphasized trying to win power in Latin America through orthodox, Moscow-line communist parties operating within the established political processes. In this, the Soviets were influenced partly by the desire to make some detente tradeoffs with the United States and partly by fear that Castro was trying to use the guerrilla movements to make himself the ultimate arbiter of communism within the hemisphere.

These differences put severe strains on the Soviet-Cuban relationship. It wasn't until the end of the decade when most of the guerrilla movements—including Guevara's abortive foray into Bolivia—had failed and Castro was encountering severe domestic economic difficulties that Moscow was able to exert sufficient leverage to cool off Havana's support of Latin guerrilla forces.

Staff writer Karen DeYoung contributed to this article.



By Richard Forno—The Washington Post



# Senators, White House aides hint SALT can be saved by Soviet gesture on Cuba

By HENRY L. TREWHITT  
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—Administration officials and several influential senators indicated yesterday that the SALT II treaty might be saved by something less than withdrawal of the Soviet combat brigade in Cuba.

They all judged that some Soviet gesture to eliminate the combat potential of the troops was necessary. But no one, following a meeting of President Carter and a Senate delegation, argued specifically for outright withdrawal.

Ratification prospects for SALT, the strategic arms limitation treaty, were uncertain even before the presence of the troops was revealed at the end of August. They worsened as some senators demanded the troops' withdrawal as a precondition for approval of the arms control treaty.

Some still do. But the attitude of those who talked with Mr. Carter yesterday is especially important. The emphasis clearly was on some compromise that might save face on both sides.

There has been no indication what action the administration might take if the Soviets failed to reduce the combat presence. But administration officials have suggested that the United States might grant favored trade status to China while withholding it from the Soviet Union, deny advanced technology or even establish a comparable American presence in some area of primary interest to the Soviet Union.

An administration official said that the U.S. to this point had been assessing information about the troop presence, part of it from answers to questions put to Soviet diplomats. Cyrus R. Vance, the Secretary of State, met with Anatoly F. Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador, for the fifth time yesterday and plans to meet with Andrei A. Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, in New York next week, if not before.

Now, the official said, the administration is ready to begin talking about steps to relieve or alter the situation in an acceptable way. He did not mention withdrawal.

Neither did Senator Frank Church (D., Idaho), the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as he and other members of the Senate group left the White House yesterday.

He did say that "the Senate will require

certification by the President that Soviet combat forces no longer are deployed in Cuba if the way is to be cleared for consideration of the SALT treaty." He added, however, that "the issue is the combat character of the force and the circumstances under which it was deployed."

Senator Jacob K. Javits (R., N.Y.), the senior Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee, in effect adopted the often-stated administration position: The status quo is unacceptable.

"I am hopeful that there will be a change in the status quo," Mr. Javits said, "and that will remove the roadblock: the roadblock being the untrammelled consideration of SALT."

"The Soviet Union has enough at stake with the United States so it ought to take account of our sensitivity and be willing to do something about it. And that, I think, is what we're waiting [for] and I'm very hopeful that it will in the next few days."

Even Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr. (R., Tenn.), the minority leader, spoke of getting the Soviet troops to "stand down." The best answer was withdrawal, he said, "but maybe there are variations on that theme."

Unlike Mr. Church and Mr. Javits, Mr. Baker has all but committed himself against SALT on its merits, the troop issue aside. But in any case, he said, "I don't think that SALT treaty has a prayer in Hades of getting through the Senate unless the Russians do something to de-escalate this latest confrontation."

From the beginning, the administration has stated a position repeated several times yesterday: It is the combat nature of the 2,000 to 3,000 troops that is bothersome. No one suggests they threaten the U.S. directly and no one questions Moscow's right to send advisers to Cuba.

But the combat presence in an area of supreme American interest is regarded as a severe political challenge. Mr. Baker, who plans to run for president, said he was equally concerned about the MiG-23 fight-

er-bombers and the non-nuclear submarine recently sent to Cuba.

"What does Cuba need with a submarine?" he demanded. It all added up, he judged, to "a Russian testing of Jimmy Carter." But the President had asked him to withhold public announcement of his own recommendations and criticisms, he said, and he would comply.

However, he added, "I do think we have options, and they range over a wide area," one of them being suspension of the SALT treaty.

All the remarks yesterday were consistent with a speculative solution to SALT's future being considered by several members of Congress. There were some indications that Mr. Church has suggested some of its elements to the President.

First, senators who insist on greater defense spending must be satisfied. Mr. Carter has proposed a budget increase, but one short of what defense-minded senators want. What amounts to a negotiating process is under way on that point.

Next, SALT might be adopted along with a reservation proposed by Senator Dennis DeConcini (D., Ariz.). It would specify that the U.S. and the Soviet Union could not exchange ratification documents—the final step—until Mr. Carter could certify the absence of Soviet combat units in Cuba.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union would have to be persuaded to break up the brigade. The tanks and artillery weapons might be turned over to the Cubans—a gesture consistent with the public Soviet identification of the troops as on a training mission for Cubans.

In the end, Mr. Carter might certify that the troops no longer amounted to a combat force. Whether such a partially cosmetic answer would be acceptable to either the administration or the Senate is untested. But few analysts here believe the Soviet government would accept the humiliation of publicly sending the troops home, as it did its nuclear missiles in 1962.

"It all comes down to how much respect the Russians have for us and how badly they want something from us, including SALT," a U.S. diplomat said.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 10CHICAGO TRIBUNE  
15 SEPTEMBER 1979Nick Thimmesch

# Intelligence slipped on Cuba-

## —but where's the crisis?

WASHINGTON — The rumpus over the "discovery" of Soviet combat troops in Cuba reveals more about the failings of human nature than the world Communist plot. This is an overblown story that will have to spend itself.

President Carter is caught in a bind. He must keep the Senate on a steady course for ratification of SALT II, while reassuring senators that the U.S. intelligence apparatus is functioning well enough to spot dozing troops in Cuba and missiles in the Soviet Union as well.

So 2,000 to 3,000 Soviet troops are in Cuba and might have been there for a decade or longer. So what else do you expect on this surrogate island? The Soviets regard Cuba as a prize. They pay for it dearly by purchasing sugar at inflated prices from the Cubans and selling them oil below world market prices.

In return, the Soviets derive these advantages, among others: Seeing Cuban troops do Soviet work in Africa; listening to Castro regularly flail Uncle Sam for the Third World's enjoyment; having access to a nice, warm island, where Communist officials [from satellite countries, too] can come for holiday, and where Soviet military personnel can show Cubans how to make mischief militarily. All this is 90 miles from the United States, on an island that was

once considered for statehood after being administered by an American governor.

The United States botched the Cuban situation 20 years ago, and the chances are that we must live with our mistake for a long time. The Beard is not yet an old man.

In the old days — from the first Nixon term back — the U.S. intelligence community monitored Cuba like a distrustful wife checking on her husband. But somewhere along the line the scrutiny slipped a little.

As Sen. Sam Nunn of the Armed Services Committee sees it, no satisfactory explanation has yet been given as to why our intelligence agencies didn't spot the Soviet troops until recently. He feels there aren't enough intelligence analysts at work, and wonders why CIA Director Stansfield Turner refused to take funds to hire 500 new intelligence analysts next year, as authorized by Congress. The 500 will work for the Defense Intelligence Agency instead.

If our intelligence slipped a bit, anxious candidates will make certain everybody knows about it. When Henry Kissinger was secretary of state, he cut Congress off from receiving many intelligence estimates because some congressional eager beavers promptly leaked what Henry sent, making his administration look bad. The good-guy Cartermen decided to resume sending such classified material, and lo, what happens? Leaks from Democrats that reflect on the Democratic administration.

For some American politicians, Cuba

is like the local bordello that the mayor must rediscover every election season, raid, and close down.

Some politicians like to run against Cuba the way old Irish-American pols used to run against the king of England. But what do the thumpers propose doing to get the Soviets out of Cuba — offer them a nicer time in Miami?

No, it's more important, as Sam Nunn points out, to find out what the role of the Soviet troops is. If they are there as living Communist symbols to inspire the Cubans to carry out more Soviet missions in Africa or even on the Arabian peninsula, then maybe we had better get tough with the Soviets in some special way.

Sam Nunn laments the decline of the quality of American intelligence and the lessening of human intelligence activities by U.S. agents around the world.

He has this to say about colleagues who leak classified information for political gain:

"I hope the senators who were so energetic in getting this information out give the President some flexibility in dealing with the Soviets and Cubans, both by increasing the defense budget and by restoring our intelligence capability."

• Los Angeles Times Syndicate

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A2THE WASHINGTON POST  
15 September 1979

# U.S. Optimism Voiced About Accord on Soviet Troops in Cuba

By Don Oberdorfer  
Washington Post Staff Writer

The first shadowy outlines of the secret diplomatic negotiations on Soviet troops in Cuba emerged yesterday in guarded comments of informed congressional and administration officials. They expressed optimism about a mutually acceptable settlement.

Following a third round of talks between Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin at the State Department, officials still refused to set a target date for a conclusion. Vance said another meeting with Dobrynin is likely Sunday or Monday, and diplomatic sources reported that Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko is expected to arrive early next week in New York. This could bring a change in the tempo and perhaps the level of the negotiations.

"The Vance-Dobrynin meetings are progressing well," said Senate Democratic Leader Robert C. Byrd (W. Va.), one of the handful of congressional leaders who has been briefed by the tightlipped secretary of state about his sensitive negotiations.

"We are getting a quick turnaround (from Moscow) on the information we are seeking. The Soviets are being responsive," he said.

With the future of the strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT II) in the balance, Byrd said he has been cautioning undecided senators against taking positions based on the Soviet troops issue until the current negotiations are completed.

An administration official familiar with details of the negotiations said the United States has not made a formal proposal to the Russians at this stage about the presence in Cuba of what the United States describes as a Soviet combat brigade.

The official, who asked not to be identified, which is verified withdrawal and his administration have agreed on "some general notions about what would be a mutually satisfactory outcome." The official implicitly conceded that the final resolution will

may be short of the U.S. maximum objective, which is verified withdrawal of the Soviet force, by saying that "the clearer the resolution, the more acceptable the resolution will be and the better it will be for U.S.-Soviet relations."

In addition to holding out a promise of better superpower relations if the impediment of the troops issue is removed, the Carter administration is also brandishing a stick of potential trouble for the Soviets in their border regions if the issue remains unsolved.

Referring to "the principle of reciprocity in international relations," the administration official noted that Soviet combat troops in Cuba impinge on a country as large as the Soviet Union. A country also has special sensitivities, he said, in an apparent reference to historic Soviet concern about its long borders with Europe on one side and China on the other.

on an area of special U.S. sensitivity.

"The United States has shown respect for their concerns. We've generally shown ourselves sensitive to

them. We would like to continue respect for their concerns," the official said.

He added that failure to resolve the issue of Soviet troops in Cuba could bring "certain negative consequences not of our desire." He declined to specify what he had in mind, or how explicitly the Soviets have been warned of such possibilities.

It was clear that he was speaking of troubles beyond the effect on Senate approval of SALT.

At the White House, the State Department and on Capitol Hill there is common agreement that the effort to find a solution to the troops issue through quiet negotiations with Moscow is a high-stakes operation fraught with difficulty. While nobody is flatly predicting success, the course of the Vance-Dobrynin talks as they develop has generated notably greater optimism than at their start on Monday.

Despite the unusual secrecy imposed at the insistence of Vance, reporters have been reliably told that:

- The current negotiations deal with the limited issue of the Soviet brigade in Cuba and will not undertake a solution to the broader problem of Soviet-Cuban military activities in Africa and elsewhere.

- Despite intensive and continuing study by intelligence agencies, the United States still does not know precisely what the Soviet brigade's mission is. Intelligence analysts are reported to be "swamped" by information still needing study.

- It is considered possible that the Soviet brigade has been engaged in training Cubans from time to time. But in the official U.S. view, this is not a crucial question. The issue, as seen by an informed official, is not what functions the brigade may have performed "but its combat capability" as an organized unit with a headquarters, combat arms and combat equipment.

Staff writer David Broder contributed to this report.

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ON PAGE A2

THE WASHINGTON POST  
15 September 1979

# Robert Byrd Asks Colleagues Not to Reject SALT Because of Troops in Cuba

By Robert G. Kaiser  
and David S. Broder  
Washington Post Staff Writers

Senate Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.), hinted strongly yesterday that he is about to come out in favor of the SALT II pact, and said he has been urging other senators not to take firm positions against SALT during the current flap over Soviet combat troops in Cuba.

Byrd's remarks, in an interview, were one of several apparent attempts, by friends of SALT II to counter the anti-SALT mood that has spread through Washington since the Carter administration accused the Soviet Union of stationing combat troops in Cuba.

At the White House, officials continued to search for ways to calm the concerns of senators, who seek firm commitments of higher defense spending in 1981 and 1982, without actually committing the administration to specific spending levels.

The defense spending issue will come to the Senate floor next week in a debate on the budget resolution, and the White House is trying to prevent that debate from turning into a symbolically damaging show of force by SALT II opponents.

Byrd, in an interview yesterday, said he is "about to reach a decision" on the treaty, which he has been study-

ing rigorously for months. Indicating his likely support, he described the treaty as "winnable," and said he wants "to get these undecided senators to slow down and not get rushed to judgment."

Byrd repeated his earlier observation that the flap over Soviet troops in Cuba "is no reason to get panicky or hysterical," adding, "It's easy to cut off our nose to spite our face." SALT is worth supporting, he said, if "it will have a beneficial effect on the security of the country."

Byrd said the opposition of Sen. Russell B. Long (D-La.) to SALT II, announced this week, "did not surprise me." Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Calif.), the majority whip, went fur-

ther in a separate interview, saying he always expected Long to vote "no." Cranston is an active SALT supporter.

Byrd said President Carter's political weakness has been a factor in the SALT debate, and hinted that Carter should be spending more time on SALT and other legislative matter, and less on political campaigning. "He has problems that need attention here," Byrd said of the president. "The energy issue, defense spending in the budget, SALT, the Cuban situation."

"I'm not saying he's not giving them attention," Byrd said, but added it would be better "if he could give them more time."

"I have always said that the best campaigning is getting your job done," Byrd observed. "People perceive that if an officeholder does his job well and is on the job, they are reluctant to throw him out of office."

The ranking Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee, Jacob K. Javits (N.Y.), released a speech last night that he will deliver today insisting that the Cuban issue should not

affect the final vote on SALT II. "I believe this issue will be satisfactorily resolved in the next few weeks," Javits said.

Javits said if the Senate vote were held on SALT II now, "It is highly unlikely that it would command the necessary two-thirds vote. Yet I believe that the chances are better than 50-50 that, when it is finally voted on, it will be ratified."

(Two-thirds of the senators must vote for the treaty to approve it.)

Javits indicated, but did not directly declare, his support for the treaty, saying it "can have no material adverse effect" on American security, and might restrain the Soviet buildup while the pact is in effect.

An uncommitted southern Democrat, Walter (Dee) Huddleston (Ky.), said in a speech yesterday that the issue of Soviet troops in Cuba should not be linked to the SALT debate. The troops' presence in Cuba "is a matter of serious concern," Huddleston said, but their removal "should not be made a condition of treaty approval."

Both the White House and Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), now a key swing figure in the SALT debate, continued to maintain silence yesterday on the contents of an evening meeting Thursday between Nunn and President Carter, which administration officials said could be crucial to the outcome of the SALT debate.

Knowledgeable sources said Carter had urged Nunn not to commit himself publicly in the near future, and there were indications that the senator would comply.

A hopeful Carter administration official said last night that "the crisis atmosphere (set off by the Cuban flap) has begun to calm down," noting that Long's declaration of opposition to SALT II on Wednesday "did not trigger any other announcements" from other senators.

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ON PAGE M-1

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER  
16 SEPTEMBER 1979

# This time, Soviets won't be cowed in Cuba face-off

By Jim Klurfeld  
*Newsday Service*

WASHINGTON — Every Soviet politician remembers the lesson of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.

Nikita S. Khrushchev gambled in putting Soviet missiles in Cuba and had to pull them out at American insistence. It was a humiliating defeat, and proved to be a factor in Khrushchev's eventual demise.

In the view of many analysts, no Soviet politician is about to make the same mistake again, especially now that President Leonid I. Brezhnev is ailing and other Politburo members are maneuvering to succeed him.

And since 1962, the analysts say, the Kremlin has spent billions of dollars to improve its arsenal so it will not be forced to back down again in a confrontation with the United States.

"What you must remember is that the Soviets felt they could not fully challenge President (John F.) Kennedy in 1962 because the United States had nuclear superiority over them," one U.S. analyst said. "More than anything else, that caused the Soviets to back down. They knew the United States could inflict much greater damage on them than they could on the United States. But it was at that time that their military and civilian leaders vowed never to be faced down in a confrontation again because of military inferiority."

## Surpassing U.S.

Indeed, according to most analysts, the large and unremitting buildup of Soviet military forces — a steady 3 percent a year — started right after October 1962 and has not stopped. The Soviets have gained nuclear parity with the United States and may soon be stronger, some analysts believe.

All of this means that the Soviet Union will be in no hurry to withdraw its combat brigade of between 2,000 and 3,000 troops from Cuba. Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance said the United States could not live with the "status quo" of the Soviet brigade, but it may just have to.

"After spending all those billions of dollars, you don't expect the Soviets to pick up their troops and pull them out just because a few United States senators have tough re-election campaigns," said one analyst of Soviet affairs, referring to the fact that Sen. Frank Church (D., Idaho) and Sen. Richard Stone (D., Fla.) disclosed the Soviet troop presence in Cuba and demanded withdrawal.

Church and Stone both are in difficult re-election campaigns. Church, targeted by right-wing groups for defeat, is particularly anxious to appear tough on Soviet relations. As chairman of the influential Foreign Relations Committee, he has threatened that the new Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) will not be reported out of committee until the Soviet brigade leaves Cuba.

## Caught in middle

Church's vehemence has created a political and diplomatic problem for President Carter. The brigade presents no threat to the United States mainland and does not violate any agreements between Washington and the Kremlin. Furthermore, uncertainty lingers about how long it has been in Cuba. The Soviet Union, claiming that the troops have been there since 1962, is mystified by the belated discovery by U.S. intelligence and suspects a plot to scuttle SALT II.

In effect, Carter finds himself trapped between Church and the Kremlin. His only approach so far has been to try to cool the rhetoric. Vance and Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin held low-key talks last week, working for a compromise in which neither side would lose face.

Some critics accused the administration of trying to back down last week by dropping hints that the brigade was merely training Cuban troops in maneuvers. But State Department spokesman Hodding Carter 3d denied that, saying the administration stood by its description of the troops as "combat."

U.S. analysts said the issue must be seen in the context of the Brezhnev succession struggle, which has already begun, and the Soviet military buildup. The tough line announced by the Soviets last Monday in a front-page editorial in *Pravda* is a sign that negotiations are going to be difficult and not quickly resolved.

In pursuing detente during the early and middle 1970s, analysts say, Brezhnev had to overcome opposition from hard-line members of his government. Those analysts point out that Brezhnev cannot now afford to alienate those hard-liners for fear that his career will end in the igno-

minious manner that Khrushchev's ended. It was Brezhnev and Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin who led the coup against Khrushchev in 1964.

"Publicly demanding a withdrawal — a public humiliation — is not how this confrontation is going to be solved," said one State Department official, a Soviet expert. "Just as Kennedy offered Khrushchev an out in 1962, the Soviets cannot be backed against the wall in this instance. Just as we expect the Soviets to be sensitive to our domestic political situation, we must understand that they often must make foreign policy from domestic political considerations as well."

American officials believe that the Soviets have reason to avoid confrontation with the United States. Given their serious economic problems and desire for predictability in the arms race, the argument goes, the Soviets very much want to have SALT II ratified as soon as possible. They know the Cuba issue imperils ratification.

And the fact that a struggle over Brezhnev's successor has started is another reason to stabilize foreign relations; the Soviet leaders would rather spend their time on internal maneuvering and issues involving the domestic economy, analysts said.

Some U.S. analysts believe that Soviet desire for U.S. technology and grain gives Washington leverage. By saying that the entire nature of their relationship is at stake, the Carter Administration is forcing the Soviets to choose between detente and a few thousand soldiers, according to some administration officials.

But other analysts point out that, defense spending and national prestige aside, the Soviets can argue that those soldiers have been stationed in Cuba for years, and it is too late for the United States to be making an issue of them. Moscow can argue that the United States knew of the troops earlier and acquiesced by not pursuing the matter.

"Aside from their desire to see SALT ratified, it is hard to understand why the Soviet leaders would want to be cooperative — especially at the outset," said an administration expert on the Soviet Union. "After all, at this point it is as dangerous for one of them to be seen as soft on the United States as it is for one of our politicians to be soft on the Soviet Union."

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE E3THE NEW YORK TIMES  
16 September 1979*The Cuban Troops Issue Is a Headache for Moscow Also*

# Past History May Stiffen Backs in The Kremlin

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

WASHINGTON — For Leonid I. Brezhnev, the latest, American-inspired furor over Soviet troops in Cuba poses policy questions of great proportions.

On the one hand, as the Soviet Communist Party newspaper, Pravda, indicated last week, the Russians regard the matter of the "combat brigade" as a non-issue. The troops, the Russians say, have been in Cuba since 1962 at same force level, and with the same mission: the training of Cuban forces in Soviet military arms and techniques.

On the other hand, some United States officials believe that President Carter has jeopardized the passage of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty by the way he has handled the matter — giving the appearance, at the start, of agreeing with Senator Frank Church and other influential politicians who have made the SALT agreement hostage to the withdrawal of the Soviet troops.

Since Mr. Brezhnev, now in his last years in power, has staked a considerable part of his prestige on the treaty, the whole affair must be disconcerting. His relations with President Carter have never been smooth but the latest development must have caused the Soviet leader and his aides to wonder even more about the American Administration's ability to deliver on its promises.

Russians delight in a conspiratorial view of events. In their perspective, an examination of the situation could produce the following analysis.

Against the background of strong criticism of Soviet-American détente in the United States, the Carter Administration, nevertheless, summons the political courage to sign the SALT treaty in June. It is sent to Capitol Hill in July just when the President's domestic popularity is dropping because of economic troubles and poor management of oil resources.

To improve his political standing, Mr. Carter fires some of his Cabinet officers and tries to act decisively. But he is facing a growing challenge from Senator Edward M. Kennedy, whose brother, John, is remembered by Soviet leaders for forcing Nikita S. Khrushchev to remove Russian missiles from Cuba in 1962, and also for opening the "détente" era by signing the first nuclear test ban treaty a year later.

Then suddenly, or so it appears to Moscow, Senator Church, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, who until then has supported the SALT treaty, announces that he has been told that a Soviet combat brigade is in Cuba, that this violates the Monroe Doctrine and the troops must be removed or else SALT will not be ratified. Mr. Carter and Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance also make statements saying that the situation is "unacceptable."

The Soviet Embassy in Washington had reported throughout July that the SALT treaty was proceeding more smoothly than expected in the Foreign Relations Committee. Then why the outburst by the Carter Administration? The explanation in Moscow, however bizarre to Americans, was probably that the Administration and its supporters, losing popularity primarily because of economic issues, allowed the Central Intelligence Agency to manufacture a "Soviet crisis." This permitted the President to appear decisive, to distract attention from the economy, and to counter the strong anti-détente crowd which called him too conciliatory.

For Mr. Brezhnev and his Politburo colleagues, the developments, which occurred as they were returning from their Crimea vacations, are only the latest in a series of what they like to call "zig-zags" in American policy. Mr. Carter has been a passionate advocate of arms control and other efforts to reduce tensions. Yet at the start of his Administration, he seemed to want to embarrass the Soviet leadership by frequently raising Soviet human rights violations and by making public his proposals for deep cuts in strategic arms. Mr. Carter said that "competition"

CONTINUED

was natural in Soviet-American relations but he allowed Zbigniew Brzezinski, his national security adviser, to act the sore loser when the Soviet Union made gains in Africa and Asia.

In the Cuban situation, Mr. Brezhnev, like Mr. Carter, has had to weigh both domestic and foreign policy considerations. At the time of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, Vasily V. Kuznetsov, now Mr. Brezhnev's Vice President but then Mr. Khrushchev's special envoy, told the American negotiator, John C. McCloy: "You Americans will never be able to do this to us again."

Mr. Brezhnev was able to win the support of the Soviet military for the palace coup against Mr. Khrushchev in 1964, in part because of the humiliation the armed forces had suffered two years earlier in Cuba. Mr. Brezhnev's support for the steady, impressive growth of Soviet military strength in the intervening 15 years was meant to ensure that Russia could stand up to any ultimatum in the future.

There is also the matter of Soviet ties to Cuba, Moscow's most durable and loyal ally in the developing world. Backing down and withdrawing the troops from Cuba just after Fidel Castro, at a meeting in Havana of so-called nonaligned nations, aggressively defended the Soviet Union as the "natural ally" of the movement, would be hard to justify to present and potential Soviet clients.

Thus, it is likely that the Politburo will reject the withdrawal of troops from Cuba as demanded by Senator Henry M. Jackson, Mr. Church and others—an outcome the Carter Administration seems to have anticipated by refusing to ask publicly for it. On the other hand, Mr. Brezhnev presumably has no desire to humiliate Mr. Carter and risk the collapse of the SALT treaty over a relatively minor matter.

There are precedents on Cuba. Mr. Brezhnev will be advised. In 1962, after the missile crisis, Mr. Khrushchev pledged not to introduce any new offensive weapons in Cuba. In 1970, under pressure from the Nixon Administration, Mr. Brezhnev agreed not

to build a naval base at Cienfuegos to service nuclear-powered submarines which could pose a threat to the United States. In 1978, when it was disclosed that the Russians had sent MIG-23 fighter-bombers to Cuba, the Carter Administration raised the issue quietly. Moscow reaffirmed the 1962 accord and pledged that the planes would not carry nuclear weapons.

Presumably, Mr. Brezhnev could agree to bail out Mr. Carter by agreeing that the Soviet forces in Cuba would have no combat mission; the *Pravda* editorial already said their role was purely advisory. Such a statement would not bother President Castro, who also has said there were only Soviet advisers in Cuba.

It is hard to see how Mr. Brezhnev can do more. But for Mr. Carter and the SALT treaty, it may not be enough.

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ON PAGE 29U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT  
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## "Aggressive" Expansion by Soviets



Interview With  
Senator  
Richard G. Lugar,  
Republican,  
Of Indiana

Q Senator Lugar, does the presence of Soviet combat troops in Cuba constitute a threat to U.S. security?

A Yes, because their presence makes possible a Soviet extension in Cuba well beyond those particular troops. This is the type of protection the Soviets would require if they were to deploy nuclear weapons in Cuba.

For instance, the troops could be the precursor of an expanded Cienfuegos naval base to service nuclear-armed submarines or the placement of nuclear weapons to guard the MiG-23s that are already in Cuba.

Q How is the Soviet action in Cuba different from our stationing troops near the Russian border in Europe?

A Our forces in Europe are purely defensive. They help to balance the forces of Western Europe against those of the Warsaw Pact. These forces are well known to everyone; they have not been introduced surreptitiously. We have not hidden their presence in Europe. Beyond this, since the Soviet Union is a closed society, we must rely more heavily than they upon intelligence collection from foreign locations.

Q The U.S. has troops stationed at the naval base at Guantánamo Bay in Cuba. Wouldn't they balance out the Russians?

A The troops at Guantánamo Bay have been there for many decades. They are very different from the Soviet brigade because they have not been introduced covertly, they are a known quantity, and the Castro regime has accommodated itself to them.

Q If the Soviet brigade has been in Cuba for years, as some believe, isn't it a bit late to be concerned about it?

A Anytime that American intelligence discovers a combat brigade, it's cause for very deep concern.

If it has been there for a long time, our belated revelation of it is either an indictment of our intelligence capabilities or a suggestion that the nature of the brigade has changed.

Q How far would you go in demanding the brigade's withdrawal?

A If I'm correct, this is a very aggressive extension of Soviet military diplomacy with regard to our country. We have to indicate that it is serious enough for us to forgo discussion of the SALT treaty and, beyond that, forgo trade and other relationships.

Q Is getting the troops out of Cuba worth the risk of losing Soviet agreement on SALT?

A As I said, SALT could very well be postponed until the troops are removed and the situation is clarified to our satisfaction.

There is another reason for postponing SALT: It's totally inconsistent for us to be debating the verification of the treaty at the same time that serious questions are being raised about our intelligence capability in Cuba.

Q Don't you think the United States is risking a military confrontation with the Soviet Union?

A I don't see a risk of military confrontation. Our response could be something that would lessen tension.

It would certainly give the Soviets the signal that they may not want but really need to have at this point. Our failure to insist on their leaving is likely to lead to an expanded Soviet presence, which really does risk military confrontation farther down the trail. □

## "Their Troops Don't Threaten Us"



Interview With  
Representative  
Bob Carr,  
Democrat,  
Of Michigan

Q Representative Carr, why do you feel that Soviet combat troops in Cuba pose no real threat to the United States?

A The only danger posed by these troops lies in their apparent ability to provoke some into statements of higher stupidity. Even if the Russians had a combat sealift or airlift capability—which they don't—no number of non-nuclear forces could hope to attack the U.S. without being annihilated. The only thing we're directly vulnerable to is attack by strategic weapons, and our second-strike nuclear force gives us an effective deterrent against that.

Q Aren't you concerned about a Russian military force being based so close to the U.S. mainland?

A How close they are is really of no significance since there's no way they can get the strength to attack us.

We have 4,700 troops in Turkey, which is right next door to the Soviet Union. Our troops there don't threaten the Soviets, and theirs in Cuba don't threaten us.

Q Could this incident be an early step toward the creation of a "fortress Cuba" in the Caribbean?

A A fortress is a defensive installation. A "fortress Cuba" could only be a problem for us if we plan to invade it—which we don't.

Q Isn't the Monroe Doctrine—the long-standing principle forbidding foreign interference in the Western Hemisphere—being challenged?

A The Monroe Doctrine was a unilateral statement never unconditional accepted by the Soviet Union.

And it's well to remember it also involved a promise that, in return for no foreign intervention in the Western Hemisphere, we would not interfere in

Europe in any way. We violated that beginning in 1917 and are violating it today in NATO.

I support NATO nevertheless, but it does torpedo the Monroe Doctrine.

Q If not here, where would you draw the line on Soviet activity?

A That's the key question. I believe we should draw the line at the use of Soviet troops where they're not invited.

For example, if they invaded Nicaragua by force, we'd be fully justified in opposing them militarily.

Q Why should the Senate ratify the SALT treaty despite the troop incident?

A Fundamentally, because the treaty is in the interests of our national security. It isn't a reward for the Russians' good behavior; we do it because it's a good thing for us.

Q Does this troop incident show how little the Russians care about SALT?

A I don't think it has anything to do with the treaty. These troops have been there possibly for years or decades. What is new is our discovery of them.

Q Isn't the Soviet Union testing American resolve to maintain and defend stability in the hemisphere?

A All that's being tested is our ability to distinguish between the significant and the trivial. So far, we've flunked. □

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## Cooling the Cuba Crisis

*Can quiet diplomacy end the furor in the Senate?*

Three times last week, the long black Cadillac limousine glided into the underground garage beneath the State Department; three times Soviet Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin slipped into a private elevator and rode up to the seventh-floor office of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. After each meeting, both diplomats avoided reporters' questions. There had already been far too much threatening and ill-considered rhetoric about the problem that confronted them: the controversial role of Soviet combat troops in Cuba.

Just a week earlier, Vance had publicly declared that the newly reported existence of a Soviet brigade in Cuba was "a very serious matter," and that he would "not be satisfied with maintenance of the status quo." After several days of silence, the Soviets produced an unyielding answer. *Pravda*, the Soviet Communist Party's official newspaper, declared that the Russian forces in Cuba were there solely for training purposes, had been training the Cuban army for 17 years, and had changed in neither size nor function during that entire period. Furthermore, said *Pravda*, the Soviet troops had "an inalienable right" to be where they were. Added *Pravda*: "All contentions about the arrival in Cuba of 'organized Soviet combat units' are totally groundless." The paper blamed the whole crisis on elements within the U.S. Government that were trying both to undermine Cuba and prevent Senate ratification of SALT II.

Though Vance would disclose no details of his talks with Dobrynin, it was apparent that the Secretary of State was trying to be conciliatory. Even while the Senate continued to reverberate with demands for a Soviet withdrawal, State Department officials began suggesting that some face-saving accommodation could be found. Perhaps the Soviets could disperse their brigade, or simply pledge that it had no offensive purpose.

What was most perplexing about the whole affair was the number of questions that remained unanswered. Was there really a buildup of Soviet forces in Cuba? If so, since when, and by how much? What exactly was the Soviet brigade doing in Cuba? Was it merely training Cubans, or did it have a combat role? Did its presence represent a Soviet gesture to support Castro's maintenance of 40,000 Cuban soldiers in Africa? Was it guarding Soviet information-gathering installations

that eavesdropped on the U.S.? And if U.S. intelligence did not know the answers to any or all of these questions, why could it not find out?

One of the few facts known for certain was that the Russian force, 2,600 to 2,800 strong, was on duty in Cuba. Years ago U.S. intelligence began to pick up references to the Soviet force as a brigade, but officials who received that information attached little importance to it. Last spring, worried about Cuban influence in Nicaragua and the Caribbean, Zbigniew Brzezinski's National Security Council asked U.S. intelligence agencies to re-evaluate the Soviet role in Cuba. As late

Senate was escalating the "crisis" out of proportion. They knew that Church, a longtime liberal and self-declared "friend" of Cuba's Fidel Castro, faces a difficult re-election campaign in conservative Idaho. They also recalled that Church felt he had lost face by endorsing Brown's earlier statement that there appeared to be no significant Soviet troops in Cuba. Whatever his political problems, Church insisted last week that the Soviets were challenging the U.S. Said Church: "I have not suggested that this constitutes the same threat as the missiles did in 1962. But it is contrary to U.S. interests to permit Cuba to be a Soviet base. And if we acquiesce on this, what kind of signal does that send to Castro and the rest of the world?"

Church's position undeniably emboldened the opposition to SALT. Senator Scoop Jackson, who opposes SALT anyway, charged that the Soviets were building a "fortress Cuba." He noted that Cuba in the past two years has acquired sophisticated MiG-23s theoretically capable of penetrating the southeastern U.S. The military buildup, said Jackson, represents "a major change in what the Soviets and Cubans believe they can get away with in this part of the world." He demanded that the Soviets withdraw not only their combat troops but their planes, and that they promise to provide Cuba with no more submarines. It was in this atmosphere that Louisiana's influential Senator Russell Long joined the opponents of SALT and announced that he would vote against the treaty.

Amid the rhetoric and confusion, one of the coolest voices in Congress was that of Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd. When he saw President Carter at the start of the crisis, Byrd counseled calm and restraint. Last week he predicted, somewhat optimistically, that the whole matter would be resolved within a few days. "There never should have been a crisis atmosphere to start with," Byrd declared. "I've

been here during a few crises, including the missile crisis in 1962. I saw nothing in this one to justify panic or a hasty judgment on SALT."

Byrd said he expected Church's committee to continue hearings on SALT, and he intended to bring the treaty before the Senate in early November. Said Byrd: "There is plenty of time for the dust to settle. I hope by then we can reach agreement on the treaty in an environment less charged with emotion than we had a week ago." He then firmly repeated what he had told Jimmy Carter a week earlier: "The SALT treaty must not be held hostage to the situation in Cuba."



Carter with Brzezinski and Vance outside Oval Office  
A perplexing number of unanswered questions.

as mid-July, Defense Secretary Harold Brown assured Senator Frank Church of the Foreign Relations Committee that this Soviet role had not changed. In August, however, after a U.S. camera satellite photographed a Russian brigade on maneuvers with armored equipment near Havana, the U.S. concluded that a Soviet brigade was in Cuba as a combat unit. When informed of this conclusion, Church made it public, and coupled that with a warning that the Senate would not ratify SALT II until the Soviet brigade was removed. Many of Church's colleagues joined in the hue and cry, but last week some of them seemed to realize that the

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## For MOSCOW, A Crucial Test

### Cuba Issue Threatens Essential Arms Treaty

By ANTHONY AUSTIN

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Sept. 16 — The Soviet-American negotiations on Soviet troops in Cuba appear to be a crucial test for Soviet diplomacy no less than for the Carter Administration. At stake is Senate approval of a strategic arms treaty that has become a cornerstone of Soviet planning for a decade ahead.

But how the Soviet leadership is dealing with the situation is a matter of pure conjecture.

The Soviet press, radio and television have had nothing of substance to add to Pravda's authoritative statement on Sept. 11 that the Soviet troops are in Cuba to train Cuban forces and for no other reason. Linked to sporadic repetitions of the substance of Pravda's statement has been a spate of Soviet press reports about American bases and forces overseas.

The message, directed at Western and third-world audiences over Moscow radio as well as at domestic public opinion, is simple: Why is Washington making such a fuss about Soviet training contingents in Cuba when it has a base at Guantánamo that is a dagger pointed at Cuba's heart and other military bases far from American shores?

#### U.S. Not Satisfied

Clearly Pravda's statement was not enough, and the Carter Administration is trying to clear up the question of what a Soviet combat brigade is doing in Cuba and to see whether there is something Washington should do about it.

According to American officials, there is a Soviet combat unit in Cuba, with a command structure and infantry, rocket and armored elements. Moscow has not publicly acknowledged that. But what Pravda denied on Sept. 11 was the "arrival" of any combat units in Cuba during the 17 years the Soviet military training center has existed there. The paper did not say anything about the presence of a combat brigade in Cuba. Hence, the official Soviet position leaves open the possibility that such a brigade could have been formed with troops that had been rotated.

The question at issue is what the mission and capabilities of this brigade are and how long it has been in existence. One theory is that it may be a demonstration unit used for training purposes, but no responsible Soviet official is known to have offered that or any other explanation.

The usual Soviet sources have not been accessible to Western correspondents on the subject. Presumably, Soviet officials have not broken off working contacts with their Western diplomatic colleagues, but it is virtually certain that they are not telling them anything Pravda did not say.

What might be the alternatives before the Soviet Government? The question cannot be answered satisfactorily, perhaps not even by the Soviet leaders themselves, until the Carter Administration satisfies itself as to what the Soviet combat brigade is all about. It is trying to do this by taking another intelligence look and through Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance's meetings with the Soviet Ambassador, Anatoly F. Dobrynin.

#### U.S. Demands Likely

The Carter Administration could conclude that the brigade is there for training only, just as the Russians have said, and leave it at that. More likely, there will be something the Administration will ask of the Russians to ease American concerns.

Moscow would seem to have three possible courses — to withdraw the combat brigade, which seems highly unlikely after Pravda's categorical statement; to stand pat, letting the Administration make of it what it wants, or to try to negotiate a new understanding on Soviet military personnel in Cuba. Theoretically, the third alternative, avoiding a serious confrontation, would seem to be most attractive to Moscow.

At this point, speculation founders on ignorance of the basics of the situation. What, essentially, is the Soviet military and political strategy in the Caribbean, and why did Moscow feel it necessary to form a combat brigade in Cuba. What is the Soviet reading of the stir in Washington — that it is a waning furor not requiring major Soviet concessions or a growing dispute that could kill the arms treaty and undo détente?

All that can be said with any degree of assurance is that, in this volatile situation the Soviet leaders must be caught between reluctance to accept any further restrictions on their military deployments in Cuba and the overriding importance of the treaty.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 6THE WALL STREET JOURNAL  
17 September 1979

## As Talks on Soviet Troops in Cuba Drag, Chances for Solution, and for SALT, Dim

By KAREN ELLIOTT HOUSE

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON — As U.S.-Soviet talks over Russian troops in Cuba drag into their second week, chances of a politically acceptable solution dim and the threat to the arms limitation treaty grows.

The longer the negotiations continue, the harder it will be for Moscow to make concessions without losing face. Similarly, prolonged talks will make it more difficult for President Carter to persuade the Senate—and the country—that an ambiguous outcome isn't a victory for the Kremlin.

An ambiguous outcome currently seems most likely. Administration officials don't expect the Soviets to remove the brigade. Nor do they expect Moscow to force the U.S. to live with the status quo, something the President has said is "unacceptable."

What is being said in the talks between Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin is a well-kept secret. But it's clear the Soviets are bargaining hard. Carter administration officials, who last week spoke optimistically of resolving this latest U.S.-Soviet dispute soon, don't any longer. "It may take some time," says one official.

Time doesn't appear to be on Mr. Carter's side. With his leadership in doubt, he can ill afford simply to let this dispute drag on. Nor can he expect it to slip quietly into diplomatic oblivion as the future of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty has become firmly linked to a resolution of the Soviet troop issue.

Already, the momentum for SALT that existed after the initial hearings this summer is gone. Last week, Sen. Russell Long (D., La.) seized the Soviet presence in Cuba as a reason to announce that he will vote against the treaty. Sen. Sam Nunn (D., Ga.), widely considered the most influential Senator on SALT, has seized upon new delays in the SALT vote to renew his demands that the President outline a five-year defense-spending program before the vote.

currently expected around Thanksgiving. That defense program, Sen. Nunn says, is critical to secure his vote for SALT.

Even if Mr. Carter secures some face-saving resolution from the Russians, he is likely to find it hard to restore momentum to the SALT debate. Any outcome short of the removal of the troops will be seen by many in the Senate as phony. So, Mr. Carter will be in the uncomfortable position of defending a fuzzy solution as a real and acceptable one.

Administration officials still talk of a solution that somehow removes the combat characteristics of the Soviet brigade. That could be done in a variety of ways, these officials note. So far, Moscow insists that the brigade is there only to train Cubans.

If the President can't win an agreement he believes he can sell politically, he can, of course, always abandon the talks and take unilateral steps to alter the situation. For instance, he could beef up U.S. forces at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, or he could make a show of military force in some other region such as the Indian Ocean.

Such a move would be out of character for Mr. Carter, but it is one option under consideration. The President's advisers acknowledge Moscow may be unwilling to give enough to permit a solution Mr. Carter can defend as a real change. With SALT already in jeopardy and Sen. Edward Kennedy (D., Mass.) testing the starting blocks, they know Mr. Carter can't afford to appear to be caving in to the Soviets.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A-9WASHINGTON STAR  
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# Cord Meyer: The verification gap

The long delay of American intelligence in spotting the infiltration of Soviet combat troops into Cuba has raised new doubts in the Senate about the reliability of U.S. SALT verification techniques.

These doubts will now be sharply intensified by the failure, previously unreported, of the Carter administration to obtain Turkish assent to an ingenious new method of monitoring Soviet missile tests. The collapse of this attempt to compensate for the loss of the U.S. bases in Iran leaves a gaping four-year hole in the American verification capability.

Last month, Carter officials reluctantly faced up to the Soviets' unwillingness to allow U-2 flights along the Russian-Turkish border to pick up the telemetry from Soviet missile tests. Ground sites in Turkey are no substitute for the bases in Iran because the intervening terrain prevents line-of-sight coverage of the launch phase of missile testing. Without access to this data, it will be impossible to determine, reliably, whether the Soviets are cheating on the SALT limits on the size and payload of new missiles.

After the Turks made Soviet acquiescence to such

U-2 flights a condition of their cooperation, Carter tried and failed to get Leonid Brezhnev's agreement at the Vienna summit. To

## Soviet behavior seems almost designed to make SALT ratification harder

drive home Brezhnev's objection, Soviet ambassadors around the world have been telling Turkish diplomats that Moscow is adamantly opposed to U-2 spy planes on the border.

Lacking a substitute for U-2 coverage, the administration was obliged to admit to senatorial critics that crucial data on Soviet missile testing could not be collected until a new surveillance satellite had been specially designed and built to pick up the missing telemetry. As CIA Director Stansfield Turner testified to the Senate, a suitable satellite could not be orbited until 1984.

To meet the dilemma, the Carter administration came up with a quick-fix solution that at first blush seemed to promise access to the essential data and an escape for the Turks from Soviet pres-

sure. As a substitute for the U-2, Carter officials proposed the deployment in Turkey of a different type of plane, the EB-57. This aircraft is a two-seater with an altitude of 45,000 feet, originally designed to carry electronic equipment to jam hostile defensive radars.

Fitted with new antennae to pick up the missile telemetry, this plane was to fly from Turkish bases when Russian missile tests were believed to be imminent. With only half the altitude of the U-2, it would have been less effective but still capable of recovering some of the launch data.

In its favor was the fact that this plane did not have the U-2's historical record of espionage activity, but unlike the U-2 it had to fly from Turkish airfields. The hope was that the Turks might accept its deployment on their territory and the Soviets would not be able to identify its purpose.

When U.S. ambassador in Ankara, Ronald Spiers, was first instructed to request Turkish approval, he balked on grounds that the Turks would have to refuse because of the high risk of exposure. When his objections were overruled, Spiers, in mid-August, put the proposal to Prime Minister Ecevit, who predictably declined to go along.

The administration now finds itself back at square one on a crucial aspect of the verification issue with no solution in sight until 1984. Carter officials are particularly concerned that outgoing U.S. ambassador to Russia, Malcolm Toon, may now reverse his grudging approval of the SALT treaty.

Toon's support was only won by assurances that the U.S. would be able to work out "cooperative arrangements with the Turks to replace the Iranian sites. Now both Toon and Sen. John Glenn will be hard to persuade that the higher risk of Soviet evasion is worth taking.

Moreover, Soviet behavior seems almost deliberately designed to make SALT ratification more difficult. The Soviets are obviously more interested in building a *cordón sanitaire* around their territory to prevent American surveillance than they are in establishing cooperative verification procedures.

The irony is that the Soviets, by openly conducting field maneuvers of their brigade in Cuba, invited a discovery which has given weight to arguments that they cannot be trusted in a SALT agreement that is less than 100 per cent verifiable.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE E19THE NEW YORK TIMES  
16 September 1979FOREIGN AFFAIRS

# The Rightists' Brigade

By Leslie H. Gelb

WASHINGTON — It is getting harder and harder to know what is going on in Cuba with that Soviet brigade, and easier and easier to understand the disarray in Washington. Maybe the Soviet personnel in the brigade have been in Cuba since 1962. Maybe they did perform training and advisory duties and were just recently given a brigade-command structure. Maybe it is a combat brigade now, and worthy of a serious Administration response. But the point is this: Before the facts could be established, a number of scared and ambitious political leaders, legislators and a few Administration policy makers went off like firecrackers.

One reason for the panic is the climate of near-hysteria about the Soviet Union's military capability and international designs that has been created by right-wingers and abetted and magnified by the news media.

Another reason is that President Carter has not been able to formulate an overall policy toward the Soviet Union that lets Moscow know where we draw the lines and gives the American people confidence that the Administration knows what it is doing.

For several years, the right wing, embodied in organizations such as the Committee for the Present Danger and the American Security Council, has increased the volume of its drumbeat about growing Soviet might and weakening American capability. The thrust of their point has been a fair one. Presidents Gerald R. Ford and Carter, recognizing the need to maintain the military balance, responded by increasing defense spending.

But the right-wingers were not satisfied. They embarked on a holy war. They demanded total agreement with their position or threatened that they would "get you next election." They have the money and the workers to make the threat seem real.

Their pronouncements of fear and their political power has made for good news stories. Regrettably, the news media has found boring, and has largely ignored, the more-balanced views — the views that granted that Soviet power presents us with new and serious problems but understands that the Russians have serious problems of their own.

It has gotten to the point where moderate politicians and officials either have not bothered to express their views or have been afraid to express a balanced view for fear of being branded as apologists for Moscow. This is not to say that a McCarthy-like atmosphere prevails, but the right-wing attack has fundamentally distorted the policy debate.

This was the climate for the latest foreign-policy crisis, over the brigade.

This explains Senator Frank Church's ill-timed disclosure about the brigade and ill-advised position that the strategic arms limitation treaty should be held hostage to its withdrawal.

This tells us why White House officials have latched on to the situation as an opportunity to prove the President's toughness.

It also accounts for the desire of some officials in the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency not to appear to be to the left of the White House.

It explains the statements by Presidential candidates that the brigade had to be out of Cuba by sundown — otherwise there would be a shootout.

These people continue to insist publicly on the complete withdrawal of the brigade, even though some of them privately admit that Moscow will not do so and even though they themselves have no practical way to bring this about.

What makes the brigade incident so deadly serious is that it exposes and dramatizes that the Administration has no overall policy for dealing with a now more-powerful Soviet Union that either Moscow finds compelling or that the American people can begin to understand and support.

Mr. Carter needs to stake out a solid middle ground that is not simply a patchwork of conflicting views. To hold that ground, he must take on the right wing frontally; he can show the contradiction between accepting the notion that the Russians are 10 feet tall militarily and at the same time believing that we need only to be tough and resolute to make Moscow beg for mercy. He also has to deal with the naivete of some left-wingers who think that we can respond to growing Soviet military strength with business-as-usual.

Mr. Carter has to convince Moscow and Missouri that he has a coherent way of maintaining and managing a world of military parity between the superpowers. Any compromise on the brigade that he is trying to develop will inevitably be messy and open to question. Without an overall policy that makes sense, he will never gain public acceptance of the compromise and without such a policy we can continue to expect every little annoyance like the brigade to turn into a diplomatic and domestic political crisis.

*Leslie H. Gelb, senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and former Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in the State Department, is a guest columnist.*

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 37THE WASHINGTON POST  
16 September 1979*Joseph Kraft*

## The Cost of Cuba

The latest storm over Cuba provides a textbook study in the mismanagement of foreign policy. But far more than abundant goofs are involved. For all the goofs lead back to a common policy—the policy of trying to appease the Third World.

The blunders became vividly apparent with the surfacing of the present Cuban problem. On Aug. 30, Sen. Frank Church of Idaho was told about the discovery of a Russian combat unit. He announced the fact the next day, and demanded the unit be removed.

For four more days, various public persons echoed those views. But it was only on Sept. 3 that the administration began high-level deliberations on what to do with the Russian unit. Thus the issue was allowed to kick around publicly for a full week before the administration even began to determine its policy line.

The White House claims that Church was given advance notice of the combat unit only because it feared word was going to leak anyway. But even if he tried, which is not clear, the official who alerted the senator lacked the weight to keep him silent—a first goof. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance did not persuade the senator it was important to stay mum—a second goof. President Carter refused to take calls from Church—a third goof.

The reason leaks were feared is that word of the discovery had spread widely within the intelligence community, which is not happy with the Carter administration. But the Carter administration had plenty of time to tighten its hold on the intelligence take from Cuba. It didn't—another goof.

To sweeten the intelligence community, Vance spoke of the discovery in terms that made it seem the combat unit may have been in Cuba at least since 1976 and perhaps since the 1960s. That way, any charges of failure would be softened.

But in stroking intelligence officers, the secretary implicitly planted the suspicion that the dirty deed was done by the Russians while Gerald Ford, or Richard Nixon, was on the watch. With blame being directed at them, Republicans have not exactly been keen to help the administration.

As a matter of fact, something changed the nature of the Soviet presence in Cuba in an important way without American intelligence officers knowing about it and passing it on to higher authority. The reason for that failure is clear. Intelligence officers are sellers who respond to their customers. When a president wants information on Cuba, it is forthcoming. When he doesn't, he doesn't get it.

But the Carter administration didn't want intelligence about Cuba. It didn't even act on what came its way. Thus the secretary of state and the secretary of defense roundly denied the assertion when Sen. Richard Stone, on July 17, first claimed there was a Soviet combat unit in Cuba. Nor was there a serious reaction from the administration to earlier word that MiG fighters, sometimes with Russian pilots, were participating in the air defense of Cuba.

Nor to alarms about Cuban troops in Ethiopia and Yemen. Nor to the possibility that Cubans might be fostering, or at least turning to advantage, the radical movements taking over Nicaragua and other countries in Central America.

Why? Because a major theme of the administration has been the cultivation of radical, Third World countries. It embraced the policy of radical blacks for southern Africa. It bought the program of radical Arabs for a "comprehensive settlement" in the Middle East. It sought publicly to knit up ties with Vietnam—not to mention Cuba.

In fact, the Third World countries have taken advantage of the administration. They have hit, and continue to hit, this country where it lives—in the price of oil. They have sided with Russia—most recently at the Havana conference of non-aligned countries—in deriding American security interests in Europe, the Middle East and Asia.

The Soviet combat unit in Cuba is only one fruit of the policy of appeasing the Third World. That its discovery puts SALT in jeopardy and ditches the hope of reaching a consensus on defense spending may seem unfair. But it is not surprising. It is the cost that an administration pays for blindly following a dumb policy.

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ARTICLE APPEARED  
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*Clayton Fritchey*

## Misreading Monroe

The latest Cuban crisis has again focused attention on the Monroe Doctrine, and again shown how little it is understood or how time and a fast-changing world have largely overtaken it.

In issuing ultimatums calling for the prompt withdrawal of Russian troops stationed in Cuba, even presumably well-informed congressional leaders seem to be laboring under the impression that the Soviet presence is a violation of the policy enunciated by President James Monroe on Dec. 2, 1823.

"We must demand that they leave Cuba," says Sen. Richard Stone (D-Fla.), who has a large constituency of Cuban exiles. Calling on the president to invoke the Monroe Doctrine, Stone says that "our nation's policy for more than a century has been to oppose the establishment of bases in this hemisphere by countries who don't belong here."

But, in practice, we have for the last century or so tolerated a number of imperialistic foreign involvements in the hemisphere. However, various presidents have added so many extensions, "corollaries," and personal interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine that it is easy to see why so many Americans (and foreigners) are now uncertain about what it has come to stand for.

How did the author himself define it? In an 1823 message to Congress, Monroe said, "We could not view any interpretation for the purpose of oppressing them [the South American states], or controlling in any other manner their destiny by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States."

The operative phrase, it will be noted, is "for the purpose of oppressing them." Later, Monroe elaborated: "The American continents . . . are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers."

Monroe's clear intent was to head off European imperialistic adventures in the Americas. There is no indication that he was trying to deny the right of any Latin American country to seek and accept foreign assistance for economic and defense purposes, as in the case of Cuba and Russia.

Monroe's declaration was directed against the assumed danger that the European powers intended to intervene in Central and South America to restore to Spain colonies that had revolted and gained independence.

The danger evaporated, but the Monroe assertion stood, although for most of the 19th century it commanded no great respect. Moreover, there was little reaction in the United States to the British occupation of the Falkland Islands, the French blockade of Mexico and Argentina in 1838, and the encroachments of Britain in Central America.

Actually, the declaration was not even referred to as a "doctrine" until 1854, but even then it continued to meet with sharp challenges, especially in the period of our Civil War. Spain occupied the Dominican Republic; France, intervening in Mexico, set up a monarchy under the Austrian archduke Maximilian. And so it went.

The most controversial "corollary" to the doctrine was authored by President Theodore Roosevelt in 1904. While still forbidding European intrusions in the Americas, it in effect reserved that right for the United States itself under certain conditions. The corollary paved the way for a series of U.S. interventions in Central America and the Caribbean.

It is not surprising that this generated a growing resentment against the doctrine in Latin America, where it was seen as an offensive expression of U.S. hegemony in the new world.

The Pan American states finally joined in a declaration of their own, asserting that all intervention in the domestic or external affairs of one state by another was illegal. That, however, did not deter our Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961 or the military occupation of the Dominican Republic in 1965. And the United States still maintains its big naval base at Guantanamo Bay, despite Fidel Castro's protests.

At the just-concluded Third World conference in Havana, attended by 136 nations including 22 from Latin America, the delegates were conspicuously unmoved by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's assertion that the Russian troop presence was a "serious matter."

According to the Baltimore Sun's Havana correspondent, the delegates "mainly ignored it, disparaged it, or considered it a deliberate move to influence the conference by demonstrating Cuba's close Soviet ties."

Is Pravda right or wrong when it says: "Soviet-Cuban cooperation of many years, dictated by Cuba's defense program, comprises an inalienable right of two sovereign states. Any attempts to restrict this right are a blatant contradiction of accepted norms of international relationships . . . ?"

Why not submit this question of international law, or practice, to the Organization of American States for calm consideration? Surely we have had enough confrontation.

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ON PAGE A-12NEW YORK TIMES  
19 SEPTEMBER 1979

# U.S. Said to Develop Policy Options on Issue of Soviet Force in Cuba

By RICHARD BURT

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 18 — Government officials said today that the Administration was developing several policy options in the event of an unsatisfactory resolution of the dispute over Soviet combat troops in Cuba, including an increase of American naval and air force units in the area.

At a luncheon meeting with reporters today, a senior Administration official said that Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin of the Soviet Union had been told in recent discussions that the presence of a Soviet brigade in Cuba had become a serious issue in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The official declined to discuss what the United States was asking the Soviet Union to do about the troops and he refused to describe what steps might be taken if the Russians did not accede to American demands.

In response to questioning, the official said that, at a meeting of the National Security Council on Monday, President Carter asked aides to outline "a series of specific options" whose use would depend on the outcome of the talks between Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance and Ambassador Dobrynin.

Although the official would not list the options, he reiterated a comment made by President Carter earlier this month that Washington could not be expected to respect Moscow's "sensitivities and concerns" if the Soviet Union ignored American interests.

Other officials suggested that there were several steps the President could take if the Soviet Union did not satisfy his concerns. These include an increase in the American naval presence around Cuba, where the United States already has a naval base at Guantánamo; a slowdown in trade and sales of advanced technology to the Soviet Union, and closer economic ties with China.

Some officials said that encouraging other Western countries to provide China with military equipment was another option open to the United States.

One official, noting that Mr. Vance would probably not discuss the issue with Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko until early next week, suggested that the pause was meant to induce the Russians "to think about the consequences of this

problem for the future state of the relationship."

Today, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Mr. Carter's national security adviser, told reporters that the troop issue was only part of a larger problem created by Soviet-Cuban military cooperation and that the United States had "to compete effectively" with Moscow's use of Cuban troops as "a proxy force" in third-world conflicts.

At the same time, Mr. Brzezinski emphasized that it would be a mistake to allow the issue to interfere with the Senate's ratification of the Soviet-American strategic arms treaty. Contending that the United States faced "a test of our maturity and our leadership," he said the country needed both the new arms accord and expansion of its military capabilities "across the board."

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ON PAGE A10THE WASHINGTON POST  
18 September 1979

# Carter Meets With Top Advisers on Soviet Brigade Issue

By Don Oberdorfer  
Washington Post Staff Writer

The United States and the Soviet Union held a fourth meeting on the troops in Cuba issue here yesterday amid intensified policymaking and hints of renewed concern in the top ranks of the Carter administration.

President Carter arrived at the White House by helicopter from Camp David several hours ahead of schedule to head a meeting of his senior foreign policy advisers on the issue. White House press secretary Jody Powell said: "there were decisions made," but he refused to disclose their nature or substance.

Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance left the meeting to see Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin for 27 minutes at the State Department just before noon.

Dobrynin then proceeded to New York to meet Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, who was arriving from Moscow for several weeks at the United Nations.

The White House meeting, according to informed sources, addressed the specifics of U.S. requirements for a successful resolution of the dispute. Carter and Vance have declared that the "status quo" involving the presence in Cuba of a Soviet combat brigade is unacceptable, but they have not said publicly what the United States demands that the Soviet Union do about it.

The president is reported to have been irritated at news reports last week suggesting that the issue might be resolved by redefining the Soviet force as a training rather than an operational unit. White House officials said Carter is determined to reject any "cosmetic solution" to the problem.

Reporters have been told there is agreement within the administration's top ranks on "general notions" of a negotiated settlement of the dispute. One of the aims of yesterday's White House meeting was to refine those general ideas.

Another topic of the meeting reportedly was contingency planning for countermoves if the troops issue cannot be settled through negotiations. Echoing a U.S. warning made known late last week by an administration official in a briefing for reporters, press secretary Powell said: "We have a right to expect the Soviet Union to respect our concerns [in Cuba] if they are to expect us to respect their concerns."

No details of possible U.S. counteractions were made public. Reporters were told late last week, without elaboration, that failure to resolve the troops issue would bring "certain negative consequences not of our desire" in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Administration sources did not discourage speculation that a Vance-Gromyko meeting within the next few

days might be the next step, but said that no such meeting is now scheduled.

With ratification of the strategic diplomatic negotiations. Nonetheless, there was a strong hint of growing concern about the talks in the personal participation by Carter in yesterday's policy review, a type of meeting he does not usually attend.

The Soviet Union, in its only authoritative public statement on the issue, said its troops have been in Cuba for 17 years to man "a training center," and that their functions have not changed.

After the United States made a public issue of the matter about two weeks ago, government researchers found several public statements by President John F. Kennedy referring to the presence of Soviet ground forces in Cuba after Soviet missiles and related technicians were withdrawn in settlement of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.

On Jan. 24, 1963, for example, Kennedy said: "some organized units" of Soviet military remain in Cuba "exercising" and "building some barracks." It has not been established whether these organized units of nearly two decades ago are the Soviet combat brigade of the present dispute.

CONTRA COSTA TIMES  
WALNUT CREEK, CALIFORNIA  
13 September 1979

# CIA's Toughness

The pendulum seems about ready to start its swing back toward the old CIA.

The old CIA kept its finger on the pulse of — or, if that is your inclination, extended its tentacles into — every nation in the world.

Its information-gathering efficiency was awesome — as was its capacity for heavy-handed international intrigue and manipulation.

Its critics charged it was not above assassination or fomenting insurrection.

Finally, the criticism rose to a pitch where the nation's spy system was reined in.

But even its severest critics had to concede that, for all its alleged excesses, it knew what Fidel Castro — and others around the world — were up to.

Today, the CIA is like a tiger with its fangs pulled.

And the nation has been caught with its spy system at half mast.

Castro, it turns out, has had Russian combat troops in Cuba for four or five years, and Uncle Sam never had an inkling.

In fact, while the diplomats were clucking over Castro's adventures in Africa, they were blissfully ignorant of Brezhnev's adventures 75 miles south of Miami where a Communist island fortress was taking shape.

Now we have a national furor.

Senators are threatening to hold hostage the SALT-II agreement unless Russia pulls that combat brigade out of Cuba.

Ronald Reagan is talking darkly of cutting off "communications" with the Soviets in response.

And President Carter must be consulting the White House pastor and praying for guidance.

In the meantime, the rest of us are left to survey the remnants of a once-effective if overbearing intelligence system.

And to ponder the wisdom of defanging the tiger.

Somewhere between the excesses of the CIA's halcyon days and today's embarrassing deficiencies is the type of intelligence system this nation must have.

It's high time for the pendulum to swing back.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A30THE WASHINGTON POST  
20 September 1979

## Briefing Set For Hill on Cuban Talks

Key congressional leaders are being summoned to the White House today for a briefing by President Carter on the sensitive and unusually secret U.S. - Soviet negotiations over Soviet troops in Cuba, according to informed sources.

Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, meanwhile, has scheduled a fifth meeting this afternoon with Soviet Ambassador Anatoli F. Dobrynin. Besides discussing the positions of the two nations on the troops issue, the two diplomats are expected to arrange further negotiations in New York late next week between Vance and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, who is attending the U.N. General Assembly session.

A meeting to discuss the U.S. diplomatic position and options for counter actions was chaired by Carter at the White House Monday. Several high officials, including Vance and national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, discussed the questions yesterday at an unannounced and informal White House session.

The Carter administration has demanded a change in "the status quo" of some 2,000 to 3,000 Soviet troops that have been described officially by the administration as a combat brigade. The Soviet Union has rejected the U.S. position saying the troops non-threatening "training center" in Cuba.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 1-8HUMAN EVENTS  
22 September 1979Sen. Jackson Demands:

# Soviet Base Must Be Dismantled

More than three weeks after a U.S. spy satellite had spotted that Soviet armored combat brigade in Cuba, American and Russian officials were still locked in secret discussions concerning how to resolve the issue. *Pravda* asserted that such a combat brigade was the figment of fevered imaginations, while U.S. officials insisted the brigade not only existed but had been engaged in maneuvers near the southern coast of Cuba in mid-August.

While the President promised "firm diplomacy" in handling the situation and said the "status quo" would be unacceptable, by week's end there was no word as to whether the Soviets were willing to budge from their position that U.S. charges were "totally groundless."

Indeed, if anyone was giving way, it was the Administration, which was trying to ease matters by suggesting that the activities of the combat brigade were not directed against the United States or nations in this hemisphere, but were being used to train Cuban soldiers for Africa—a line that Moscow itself has been handing out and which apparently is soothing to many U.S. policy officials.

The Administration, in fact, seemed to be hoping for a solution which would *not* require a Soviet pull-out of combat troops, as many senators have been demanding, but only a pledge that they be shorn of much of their armor the next time they're on maneuvers.

If the Administration accepts that kind of "solution," however, it will not go down well with much of the Congress. Rep. Samuel Stratton (D-N.Y.), a senior member of the House Armed Services Committee and chairman of the committee's investigations panel, told us: "Look, they're building a Russian base. Whether they're just training Cuban troops or not, they have a combat capability which could be used to help the Communists take over much of Latin America, including the Panama Canal."

The Administration, said Stratton, "seems to be looking for ways to cave in." And if it does, the Soviets "would then be convinced they could provoke us in any way, tell any story they wanted, and we'd just go along."

Stratton said that he was also seriously disturbed that the intelligence community failed to inform his investigations subcommittee about what the Soviets have been doing in Cuba. Last year, spokesmen for various intelligence agencies, including the CIA and the DIA (the Defense Intelligence Agency), were asked about various suspected Soviet activities in Cuba, but each time they played these activities down. At any rate, they knew nothing—or said nothing—about the combat brigade.

"I'm convinced," said Stratton, "the Soviets could put another 10,000 combat troops in Cuba and even nuclear missiles and we wouldn't know about it."

Whatever the outcome of the troop issue, there were growing signs that even their complete removal might not be enough to satisfactorily resolve what has become a burgeoning problem for the Administration. For a number of voices—both within and without the Administration—were crying for measures that would actually dismantle the growing number of Soviet military facilities in Cuba.

Though the State Department seems not overly concerned with what the Russians are doing in Castroland, some U.S. officials believe the combat troops are the least of our worries. What particularly disturbs them is the ever-increasing Soviet presence.

"The brigade is only one part of a general increase," noted one U.S. intelligence analyst. "Everything they have done is small in itself, but they are building a 'Fortress Cuba' that down the road has strategic significance for us."

In 1976, for instance, the Soviets supplied Cuba with air defense missiles and rearmed Cuban military units. In 1977, they installed electronic antennae capable of picking up U.S. satellite transmissions and began new construction of naval port facilities in Cienfuegos Bay.

In 1978, the Soviets quietly sneaked into Cuba a dozen or so MiG-23 aircraft, each capable of carrying nuclear missiles and covering the southeastern portion of the United States. This year the Soviets have supplied Cuba with submarines, along with "a fleet of 24 two-engine turboprop military transport planes," according to the *Washington Post*.

The new Cienfuegos construction, says the State Department, "is virtually complete" and consists of "a number of naval support-type buildings and a deep-water pier." Because of its huge size, U.S. intelligence analysts believe the facility is designed to serve a

CONTINUED

number of Soviet vessels and Soviet submarines supplied to the Cubans.

As one analyst told the *Post*: "Down the road these increased navy elements will require us to guard our flank." They will begin to "tie down our resources," he added, describing how U.S. destroyers would be required to watch the Cuban subs.

In the wake of these events, Sen. Henry Jackson (D.-Wash.), an influential member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, delivered a major speech last week on how to deal with "Fortress Cuba."

The deployment of Soviet combat forces, he stressed, was not an isolated event, but "a most dramatic example of a pattern of Soviet and Cuban behavior which is hostile to the interests of the United States, its friends, and allies....

"MiG-23's have been introduced.... More ominous, during this past year the Soviets have supplied the Cubans with their first attack submarine capability. They have introduced two boats: one is a training unit, the other is a combat unit. Cuba has no experience in submarine warfare. Are the officers who will call the shots on Cuban attack submarines Cubans or Soviets?

"What is the role of any Soviet naval advisers embarked? This is a brand-new military capability for Cuba. And it would seem likely that the Soviets would provide a separate training submarine only if they intended to supply Cuba with a number of attack boats.

"Diesel submarines are very quiet when operating on batteries; the type of submarine supplied—known as Foxtrot—is an ocean-going combatant; and boats of this type are capable of laying mines covertly off our coast. In numbers, they would constitute a major threat to our oil supplies. Even a small number are especially well suited for covert insertion of personnel and small arms throughout the Caribbean and Central America."

The United States cannot continue to tolerate a hostile power in the Caribbean that poses a threat to the security of ourselves and our allies, said Jackson. The Administration must demand "no less" than the following:

- Soviet combat units must be removed from Cuba.
- Soviet high-performance ground attack aircraft must also be eliminated.
- The Soviets must be prohibited from providing Cuba with additional submarines, or "other naval forces with the reach to threaten our ports or our shipping."

Why are the Soviets flexing their muscles in this way? "The military balance," said Jackson, "is very different from that which existed in 1962. We have allowed ourselves to drift into a position where the Soviets believe they can do most anything they and their Cuban surrogates wish to do—even in this hemisphere. We are now witnessing just one of the effects of the unparalleled Soviet military buildup and the adverse shift in the military balance....

"Fortunately, the United States still possesses political strength and considerable military power. What is needed now is a national consensus behind our determination that we will not allow the Soviets to turn Cuba into a fortress-state capable of threatening the United States, our allies and friends in this hemisphere, and our vital lines of communication."

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 58NEW YORK DAILY NEWS  
20 SEPTEMBER 1979

# Carter & Church & Castro & Co.

## *And the Russian submarine pen that didn't just go away*

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**PATRICK J. BUCHANAN**

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**W**ASHINGTON—The Audubon Society's Field Guide to North American Birds contains this abbreviated description of pigeon families: "This group includes the familiar Rock Dove or city pigeon and its allies. These are small-to-medium-sized birds, small-headed, and clad in soft browns and grays. On the ground they walk with a characteristic mincing gait." Which brings us to the subjects of this column.

Early in his closing administration, President Carter professed a desire for "full friendship" with Cuba, underscored by his decision to terminate intelligence overflights of the island. Sen. Frank Church, a Capitol Hill dove who grows hawk-like talons every six years when reelection approaches, warmly embraced the new policy and flew off to Havana in its furtherance. According to press accounts, he returned to declare that he and Castro had become personal friends, that Castro was "reasonable, objective and surprisingly moderate," that the U.S. policy of isolating the island was "stubborn and self-defeating."

A lifetime hater of the United States, Castro is a small-bird hunter not unfamiliar with the North American pigeon. On Carter and Church, he had spotted two world-class specimens. He hailed the Idaho senator as an "important, courageous politician...capable, serious and intellectual...a man you can talk to."

Thus, when Carter went to Notre Dame to announce that we had gotten over "our inordinate fear of Communism," Castro beefed up his army of occupation in Angola and intervened on the Soviets' behalf in Ethiopia. With the U.S. overflights ended, the Russians sent B-52s to fly air cover over Cuba, provided Castro with

his first submarines, gave Cuba the nuclear-capable MiG-23 fighter-bomber and secretly moved a Russian combat brigade onto the island. And, if Sen. Richard Stone of Florida is accurate in his report to this writer, something more chilling is going down.

In 1962, Khrushchev agreed to pull his offensive weapons—intermediate range ballistic missiles and conventional bombers—out of Cuba in exchange for a U.S. promise not to invade. In 1970, U.S. intelligence discovered the Soviets building a submarine base at Cienfuegos Bay, capable of servicing missile-carrying submarines. A secret crisis ensued. The Americans claimed the submarine base was a violation of the 1962 understanding. After some diplomatic hauling and shoving, the Soviets abandoned Cienfuegos.

During that quiet crisis, Henry Kissinger handed Ambassador Dobrynin a note, outlining the U.S. interpretation of the 1962 agreement. Drafted by Nixon himself, the note read: "The U.S. government understands that the USSR will not establish, utilize, or permit the establishment of any facility in Cuba that can be employed to support or repair Soviet naval ships armed with nuclear-capable, surface-to-surface missiles."

According to several sources, Cienfuegos Bay is once again being expanded and modernized to accommodate submarines. And, according to Stone, in 1974 a Soviet Golf II class ballistic missile submarine (which carries three surface-to-surface missiles of 700-mile range) spent several weeks in the Cuban port.

What we are witnessing, with the submarine, the base, and the MiG-23s, is Soviet chiseling away, with Castro's collaboration, at the understanding that ended the missile crisis, chiseling similar to that by which the Kremlin deceived Henry Kissinger in SALT-1 when it replaced the light, single-warhead SS-11 with the larger, heavier, six-warhead SS-19.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 57

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS  
20 SEPTEMBER 1979

## VOICE OF THE PEOPLE

### WHAT'D YA EXPECT?

Bergenfield, N.J.: The CIA's powers were emasculated, its budget was cut to pieces, its overt and covert operations were put under a microscope and exposed to public view, and its standard operating procedures were put through the congressional meat grinder. And now that phony politician, Sen. Frank Church, screams and wonders why CIA wasn't aware of the Soviet military buildup in Cuba. Who the hell does he think he's kidding anyway? **JOE CORRADO**

Approved For Release 2009/04/30 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501280001-5

**H-Bomb Plan Has Emerged as a Government's Right  
To Keep Secrets Debate**

Approved For Release 2009/04/30 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501280001-5

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A-23NEW YORK TIMES  
20 SEPTEMBER 1979

## ABROAD AT HOME

A  
Famous  
Victory

By Anthony Lewis

BOSTON, Sept. 19 — When the Justice Department abandoned its effort to keep The Progressive from publishing an article on the hydrogen bomb, the magazine celebrated. The editor, Erwin Knoll, said: "It's a clear-cut victory, not only for The Progressive but also for the American people."

Writers and editors who had been silenced for six months by court orders were entitled to feel happy. And the Government's withdrawal, after other journals printed similar material, was certainly better for the public and the press than losing a final decision in the court. But how much better is a different question. Considered as a whole, The Progressive case was no triumph for the First Amendment.

A prior restraint actually operated for six months. Even though the Government's lawsuit is now dismissed, the fact of that restraint will remain: a dangerous precedent ready for use by other Administrations and other courts. What judge, faced with some future claim that an article threatens the national security, will not be tempted to look at this example and restrain publication at least long enough to "study the facts"?

The First Amendment, in its guarantees of free speech and press, was intended above all to rule out prior restraints. The Supreme Court has firmly and consistently said so from its first great decision on the question, in the Near case in 1931, to the Pentagon Papers in 1971.

As Chief Justice Burger later explained, every Justice who sat in the Pentagon Papers case accepted the premise that prior restraints were "presumptively unconstitutional." The Chief Justice added that the rule was the same whether the requested ban on a publication was permanent or only long enough to study the facts:

The Pentagon Papers decision, he said, "suggests that the burden on the Government is not reduced by the temporary nature of a restraint."

Why is it, then, that the Government succeeded in suppressing The Progressive article for so long? The answer, of course, is that it concerned the hydrogen bomb — a subject guaranteed to worry people, judges not least.

Law teachers used to test the reach of the rule against prior restraints by asking their students whether an article disclosing "the secret of the hydrogen bomb" could be restrained. Now the hypothetical seemed to have become real. The Progressive made it worse by the provocative title it gave the piece, "The H-Bomb Secret — How We Got It, Why We're Telling It." (Judge Wilbur F. Pell Jr., of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, put that piffery aside with the apt comment: "Well, you have to sell your newspaper.")

In fact, the point of The Progressive article was that there really was no "secret" — and that the United States should stop relying on secrecy to limit the spread of thermonuclear weapons. The author, Howard Morland, put it together from open sources. The Department of Energy then declared it classified.

The Supreme Court has allowed only the narrowest exception to the rule against prior restraints. As Justice Potter Stewart put it in the Pentagon Papers case, publication can be stopped only if it "will surely result in direct, immediate and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people."

The Government virtually conceded that The Progressive article did not pose that kind of direct threat. For example, an affidavit by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown was vague in its prediction of bad consequences: "If the Morland paper were disseminated, there is a substantial increase in the risk that the availability of thermonuclear weapons would be increased."

Having failed to meet the Pentagon Papers test, the Government tried to sidestep it by advancing these other theories:

1. The Pentagon Papers standard did not apply, because no statute was involved in that case and here the Government acted under the explicit language of the Atomic Energy Act. The Justice Department indeed suggested that legislation made prior restraints presumptively constitutional. Of course, statutes may make a difference. But the Near case, which established the rule against prior restraints, itself involved legislation.

2. "Technical information" on weapons, like obscenity, is outside the First Amendment's protection altogether. That theory would remove many urgent political issues from public debate.

3. If classified information has, in fact, spread around the world over time, the proper remedy is to get it declassified; that requires a "complex judgment," and judges are not expert enough to make it. This proposition would let the executive branch avoid judicial scrutiny of censorship simply by stamping an article classified. The same outrageous contention was advanced by the Nixon Administration in the Pentagon Papers case.

Why should the Carter Administration have made arguments so dangerous to the First Amendment? My impression is that some Justice Department lawyers wanted to drop The Progressive case earlier. It will be for history to say why neither Griffin Bell nor Benjamin Civiletti had the courage to say, long ago, "If the only way we can win this case is to make arguments of that kind, we ought to lose."

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 3THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
20 September 1979

# Missing uranium raises worry of homemade A-bomb

By John K. Cooley

Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor  
Washington

How much danger is there that widespread publication of nuclear technology and loss of weapons-grade nuclear materials might put a home-made bomb in the hands of criminals or terrorists?

This long-unanswered question is insistently posed again for the Carter administration by disappearance of enough enriched uranium from an Erwin, Tennessee, plant to make one nuclear bomb and by the Chicago Tribune's 18-page article on secrets of the hydrogen bomb.

Administration analysts have tentatively concluded that foreign governments developing nuclear weapons probably do not need the kind of information disclosed in US publications recently, and that terrorists would not possess sophisticated know-how to build hydrogen weapons. However, some feel that terrorists or criminals might be in a position to utilize published descriptions of simple nuclear devices to make a crude atomic bomb if they were able to obtain fissionable materials.

The Tribune publication, Sept. 18, coincidental with closing of the Erwin plant for investigation of the loss, followed close upon the US Government's abandonment of efforts to suppress publication of the H-bomb information.

This was published a day earlier by the Press Connection, a Madison, Wisconsin, newspaper. It now is scheduled for October publication by Progressive magazine, restrained by a federal court order from doing so since last March.

The US Justice Department has opened a "preliminary inquiry" into publication by both the Chicago Tribune and the Press Connection, Robert Havell, a spokesman for the department, disclosed Sept. 19. The department was "looking into the possibility" that classified information was included. If it were so determined, the author, computer programmer Charles Hansen of Mountain View, California, as well as the newspapers, might be prosecuted under the 1954 Atomic Energy Act.

The act forbids publication of "secret restricted data" on "design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons." Mr. Hansen's article was a detailed account of the theories and practice of building a complex hydrogen weapon that is detonated in eight separate explosions. It is not a formula for a simple nuclear bomb such as terrorists might build themselves.

Mr. Havell said the Justice Department has warned about assistance such information might give to "foreign governments" in making a nuclear weapon, but has not mentioned publicly the possibilities of terrorist or criminal groups getting materials or technology to make one. Howard Morland, a scientist concerned with hazards of nuclear weapons, wrote his soon-to-be published article in

the Progressive to illustrate the ease, as well as the dangers, of building such weapons, staffers on the magazine have said.

On the theft or disappearance of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium, the US and other governments have been warning against the danger for years. In 1974 and 1975, both the Ford Foundation and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in separate findings, said it would not be difficult for even relatively unsophisticated criminal or terrorist elements to assemble a bomb. US Government reports that would apparently help them were found in a public library in Los Alamos, New Mexico, last spring by investigators working with the Progressive.

Nuclear scientist Theodore B. Taylor told a US Senate subcommittee in 1974 that ". . . a few persons, perhaps even one person working alone, could. . . within several weeks, safely design and build a crude, transportable fission bomb. . . This could be done using materials and equipment which could be purchased in a hardware store."

Western intelligence sources have privately said they feared the Palestine Liberation Organization, if it could get sophisticated technology, might build nuclear weapons. Terrorist organizations like the former Baader-Meinhoff gang in West Germany also were suspected of such aspirations, but they never materialized.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A 1-30THE WASHINGTON POST  
20 September 1979

# H-Bomb Scientists Suspected of Leaks

By Charles R. Babcock  
and Thomas O'Toole  
Washington Post Staff Writers

Government nuclear weapons experts suspect that scientists at their own Argonne and Livermore national laboratories leaked classified secrets to authors of stories on the hydrogen bomb that the government tried to suppress, according to sources.

Though the writers insist they based their articles on information available to the public, Energy Department officials feel they were aided by sympathetic scientists at the government laboratories, the sources said. The Justice Department has been asked to determine whether anyone should be prosecuted under the criminal sections of the Atomic Energy Act for divulging the crucial concepts of the H-bomb.

The government dropped its effort to stop the Progressive magazine from publishing an article by Howard Morland on Monday. This came a day after the Madison (Wis.) Press Connection printed a letter by Charles Hansen, which disclosed the key principles for making an H-bomb, a Justice Department spokesman said.

Energy Department officials seem more intent on finding those who might have leaked classified information than in prosecuting the Madison newspaper for finally printing the Hansen letter. Justice lawyers haven't decided yet whether the case is worth pursuing, officials there said yesterday.

The government nuclear experts were said to be particularly upset by what they believe were leaks from the government's secret filings in the Progressive case that they believe were used in Hansen's letter, the sources said.

One source said Energy Department officials found "significant language similarities" between sections of the

government briefs and parts of the 18-page Hansen letter.

It was not clear why scientists from Argonne and Livermore are the subject of suspicion, though a few nuclear experts from those labs had permission to see the secret government filings while aiding defense lawyers preparing the Progressive's case.

Mark H. Lynch and Paul L. Friedman, attorneys for the Progressive, said they were disturbed by the government's decision to begin even a preliminary criminal inquiry. They said they did not violate the court's protective order and Lynch added he was sure the scientists who assisted them "wouldn't be that foolish."

They noted that the defendants, Morland and Progressive editors Erwin Knoll and Samuel Day Jr., did not have access to the government's secret court filings.

Some government nuclear experts have believed from the beginning that both Morland and Hansen had help in preparing their articles.

In its public brief before the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Chicago the government said: "The evidence suggests that Morland was able to write accurately about the H-bomb secret only because he had significant guidance by a person or persons with access to classified material."

Morland interviewed several government scientists during his research on the article, with the permission of the Energy Department. But the government moved to block publication of the story in March, when Progressive editors submitted it for approval.

Government suspicions were heightened in late April and early May when a Milwaukee Sentinel reporter, Joe Manning, wrote stories about the H-bomb from materials he said he found on library shelves, the sources said. The articles repeated some of the same mistakes Morland made in his piece, sources said.

Trueman Farris, managing editor of the Sentinel, said in a phone interview yesterday that Manning didn't talk to anyone with a classified clearance in preparing his stories. "If there were mistakes that paralleled Mor-

land, it could be because they used the same public materials," Farris said.

Hansen, a computer programmer from Mountain View, Calif., said he couldn't comment about the government's leak suspicions because his lawyer told him not to discuss the case.

The government's concern about suspected leaks is apparent in its motion to dismiss the preliminary injunction against the Progressive. In that motion, Justice lawyers specifically ask that the district court be allowed to take "appropriate action to protect the in camera [secret] materials."

"Some material filed in camera by the United States is more sensitive than the Morland article," the government lawyers said. "This material was submitted by the government in reliance upon the assurance of confidentiality provided by its in camera treatment."

Progressive attorney Friedman said the scope of the protective order and the government's reference to a preliminary inquiry for possible criminal violations of the Atomic Energy Act would have a "chilling effect" on future writers. "It could lead to self-censorship and the victory we have achieved would be eliminated," he said.

The Progressive lawyers said they feel the constitutionality of the Atomic Energy Act can be challenged because its provisions are too loosely defined. Deputy Assistant Attorney General Robert L. Keuch, an expert on espionage cases, said the act has been used in only one criminal prosecution and that was a classic spy case in 1964.

Some department lawyers believe any criminal case stemming from the H-bomb disclosures would be flawed because the government has acknowledged that many of the same secrets had been disclosed by inadvertent declassification.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A 20THE WASHINGTON POST  
19 September 1979

# Keeping Secrets Secret

THE CASE OF the *United States v. the Progressive* magazine came to a dismal end Monday. Nobody won. The government failed to protect what it says are fundamental secrets about the construction of the hydrogen bomb. The Progressive, and the press as a whole, failed to establish either that prior restraints on publication are unconstitutional or that the government has misused its secrecy stamp. All that has been established is that it is difficult, if not impossible, to keep information secret once it is out of the government's control.

This result came about because the Madison Press Connection published a letter containing the information that the Progressive had been barred by a federal judge from publishing for more than six months. Once that information was in the hands of the general public, as it obviously was after the Press Connection printed 8,000 copies, further efforts by the government to stop others from printing it were senseless. That's why the government asked that the order against the Progressive, and a similar order against a California paper, which also had the letter, be dissolved.

There is no way to judge now what damage has been done to national security by the publication of this information. The government's contention all along has been that it might be used to shorten the time in which nations that do not now have hydrogen weapons can produce them. Because much information about such weapons is, or has been, available from other public sources—if you knew where to look for it—tracing the impact of these disclosures on nuclear proliferation will be difficult.

The primary lesson to be learned from this affair is the flimsiness of prior restraint as a way to prevent the disclosure of secret information. A judge cannot bar the publication of something unless the govern-

ment knows in advance it is going to be published, and in this case the Department of Justice did not know the Press Connection had the letter. Any person intent upon publishing a secret, or communicating it to someone else, can similarly avoid a prior restraint (and the summary punishment for violating it) simply by keeping secret the fact he has it.

The only truly effective way the government can keep secrets is to keep them. Once they get out, they tend to be spread quickly—just as this one was. The only real protections then available against publication of such secrets are the moral constraints felt by those into whose hands they have fallen or the deterring effect of the criminal provisions of the Atomic Energy Act and other laws. In this case, neither was sufficient to prevent publication—the former because too many people thought the government was carrying secrecy too far and the latter because some people, apparently including the editors of the Press Connection, believe the government lacks either the will or the ability to prosecute.

The risk those editors are taking is great—prison terms of up to 20 years if their judgment of the letter's content is wrong and the government's right. But if the letter does contain the highly sensitive material the government says it does, it should not have been published. While a prosecution of those editors could jeopardize the current classification system and, perhaps, portions of the Atomic Energy Act itself, a decision by the Department of Justice not to prosecute could well turn that act's deterring provisions into a sham. In that event, the government would be tempted to ignore what it should have learned from this affair about protecting its secrets and to rely even more on a dangerous system of ineffective prior restraints—which it should in fact abandon.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A18

THE BALTIMORE SUN  
19 September 1979

## Nuclear Secrets

The Department of Justice is right—at last—to decide that it really serves no security purpose to prevent *Progressive* magazine from publishing its article about how hydrogen bombs are made. As so many people have been telling the department since the magazine was first censored back in March, the technical details about H-bomb construction are not secrets.

What finally convinced the department was the publication elsewhere of a similar article, drawing on unclassified sources. But it was clear before this that the author of the *Progressive* magazine piece had based his article on similarly unclassified publications and interviews, and that many other writers could put together this sort of "how to" article, here and abroad. In June, the department even stipulated to the judge hearing the case that a government library had long offered the public a document "at least as complete" as the *Progressive* article.

This exercise of prior restraint of a publication for six months is the most blatant and severe example of censorship in this nation's history. Indeed, only once before, so far as we know, has a court forbidden a newspaper or magazine to publish an article. And in that case the injunction was in effect for only a brief

period before the Supreme Court dissolved it and the papers published.

The *Progressive*'s editors said all along that they hoped to start a debate about the nuclear weapons program, particularly about how information about the weapons is kept from the public. The public does need to know more about nuclear weapons—their cost, numbers, availability, destructiveness, reliability and safety. Many scientists and laymen believe that the real threat to national security is not that a hostile power or band of terrorists will build a bomb, using stolen documents or reckless magazine articles. They fear the theft of weapons, themselves, and accidents involving weapons and nuclear materials, which may well be more likely to occur as long as policies and programs are carried out in secret.

Obviously some secrecy procedures and laws are necessary in the field of nuclear physics and engineering. The *Progressive*'s experience makes it clear that the Atomic Energy Act is the wrong law. There is presently an effort under way in the House Judiciary Committee to rewrite the nation's basic espionage law. We believe Congress also ought to reconsider the Atomic Energy Act's secrecy and censorship provisions.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A-24NEW YORK TIMES  
19 SEPTEMBER 1979

## Press, Bomb and Pistols

No grave danger to national security justified the unprecedented six-month suppression of The Progressive magazine's article about H-bomb design. That, at last, will be proved with its publication. If the Government had really lost a valuable secret, it plainly would — or should — have stood mute instead of alerting technicians the world over. As was quickly apparent, the feared damage lay mainly in the demonstration of how much weapons information can be collected and deduced from public sources. And that meant there was — or should have been — no basis for restraining an American publication.

This case was in fact a political contest for both sides. The Government raised dark fears about alleged instructions on "how to build" an H-bomb so as to dupe a Federal judge into suppressing the article. But even the judge found no how-to manual, only untested conclusions by Cabinet officials and famous scientists that the article "could possibly" help some nations already possessing an A-bomb to build an H-bomb too. Which nations? Had he asked, he would have been told India, or Israel, or South Africa — none that would need to add H-bombs to A-bombs and none that would need The Progressive's help. The Government's concern was more with power at home than abroad. It wanted to use this sensational-sounding case to have the courts declare it the sole arbiter of who may receive and disseminate nuclear weapons data, no matter how innocent their source.

For its part, The Progressive hardly expected its liberal readers to value a dreary technical treatise on H-bomb concepts. Nor did it want to proliferate thermonuclear weapons. The magazine was out to prove that many nuclear secrets are not in fact secret. It thus wanted to show that the Government's elaborate classification system exists not so much to protect the na-

tion as to confine discussion of nuclear policies, both military and civilian, to a small and certified group of experts.

One need not share the magazine's opinions to recognize its right to promote them as it did. One need not deny the Government's right and duty to protect some weapons secrets to deplore the resort to prior restraint against such an insubstantial threat. The Government again cried wolf at the sight of a mouse, thus offending and damaging true national security.

We congratulate The Progressive and the American Civil Liberties Union for resisting, against the advice even of some customary defenders of a free press. The Government's case simply collapsed when other publications began to print similar H-bomb information, found by other amateur students in public sources, including Government libraries, museums and a journal for model-airplane builders. But vindication for the defendants does not automatically bring satisfaction of their constitutional rights.

Before suffering a technical knockout, the Government had created some pernicious legal theory. Lacking evidence that anyone had stolen H-bomb secrets, it claimed the right to suppress all nuclear weapons information on the ground that it is "born classified" — even if born in the minds of free men. And lest this reading of the law fall, it then proclaimed that "technical" information — allegedly distinguishable from "political" ideas — was never entitled to the free speech and press guarantees of the First Amendment. If the courts now avoid ruling on them, these doctrines would lie around, in Justice Jackson's phrase, like loaded pistols. It would be wiser to unload them while they lie within reach.

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Four Released From Cuba

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A3NEW YORK TIMES  
21 SEPTEMBER 1979

# Freed American Talks Calmly of Cuba

By JO THOMAS

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 20 — He was at last in the country he had longed for, where the listeners were sympathetic and knew his language. But he spoke slowly, trying to translate past into present and apologizing when the words would fail.

Lawrence K. Lunt, 55 years old, a rancher charged by the Cubans with espionage, served 14 years and 4 months in prison before he and three other Americans were freed Monday, the last American political prisoners.

Today he sat, pale and knife-thin, in the late September sunlight filtering into his sister's Georgetown garden. The air was cool and he kept adding layers of clothing.

### Accused of Hiding Castro Foes

The Cubans charged him with having worked for the Central Intelligence Agency and having hidden counterrevolutionaries on his 5,000-acre cattle ranch in Pinar del Rio Province, on Cuba's western tip. Whether these charges were true cannot be determined. Mr. Lunt will say little about the C.I.A.

He has acknowledged that he was associated with the agency, and that the C.I.A. had approached him. But he also said today that he had no contract, received no money, and expects no compensation in the future.

"I have no arrangement with them at all," he said today when pressed to explain why he was still remaining silent. "I don't think it has any reason to be discussed."

The harshness of his sentence was etched on his face, and the calm of his voice was betrayed by the knuckles that whitened as he gripped the chair at the sound of a siren, a noise he heard "any time they would take us anywhere."

### 'Looking for a Challenge'

He went to Cuba in 1956, he said, because "I wanted to find an undeveloped area I could develop in my own way."

"I was looking for a challenge," he went on. "I found it in this run-down

ranch. The owner, who lived in Havana, had let it become completely overgrown."

Mr. Lunt and his wife, Beatrice, took out a \$200,000 mortgage and began raising Zebu cattle, clearing some of the pasture by hand, working beside the hired hands. They had just married, and over the years they had three sons.

The ranch house they built looked east to the Cordillera de los Organos, a mountain range that sheltered some of the guerrillas fighting against the Government of Fulgencio Batista.

### Castro's 'False Promises'

"We helped the guerrillas," Mr. Lunt said today. "I believed in the revolution. After the corruption in the Government of the Batista regime, I thought any change would be for the better. I was fooled by Fidel Castro and his false promises for agrarian reform, his promises to stay out of politics himself, his promises of equality for all, etcetera, etcetera ad nauseum."

He did not know then, he said, that he had aroused the ire of his neighbors by paying the five cowboys on his ranch more than the going wage and by building houses for them and their families.

"I misplaced my faith," he said; "in any humanitarian feeling in the Cuban Communists. I naively thought that developing Cuban land, helping to give jobs and improving the way of life on a small scale — I was naive enough to believe that the revolution might have welcomed my presence. But the Communists must do everything their own way and not have an example by a foreigner, particularly a gringo."

The first wave of executions after the revolution worried him. He stayed. It became difficult to get his money out of the bank. He stayed. He was warned, finally, when he was out of the country that he should not return to Cuba. He did.

### Stopped at Airport

"I suppose I went back because I didn't want to implicate the five men and their families in what could have come out."

On May 4, 1965, he was stopped just as

he was about to board a plane at Havana's main airport to return to the United States for his parents' 50th wedding anniversary. He was told there were problems with the mortgage on the ranch.

"I knew this was not true, but I took their word for it and went to the bank. They knew nothing about it."

Two days later, four men arrested him at gunpoint in Havana and shoved him into a battered Mercury sedan. He found himself in an isolation cell with a wooden bunk and no windows.

There were other prisons; the ancient prison at La Cabaña where the executions took place at 9 P.M. and where all the prisoners had to listen to the shots; and the tiers of cells at the Isle of Pines, where the prisoners worked in the rock quarry; and the new prison at Combinado del Este, where there were books and even a television set. The time added up to more than 14 years.

"I was a born optimist," Mr. Lunt said. "I supposed it would be a long time — but never as long as 14 years."

### Mistreated but Not Tortured

During the interrogation, he said, he was not tortured. "The only man who ever touched me was the barber," he said. Later, he said, working in the quarry, he was "mistreated as all prisoners were."

He spoke without much bitterness of the cornmeal mush with maggots in it, of the years of eating macaroni, of the slow improvement in prison food and conditions — "was it in '73? Or in '76?" And he explained that his fellow prisoners, his family and friends, and his health kept him going.

"I was able to get most of Solzhenitsyn's works because he was a Russian," he said. "I didn't think the Cubans had an idea of his significance. Solzhenitsyn described it far better than I can, in 'One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich.' The only difference was the climate."

He was able, he explained, to read magazines during his last two years in prison, but he is still stunned by the outside world. Reading, he explained, "does not prepare you for the shock. It has been a Rip Van Winkle experience. At the airport, running into big-bosomed women of undetermined age in T-shirts! It was a little shocking and, what's the word?"

"The opulence of American life after the austerity of Cuba is almost frightening. On my first day in Washington, I went to a supermarket with my wife and sister. I longed to take the whole supermarket into my arms and present it to my friends who are still in prison."

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A3THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)  
18 September 1979

# 4 Americans in Cuban Prisons Since 1960s Released by Castro

By Marilyn Alva  
Time-Life News Service

MIAMI — The last four American political prisoners in Cuba were back on U.S. soil today after spending more than a decade each in Fidel Castro's jails.

They were released yesterday by the Cuban government and flown to Miami last night in a plane chartered by the State Department.

The release completed a series of reciprocal gestures and actions by Cuba and the United States, whose end result was the freeing by the United States of four Puerto Rican nationalists imprisoned for the attempted assassination in 1950 of President Harry S. Truman and the freeing of the four Americans by Cuba. The United States, however, denied emphatically that the releases constituted a prisoner exchange.

"I feel very deeply and immensely happy," a pale and drawn Lawrence Lunt, 55, of Saratoga, Wyo., told a crowd of reporters waiting at Miami International Airport.

A former CIA operative, Lunt said he heard of the release on Cuban television "almost the same time President Carter announced the release of the Puerto Rican nationalists."

Unlike Everett Jackson, another released prisoner, who maintained he "collaborated" with the CIA as a freelance newsman, Lunt said he had no ill feelings about the timing of his release to follow that of the Puerto Ricans. "I served enough years in prison," he said weakly.

Jackson, 38, told reporters, "I refuse to categorically be exchanged for the Puerto Rican. I refuse to be exchanged for any citizen who made an armed attack on the U.S. president. I was deported."

Juan Tur, 63 of Tampa, Fla., was greeted in Miami by flower-bearing residents from four states. "I'm very

pleased to be here. I'm so happy I can't talk," Tur said as his relatives closed in. He plans to live in New Jersey with a sister.

A fourth prisoner, Claudio Rodriguez Moralez of Puerto Rico, was whisked off to a connecting flight to Puerto Rico, where his family was awaiting his return.

The group arrived in Miami shortly before 8 p.m. after a one hour and 10 minute flight from a tiny airport in the beach resort town of Vera Dero, about 70 miles east of Havana.

Also aboard the plane were Reps. Benjamin Gilman, R-N.Y., and Mickey Leland, D-Texas; Wyoming Gov. Edward Herschler; two State Department officials; Dr. John Lunt, a brother of Lawrence Lunt; and the wife and daughter of Tur, Cuban nationals who were permitted to leave their country with Tur.

The group was sent to escort the Americans back to the United States after Cuba notified the State Department Friday of the impending releases.

The prisoners, who had spent two days at Vera Dero waiting to fly to the United States, were not told of the departure until yesterday afternoon. The Cuban government provided them with new suits, shirts and ties.

"They were in somewhat of a stupor," Leland said. "But when the plane took off they were smiling and clapping."

The U.S. State Department says the release of the Americans yesterday were not negotiated. "People are trying to link the release of the Puerto Ricans with these Americans. That's a tenuous link," State Department spokesman Donald Mathes said. "There's been no packaged deal. This was not a prisoner exchange." He added, "We released the Puerto Ricans on the merits of their cases."

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A-10THE WASHINGTON POST  
18 September 1979

# Cuba Frees Four U.S. Prisoners

By Bill Curry

Washington Post Staff Writer

MIAMI, Sept. 17—Four Americans imprisoned on political and espionage charges in Cuba for more than a decade were returned here late today.

Wearing Cuban-issued suits and white shirts, they stepped off their State Department plane at Miami International Airport shortly before 8 p.m., thus completing an informal arrangement promised by Cuban President Fidel Castro. Their release followed President Carter's action on Sept. 10 freeing four Puerto Rican nationalists held on terrorist charges since the 1950s.

Their emotions ranged from the gratitude shown by Lawrence K. Lunt, 54, who served 14 years of a 30-year sentence on an espionage charge, to the tight-lipped defiance of Everett D. Jackson, who served almost 12 years of his 30-year sentence for violating Cuban air space.

Jackson, who parachuted into Cuba with news organization credentials and was "indirectly" working for the CIA, said he was not released but "deported," as he refused to be part of an arrangement that he said equated his efforts with the Puerto-Ricans' attacks on former President Truman and the U.S. Congress in the 1950s.

The Carter administration also refused to link the two sets of prisoner releases and had avoided direct negotiations with Castro.

At an airport news conference, the third released prisoner, Juan Tur, 62, sat quietly with his Cuban wife and daughter, who were permitted to leave the country with him. Tur served 15 years of a 30-year espionage sentence. A relative has said he was a contract employee of the CIA.

The fourth released prisoner was Claudio Rodriguez Morales, a 49-year-old Puerto Rican who had

served 13 years of a 20-year term for trying to smuggle refugees out of Cuba. After passing through customs and immigration, he left immediately for a flight to Puerto Rico.

Lunt, a rancher in Cuba, acknowledged he became a CIA contract employee in the early 1960s; his ranch was in the same region where Soviet missiles were discovered in 1962. He said he did not regret his actions and believed that his time in prison was worth it, that he would "do anything" for our country. He said, however, that he would "rather not answer" as to exactly what he did and that he had "served" enough years.

"I was in the wrong place at the wrong time," said Jackson of his 1967 arrest after the crash of his small plane in the mountains of central Cuba. He said he carried credentials from a California newspaper, but that he intended to share his information—whether there were still missiles in Cuba—with the CIA.

Tonight he said: "I never got the chance."

The release of the four concluded several years of efforts by public officials and a lawyer retained by Lunt to win their freedom. Accompanying the men as they returned to the United States were two State Department officials, U.S. Reps. Benjamin Gilman (R-N.Y.) and Mickey Leland (D-Tex.), Wyoming Gov. Ed Herschler and Lunt's brother, Dr. John Lunt of Saratoga, Wyo.

Castro had said for at least two years that if the Americans freed the four Puerto Rican nationalists, he would reciprocate. President Carter granted clemency to the four Sept. 7, and they were released a week ago. This morning, Cuban officials notified the United States that Tur, Lunt, Rodriguez Morales and Jackson would be released.

From the time they heard of Carter's decision on Cuban television, Lunt said, their release appeared certain. They were taken a short time later to a Cuban intelligence facility, then to an "immigration house" and this morning to the U.S. interest section in Cuba.

At 8 p.m. they were told their departure was imminent. One hour and 45 minutes later they touched down on American soil.

Lunt, checking into the Marriott Hotel here, said there was "always a constant fear" that the arrangement would not go through. As for his feel-

ings, the gaunt native New Englander said, "I have no feeling at all. The reaction has not set in."

The State Department said, "The United States is delighted," and Gilman described Castro's release of the four as a "gesture of humanism."

Rep. Leland, who had visited Cuba last year, described it as a "touching scene" today when Lunt's brother stood baffled after getting off the plane in Cuba, apparently waiting for some formality: "Go grab him," Leland told John Lunt, and the brother did just that. "Everybody," said Leland, "was in sort of a stupor."

While Rodriguez Morales was off to Puerto Rico and Tur was greeted in Miami by relatives from his hometown of Tampa, Fla., Lunt said he would be traveling to Washington and then to Wyoming, where he wants "to see if that worthless brother of mine will give me a job on his ranch."

Jackson, whose English bore a trace of Spanish accent, said he would visit his relatives in California and then perhaps return to Miami "to do a little writing."

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# CUBA FREES LAST 4 FROM U.S. DETAINED IN POLITICAL CASES

## RELEASED MEN FLY TO FLORIDA

Action Follows Carter's Release  
of 4 Jailed Puerto Ricans —  
State Dept. Denies Deal

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 17 — Cuba freed the last four United States citizens it was holding on political charges today in what appeared to be a response to President Carter's release earlier this month of four Puerto Rican nationalists.

In announcing the release of the Americans, the State Department denied that there had been any "package deal" involving the Puerto Ricans. However, President Fidel Castro had said earlier that he would let the four Americans go if the Puerto Ricans were freed.

"The United States Government is delighted that these Americans are being released," said Hodding Carter 3d, the State Department spokesman. He said a plane had been sent to Cuba to take the four to Miami, where they arrived this evening.

### Four Are Identified

The freed Americans were identified by Mr. Carter as:

• Lawrence K. Lunt, who was sentenced to 30 years in 1968 for espionage, and who reportedly had worked for the Central Intelligence Agency under contract;

• Juan Tur, sentenced to 30 years for counterrevolutionary activities in 1963;

• Everett Jackson, sentenced to 30 years for espionage in 1967;

• Claudio Rodriguez Morales, sentenced to 20 years in 1968 for smuggling people out of Cuba.

Five years ago, it was estimated that 25 United States citizens were in Cuban jails for political crimes. A State Department official said that these had gradually been released until the final four were let go today.

### Other Obstacles to Ties

Mr. Carter said the department knew of no further Americans being held on political charges, though two holding dual Cuban-United States citizenship are still imprisoned. Twenty-five Americans are in custody in Cuba for crimes such as plane hijacking that are considered non-political, Mr. Carter said.

The release of the four Americans appeared to remove one obstacle to smoother relations with Cuba, officials said; but normal ties are being held up for other reasons, primarily the Cuban military presence in Africa and the stepped-up Cuban military relationship with the Soviet Union.

Today, Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance conferred for the fourth time in eight days with Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin of the Soviet Union on the problem caused by the American report of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba.

The meeting, today, lasted only 30 minutes and officials said later that Mr. Vance would probably confer this week here or in New York with Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, who arrived in New York this afternoon to head the Soviet delegation to the regular United Nations General Assembly meeting.

The United States is reportedly looking for guarantees that the Soviet force of 2,000 to 3,000 men poses no combat threat to the United States or other nations. The Russians have denied that there are units other than Soviet military advisers in Cuba.

Before the meeting with Mr. Dobrynin, Mr. Vance conferred with President Carter and Presidential advisers on the situation. Jody Powell, the Presidential spokesman, said some decisions were made at the White House meeting; but other officials said no breakthrough was imminent in the discussions with the Russians.

Presumably Mr. Vance wanted Mr. Dobrynin to convey to Mr. Gromyko the Administration's thinking on the issue, which has raised doubts about the future of the strategic arms treaty. Several senators have said the treaty should not be approved until the issue is resolved.

The release of the four Americans seemed assured once President Carter pardoned the four Puerto Ricans 11 days ago. Three of the Puerto Ricans had been imprisoned for opening fire on the floor of the House of Representatives on March 1, 1964. Five Congressmen were wounded.

# Four Sketches Of Americans Freed by Cuba

### Juan Tur

Born in 1917 in Tampa, Fla., of Cuban parents, lived in Cuba after 1919 ... Wife and children believed to be still in Cuba ... Arrested Oct. 18, 1964, on espionage charges and sentenced in 1965 to 30 years.

### Claudio Rodriguez Morales

Born in 1930 in Puerto Rico ... Arrested July 18, 1966, after entering Cuban waters in small boat ... Sentenced to 30 years in August 1967 on conviction of attempting to smuggle Cubans out of country.

### Everett Jackson

Born in 1940 in Chicago ... Former paratrooper ... Arrested Dec. 30, 1967, one day after crashing a light plane into mountains in Las Villas Province ... Allegedly said he intended to photograph Soviet missile silos ... Sentenced in May 1969 to 30 years for collusion with anti-Castro Cuban exiles in Miami and for endangering Cuba's security.

### Lawrence K. Lunt

Born in 1923 in Massachusetts ... Briefly attended Harvard ... Served as Air Corps navigator in World War II and in Air Force in Korean War ... After several years on family ranch in Wyoming, bought ranch in Cuba's Pinar del Rio Province in 1967 ... Allegedly concealed anti-Castro Cubans on ranch and spotted Soviet missiles hidden in caves near ranch on contract for Central Intelligence Agency ... Arrested May 26, 1968, as C.I.A. spy and sentenced in February 1969 to 30 years ... Wife, a Belgian national, and three sons residing in Brussels.

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**SALT -- Working Its Way Back to the Front Page**

ARTICLE APPEARED  
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THE WASHINGTON POST  
21 September 1979

*Rowland Evans  
And Robert Novak*

## Two-Voiced Generals

A secret memorandum that the Pentagon brass refused to give the Senate reveals that the Joint Chiefs of Staff a year ago set specific conditions for U.S.-Soviet negotiations on SALT II, then endorsed a treaty that failed to meet their requirements.

JCSM-321-78, sent on Oct. 12 to Defense Secretary Harold Brown for forwarding to President Carter, delivered a broadside against what is now the new strategic arms limitation treaty. "These issues require satisfactory and unambiguous resolution before the SALT II negotiations can be considered adequately completed," the memo said. Yet, the JCS now endorse the treaty even though no "resolution" was achieved.

No wonder the administration stone-walls defense-oriented senators who have been demanding this and other JCS memos. While the public voice of the JCS endorses SALT II with some equivocation, the secret voice of JCSM-321-78 is so antagonistic that it would be lethal propaganda against the treaty.

Moreover, statements in the memo directly contradict the chiefs' own testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in July. The Gen. David Jones who as JCS chairman signed the memo seems a man apart from the Gen. David Jones who led the pro-SALT JCS testimony.

In that testimony, Jones listed as a "significant" concession Moscow's agreement, apart from the treaty, not to increase production of the Backfire bomber. But the memo warned that failure to include the Backfire problem in the treaty could lead to a Soviet "breakout"—that is, secret preparation for a major post-treaty military advantage.

"We regret the decision," it said, "not to insist on counting the intercontinentally capable Backfire system within the . . . limit. No Soviet assurances can compensate for the fact that Backfire will remain an effective intercontinental weapon within the total Soviet arsenal for waging nuclear war. Moreover, Backfire production and development provide a significant Soviet breakout potential, an option we would be hard-pressed to match in the near term."

In July, Jones sloughed off suggestions that SALT II leaves the United States with no bargaining position for SALT III. In October, Jones warned that SALT II "will significantly reduce U.S. negotiating leverage for a SALT III outcome."

In July, the chiefs said Moscow would have to destroy strategic weapons to reach SALT II limits. In October, they had painted this picture: "On the Soviet side, many 'reductions' will actually be conversions to strategically significant non-counters (for example, Bison bombers to tankers and SSBNs [missile-firing submarines] to SSNs [attack submarines]) and SS-20 [missile] deployments will free ICBMs currently committed to PRC [Chinese] targets."

Jones told the senators "there is nothing inconsistent" between the memos they could not read and his testimony, arguing that negotiations had changed things. "Obviously," the general testified, "we were addressing a moving train." But when the demands of JCSM-321-78 are stacked up against the final result of SALT II, the train had not moved far.

Concerning verification, the memo demanded that "national technical means must be augmented, where necessary, by cooperative measures." It contended that "we should not only preserve our option, but publicly state our intent, to share cruise missile and related technology with our allies as necessary." No more was done to resolve the chiefs' doubts on these issues than on the Backfire.

Similarly, the memo argued, "It is essential that any agreement preserve the U.S. option" for a mobile missile. Yet, the SALT II verification requirements forced a mobile basing mode for the proposed MX that is by no means the chiefs' first choice.

In overall description of arms control, the October generals do not resemble the July generals who saw little danger in the treaty. "Some may conclude," said Jones in October, "that the treaty, by itself, will arrest the very dangerous adverse trends in Soviet strategic forces, including current and projected forces . . . this is simply not the case. . . . the focus on constraining what the Soviets could do without a SALT agreement has obscured . . . what they have done, are doing and can do within the SALT framework."

Under SALT I, warned the chiefs, the Soviets have reached "at least parity with U.S. strategic nuclear forces, and the SALT II agreement being negotiated provides neither incentive nor requirement to restrict substantially the pace of their current programs."

JCSM-321-78 eloquently mourned the "recurring theme in U.S. history" of seeking security in treaties. "Despite repeated disappointments on this score throughout the 20th century," it said, the SALT process "contains the seeds of exaggerated expectations and serious public misunderstandings about the adequacy of our strategic position and programs."

Jones did indeed repeat those words in his public statement in July. Unfortunately, the heart of his testimony ignored that timely warning.

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Jack Anderson

# Vance Credibility on Line Over SALT

A new credibility problem has arisen in the SALT II controversy, and this time it's not just the Soviets' credibility that's being questioned. It's Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance's.

In his enthusiastic promotion of the strategic arms limitation treaty, Vance has often wound up as an apologist for the Soviet Union using weasel words to cover up Soviet cheating. He will say, for example, that we can verify the treaty provisions "adequately," or that there were no "significant" violations of the first SALT agreement.

Last year, in a slickly worded State Department report to Congress that subsequently was released to the public, Vance went beyond mere fudging. He made, or permitted to be made, an outright misstatement of the facts, intelligence sources told our associate Dale Van Atta.

Vance assured Congress that the Soviets had lived up to a particular section of SALT I when he knew or should have known that they had not.

If Vance knew his assurance was false, that would be unforgivable. If he didn't know, it would be almost as bad, indicating that the secretary of state wasn't reading the statements put out in his name or the intelligence reports on which they were based.

The issue involved the limit set on the number of ballistic missile launchers in the Soviet navy's vast submarine fleet, an important weapon in their strategic arsenal. Under the 1972 treaty, the Soviets agreed to a

limit of 740 of these missile launchers.

If the Soviets went over the limit of 740, they were required to destroy or dismantle an equal number of older missile launchers. Yet according to Central Intelligence Agency documents, the United States became aware that the Soviets had begun to exceed the 740 limit by August 1975.

U.S. intelligence estimated the number of unauthorized launchers at six and the State Department's treaty-enforcement officials mulled over the violations for several weeks. But before they could decide how to push this particular cookie, the Soviets blithely announced that they were indeed over the agreed-upon limit by 23 missile launchers.

Embarrassed intelligence officials did a hasty reassessment and "concluded that the Soviet report accurately reflects the status of the force under the agreement."

Like the deadbeat who assures a creditor that "the check is in the mail," the Soviets promised that the 23 missile launchers they "owed" us under the treaty would be dismantled by March 1976, as well as 27 more that would have been replaced by new launchers by that date.

When March rolled around, though, the Soviets had junked only nine of the 50 launchers. Blaming winter weather for the delay, the Soviets then promised that the 50 launchers would positively, absolutely be on the scrap heap by June 1, 1976.

The State Department bought the

Soviet alibi about the weather, even though intelligence sources noted that the Russian winter hadn't prevented the Soviets from putting together missile silos. It also bought the Soviet promise that everything would be hunky-dory by June.

Sure enough, when June came, the Soviets assured our SALT watchdogs that the launchers had been dismantled. This was an out-and-out lie.

Our intelligence agencies found that the 50 missile launchers weren't junked until the next October, by which time the Soviets owed us several dozen more to compensate for their continuing production of new launchers.

Yet Vance, in his report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Feb. 21, 1978, tried to make the Soviet cheating on the sub launchers seem like a triumph of no-nonsense treaty enforcement by the United States.

"The Soviet side," Vance said, "explained the situation and predicted that all the dismantling actions would be completed by June 1, 1976, and agreed to the U.S. demand that no more submarines with replacement launchers begin sea trials before such completion."

Then he added flatly: "Both conditions were met." That was simply not true, and if the secretary of state didn't know it, he should have.

Footnote: Intelligence sources told us the blatant violations continued at least up to 1978. Thus for fully two years, the Soviets were always above the agreed-upon limit of sub-based missile launchers.

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# New Doubts Raised on SALT Vote

## Carter Continues Efforts to Gain Approval in Senate

By Robert G. Kaiser

Washington Post Staff Writer

President Carter yesterday offered a slightly refined position on defense spending in 1981 and 1982, in hopes of winning over more moderate senators on the SALT treaty. But two key senators made statements raising new doubts about favorable action on the arms limitation treaty.

The two senators were Henry Bellmon (R-Okla.) and Sam Nunn (D-Ga.). The widely respected Bellmon urged his colleagues to delay action on SALT II and to appoint a special select committee to evaluate the country's foreign policy and defense needs.

"So far, as I am concerned right now," Bellmon said, "SALT II, considered only on its technical merits as an arms control agreement, is unacceptable."

The White House had been hoping for Bellmon's support for SALT II, and by some headcount his defection could be crucial.

Nunn, whose support for the treaty apparently is also crucial if it is to win two-thirds Senate approval, said yesterday, "It could well be beneficial to the country if SALT II were defeated, because the Senate decided that the overall military trend between the United States and the Soviet Union was unacceptable to the United States."

This was the first time Nunn had publicly suggested there might be a clear benefit to the United States in rejecting SALT II. Nunn made his remarks in a luncheon meeting with reporters.

However, Nunn also said it would be a mistake to reject SALT II for narrower reasons such as its provisions permitting the Soviets to have heavier payloads on their rockets than the United States can have.

Previously, Nunn has said that SALT II would be acceptable provided the United States undertakes an aggressive policy to improve military forces in response to continuing So-

viet force modernization and expansion. He is one of the senators who has been pressing the White House to commit more money to defense.

President Carter addressed that issue yesterday in a letter to Sen. Ernest F. Hollings (D-S.C.), whose amendment to the annual budget resolution authorizing large increases in defense spending is scheduled to come up in the Senate today.

Hollings, Nunn and several other senators met Carter last week to press for new commitments to a 3 percent increase in defense spending this year, after inflation, and 5 percent increases in each of the next two years.

The Carter administration has accepted the 3 percent increase this year, which would add about \$3.2 billion to the fiscal 1980 budget, bringing defense outlays for the year to \$130.8 billion. But the president has refused to go along with the proposal to add 5 percent to both the 1981 and 1982 defense budgets after inflation.

He did offer a slight concession in his letter to Hollings yesterday, saying, "If in my judgment more than 3 percent is required to meet defense needs for 1981 and 1982, I can assure you that I will request it."

Hollings said last night he was pleased to have the president's support for the 3 percent increases, but "sad" that he would not support 5 percent. Senate sources and administration head count agreed yesterday that Hollings has a chance of winning a Senate vote on the 3 percent proposals today.

Both the administration and senators pressing for more defense spend-

ing agree that this issue is essentially symbolic for now, but both are taking the symbolism seriously.

In his statement yesterday, Bellmon, ranking Republican on the Senate Budget Committee, said he thought the current focus over defense spending disguised the fact that the Senate does not know what the country's defense needs are. "Now is a time for a temperate, well-reasoned, factual, thoughtful review of where we are and where we are going in U.S. foreign and defense policy," Bellmon said, calling for a new select committee inquiry.

"In my opinion," Bellmon said, "under present conditions, the environment in which the Senate must consider SALT is intolerable, and it would be foolhardy to rush toward a vote." He proposed that the select committee report back to the Senate by March 1.

Bellmon's proposal could reach the Senate floor for a vote, and some Senate sources speculated it might just suit the current mood of the Senate if it comes up soon.

If Hollings' 5 percent proposal is defeated by the Senate today, or perhaps tomorrow, Sen. Gary Hart (D-Colo.) will introduce a compromise proposal calling for 3 percent increases in each of the next three years, the formula preferred by Carter.

The administration hopes this proposal will be approved, and that it will be enough eventually to satisfy senators concerned about defense without alienating more dovish members, thus preserving a coalition that could eventually put over the SALT treaty. This formula may not work, however, administration officials concede.

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# Other issues knock SALT timing awry

By HENRY L. TREWHITT

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—For the first time, partisans in the SALT debate are considering the possibility that the treaty's fate may not be decided until next year.

Not long ago, the assumption was widespread that such a delay would in itself be a decision. In that view, SALT, the strategic arms limitation treaty, could not survive in the politics of a presidential election year.

Now a re-examination is under way on both sides of the debate. There is nothing yet approaching a new consensus. No one suggests that delay automatically will help the treaty. But there is an emerging judgment that it may not be fatal.

A new look became mandatory as non-SALT issues intervened in the Senate debate. Originally, Senator Frank Church (D., Idaho), the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, planned to complete hearings and deliver the treaty to the Senate for general debate by September 25.

But the disclosure that a Soviet combat brigade is stationed in Cuba knocked those plans askew. Though no one detected a military threat to the United States in the troops' presence, several members of the Senate—not all opposed to SALT on its merits—saw the Soviet action as a gesture of bad faith.

In fact, Mr. Church, who first announced the Soviet presence, judged pub-

## Analysis

lly that SALT could not be ratified until the combat potential was removed.

Mr. Church is known as a SALT supporter, but he also is known as a politician in trouble with a conservative constituency, and the political assumption in Washington is that his tough line reflected the difficulty he and some other members of the Senate were having at home over SALT.

The Senator Robert C. Byrd (D., W. Va.), the majority leader, settled his legislative priorities for the fall. Energy legislation would come before SALT, he said, making general debate on the treaty impossible before November.

With that, the growing pressure of time became apparent. No one knows how long the Senate will debate the treaty, which would limit to 2,250 the number of nuclear launchers deployed by the United States and the Soviet Union. But opponents of the treaty can be expected to prolong the process, and the legislative devices for doing so are many and varied.

Mr. Byrd hopes for action by Thanksgiving, freeing the Senate to go home for the rest of the year. But many SALT specialists in Congress say that leaves insufficient time for debate.

If the Senate returns from a Thanksgiving recess to continue the argument, would Mr. Byrd keep it in session until Christmas?

"It depends on a lot of things," said a Republican strategist. "It depends partly on how he really feels about the treaty, how he feels about its chances, and what he judges the tolerance of the Senate to be."

Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr. (R., Tenn.), the minority leader, is known to have asked Mr. Byrd several days ago for a meeting about the Senate schedule. What comes out of that meeting could determine whether the treaty is voted up or down this year.

Another Republican adviser believes the pressure on Mr. Byrd for early action will be severe. "He has 24 Democratic senators up for re-election," the source said. "I don't think he's going to keep them here all winter."

That decision surely will be made, in part, by all the dynamics of relations within the Senate, between the Senate and the White House, and, finally, in public opinion.

Most SALT supporters, inside and outside Congress, believe delay past the end of the year would end the treaty's chances for ratification until 1981. Their assumption is that the pressures of the election year would work against co-operation with a Soviet government bent on expansion around the world.

But not all SALT supporters feel that way. One of the most highly respected Senate specialists on strategic issues says the pressures could work the other way.

"Just imagine," he said, "that some of the Republican candidates for president are eliminated early in the primaries. And imagine that Ted Kennedy has entered as a Democratic candidate, accusing them of destroying a valuable treaty."

"The pressure on the Republicans who missed the nomination to move back toward the center would be considerable."

FINANCIAL TIMES  
12 SEPTEMBER 1979

# A new threat to SALT

PRESIDENT Carter is facing yet another dilemma, though this time it is not entirely of his own making. The revelation that there are some 2,000-3,000 Soviet troops in Cuba has come at a time when the ratification of the second strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT 2) between the Americans and the Russians by the U.S. Senate is still in the balance. If the troops are not removed, it is just possible that their presence will persuade sufficient Senators to vote against the treaty to prevent it from coming into effect. Ratification requires a two-thirds majority, which is by no means yet assured.

## Intelligence

On the other hand, it would be unfair to blame Mr. Carter alone for matters which plainly go back to previous administrations. It seems quite likely on the basis of available information that a similar number of Soviet troops has been in Cuba possibly since the late 1960s and certainly since the mid-1970s. Their presence was not detected earlier partly because previous administrations had higher intelligence priorities—such as Vietnam, and partly because Mr. Carter suspended over-

flights of the island in an attempt to improve U.S.-Cuban relations in 1977. The general downgrading of the U.S. intelligence effort in the past few years—itself a consequence of Vietnam—may also have had something to do with it.

It has to be said, too, that the Soviet presence does not appear to infringe any known Soviet-American agreement. The Cuban missile crisis in the early 1960s led to the Russians agreeing to withdraw their nuclear weapons from the island and the forces associated with them, but there was no agreement about the presence of Soviet troops in general. The U.S. therefore is unable to demonstrate that the Soviet presence now is in breach of a treaty.

## Fine distinction

There remains an argument about the purpose of the forces, though in fact it may be more semantic than real. According to Washington, the Soviet troops in Cuba belong to a combat brigade. According to Moscow, as stated by Pravda, their purpose is simply to train the Cubans to use Soviet material. The distinction may be a fine

one. Forces which are there to teach others how to fight are presumably capable of fighting themselves, even if their numbers are sufficiently small as to make intervention outside Cuba exceedingly unlikely. Their most probable contingency role indeed would seem to be that of suppressing a limited rebellion against President Castro's régime, or at least of helping loyalist forces to do so. What is not in dispute, however, is that the troops are there.

For the U.S. Administration, as for the west as a whole, there are several reasons for concern. One is the failing of intelligence to make the discovery earlier. Another is that the Soviet presence in Cuba must make it easier for the Cubans to intervene in Africa and perhaps Central America, if only by providing training. Yet by far the most important is that the discovery now could jeopardise SALT 2.

Mr. Carter is not in the ideal starting position for a negotiation aimed at getting the Russians to withdraw. The Soviet Union is perfectly entitled to argue that it has broken no treaty and indeed that it has done nothing new in

this context for several years. There is no obvious reason why it should bow to American pressure, except that it must have its own interest in securing the SALT ratification.

## Opportunity

There is, however, one point which Mr. Carter could press. Until now the Administration has promoted SALT 2 solely on its own merits: namely that it is a treaty about strategic arms control and that it would be wrong to link it to Soviet-American relations in other areas. That is a dubious argument, not least because SALT 2 has so many loopholes that its effects on arms control will be severely limited. The best case for ratification would be that the treaty would lead to a more general restraint in Soviet behaviour. It may be too late to do anything much about the 2,000-3,000 troops in Cuba, but it is not too late to warn the Russians that similar intervention elsewhere or that any stepping up of the Cuban force will be unwelcome. That is the kind of approach that has been lacking in the Carter Administration. There is now an opportunity to provide it.

AIR FORCE MAGAZINE

September 1979

# NEGOTIATING WITH THE RUSSIANS

BY BONNER DAY, SENIOR EDITOR

In this exclusive interview, Lt. Gen. Edward L. Rowny, the top US military representative during the SALT II negotiations, describes Soviet negotiating techniques and objectives. General Rowny warns that the US should not negotiate without the backing of a strong strategic arsenal: "We cannot do it with mirrors."

**D**IPLOMATIC negotiations, a rare experience for career military officers, provided Army Lt. Gen. Edward L. Rowny with a unique insight into Soviet-American relations.

General Rowny, who was the top military man on the US team during the second round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, concluded that the US, after decades of dealing with the Soviet Union, had much to learn about negotiating with the Russians.

In an interview with AIR FORCE Magazine, the General explained how the Soviet negotiators tried to outfox the US delegation.

General Rowny has made it clear that he opposes the proposed treaty. Just days before voicing his frank opposition, General Rowny retired from the Army. "Only when I was sure an agreement I couldn't agree with had been reached did I leave," he explained.

This cleared the decks for his appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in July, when he testified: "The emerging treaty, in my view, is not in our interest since it is inequitable, unverifiable, undermines deterrence, contributes to instability, and could adversely affect NATO security and Allied coherence." He urged the Senate to send the treaty back for further negotiations.

Hailed by Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N. C.) as "perhaps the most knowledgeable American in this field," General Rowny was the only member of the US delegation to serve the entire period of the SALT II negotiations. He was the Joint Chiefs of Staff Representative for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks from March 1973 to June 1979.

General Rowny was well prepared for the negotiations. He has been a student of arms control and has written a number of papers on the subject. His thirty-eight years of military service also include extensive experience as a combat leader. His background includes command of an infantry battalion and a regimental task force in Italy in World War II, command of a regiment during the Korean War, and director of a special team in Vietnam charged with testing and evaluating new Army concepts for counterinsurgency operations. His military decorations include the Silver Star with two oak leaf clusters.

General Rowny, sixty-two, received a BS degree in civil engineering from Johns Hopkins University, and then resigned an Army commission to enter the US Military Academy. He was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers in 1941. He holds master's degrees in civil engineering and international relations from Yale University, and was awarded a doctorate in international studies from American University.

His advocacy and study of arms control, and his participation in negotiations with the Soviet Union on the reduction of conventional arms in Europe, were factors in his selection as the JCS Chairman's representative to

the SALT negotiations.

General Rowny says a minimum of six months of intensive study is absolutely necessary to participate in strategic arms negotiations. According to General Rowny, continued briefings on changes in the US and Soviet strategic arsenals were equally necessary.

#### Sixty-two Trips

During the six-year period with the SALT delegation, General Rowny made sixty-two round trips between Geneva and Washington, and participated in more than 1,000 hours of negotiations.

He quickly found he was involved in not one negotiation but a series of negotiations that included bargaining within the Defense Department, bargaining within the US government, and exchanges on the SALT negotiating team.

The process of hammering out a US position often was more time consuming and more complex than exchanging views with the Soviet delegation. The US position was drawn up by interagency working groups meeting in offices of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). Sometimes these meetings were moved to the White House.

After a position was developed, it would be sent to four bodies for comment—the State Department, ACDA, the Defense Department, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The position then would be cleared by the National Security Council staff. If there was a difference of opinion, the position paper would go to the Strategic Coordinating Committee, which is chaired by the President's National Security Affairs Assistant and includes as members the Defense Secretary, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of State, and the CIA Director. Opposing views would be presented to the President, and his decisions would be passed on to the delegation in Geneva.

Within the Pentagon there was a separate negotiating process. Each service would work with the Joint Staff to prepare the JCS position. This position would be coordinated with the Defense Secretary by the Defense Department's SALT Task Force before being submitted to an interagency group.

CONTINUED

The US negotiating team itself played an active role in the interagency deliberations, sometimes recommending actions and other times requesting the modification of instructions from Washington.

"The US seems to think in terms of problem solving," says General Rowny. "We negotiate in good faith, expecting give and take." The Soviet delegates, he says, do not share Western concepts and instead regard negotiations as just another means of competition. Says General Rowny: "The Soviets look to the SALT negotiations to gain or to maintain a competitive advantage."

It is General Rowny's opinion that this complex negotiating process within the US government "militates against" US efforts to get an equitable treaty: "We would arrive at a reasonable position that we felt both sides could accept, but the Soviet delegation would present an extreme position that heavily favored the Soviet position." This meant that almost any compromises between the two positions would benefit the Russians and be disadvantageous for the US.

One defense against this Soviet tactic would be for the US to arrive at a reasonable position and then outwait the Soviet delegation. General Rowny says: "We went into the bargaining sessions with such a strategy, but we never held to it."

#### The Soviet Team

Continuity in the negotiating team also served to the Soviet advantage, in General Rowny's view. For the most part, the Soviet delegation remained unchanged throughout the negotiations. The chief of the delegation for both SALT I and SALT II was Deputy Foreign Minister V. S. Semanov. P. S. Pleshakov, representing the Soviet defense industry, and Academician A. N. Shchukin, representing the science community, also were members of the delegation throughout the negotiations. A fourth civilian seat apparently was designated a temporary position by Moscow. It was held by a series of Soviet diplomats during the talks.

The Soviet team included two generals, in contrast to one on the US delegation. Lt. Gen. K. A. Trusov and Col. Gen. I. I. Beletsky were appointed to the delegation during the SALT I period. After General Trusov suffered a heart attack, he was replaced by General Stavobudov. General Beletsky served throughout the SALT II negotiations.

On the US delegation, only General Rowny served for the entire period of the negotiations. During the six-year period, the US delegation had five State Department representatives, four representatives of the Defense Secretary, and four representatives of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. General Rowny served as a member under three Defense Secretaries, three JCS Chairmen, and three Presidents. He offered his resignation from the negotiating team at the outset of the Carter Administration, but was asked to stay on.

Negotiations with the Soviet delegation were conducted for three or four months in Geneva. This period of bargaining would be followed by a break of three or four months when the US delegation returned to Washington for consultation. During the last eighteen months before an agreement was reached, however, the talks were in session almost continuously.

An integral role of the delegation was to keep top officials of the US and NATO nations abreast of the negotiations. This was accomplished by regular written and oral reports.

Negotiations revolved around a formal meeting, called the plenary session, on Tuesday and Thursday. The meetings would alternate between an annex to the US Mission, called the SALT Negotiation Building, and a building in the ten-acre Soviet compound.

The plenary sessions were devoted to reading prepared statements. As each paragraph was read by the head of a delegation it would be followed by a translation. Each statement would take from twenty minutes to an hour. During most of the SALT II negotiations, Ambassador Ralph Earle II, a veteran ACDA official, served as head of the US delegation in the absence of ACDA Director Paul C. Warnke, the official delegation chief.

Very seldom was there any exchange or rebuttal to the prepared statements. If a question was asked, it might be answered by the delegation head after conferring with his colleagues. More often, the question was considered in the next plenary statement.

The formal session would last as long as two hours. After the time of the next meeting was agreed upon, the plenary session would officially end and the delegates would proceed with informal discussions.

In this phase, the chiefs of the two delegations would retire to another room for informal discussions. The remainder of the delegation would meet in separate corners of the room with their Soviet counterparts, accompanied by interpreters. This part of the meeting was off the record so that nothing said was binding upon the delegation. General Rowny says: "We would talk about what was in the latest plenary statement or what was in the previous week's statement. We talked about what ought to be taken up in the future. Or if we didn't have much to say, we engaged in small talk." Because General Rowny is fluent in French and Russian, he was able to participate in these talks without interpreters.

The informal talks would last an hour or an hour and a half, depending upon how long the chiefs of delegations met.

In addition to the plenary and informal sessions, there were social exchanges, about one every ten days. The two sides usually alternated with dinners, garden parties, and cocktail receptions. Though some informal negotiations took place at these meetings, the limited authority of Soviet delegates precluded much of an exchange of views. On one occasion, General Rowny recalls, he asked the wife of one of the Soviet guests how many children she had. He was astonished when she asked another in the Soviet party whether she could answer the question.

#### Negotiating Problems

One of the major problems of the negotiations, in General Rowny's view, was a failure on the part of US delegates to realize that the Soviet delegates were the product of a different environment and therefore approached negotiations differently.

"We in the US tend to think the Soviet citizen is like us," says General Rowny. "Because our leaders do not know Russian history and Russian culture, we tend to apply a 'mirror image' and think the Russian thinks and acts the same as Americans."

The differences between the two cultures, however, show themselves in negotiations:

*Trickery.* The Soviet delegates would resort to crude negotiating tricks in an effort to achieve an advantage. In one case, General Rowny offered a compromise in exchange for a Soviet compromise, and detailed what the two compromises should be. He offered the exchange at an informal meeting in which the Russian delegate indicated neither agreement nor opposition. When the proposal was made at a subsequent formal plenary session, the Soviet delegation walked out after the US half of the compromise was announced, without volunteering the assumed Soviet compromise, as General Rowny had suggested. From that experience on, General Rowny would not offer a compromise until after the Soviet side had made its offer.

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*Eleventh Hour.* The Soviet delegation would delay action until it seemed no agreement was possible, then agree to terms. General Rowny said this tactic often was used after public announcements had been made that an agreement was near, in an effort to get as many concessions as possible. This last-minute strategy played on the nerves of the US delegates: "We lacked patience and would give additional concessions as a deadline approached," General Rowny said.

*Reversals.* The Soviet delegation was not hesitant to reverse its stand if it suited its purposes. This caused the delegation members no embarrassment. "The Russians would argue that black is white, then switch with no explanation or apparent reason," General Rowny said.

*Repetition.* Soviet delegates would repeat their positions over and over without changing any point. General Rowny says this had several effects. It would tire the US delegates and cause them to shift to other negotiating issues. It would also cause the US to conclude that the Russians had strong feelings about the point being repeated and could not be persuaded to change. In some cases, the US delegation would concede parts of the Soviet position in order to move the negotiations along.

#### Soviet Spontaneity

*Programmed Delegates.* There were few spontaneous remarks from the Soviet delegation. Almost nothing was accidental or unplanned. If a US delegate asked a question, his Soviet counterpart often pulled a card from his pocket and read an answer, even though the answer might be completely unrelated to the question. Soviet delegates made this a practice both in the plenary and in the informal sessions. When Soviet delegates ran out of answer cards, they would quote Soviet Communist Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev or Lenin.

*Progress.* The Soviet delegates, without offering any flexibility in their position, would urge that progress be made in the talks. "They know Americans want to make progress, and they would play on that desire," General Rowny explained. The Soviet delegates, by contrast, seemed willing to wait years if necessary to win a point.

*Secrecy.* The Soviet Union played on secrecy at every turn of the negotiations, even keeping its own delegates uninformed on some issues and offering little or no information to the US delegates. The US delegates were forced to negotiate with what they knew about US strategic arms and what they assumed about those of the Soviet Union.

*Grand Principles.* The Soviet delegates liked to pontificate on détente, nuclear proliferation, and arms control, rather than discuss specifics about a workable treaty. This tactic seemed to be for purposes of propaganda and delay.

*Open Society.* The Soviet delegates would quote different US civilian and military officials about SALT terms in an effort to win a negotiating point. But if they were asked for the reaction of a Soviet official, they would say his views were secret. Says General Rowny: "It is like a poker game in which they've got their cards up against their chest and yours are face up on the table."

*Multiple Proposals.* The Soviet delegation would patiently ask for new proposals from the US, without offering any suggestions of their own. To keep the talks moving, the US often obliged. Then the Soviet delegation would pick out what it liked of each proposal. "It was what we call taking the raisins out of the cake," says General Rowny. Often, the US would find itself making six proposals to one Soviet proposal, then having to defend itself against Soviet attempts to take the best of each proposal.

*Anonymous Proposals.* A Soviet delegate would tell a US delegate that he had left a "nonpaper" in the negotiating room. Because of the unusual way the proposal was made, unsigned and unaddressed, the US would have to offer it as its own proposal to make it a part of the formal record. The Soviet delegate, if pressed to admit authority, would insist he had not made any proposals that were left on the table or floor without even a verbal alert to the US delegation.

*Nice Cop-Mean Cop.* The civilian Soviet delegates would ask their counterparts to "give us something to help us out with our generals." This approach, implying a split in the Soviet delegation, was tempting to US delegates even though they were very much aware that there could be no reciprocation by the closely controlled Soviet delegation.

#### Between the Lines

*Coy Answers.* The Soviet delegates would answer a question with another question. Or they would tell the US delegates to study the "nuances" of the plenary statement. On occasion, General Rowny would say he had restudied the prepared remarks and still did not understand them. The Soviet reply would be to study the statement harder and to read between the lines.

*Good Intentions.* The Soviet delegates refused to consider arms balance equations on the basis of the capabilities of the respective weapons. Instead they insisted that consideration be given to the "intent" of the Soviet Union, which they described as peaceful. General Rowny cites the Soviet Backfire bomber as the "classic case." The Soviet delegation repeatedly said that as the Soviet Union had no intention of using the Backfire against the continental US, it, therefore, could not be included in the SALT agreement.

*Objective-Subjective.* The Soviet delegation relied heavily on political doctrine to guide its negotiations. On one occasion General Rowny suggested that the Backfire bomber be discussed in objective terms, and his Soviet counterpart agreed. But when General Rowny cited figures from a magazine on the range and performance of the Backfire, the Soviet delegate replied that such figures were created by engineers and that engineers lie, so the figures were subjective. He offered as "objective truth" a statement by Secretary Brezhnev that the Soviet Union did not intend to use the Backfire in strategic missions.

*Logic Appeal.* In advancing their positions, Soviet delegates would argue their case was "logical" though in some instances the argument had nothing to do with logic and in others was actually illogical. General Rowny concluded that the appeal to logic was simply another effort to use propaganda techniques to convince the US delegation.

*Trust.* A frequent argument of the Soviet delegation, particularly on verification issues, was trust. "Trust us," was a frequent reply of Soviet delegates when specific issues were raised. The Soviet position was that all international treaties are based on trust and that the Soviet Union would be willing to trust the US if it trusted the Soviet Union.

*Public Opinion.* While the Soviet delegation held fast to its positions, the Soviet government tried to change the US position by influencing public opinion in this country. General Rowny said the Soviet Union's propaganda assaults on the US were timed to the SALT negotiations. These actions included writing letters to the US newspapers and sending Soviet officials, such as G. A. Arbatov, director of the Institute of the USA and Canada, on speaking tours in the US.

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*Agenda Control.* The Soviet delegation spent a great deal of time arguing over the agenda of meetings. The US delegation conceded a lot of these arguments in an effort to proceed to more substantive issues. But once the agenda was set, the Soviet delegates would not permit the US to bring up other issues—unless, of course, it suited Soviet purposes.

Despite the differences in negotiating techniques and the tight control Moscow held over the Soviet delegation, General Rowny advocates continued negotiations on strategic arms and is a strong supporter of face-to-face negotiations.

#### Detecting Nuances

There is a tremendous value, General Rowny says, in getting to know members of the Soviet delegation in person. Even when carefully worked-out formal statements are presented, he insists, nuances in facial expressions and voices can be detected that would otherwise be lost, if exchanges are limited to diplomatic notes. "You often can sense when a Soviet delegate is less rigid on some points than others," General Rowny says.

But for these face-to-face meetings to be profitable to the US, General Rowny insists that US delegates must be better prepared and trained in the techniques of negotiation. "I wouldn't let anyone go over and negotiate who doesn't speak Russian," he says. He cited as one example of clumsy preparation the replacement of a US aide to the delegation—an expert on the Soviet Union who spoke Russian—with an expert on South America. Civilian delegates also should be better informed on US and Soviet strategic arms, he says.

As for the question of whether the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency should also act as chief of the negotiating team, General Rowny contends that when one person holds both positions, both jobs suffer.

At the outset of the SALT I talks, ACDA Director Gerard C. Smith also served as the chief of the delegation. When Dr. Fred C. Iklé was appointed ACDA director early in 1973, the delegation was put in the charge of U. Alexis Johnson, a career diplomat. Under the Carter Administration, Ambassador Paul C. Warnke served both as ACDA director and chief of the delegation. General Rowny says that negotiations slowed when the chief delegate was not present to make or to hear plenary statements.

It is General Rowny's view that the US delegation could have negotiated a better treaty than the one submitted to the Senate, if the US had been more patient.

In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in July, General Rowny insisted that a good SALT treaty—one that would be better from the US standpoint and still acceptable to the Soviet Union—could still be negotiated.

General Rowny was challenged in this view by Sen.

Edmund S. Muskie (D-Me.), who asked him to explain why he was the only member on the delegation who saw the potential for additional Soviet concessions.

General Rowny's reply: "I know the Soviet mentality."

General Rowny insisted before the committee that the Soviet Union "needed the treaty more than we do. They will come back to the table." The Soviets want a SALT treaty, he explained, "because of their desire to be recognized as a superpower and because it will allow them to enjoy the advantages they receive from a continuation of détente." He said that Moscow's leaders also see a treaty as a "necessary step" to achieving most-favored-nation status with the US, important to winning US trade credit.

But General Rowny cautioned the questioning senators that the US must in the meantime keep its strategic arsenal competitive with that of the Soviet Union: "We need the wherewithal to renegotiate; we can't do it with mirrors."

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SINAI

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# SINAI PLAN REACHED GIVING U.S. KEY ROLE IN MONITORING PEACE

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 19 — The United States, Egypt and Israel announced tentative agreement today on a new formula for monitoring the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, requiring increased American ground and air surveillance of the Sinai Peninsula.

Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance told reporters of the preliminary accord after two days of negotiations with Defense Minister Kamal Hassan Ali of Egypt, Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan of Israel, and other officials.

The main element in the new monitoring system is that the Sinai field mission of the United States, which has been operating an early-warning system between Egyptian and Israeli lines for three years, will have its life extended and its functions broadened, officials said.

## U.N. Was to Oversee Pullout

Originally, when it was believed that United Nations forces would supervise the carrying out of the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai over a three-year period, the Sinai field mission, which has an authorized strength of up to 200 unarmed civilians, was to have been disbanded early next year.

But Mr. Vance said that the mission, with the same number of men, would remain to take the place of the United Nations force. Officials said that the mission would have a larger role to play than now, and that military personnel would be introduced.

American officials said that the United States would have overall supervisory responsibilities, possibly augmented by United Nations observers, to monitor the treaty in the area that will be relinquished by the Israelis.

## Egyptian-Israeli Checkpoints

Egyptian and Israeli patrols will be responsible for setting up checkpoints in the narrow buffer zone that will separate their forces until the final Israeli withdrawal in 1982.

Mr. Vance said that Congress would be asked to approve the extension of the Sinai field mission's life and its responsibilities.

The agreement also must be approved by the Israeli Cabinet and the Egyptian Government and one Israeli official said he was not sure agreement in the Cabinet would be automatic.

Under the peace treaty, signed in Washington on March 26, the United States agreed to continue flights by Air Force reconnaissance planes to check on each side's compliance with the treaty.

Mr. Vance said today that the number of such flights would be increased to improve the accuracy of the monitoring.

The Egyptians are required by the treaty to limit their force levels in areas of Sinai recovered from Israel, and the flights are designed to check on that.

The negotiations for a new formula to monitor the peace treaty became necessary when the Soviet Union refused in June to go along with United Nations Security Council approval for the United Nations Emergency Force to stay on in Sinai to supervise the treaty.

The Emergency Force had been in Sinai since shortly after the cease-fire in the Israeli-Egyptian war of October 1973 and a following troop disengagement agreement.

At first, the United States believed that the stationing of unarmed United Nations truce observers would be a satisfactory substitute for the Emergency Force. But Israel objected, contending that the truce observers could be withdrawn at any time. Israel initially wanted the United States to seek a multinational force.

In the meantime, Israel and Egypt agreed to use their own forces to set up checkpoints and to monitor compliance with the agreement. But the Israelis still wanted a significant outside institution to play a role. Foreign Minister Dayan made it clear today that he welcomed the extended American responsibility.

As outlined by Mr. Vance, the United States will play a major surveillance role on the ground and in the air. The Egyptians and the Israelis will assume significant responsibility. And "we do not rule out" a United Nations observer role, Mr. Vance added.

He stressed that the three parties had agreed only on the terms for monitoring compliance with the peace treaty over the three-year period that the treaty is

being put into effect. Under the treaty, Israel is to pull its forces out of two-thirds of the Sinai by February and out of the remainder of the peninsula by May 1982.

## Multinational Force Pledged

The United States has pledged to obtain a United Nations force or some other multinational force to serve as a peacekeeping body once the treaty has been carried out completely in 1982. But Mr. Vance said that the permanent force had not yet been agreed upon.

The net effect of the two days of talks was to remove one of the irritants in Israeli-American relations that developed during the summer. The accord was described by Mr. Vance as "tentative" because it must still be approved by Congress and the Egyptian and Israeli Governments.

Mr. Dayan said he was satisfied with the agreement because "it is a practical one, the best that could be achieved under the circumstances." He thanked "the American people" and Mr. Vance not only for handling the negotiations but also for agreeing to play a direct role in carrying out the treaty.

## Surprised by U.S. Criticism

Later, at a separate news conference, Mr. Dayan expressed surprise at the State Department's criticism yesterday of Israel's decision to permit its citizens to buy Arab land in the occupied West Bank of the Jordan.

He said that the United States had urged Israel, at the Camp David talks a year ago, to use this formula rather than having the state expropriate land, as had been the practice for the last 12 years.

Mr. Dayan said Mr. Vance told him yesterday that the United States had no objection in principle to giving Jews the same right as Arabs to buy land, but that the timing did not help the negotiations.

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# U.S. to Augment Israeli-Egyptian Patrols in Sinai

By John M. Goshko  
Washington Post Staff Writer

The United States, Israel and Egypt tentatively resolved an acrimonious squabble over a Sinai peninsula truce force yesterday by agreeing that Israeli and Egyptian military patrols should be augmented by U.S. civilian technicians and increased U.S. aerial surveillance.

After two days of intense negotiations, a smiling Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, flanked by Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan and Egyptian Defense Minister Kamal Hassan Ali, announced that the formula for this arrangement is being submitted to their three governments for approval.

If the plan does get the expected green light, it should defuse the tensions that have been smoldering between Israel and the United States for weeks over the need for a buffer force while Israel is withdrawing from the Sinai and turning it back to Egyptian control.

Originally, the three parties to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty had expected the United Nations Emergency Force in the Sinai to be the buffer. But that plan was scuttled during the summer when the threat of a Soviet veto in the U.N. Security Council caused UNEF's mandate to lapse without renewal.

Israel then insisted that, under the Camp David accords, the United States was obligated to provide an alternate peacekeeping force. But a U.S. proposal to use the U.N. Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO) was rejected as inadequate by Israel, which said the personnel would be insufficiently armed and under the control of U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim.

The dispute was papered over temporarily when Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin agreed to have patrols from their armed forces carve up the supervising of different phases of the withdrawal. Israel's insistence on a more permanent arrangement led to the negotiations here this week.

As sketched by the negotiators yesterday, the key to the agreement involves the use of American technicians and overflights to help insure that the withdrawal lines are respected by the other two countries and to guard against Egypt putting heavily armed units into Sinai areas designated as limited-arms regions under the peace treaty.

U.S. technicians and monitoring equipment have been in the Sinai since 1973 when Israel made a partial pre-treaty withdrawal. Although the technicians were scheduled to be withdrawn at the end of the year, Vance said yesterday that the plan now is to keep them there during the three-year Israeli withdrawal.

In apparent anticipation of questions about whether U.S. troops will be involved in the Sinai, Vance stressed that all American personnel will be civilians and will not exceed 200. Also, as was done when the technicians originally were sent to the Sinai in 1973, the executive branch will ask permission from Congress for the arrangement, Vance said.

In addition, he said, the United States will increase the reconnaissance flights being made over the Sinai by U.S. Air Force planes based in Cyprus.

Other aspects of supervising the withdrawal such as inspections and establishment of check points along the buffer zones will be handled by the Egyptian and Israeli military. However, the negotiators did not make clear whether Egypt and Israel will form joint, mixed patrols under a single command or will divide these tasks and operate independently.

In response to questions about that, Hassan Ali said: "What matters is that the role itself will be carried out. Who does what and who watches what will be discussed."

The three ministers also said there is still a possibility of UNTSO observers or other U.N. personnel becoming involved. But, they added, the question of a U.N. role is something that requires further study and negotiation.

U.S. officials said privately that part of the problem is simply the mechanics of negotiating with the U.N. bureaucracy and those member countries that contribute personnel to UNTSO. An even bigger obstacle to potential UNTSO participation, though, concerns Israeli mistrust of the United Nations and fear that U.N. members hostile to the Middle East peace process might use UNTSO as a device to cause trouble in the Sinai.

Israel has made clear that it will not permit any involvement in the Sinai withdrawal by the Soviet Union, its Communist bloc allies or Third World countries supporting those Arab factions hostile to the Egyptian-Israeli accord.

At a press conference later yesterday, Dayan underscored that stance by saying that while U.N. observers might be included in one way or another, the job can be done only by countries that have a genuine interest in furthering the peace treaty."

Calling the agreement "the best that could be achieved under the circumstances," Dayan said: "The main point is that we—the Egyptians and the Israelis—have agreed to work together to police the buffer zone."

His words indicated that the agreement has laid to rest one of the several issues—the others include Israeli strikes into Lebanon, U.S. overtures to Palestinian forces, and Israeli land acquisition moves in the West Bank and Gaza strip—that have caused severe strains between the United States and Israel during the summer.

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These strains were given a symbolic personal dimension last Saturday night when Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizman and Harold Saunders, assistant secretary of state for Middle East affairs, got into a tense public argument at an Israeli embassy reception.

During the hour-long exchange, Saunders admonished Israel for not informing the United States of its plans for patrolling the Sinai in cooperation with Egypt, and he sharply criticized Israeli bombing of Lebanon. Weizman retorted that U.S. "weakness" had caused the loss of Ethiopia, Angola and Iran.

Yesterday, in an apparent attempt to demonstrate the new upbeat feeling engendered by the Sinai agreement, Saunders and Weizman appeared before reporters and TV cameras in the State Department lobby to publicly patch up their quarrel with broad grins and compliments.

"I was very sorry it blew up like that," Weizman said, "but this is a democracy. We don't have to defect because of that, thank God."

He told Saunders, "I hope to see you in Israel very soon." To which Saunders replied, for all to hear:

"I look forward to that very much. Ezer and I have known each other for 15 years. We've discussed many things over the years and always come out of it with smiles—as we do today."

# U.S. Agrees to Remain in Sinai Under Egyptian-Israeli Plan

By Walter Taylor  
Washington Star Staff Writer

The United States has agreed to an Israeli-Egyptian plan for supervising the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula that will continue a U.S. presence in the area for an additional 2½ years.

The continuation of some 200 American civilians in the Sinai to monitor its return to Egypt in several phases and the increased aerial surveillance of the area by high-flying U.S. spy planes are key elements in the plan, which was tentatively agreed upon yesterday by negotiators for the three countries.

After "intensive" negotiations over the past two days, a "tentative" agreement, subject to approval by the governments of Israel and Egypt has been reached, Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance announced at the State Department.

The agreement also must undergo scrutiny by Congress, which would have to appropriate additional funds for keeping the U.S. monitoring group in the Sinai during the remainder of the three-year withdrawal period.

drawal period, U.S. officials said they could not put a price tag on American participation in the truce force, but the annual budget for the 200 civilians now in place is about \$8 million.

The civilian force, called the U.S. Sinai Field Mission and currently manning sophisticated monitoring equipment in the strategic Gidi and Mitla mountain passes, was scheduled for removal in January under a timetable established by the Camp David accords and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

The new truce force, which also would include joint Egyptian-Israeli military patrols and checkpoints, would replace the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in supervising the return of the Sinai to Egyptian control. The vast desert peninsula has been under Israeli occupation since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.

## Israel Opposed Earlier U.S. Plan

UNEF was disbanded late this summer when its mandate expired and after the Soviet Union, using the threat of its statutory U.N. Security Council veto, blocked an extension.

At that point, the United States proposed that another United Nations unit, the U.N. Treaty Supervisory Force (UNTSO), be given the task of monitoring the Israeli withdrawal. Israel rejected that plan, however, insisting that the United States was obligated to organize some new multinational force for the Sinai.

Then, at a meeting in Haifa, Israel, earlier this month, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat agreed on a plan calling for joint military patrols, coupled with a continued U.S. presence in the region. The United States was not involved in those discussions.

The Haifa plan essentially is the agreement announced yesterday by Vance, Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan and Egyptian Defense Minister Kamal Hassan Ali, the negotiators for the three nations.

Vance told reporters the agreement does not "rule out the possibility" that some vestige of the U.S. proposal for using the UNTSO force might be salvaged. However, other American officials familiar with the arrangements said details of how the United Nations might fit into the plan had been left vague.

In any event, these officials said, the U.S. commitment to maintain its 200-man monitoring team and to step up its reconnaissance flights would not be affected by UNTSO participation in the truce force.

## Size Not the Important Point

The total size of the peacekeeping army also was vague. Hassan Ali said details were yet to be worked out between the Egyptians and Israelis.

For his part, Dayan said the size of the force was unimportant. "The main point is that we... the Egyptians and the Israelis — have agreed to work together to police the buffer zone," between the two countries.

The three negotiators described the truce force as an "interim" solution to the long-term U.S. commitment under the Camp David agreements to maintain a supervisory military unit in the Sinai. At the conclusion of the three-year withdrawal period, they said, a multinational army would replace the interim peacekeeping force.

Meanwhile, Dayan took exception to efforts by black leaders in the United States to bring Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization into direct negotiations over the future of the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.

"Just now," the Israeli Foreign Minister said at a news conference yesterday, Israel is "deeply engaged and involved in productive negotiations with Egypt over the future of the two areas."

PLO involvement in those discussions "would not be helpful," he said.

At the news conference, Dayan also responded to U.S. criticism of a new Israeli policy of permitting the purchase by Israeli citizens of Arab land in the occupied territory. He said that at last year's Camp David summit meeting, U.S. officials had objected only to the "organized way" in which Israel was attempting to establish permanent settlements on the West Bank and Gaza.

"We were told there was nothing wrong" with individuals seeking to purchase land there, he asserted. Now he said, "it's the other way around."

A State Department spokesman later denied that U.S. policy ever has encouraged Israeli settlement either by individuals or government-organized unoccupied Arab land.

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CIA STUDIES/REPORTS

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WESTERLY SUN (R. I.)  
31 August 1979

## Dismal Oil Outlook

Given the stubborn facts of the matter, complacency about the energy future has not been justified for a long time now. And any tendency to backslide into comparative euphoria, just because the gas lines have disappeared for the nonce, is rudely jolted by a new Central Intelligence Agency report.

This is the first time since 1977 that the CIA has offered a major new assessment of the world oil situation. What it tells us is essentially summed up in these two sentences: "No matter how events in 1979 sort themselves out, the outlook for oil supplies over the next few years is poor. Total oil supplies available to the Western countries are unlikely to increase significantly and may well fall off."

We are told that U.S. oil production is likely to keep declining, in spite of the removal of price controls. It is noted that within the next three years the Soviet Union, heretofore self-sufficient, will

become a net importer of oil, with resultant competition for Middle East supplies. There are other hints of trouble: no significant increase in OPEC countries' production is foreseen, and it is said to be likely that after a brief growth period Mexican oil production will slow down by the mid-80s.

The current downturn in our economy will foster weak demand which, the report says, "may temporarily create the illusion of ample oil supplies, masking once again the longer term energy problem." But that will change with the next business upswing, as the CIA notes, and we will again face problems of balancing oil supply and demand.

The way to do that with the least possible disruption will be to undertake strong conservation measures. It is not at all too soon to start moving along those lines.

SACRAMENTO BEE  
30 August 1979

# Postscript

## The CIA Connection

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has gone public and we're uneasy. The U.S. Department of Commerce is selling CIA reports on the open market. For example, a leaflet which arrived at our office offers a report on *Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments* that appears monthly for \$36 a year; *The Chinese Coal Industry: Prospects Over the Next Decades*, \$40 a year for 10 reports; and *A Directory of Cuban Officials* for \$160 — a total of 40 publications. We've always worried about the CIA's prowling the back alleys of the world, but we figured that if it turned up enough secret material it was worth the risk. We never thought it'd peddle information on the open market. Maybe the agency is just trying to cut its monetary losses.

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LENOIR NEWS-TOPIC (N.C.)  
22 AUGUST 1979

## In Our Opinion

# CIA Foresees Recurrence Of Gas Shortage, Lines

In most parts of the country, the long gas lines of this past spring and the early part of this summer have vanished.

Now the problem is not so much the availability of gasoline as the price charged for this commodity. The days of worrying about the \$1 a gallon price plateau have disappeared; everyone is now guessing when the \$1.25 or \$1.50 norm will arrive.

If a recent CIA report is to be believed, however, the current easing of the supply shortage could be a short-lived reprieve; the days of the gas line may soon return—with a vengeance. Specifically, the spy agency document states that once the American economy pulls out of its current slump, then the shortage of supply (with the attendant queues at the service stations) will almost certainly reappear.

Regardless of the price, which the CIA sees as escalating in "spurts" as the industrialized nations compete for the limited supply, the prospect for the near future is for continual shortages. "No matter how events in 1979 sort themselves out, the outlook for oil supplies over the next few years is poor. Total oil supplies available to the Western countries are unlikely to increase significantly and may well fall," the report bleakly states.

The CIA expects oil production in this country to decline and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries to refuse to increase its own production. If this country is counting on Mexico to take up the slack in supplying our needs, the word from the CIA is to forget it. From now until about the mid-1980s, Mexico likely will step up its oil production, but then will put a halt to such increases in order to forestall the inflation that would come with an escalating influx of petrodollars.

The present slackening of demand for oil is a passing phenomenon, according to the CIA. It is attributable to the 60 percent price hike that OPEC has imposed since Jan. 1 on its crude and to the developing U.S. recession, the report proclaims. Once an economic recovery begins in this country, demand should increase significantly—both here and abroad.

When that happens, the supply could fall between 2 million to 4 million barrels a day short of demand, assuming an average 3 percent annual growth rate for the industrialized economies. Such a shortage, of course, would drive prices up higher than ever—which, in turn, would wreak further havoc on the world economies, which are already staggering from the quintupling of OPEC prices since 1973.

Perhaps the United States can escape the worst projections of the CIA report. To do so, however, will require a full steam ahead commitment to the exploration and development of alternative energy sources. Doubtless in the short term, we will suffer afflictions similar to or even worse than the inconveniences and economic hammer blows of recent months. Over the long haul, though, the achievement of energy self-sufficiency by this country is imperative for the well-being—and even survival—of the West.

There is a limit to how much price gouging even the world's biggest and most vibrant economy can absorb. Failure to act forcefully and immediately to free ourselves from the grip of the oil cartel would spell our doom.

In that respect, the CIA report can serve as yet another warning (if one were really needed) of the absolute necessity of doing everything within our power to exploit such energy alternatives as solar, geothermal, wind and ocean tide power, coal, natural gas and even (at least temporarily, under the strictest of controls) nuclear plants.

With all the resources at this country's disposal, there is no reason why the most apocalyptic possibilities that the CIA report implies need occur. There may indeed be some rough times ahead, but given the proper degree of commitment to finding alternatives to petroleum, the worst scenario may be avoided.

THE ASHEVILLE CITIZEN (N.C.)  
4 September 1979

# Soviet's Oil Problem Is No Cause For Glee

Most Americans admit a feeling of rejoicing when misfortune befalls a Communist nation. This is understandable. Marxist philosophy is an enemy of our way of life. Therefore, in the public mind, good fortune for them somehow spells ill fortune for us.

Well, the Central Intelligence Agency has revealed a situation that is bad news for the Soviets but absolutely no reason, in the CIA view, for happiness in the West.

It is that Soviet oil production is peaking and that the Russians and their Eastern European allies will become petroleum importers within three years.

The West should not "gloat over Moscow's predicament," said Rep. Les Aspin of Wisconsin, chairman of the House Intelligence Oversight Committee, in summarizing unclassified portions of the report.

The drop in production, he said, means a cut in worldwide fuel supplies and more upward pressure on prices.

Aspin said for several years the Soviets and allies have exported an average of a million barrels a day to the West.

"The CIA now forecasts," he added, "that as early as 1982, the Communist nations could be importing 700,000 barrels a day. That means instead of adding three percent to the oil in world trade, the Communist states would be subtracting two percent."

In 1977, the CIA issued a

controversial report saying that the Soviets would be importing 3.5 million to 4.5 million barrels a day by 1985. That report was widely criticized, but two years later the agency, assessing a growing amount of data, has reached essentially the same conclusion.

In fact, the CIA has moved up the timetable for the developing shortage to a requirement for sizeable imports by 1982.

Aspin told of the troubles the Russians will have when it comes to conservation:

"They can't save fuel by switching to small cars since they have hardly any cars to begin with. They can't switch from trucks to railroads since almost all their long-distance freight moves by rail already."

Then there is the problem of foreign exchange for exports. The CIA notes that oil exports now account for 40 percent of Russia's hard currency earnings and that the disappearance of oil exports and appearance of heavy imports would be exceedingly burdensome.

Another good reason for American concern over Moscow's growing predicament is the fact that it will make the Soviet Union's fingers more itchy than ever where Middle East oil is concerned.

The prospect is that more vicious political weapons than ever will be put into use. The politics of petroleum has become a deadly game.

SOVIET ANALYST  
30 August 1979

## ***CIA Report on Moscow's Propaganda***

by LENNART FRANTZELL

A little-noticed Central Intelligence Agency study of Soviet propaganda which has been released by the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States House of Representatives deserves wider attention.

The study noted that "Under the Politburo's general guidance, the various elements of the Soviet party and government bureaucracy play important operational and co-ordinating roles. Among these are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the KGB, the CPSU's International, Propaganda and International Departments; and the Radio-TV Committee, a ministry-level organ which administers Soviet broadcasting. Of these one of the more significant, though not well known, is the International Department".

The report listed the main objectives of Soviet propaganda as being to:

- a) Influence both world and public opinion against United States military and political programs which are perceived as threatening to the Soviet Union;
- b) Demonstrate that the United States is an aggressive "colonialist" and "imperialist" power;
- c) Isolate the United States from its allies and friends;
- d) Discredit those who co-operate with the United States;
- e) Demonstrate that the policies and goals of the United States are incompatible with the ambitions of the underdeveloped world;
- f) Discredit and weaken Western intelligence services and expose their personnel;
- g) Confuse world public opinion regarding the aggressive nature of certain Soviet policies;
- h) Create a favourable environment for the execution of Soviet foreign policy.

### Propaganda drive

The Soviet propaganda effort has recently been strengthened. The study noted that in spring 1978 Leonid Zamyatin, director of TASS, was elevated to become director of a new "Information Department" of the CPSU Central Committee. A variety of overt sources indicated that Zamyatin was to be responsible for "directing foreign propaganda". While the scope of his duties remained unclear, his appointment suggested that the Politburo intended to place even greater emphasis on propaganda in the future. The report pointed to two other recent indicators "that the Soviets intend to place increasing reliance on propaganda against the United States".

These were the January 1978 meeting of the Presidium of the World Peace Council in Washington and New York, and the simultaneous visit to the United States of a Soviet delegation, including Zamyatin and Ponomarev, and "a number of other Soviets who play a primary role in the development and execution of propaganda policy". It is apparent that one purpose of their mission was to determine major concerns of American public opinion makers, as well as the susceptibility of American mass communicators to Soviet media operations.

The report described the Soviet propaganda establishment in some detail: The USSR has 18 radio stations broadcasting 2,000 hours a week in 84 languages (including the clandestine National Voice of Iraq to Iran, located in Baku, and four stations in Eastern Europe broadcasting to Italian, Greek, and Turkish workers in Western Europe). The news agency TASS has correspondents in 100 countries and sends out 800 hours of news daily. Novosti transmits 60,000 articles and two million photographs a year, and publishes 15 million books and brochures in 50 languages.

Other important propaganda tools, the international front groups, are managed by the International Department. The most important one is the World Peace Council in Helsinki, with affiliates

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in 120 countries. It is recognised as an independent organisation by the United Nations.

The study gives examples of recent Soviet propaganda operations.

"The Soviets attempted, by repeated efforts in a variety of media, to establish in the European mind that the kidnapping of Aldo Moro was the work of Western intelligence agencies, or specifically, the CIA." Two instances of KGB disinformation operations are also given. In March 1977, an envelope containing microfilm of a bogus letter from US Ambassador Elts in Cairo turned up in the Sudanese embassy in Beirut. Addressed to the US Ambassador in Saudi Arabia, it called for the overthrow of the Numeiri government in the Sudan.

In September 1977, a forged USIS press release of a speech by President Carter implying that the US Government was exerting heavy pressure on Greece with respect to Greece's relationship to NATO was mailed to Greek papers.

#### 'Neutron bomb' campaign

The most dramatic example of Soviet propaganda cited in the report, however, is the Soviet campaign to stop the production of the so-called Neutron bomb, (actually an enhanced radiation weapon). That campaign, the report indicates, started well before the bomb became an issue in Western Europe, and provided the spark that set off the widespread protests (many of which were organised by Soviet front groups) which finally forced President Carter to delay indefinitely the production of the bomb in April 1978. The CIA provides the following figures from its monitoring of Soviet broadcasts:

1977	total number of items	percentage of items dealing with neutron bomb
4-10 July	3,247	2
11-17 July	3,123	2
18-24 July	3,163	5
25-31 July	3,118	13
1-7 August	3,091	13
8-14 August	3,445	11
15-21 August	3,331	5

From the period of 25 July to 14 August, the neutron bomb issue was the major topic in the Soviet broadcasts directed towards the West. The campaign against the bomb by protestors in the West did not get off the ground until late in 1977.

\*The report appears as an appendix (p 531-627) to *CIA and the Media*, Congressional Information Service no. H-431-1 (1978).

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## THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

19 September 1979

# Analyst sees slower rise in OPEC prices

By Ward Morehouse III  
Staff correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor

New York  
OPEC oil price increases next year will be far below the 65 percent increase from September, 1978, to September, 1979, one of the most respected oil analysts in the United States forecasts.

The reason, says John H. Lichtblau, executive director of the New York-based Petroleum Industry Research Foundation (PIRINC), is that OPEC members are worried about plunging the world's economy into a deeper recession. This is tied into their own huge investments in the US and Western Europe.

When the oil ministers of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) meet again in December to discuss price increases for crude, their decision, according to Mr. Lichtblau, is likely to be affected by the Saudi Arabian and Venezuelan representatives who "have said they are not interested in any significant oil price increase for 1980...."

In an interview, the oil expert, who is known for his independent thinking despite the fact that PIRINC is funded in large part by US oil companies, made these other points:

- Political forces in Iran and other Middle Eastern countries make the current improvement in US crude oil supplies precarious.

- Substantial maintenance work needed to keep Iranian crude production going at current levels is not being done. "Foreign experts have not returned in significant num-

bers," Mr. Lichtblau says, "and a number of Iranian experts have actually left...."

- President Carter's proposed "quota" on imported oil is unrealistic. The President wants to limit imports to approximately 8.5 million barrels a day from 1979 on. But Mr. Lichtblau says that after 1980 the US will either "have to ration oil to the end user or ... raise the price above the world price level" to meet the quota.

- Gasoline prices conceivably could reach \$1.50 a gallon in 1980. "Gasoline prices will increase," he says, mainly "because domestic crude oil prices will go up" under the phased decontrol of the price of domestically produced oil, which began earlier this year.

- Domestic oil production may well decline after 1980. (This is despite promises by other oil industry experts that decontrol will mean more production.) Yet Mr. Lichtblau says a study this year by the US Central Intelligence Agency showing US production will decline dramatically is overly pessimistic.

- On the other hand, although the Baltimore Canyon, the Atlantic offshore exploration area, has so far yielded little evidence of any significant crude reserves, the oil economist warns that the area cannot be "written off" as a possible major producer. "Two years of exploratory drilling is not all that long, because if you look at the record of big finds in places like Alaska and the North Sea, it has sometimes taken substantially longer than two years before anything was discovered. And then something very big was discovered."

Mr. Lichtblau says the production of crude from non-OPEC areas such as Mexico, Britain, and Norway will continue to increase over the next few years. Mexico alone, he says, will increase exports to the US from a current level of 60 percent of production to 75 percent.

But Mr. Lichtblau agrees with some Carter administration analysts who are deeply concerned about the possibility of another cutoff of Iranian oil.

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**MISCELLANEOUS**

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THE WASHINGTON POST  
15 September 1979

## U.S. May Drop Some Spy Counts

A federal prosecutor said yesterday that the government may have to drop some of the 11 espionage charges against a Navy enlisted man accused of stealing top secret documents from the Pentagon.

U.S. Attorney Justin W. Williams told Magistrate Elsie Munsell that the government might have to drop some of the espionage counts against Lee Eugene Madsen because they duplicate other allegations in an indictment against him.

Madsen, a Navy petty officer, yes-

terday pleaded innocent to the three new charges that the government filed against him on Thursday. The new charges bring to 29 the number of classified documents he is accused of removing from the Strategic Warning Staff, a CIA-run agency, at the Pentagon.

The 24-year-old Navy man is being held under \$250,000 bond pending a trial in federal court in Alexandria on Oct. 4. He has maintained he's innocent of all counts.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 4-9WASHINGTON STAR  
15 SEPTEMBER 1979Allen Weinstein

# An historian's place in Washington

Historians, Leo Tolstoy once observed, were deaf men answering questions no one put to them. Jimmy Carter and those in his inner circle until recently seemed to share that unfriendly assessment. As a candidate, Mr. Carter had sought the White House by campaigning against the American political past.

Once in the White House, there appeared little to be gained by filling what some have thought of as the "historian's seat" among recent White House advisers, a role of resident chronicler. Gladly that Arthur Schlesinger Jr. performed for John Kennedy and Eric Goldman for Lyndon Johnson.

Nor did Mr. Carter feel especially drawn for sage counsel earlier in his presidency to the cadres of experienced Washingtonians whose collective careers spanned the drama of government over a half-century. White House aides kept their distance from those who might have known the life of Washington, D.C. (Before Carter), contemptuously dismissing such widely-different figures in homogenizing catch-phrases about "the Georgetown set."

Though Mr. Carter began his 1976 campaign with an appearance at a Warm Springs, Ga., to emphasize future policy discussions, his place in the Democratic

## Point of View

continuum since FDR, he twice declined invitations to reunion dinners of New Dealers held in the District after reaching the White House. Rarely have those whose memories held much of the history and institutional memory of modern American government been shunned by an incoming president as systematically — until the latest polls brought the dire news.

No, in adversity as always, devout politicians turn to the supposed "lessons" of history with the same alacrity that despairing religious persons rediscover their sacred texts. A frantic White House cram course is already well along.

Recently, Mr. Carter told journalists he has been carefully studying Clark Clifford's 1948 memorandum to President Truman on campaign strategy, hoping to watch History repeat itself to his advantage by modeling his own 1980 drive on Truman's successful comeback.

The mid-summer appointments to the White House staff of knowledgeable historians any easier. At Langley, the Agency's one-man historical office did not devote any time to churning out studies for the

have company when tracing the history of an evolving issue back past 1976.

But if History is "in" at the White House, it is decidedly "out" at the CIA, which recently abolished its Historical Office. Many government agencies and departments maintain such offices, staffed often by professional historians including first-rate scholars such as Richard Hewlett at the Department of Energy and David Trask at the State Department.

Government historical offices have traditionally prepared studies to assist policy-makers and, sometimes, directed major historical research projects of general public interest. These practitioners of the rapidly-growing field of "public history" met here this week, at the second annual conference of Federal Government Historians.

Increasingly, they have tried to break out of the bureaucratic mold and forge cooperative links with academic historical associations. The CIA's abrupt decision to terminate its historical office, a first within the government, will not make the task of other government historians any easier.

At Langley, the Agency's one-man historical office did not devote any time to churning out studies for the

public. Its research on agency projects, problems, and operations was classified and circulated for internal use only.

Although there have been reports that some of these studies reached congressional intelligence staffers, the Agency insists that budgetary constraints and not high-level embarrassment led to its decision to eliminate the office and to return its sole historian to other duties. That decision suggests a belief that "the production of intelligences" can somehow proceed in a historical vacuum.

Although Mr. Carter has come to learn differently about effective policy-making, the news that History has become fashionable at the White House may not yet have reached the Agency. When it does, Admiral Turner's aides might manage a last-minute reprieve for the Historical Office. In this case, the "lesson" of the past would be to find somewhere in the CIA's multi-billion dollar budget the small change needed to maintain what the boys with the cloaks and computers (daggers being out of style at Langley) could then justify to their superiors as a small dose of "Historical Humint."

*Allen Weinstein is a professor of history at Smith College and author of *Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case*.*

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A16THE WASHINGTON POST  
17 September 1979

# Young Blames U.S. Policy For Angola's Soviet Ties

By Leon Dash

Washington Post Foreign Service

NAIROBI, Kenya, Sept. 16—The United States has pushed Angola into the arms of the Soviet Union by withholding recognition of the Marxist Angolan government, U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young said tonight.

Young said U.S. policy toward Angola, which achieved independence during civil war four years ago, was prompted by a fear of the 20,000 Cubans estimated to be stationed there.

"I have always felt it is stupid to be afraid of Cubans," Young said. "We should go in there and compete with them."

The Carter administration has made its recognition contingent on the withdrawal of Cuban soldiers from Angola.

"That is one of my biggest regrets," Young said of American failure to recognize Angola during his 2 1/2 years as U.N. ambassador.

Young made the comments at a press briefing following a diplomatic reception at the home of the U.S. ambassador to Kenya, Wilbert J. Le Melle. Kenya is the fifth stop of a seven-nation African trade mission Young is heading.

The trade mission has slipped into the background as the loquacious, outgoing U.N. ambassador increasingly has concentrated his comments on U.S. domestic politics and foreign policy.

Most of his comments have been made in speeches or in answering reporters' questions.

Young's criticism of American policy toward Angola came in response to questions about Young's regret over the death of Angolan President Agostinho Neto. Young said he would have liked to attend Neto's funeral in Angola today.

"I would have liked to have been there because of the respect I have for Neto," he said.

Neto came to power in 1975 as head of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola after more than a decade of anticolonial guerrilla war against the Portuguese. Independence was preceded and followed by civil war between the Popular Movement and two other groups who also had rebelled against the Portuguese.

In the ensuing strife, the United States' Central Intelligence Agency and South African soldiers aided the two movements fighting Neto's Popular Movement. Neto was able to win

the conflict with the aid of Cuban soldiers.

Today there are Cuban doctors, technicians and a large contingent of Cuban troops in Angola. The Soviet Union also has large numbers of advisers there.

Angolan "leadership in the front-line states has been the most moderate," Young said. "They want to end the fighting [in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia] because they know the cost."

The front-line states of Angola, Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique and Botswana have played a leading role in seeking a solution to the guerrilla war in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

Young said that while he was a congressman a delegation from the Popular Movement came to see him and asked that the Americans "not do to them what was done to the Cubans."

After it was clear that the Portuguese were leaving and the Popular Movement would win the civil war, "they wanted to stay nonaligned and they felt they couldn't do that if pushed into the Soviet camp," Young said.

Recent news accounts have reported three assassination attempts against Neto by leftists in his own party who wanted a closer alignment with the Soviet Union. Neto is said to have wanted Angola to remain independent of the Soviets.

The withholding of American recognition of their government pushed the Angolans closer to the Soviets than they wanted to be, Young said.

Young said he felt the transition of power to Neto's yet-unknown successor would be smooth. "If there is a smooth transfer and a new government emerges that still wishes to be nonaligned, then I think we ought to give them the chance to be nonaligned," he said.

Young also said Nigeria's transition from military to civilian rule in two weeks, will have a wide impact on Africa and other parts of the developing world under military governments. "Freedom is contagious," he said.

Young also said:

- Future American foreign policy in Africa will have to include Nigeria, Africa's most populous and richest state.

- Nigeria's President-elect Shehu Shagari's incoming civilian government "would be inclined to be a bit more cooperative with Britain" than the outgoing military government which recently nationalized British Petroleum's holdings in Nigeria.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A-20NEW YORK TIMES  
19 SEPTEMBER 1979

# Tennessee Factory Ordered Shut In a Search for Missing Uranium

By DAVID BURNHAM

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 18 — The Federal Government today ordered shut for at least 45 days a privately owned factory that makes fuel for the Navy's nuclear submarines because the Tennessee facility could not account in a recent inventory for a significant amount of highly enriched uranium, a material that could be fashioned into an atomic bomb.

The problem of assuring adequate protection for materials that can be turned into a bomb by small nations or even a highly organized terrorist gang has been a constant concern to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and its predecessor agency, the Atomic Energy Commission.

A little more than two years ago, for example, the Federal Government announced that nuclear facilities similar to the Tennessee factory closed down today were unable to trace a cumulative total of more than 8,000 pounds of highly enriched uranium and plutonium since the beginning of the nuclear age.

While the Central Intelligence Agency has reported that it believes a significant amount of nuclear materials was stolen by a foreign power in at least one instance, other Government officials have contended there was no evidence of such a theft and that the losses occurred in the normal manufacturing process.

#### Long History of Problems

The factory affected by today's order of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is situated in Erwin, Tenn., and is owned by Nuclear Fuel Services Inc. The factory, which has 400 employees, has a long history of accounting and security problems.

In April 1977, for example, the Erwin facility was fined \$53,000 by the commission for failing to provide adequate guard services to test its burglary alarms and provide required security barriers.

The commission, while announcing the closing of the plant, did not immediately disclose how much of the uranium was found unaccounted for in a recent two-month inventory. The size of such inventory discrepancies are kept secret for six months to protect the Government from fraudulent extortion threats.

Under the terms of the factory's operating license, however, any discrepancy

of 19.8 pounds or more requires a shutdown for inventory within 72 hours.

Experts do not agree on exactly how much highly enriched uranium would be required to make a nuclear device. In 1977, however, the commission said that 40 pounds of the material would be sufficient.

#### Investigators at Facility

William D. Dirks, head of the commission's Office of Nuclear Materials and Safeguards, said in an interview that seven commission investigators were now at the Tennessee facility examining "its physical security procedures" for the period when the inventory discrepancy was discovered.

"There is no indication right now that the material has gotten off site, but we haven't ruled out that possibility," Mr. Dirks said.

The official added that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and an Energy Department agency called the Nuclear Emergency Search Team had been alerted that they might be called in to work on the case.

The F.B.I. would investigate if the commission decided there might be a possible criminal violation. The Nuclear Emergency Search Team, with headquarters in Las Vegas, is equipped with mobile detectors designed to enable its technicians to locate sources of radiation.

Mr. Dirks said that in addition to the examination of the factory's security procedures, the plant would be required to close down its operations and make a complete inventory to determine exactly how much of the highly enriched uranium could not be accounted for. The official said the inventory would require a minimum of 45 days.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE D-1NEW YORK TIMES  
19 SEPTEMBER 1979

# Bonn Fights Industrial Espionage

By JOHN M. GEDDES

Special to The New York Times

BONN, Sept. 18 — In West Germany, spies are exchanging their cloaks and daggers for business suits and briefcases.

In the first eight months of this year alone, West German counterintelligence agents have uncovered more than 40 Soviet-bloc spies, about three-quarters of them engaged in industrial espionage and nearly all working for East Germany. Although officials note that the unusual concentration of economic spies was touched off by the January defection of their East German control officer, the trend toward industrial espionage seems established.

"It's now clear," the West German Interior Ministry said this summer in its report on internal security, "that economic and scientific espionage within East Germany's intelligence apparatus have reached a level of special rank and to a large degree have proved of great benefit to the East German economy."

East Germany, which is believed to control about 3,000 of the estimated 4,000 foreign agents in West Germany, has put its special emphasis on espionage in high-technology sectors where its own efforts lag. The positions in which agents were discovered this year — nuclear energy, computers, electronics, optics, chemicals, machine building — represent the focus of East German espionage, officials say.

The agents themselves come from a broad range of backgrounds. Some are professionals, others are blackmailed by pressure on families left in the eastern half of this divided country and still others spy for the more common motives of love or money. The only connecting thread is the lift they provide to the East German economy.

"There is a whole range of benefits to the East bloc from conducting industrial espionage," said Norbert Hammacher, chairman of the Committee for Security in the Economy, a nationwide industrial panel. Among the most obvious, he said, were savings on research and development outlays, freedom from paying license fees and varied cost reductions stemming from Western production techniques.

Mr. Hammacher noted that resultant reductions in cost and improvements in quality enabled Soviet-bloc governments to mount a competitive threat to Western companies. For such purposes, he said, Western market strategies or even price schedules from salesmen give an added competitive edge to eastern producers.

In some cases, the advantages to the East-bloc countries are clear. Gerhard Arnold, 44 years old, the co-owner of a small computer consulting firm near Munich, was arrested earlier this year on suspicion of espionage. Mr. Arnold was accused of passing computer technology to East Germany for more than 20 years, including the 11-year period he worked at IBM Deutschland A.G., which he left in 1971, quitting his post as a regional sales manager.

#### Used to Modernize Computers

"This information," the Interior Ministry report said, "was used by East Germany to modernize the data processing equipment" of the East German Army and bring it up to Western standards.

But for every case where some clear damage assessment can be made, two more exist where the costs of the spying remain unknown. Mr. Hammacher said the currency cost of the espionage had never been calculated, largely because its extent was not known.

Perhaps indicative of the still unclear results of most espionage cases was the defection earlier this year of Heiga Rodiger, a secretary for Manfred Lahmstein, the state secretary in the Finance Ministry. Officials say Miss Rodiger defected to East Germany with a friend, a suspected East German agent, Robert Kresse, who worked at Basf A.G., the chemical company.

Mr. Lahmstein was the chief German liaison official involved in last year's efforts by the Carter Administration to support the dollar and continues to be extensively involved in currency negotiations. Presumably, his secretary could have had early access to information about Government action on foreign exchange markets, providing her sponsors with an opportunity to reap a windfall profit on currency markets.

#### No Assessment Yet

Security officials have yet to publish a public assessment of what was passed on. And as is often the case in the foreign exchange market, currency dealers reached earlier this year could not discern East-bloc moves in the market one way or another.

"For all we know," one Dusseldorf banker said, "the East bloc might have called her in from the cold because she gave them a bad tip and they lost a bundle."

Mr. Hammacher, who acknowledges that detentes has not helped raise public recognition of the dangers of espionage, said the security checks on potential employees still remained a prime defense against later leaks. But, he noted that with the flow of legitimate refugees from the East, and no language problems for spies hidden among them, agents still slipped through.

The other approach, he said, is publicity to keep West Germans aware "that if they get a blackmail threat or pressure on families in the East, their companies will support them and help them solve the problem." Other than this type of preventive counter-espionage, legal tools for the companies are limited because of the narrow nature of East-West licensing laws, he said.

"Let's say you're at an East-West trade fair, and you see an Eastern exhibit that looks uncannily like a process you're selling," Mr. Hammacher said. "You get back home and see a patent lawyer to find out what you can do about it."

"His answer will be 'forget it, you'll never win.'"

THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS  
11 September 1979

# JOB MARKET

## I spy a career in the CIA

By KAREN STEELE

**A**S A KID, did you play with invisible ink and secret codes? Do strange puzzles and faraway places intrigue you? If so, you could be just the person that Bill Wood is looking for. He's your local CIA recruiter.

The CIA, or Central Intelligence Agency, is the United States' foreign information-gathering arm.

"We like to think of ourselves as being in the business of foreign intelligence," says Wood, who has been recruiting in the Dallas-Fort Worth area for 15 years. He notes the CIA is interested in "the dynamics of life in foreign countries as it may pertain to life in the USA — political matters, science and technical matters, military and economic matters." But, he hastens to point out, "We have absolutely nothing to do with law enforcement."

Of late, the CIA has been taking ads in various newspapers looking for "you special men and women who still have a spirit of adventure." The ad goes on to say:

"There aren't many of you. One in a thousand maybe. You're a bright, self-reliant, self-motivated person we need to help us gather information and put together a meaningful picture of what's happening in the world. One of an elite corps of men and women."

That may sound like a hard sell to you, but the CIA isn't kidding. They're out to recruit new members. It sounds like one way to have more than an average 9-to-5-type job and see a little of the world on Uncle Sam, too.

Wood knows exactly what he's looking for: "Our personnel needs center around the college graduate, and in the liberal arts area we tend to look predominantly for graduate-degree candidates. In the sciences and engineering we do hire at all degree levels — baccalaureate, master's and Ph.D."

"Business administration is really not a field that appeals to us in any preponderance at all. We hire only a very limited number of BBA, MBA kinds of people, unless there's something in their background that points toward the international trade area or international commerce area."

He goes on to explain that "our business is foreign intelligence. It has nothing to do with domestic ability at all. Therefore, as we look at college backgrounds, we're looking for evidence of people who are interested in the international scene."

"From the liberal arts area we would be much interested in someone who has begun to understand the Soviet Union or China or Africa or the Middle East or Latin America and whose academic background tends to take note of political and economic developments there. Hopefully there may be some language in the background of the individual."

Wood emphasizes that the CIA plays no policing role and does not seek or solicit persons with a criminal justice or law enforcement background. "I like very much to be talking with people who may call themselves Soviet specialists, East European specialists or Asian specialists. These are people who are likely to have a graduate degree from what may be called an area study program on a major college campus," he says. These people will usually hold a B.A. in political science or some related field, then go on to specialize in graduate school.

He notes that he is currently searching for electronic engineers, physics majors, computer science majors and people with what is defined as "rare" languages, such as Russian, Japanese, Chinese, any of the East European or Scandinavian tongues, Arabic, etc. "We have a very special liking for people who are into the more uncommon languages of the world. There is a very great availability of romance language majors, but in our recruitment program we like to get out into the unusual areas."

When asked about areas that a recruit may be working in, Wood was obviously unable to go into great detail but did say that "there are generally two functions one might be aligned with in the agency. One would be our overseas collection program (in other words, information gathering, or spying) and the other would be an analytical position at CIA headquarters." Someone working in the information-gathering process overseas would work in an "under-cover arrangement of some type, but I think that's about as far as I'd like to go."

As far as the age factor goes, Woods says there are no barriers there. "A major portion of our nationwide

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recruitment program is aimed at people who are already in the world of work. We're interested in alumni who may not have found precisely what they're looking for. So by no means is our recruitment program aimed exclusively at the college campus." He says he has been talking to people who have been out of college for as long as 15 years.

Starting salaries will vary, depending on qualifications. Most candidates will begin at the GS-7 to the GS-9 level, which will put the beginning salary in the \$13,014 to \$15,920 range.

The CIA has a high rate of retention with its workers, probably because "most people seem to have a special reason for wanting to be part of the intelligence team."

Wood is in the D-FW area two or more times a month recruiting. Interested people should contact him by sending a resume to William B. Wood, CIA, P.O. Box 26, Austin, TX 78767.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 7FHUMAN EVENTS  
15 September 1979

# Building Moscow's War Machine

## Carter's Cover-Up

### At Kama River

Further developments on the Kama River truck plant in the Soviet Union—and the explosive growth of East-West trade in general—suggest the Carter Administration is sitting atop a national scandal of immense proportions.

The situation, indeed, has all the makings of a Watergate, only more so: Questionable transactions concealed from the American people, possible violation of the law, use of "executive privilege" and "national interest" to suppress important data, and a crackdown on those who try to get such information to the public. In addition, there is testimony from a high-ranking Carter official which, in one key respect at least, is in jarring conflict with the facts of record.

The major difference between this scandal and the agony of Watergate is that this time the cover-up involves, not a political burglary, but official actions that encourage dealings potentially harmful to our national security. (Another distinction is that the national media, which made such an issue out of Watergate, have so far viewed the facts of "Cartergate" with yawning indifference.)

In recent years, under the umbrella of detente, trade with the Soviet Union and other Communist bloc nations has grown by leaps and bounds. The total volume of trade with the Soviets alone has jumped from \$191 million in 1970 to \$2.8 billion in 1978. In the same period, the volume of U.S. trade with the Communist bloc in general has increased from \$579 million to better than \$6 billion.

There is mounting evidence that a substantial part of this traffic—including computers, ball-bearing machinery, chemical processes, etc.—has military application. In addition, testimony has been given in Congress indicating the Communists have been diverting allegedly peaceful trade to military purposes. Revelations on both counts have prompted Congress to take a closer look at East-West trade, and caused the Carter regime to go into a classic cover-up.

Under the Export Administration Act of 1969, the secretary of commerce is required to restrict the sale of goods or technologies abroad "which would make a significant contribution to the

3 February 1977

MEMORANDUM TO:

FROM:

SUBJECT: Computer (\$6.1 million) for Soviet Truck Plant (ZIL)  
(OC DOC. 5643)

Following is a status report on OC consideration of subject document.

Problem is that a quarter of the 200,000 trucks ZIL produces annually goes to the military, including 100 missile launchers. State and Commerce support approval, on grounds that US Government, aware of ZIL's military production, has licensed exports to it several times during the 1970s, that 100 missile launchers out of a 200,000 vehicle annual production is small, and that the remaining trucks for the military are basically no different from heavy duty civilian trucks. Defense and ERDA support denial on grounds that ZIL's military contribution is unacceptably high, and past export approvals should not be dispositive of instant case. Deadlock appears unbreakable at OC level.

At the Operating Committee Meeting of December 29, Defense said they object and will appeal. At the meeting of January 14, ERDA also said they would object to approval.

A memorandum is being drafted with a fuller explanation of the issues posing the divergent positions for your review and possible referral for higher level review.

*This copy of an internal Carter Administration memorandum shows how the Commerce Department pushes for technology trade with Moscow—even when the trade involves production of missile launchers.*

military potential of any other nation or nations which would prove detrimental to the national security of the United States." Critics of existing trade policy say Commerce has made this provision a virtual nullity by interpreting the most obvious military uses as insignificant.

A striking example appears in an interoffice memo concerning a proposed computer sale to the Soviet ZIL truck plant (see full text above). This memo states that "a quarter of the 200,000 trucks ZIL produces annually goes to the military, including 100 missile launchers." Nonetheless, "State and Commerce support approval," on the grounds that we have already licensed exports for this plant, that the military trucks are basically like civilian trucks anyway, and that "100 missile launchers out of a 200,000 vehicle annual production is small."

The mentality behind that episode

tion's push in Congress to relax our export standards even further—including an attempt to "index" items off the restricted trade list. By the same token, a number of irate congressmen will demand a tightening of the laws when the subject comes to the floor of the House, a development expected in the next 10 days.

Much of the current debate has centered on the Kama River plant, built for the Soviets with hundreds of millions of dollars worth of our technology. Though it is only one aspect of our huge and growing volume of trade with the Communists, and arguably not the most important, it has become a symbolic focal point because it is one project on which key facts have come to light.

*It is now apparent, for instance, that the Kama River plant is being used for military purposes. CIA official Hans Heymann and Lawrence J. Brady, then*

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acting direct Approved For Release 2009/04/30 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501280001-5 tration, testified in May that diesel engines from the plant had been diverted to military uses, and that vehicles containing such engines had shown up in military formations of the Warsaw Pact. Administration officials have in effect conceded that such military uses had occurred.

There is also evidence that products of the Kama River plant are being used in military vehicles other than trucks. A report from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow says, "It appears that many of the engines are going into military trucks and other military vehicles, such as armored personnel carriers and assault vehicles."

In addition, congressional investigators have questioned whether the IBM 370 computer associated with the plant can be effectively safeguarded from military diversion.

The response of the Carter Administration to these disclosures and inquiries has been to counterattack at every level, beginning with the dissident Brady. Shortly after he contradicted official assurances that safeguards against military use of our technology were adequate, he was rebuked by Commerce officials—including Secretary of Commerce Juanita Kreps—and relieved of his post as acting director.

The substantive answer to Brady is equally intriguing. Though Commerce spokesmen have sought sporadically to deny that Kama products were going for military uses, they have of late retreated to verbal quibbling about the meaning of "diversion." As Kreps put it in a letter to Rep. Richard Ichord (D.-Mo.), "there was no 'diversion' in connection with the Kama River truck plant," because "a diversion occurs only when end-use restrictions pertaining to a licensee are violated." Since no restrictions had been imposed on Kama River, she said, military use of the project was not a violation.

This point was amplified by Assistant Secretary of Commerce Frank A. Weil (since departed in an apparently unrelated development) in testimony before the House Armed Services Research and Development subcommittee, chaired by Ichord. "There have been suggestions," Weil said, "that in the course of the export licensing process, the Soviets or the U.S. licensees represented to our government that the trucks and engines produced at the Kama factory would be used solely for civilian purposes. This was not the case."

The record, however, says otherwise. Thus one export license application filed Dec. 12, 1971, describes the end use of the commodities in question as "manufacture of heavy-duty trucks for civilian use—Kama River truck plant." Another, dated in November 1971, likewise states the object as "the manufacture of heavy-duty trucks for civilian use—Kama River truck plant." Yet another (Sept. 23, 1971) states the purpose as "manufacture of commercial vehicles."

Even without this definitive proof that the Kama River deal had been represented in export applications as a "civilian" and "commercial" venture, the retroactive justification of the Carter regime—that the U.S. government knew the

Approved For Release 2009/04/30 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501280001-5 poses, but made a conscious policy decision to accept this—boggles the imagination. At the time the Kama River project was launched, after all, we were engaged in bloody warfare in Vietnam, where the Communist enemy made extensive use of trucks supplied by the Soviet Union.

Ichord and Rep. Lawrence McDonald (D.-Ga.) have tried to find out just who had made this policy decision, and if it had been made in writing. They have, however, run into claims of "executive privilege" from Carter officials. If these claims of secrecy are backed up by the White House, we would have the anomaly of a supposedly open Democratic Administration covering up the dealings of its Republican predecessors.

Also, it should be noted, the U.S. public is prevented from knowing which American firms represented the purpose of Kama River as trucks for "civilian use," since Commerce has claimed disclosure of such information would run counter to the "national interest." This is the claim that is being challenged in federal court by journalist M. Stanton Evans and the National Journalism Center. (See HUMAN EVENTS for May 26, 1979.)

In a follow-up move, Evans on August 17 filed another Freedom of Information request asking Commerce to disclose any end-use restrictions that had been placed on exports to Soviet truck factories, whether any military violations of such restrictions had been recorded, and whether applications were pending for further exports to such factories. At press time, this request had not been answered.

These various issues concerning Kama River, militarily useful exports in general, and public access to information about our trade policy will be thrashed out on the floor of the House when that body considers HR 4034, the Administration-backed bill to revamp the export act. Amendments are expected that would tighten definitions of critical technology, impose requirements for tougher end-use restrictions, improve techniques to enforce compliance, and open up the data about such matters to inspection by Congress and the public.

Among those involved in this effort, in addition to Ichord and McDonald (both Democrats), is a bipartisan group of lawmakers concerned about the security implications of Red trade, including Rep. Lester Wolff (D.-N.Y.), Rep. Eldon Rudd (R.-Ariz.), Rep. Robert Dornan (R.-Calif.), and Rep. John Ashbrook (R.-Ohio).

Also, there is sentiment for re-calling Lawrence Brady and Commerce higher-ups to straighten out conflicts of testimony on Kama River and related matters, and to get the story on the apparent harassment of Brady because he dissented from the official line. A hearing on these issues could cast much useful light on the murky subject of who in Commerce is doing what, and the degree to which our policy on strategic trade has helped to strengthen the military power of the Soviets.

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Approved For Release 2009/04/30 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501280001-5

Cuba/SALT

This will give you a good idea

of the volume

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A16THE WASHINGTON POST  
28 September 1979

# Vance, Gromyko End Cuba Talks With No Sign of Progress

By Don Oberdorfer  
Washington Post Staff Writer

NEW YORK, Sept. 27 — Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko held a lengthy final meeting today on the disputed Soviet combat brigade in Cuba and declined to say later if any progress had been made.

Vance immediately flew to Washington to brief President Carter and the National Security Council. Gromyko said he will fly back to Moscow Friday.

The fact that no more U.S.-Soviet meetings were announced and that Gromyko is returning to Moscow without seeing President Carter was interpreted as a sign that the impasse between the two nations has not been broken.

Because of the sensitivity of the subject, part of the nearly 3½-hour session at Vance's hotel was a private conference between the two men, with only interpreters present. Another indication of the sensitive nature of the subject was that Gromyko declined to concede publicly that U.S. charges of a Soviet combat brigade were even discussed.

Emerging from the lengthy conference into a crush of reporters and photographers, Vance and Gromyko appeared solemn and ill at ease. They agreed the talks were "serious" and announced in advance they would not discuss their substance.

No additional meetings with the Soviets on the subject were announced, and U.S. officials in the Vance party would give no indication whether three weeks of talks left any hope for a negotiated solution through continued diplomatic dialogue.

State Department spokesman Hodding Carter cautioned reporters against any speculation.

Carter did not foreclose the possibility that Vance may change his schedule, which is to take him to New Haven for a speech at Yale Saturday and to Panama for a ceremony about the canal late Sunday.

Vance is to meet Friday morning at the White House with President Carter, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and national security affairs adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski in a regular weekly breakfast on foreign policy matters.

Failure to resolve the dispute over

the brigade through diplomatic means could trigger unspecified U.S. counteractions promised by President Carter.

Meanwhile, White House press secretary Jody Powell today identified seven members of the panel of former government officials named to advise the president on the troops issue.

The seven: Clark Clifford, a Washington attorney who has been an adviser to several presidents; McGeorge Bundy, national security affairs adviser to President John F. Kennedy; Brent Scowcroft, national security affairs adviser to Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford; John McCloy, a Wall Street lawyer and former holder of numerous diplomatic posts; John McCone, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency; David Packard, former electronics executive and former deputy secretary of defense; and Sol Linowitz, one of the negotiators of the Panama Canal treaties.

Powell said five other citizens from outside the administration were being consulted, but he refused to identify them or their duties. Administration sources, however, said two are former secretaries of state Henry Kissinger and Dean Rusk.

For his part, Vance continued to maintain a low-key public posture. In an address here today to the Foreign Policy Association, Vance said that, while the United States is concerned about the Soviet brigade, it wishes to keep each part of its relationship with the Soviet Union "in proper perspective."

This appeared to be a bid to discourage an across-the-board confrontation with the Soviets that would destroy the results of seven years of negotiations on SALT II and raise tensions in many parts of the world.

Several Western European foreign ministers and other allied diplomats who were briefed on the brigade dispute by Vance here this week reportedly expressed their concern about the effect of a major U.S.-Soviet dispute.

Some of these countries see "stable U.S.-Soviet relations as fundamental to their own national policies of detente with the communist world. The demise of SALT II and the beginning of a new U.S.-Soviet confronta-

tion would likely set off intense tremors in these allied countries.

Despite Vance's explanations, the Soviets as well as many Europeans appear to be puzzled about the brigade issue. In the briefings for allies, Vance described how the issue arose and how it is viewed within high circles of the U.S. government.

Today's meeting was the seventh in a series of U.S.-Soviet negotiating sessions on the issue since Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho) made public Aug. 30 the official U.S. conclusion that a Soviet combat brigade is stationed in Cuba.

The first meetings between Vance and Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, centered on expressions of U.S. concern and a question-and-answer dialogue in which Washington sought information from the Soviets about the operations and purpose of the brigade. On the day of the first Vance-Dobrynin meeting, Sept. 10, the Soviets made public a front-page *Pravda* editorial, which remains their most detailed public comment, rejecting the U.S. charges and maintaining that neither the numbers nor the function of Soviet military personnel in Cuba has changed since 1962.

From the outset, the United States announced that the "status quo" is unacceptable. But only a week ago, on Sept. 20, did Washington put forward through Dobrynin specific suggestions for a diplomatic settlement. These ranged from withdrawal of the combat force, which already had been rejected informally by the Soviets, to measures for removing "the combat capability" of the force by reassignment of its officers and transfer of its major equipment to the Cubans.

At the first Vance-Gromyko meeting last Monday, Gromyko reportedly persisted in the position that the Soviet force is not a combat unit, is nothing new and does not violate any U.S.-Soviet understandings regarding Cuba or threaten the security of the United States.

President Carter and Brzezinski have made it increasingly clear that the United States will order a series of compensatory actions to "change the status quo" if the matter cannot be resolved diplomatically. The nature of these actions has not been announced.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A 14THE WASHINGTON POST  
28 September 1979

# Moscow Assails Carter For Remarks About Cuba

By Kevin Klose

Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, Sept. 27. — The Soviet Union tonight sharply attacked President Carter's pledge to take unspecified action to counter the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba, charging his tone was "ultimatum-like" and "threatening."

The attack by the government news agency Tass came as Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was locked in protracted negotiations in New York with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in an effort to resolve the issue, which has strained U.S.-Soviet relations and endangered ratification of SALT II accords.

Referring to the president's remarks in New York Tuesday, Tass said that he made demands "in an ultimatum-like tone that the status quo, which has existed for almost two decades now, be changed."

It said that the entire problem surrounding the Soviet combat brigade in Cuba was a propaganda "hullabaloo" that was "deliberately whipped up by circles having a stake in kindling" anti-Soviet feelings in the United States.

"It is really absolutely obvious that the Soviet military personnel do not and cannot constitute any threat, either by their numbers or their functions, to the United States or any other state," it said, adding that they have been in Cuba for "the last 17 years."

"The Soviet personnel are helping the Cuban military to learn the use of Soviet equipment that has been delivered to them." While the president's statements contain "absolutely unfounded and crude attacks on Cuba's policy," Tass said, Carter at the same time expressed intentions "to continue keeping U.S. troops and numerous military bases in close proximity to the Soviet Union's borders."

Carter, in a "town meeting" in New York Tuesday night, reiterated the American contention that a Soviet force in Cuba is a combat unit, despite Soviet denials. He said he did not know if the current Vance-Gromyko negotiations will be successful.

But, the president said, he will take action "to change the status quo" if the current talks fail.

By attacking the president personally, the Tass commentary tonight appeared to raise the level of Soviet anger about what Moscow calls the campaign of falsehood. Gromyko, in a speech before the

United Nations Tuesday, dismissed as "artificial" Washington's concern about the Soviet combat brigade and said that "it is high time" that the matter be dropped.

But the Soviet foreign minister refrained from mentioning either the Soviet troops or the United States.

The Tass commentary tonight echoed Gromyko's remarks by saying that "the hue and cry over this issue has gone on all too long. It is time to end it. That would help in seeking solutions to major world problems and would advance the development of relations" between the two superpowers.

In criticizing Carter directly, the Soviets however, appeared to preclude the possibility of any concessions to Washington on the Cuba issue, even though it may threaten Senate ratification of the strategic arms limitation treaty.

Speaking about "unlawfulness" and "inconsistency" of the president, Tass said:

"J. Carter allowed himself to make a number of rude, tactless attacks on Cuba and its policy. The president did not bother himself with giving any facts or evidence."

"While pointing out that the strength of Soviet military personnel in Cuba is now less than in 1963, he virtually did not deny that in the status quo there is nothing new as compared with what has been for many years."

"Having once again emphasized that the situation is not a threat to the security of the U.S., Carter at the same time expressed an intention to press for a change of the status quo. In a threatening tone he warned the students that the United States, you see, can take some action to change the status quo."

Speaking about Carter's "inconsistencies, Tass said that the president, "having come forward with all this assemblage of inventions, attacks and threats," subsequently urged the senators" to ratify SALT II.

Tass made no reference to the current Vance-Dobrynin talks. An editorial in the Communist Party newspaper Pravda on Sept. 11 rejected as "totally groundless" Washington's assertions that a Soviet combat brigade was in Cuba but carefully avoided any criticism of Carter.

A subsequent Tass commentary bitterly denounced Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's national security adviser, but avoided attacks on the president.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A-1NEW YORK TIMES  
28 SEPTEMBER 1979

# VANCE AND GROMYKO END TALK ON TROOPS; IMPASSÉ IS INDICATED

Russian Says He Is Going Home,  
Ending Speculation He Might  
See Carter on Cuba Issue

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., Sept. 27 — Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance and Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko of the Soviet Union concluded their talks on the issue of Soviet troops in Cuba today with both sides asserting that the discussions had been "serious" but with no sign of a breakthrough evident.

After the three-and-a-half-hour meeting in Mr. Vance's suite in the United Nations Plaza Hotel, Mr. Gromyko said, he was flying back to the Soviet Union tomorrow night, which put to rest earlier speculation that he might go to Washington to see President Carter.

Mr. Vance, who in a speech to the Foreign Policy Association earlier in the day had sought to reduce the harshness of the exchanges over the issue, returned to Washington tonight to report to the President on the problem, which has found the two sides in complete disagreement over whether there is a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba.

#### Silent on Any New Meeting

The United States says that there is such a force, of 2,000 to 3,000 men, and that its combat role must be eliminated; the Russians say all forces in Cuba are military advisers. — Hodding Carter 3d, the State Department spokesman, was asked later whether there was now a "stalemate," and he refused to accept that terminology or any other. He also would not say whether Mr. Vance would hold further meetings on the subject with Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin, with whom he met five times before conferring with Mr. Gromyko Monday in New York.

Although there was no statement on whether the talks had succeeded in achieving a plan to resolve the troop question, or had failed, the atmosphere at the hotel at the conclusion of the talks was gloomy. This suggested that the impasse remained.

President Carter had indicated at a "town meeting" in Queens on Tuesday that he would make a report to the nation in about a week, when the negotiations were over. Presumably he now must de-

cide what to do if, in fact, no secret deal was worked out with Mr. Gromyko.

Mr. Gromyko, accompanied by Mr. Vance, told reporters that they had had "discussions of a serious nature" on Soviet-American relations. Mr. Vance concurred. According to the spokesman, Mr. Carter, they talked of issues in addition to Cuba during the long session, but he was not specific.

Earlier today, Mr. Vance, in his speech on Latin American policy, touched lightly on the Cuban issue, seeking to reduce the polemics that have been intensified recently by President Carter and Zbigniew Brzezinski, his national security adviser.

"We are seeking to resolve, by diplomatic negotiations with the Soviet Union, questions raised by the presence of these forces," he said in a luncheon address to the Foreign Policy Association at the New York Hilton.

He added that the United States had "significant interests at stake in our total relationship with the Soviet Union" and that "we wish to keep each part in proper perspective."

#### Full Report Promised

"However, we will assure that our interests are fully protected," he said.

In a question-and-answer period later, Mr. Vance refused to go into the details of the negotiations, but he did promise a full report "at the appropriate time."

"So long as negotiations are going on, the best thing that can be done is for private negotiations through private diplomacy," he said. "Only through private diplomacy can we find ways of achieving a satisfactory solution."

In his speech, Mr. Vance indicated that the Carter Administration was ready to have a close relationship with the new regime in Nicaragua, even if its radical policies occasionally bring it into conflict with the United States.

"By extending our friendship and economic assistance, we enhance the prospects for democracy in Nicaragua," he said. "We cannot guarantee that democracy will take hold there. But if we turn our backs on Nicaragua, we can almost guarantee that democracy will fail."

Mr. Vance said that it might take time to overcome the past history of American support for the Somoza dictatorship, but

"we must be patient, steady and prepared for inevitable disagreements."

"But so long as pluralism flourishes in Nicaragua — and we respect it — I am confident that relations will prosper," he said.

Referring to potential troubles in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, Mr. Vance said that elsewhere in the region "we will encourage and support constructive change before the ties between government and people irreversibly erode and radicalism or repression drive out moderate solution."

United States relations with Nicaragua and the Cuban-Soviet connection were two points in a six-point program of American policy outlined by Mr. Vance. The others were:

"To include Latin American countries more directly in the international economic system. He cited relations with Mexico as an example of close cooperation.

"To focus attention and resources on concrete development problems, with American aid directed to the daily needs of people in poorer countries."

"To support regional efforts in the hemisphere to resolve local conflicts, such as the dispute between Argentina and Chile over the Beagle Channel.

"To stress American willingness to work with any nation willing to work with it toward practical goals, in effect saying that the United States would not be dogmatic in its approach."

In Washington, where the issue of the Cuban brigade has grown into a major political problem for the Administration, White House officials revealed additional names of the panel of distinguished former officials who are serving with Clark M. Clifford in an advisory assignment for Mr. Carter on the problem.

Mr. Clifford, a former Defense Secretary in the Johnson Administration, will be aided by McGeorge Bundy, national security affairs adviser for the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations; Brent Scowcroft, who held the same assignment in the Ford Administration; John J. McCloy, former High Commissioner in Germany; Sol M. Linowitz, former Panama Canal negotiator; David Packard, Deputy Secretary of Defense in the Nixon Administration, and John A. McCone, former director of Central Intelligence.

Mr. Vance, in the question-and-answer period, dealt with a variety of subjects. He said that the former Shah of Iran was not welcome in the United States at this time because it would endanger Americans in Iran and would not be in the American national interest. As to Israeli use of American equipment in bombing raids in Lebanon, Mr. Vance said that Israel could use it for defensive purposes and it was hard to draw the line on what was a violation.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A1-8THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)  
28 September 1979

# Carter, Aides Meet on Cuba

## Gromyko And Vance End Talks

By Henry S. Bradsher  
Washington Star Staff Writer

President Carter holds a second urgent meeting with his national security advisers today to consider U.S. actions over failure of talks with the Soviet Union to resolve the problem of their troops in Cuba.

Carter met with the advisers for an hour last night following a private report from Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance on Vance's three-hour meeting in New York with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko.

Vance and Gromyko emerged from the meeting looking somber and saying nothing about their discussions except that they were serious. But the Soviet refusal to yield to American efforts to eliminate the troops' combat capabilities was indicated by Gromyko's statement that he would fly home today — skipping a side trip he often takes from a United Nations session to talk with the president in Washington.

No further meetings with the Soviets on the troop issue were announced. Although officials cautioned reporters that more could be held, they left an impression of a breakdown of U.S. efforts to negotiate a solution.

The Soviets have never seemed willing to negotiate. In seven meetings that Vance held with Gromyko or Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin, they apparently rebuffed all U.S. efforts to obtain a change in the troops' status. The Soviet press agency Tass reiterated yesterday the Kremlin position that Washington had created an artificial crisis.

As Vance was flying back to Washington last night, presidential advisers gathered in the cabinet room. Vance briefed Carter for about 25 minutes before they joined the others, who had been meeting for an hour.

The group included Vice President Walter F. Mondale, Defense Secretary Harold Brown and his deputy W. Graham Claytor, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff Gen. David C. Jones, CIA head Stansfield Turner, national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, budget director James T. McIntyre, presidential adviser Hedley Donovan, counsel Lloyd Cutler, chief of staff Hamilton Jordan, and Vance's deputy Warren Christopher.

Press secretary Jody Powell said after the meetings ended at 10:30 p.m. that approximately the same group would meet this morning at an expanded version of the president's regular Friday breakfast with foreign policy advisers. Powell said he still expected Carter to report to the American people on the situation by Tuesday, as he had promised last Tuesday.

Carter had said then that he would take some unspecified "appropriate action" if the Soviet Union failed to agree on changing the status of the 2,000 to 3,000 troops.

Carter has been studying options for trying to offset a Soviet refusal by U.S. actions, and his advisers were believed to have gone over them last night. Officials have emphasized that the president is not contemplating military action against the Soviet troops.

They have instead implied some forms of retaliation against other Soviet interests. The intention would be to assert American power and ability to make the Kremlin pay for an infringement of U.S. sensitivities about areas close to its shores.

While considering possible actions, Carter has also been trying to consolidate broad public support behind him. His effort signified the seriousness with which the White House viewed the prospect of a worsening of Soviet-American relations.

Vance warned Monday that a Soviet refusal to work out something

could cause relations to deteriorate dangerously.

In addition to whatever effect the impasse on the Soviet troops and U.S. retaliatory actions might have on relations, the international atmosphere will be affected by a breakdown of arms control talks resulting from an American failure to ratify the new strategic arms limitations treaty, SALT II. The administration has little hope of getting it through the Senate so long as it is unable to budge the Soviets on Cuba.

Officials disclosed yesterday that Carter had asked a small group of prominent Americans to advise him on the situation. It included two former secretaries of state, Dean Rusk and Henry A. Kissinger. Kissinger has already publicly supported the administration position on the troop issue.

Carter had earlier asked seven other prominent Americans to review the intelligence on the Soviet troops. The Kremlin has denied the conclusion that the administration drew from the data, that the troops constituted a combat brigade, and insists instead that they are just a training mission.

The review group is led by Clark M. Clifford, an adviser to Democratic presidents since Harry S. Truman and defense secretary at the end of Lyndon B. Johnson's presidency.

Other members whose names were announced yesterday were McGeorge Bundy, national security adviser to President John F. Kennedy; John J. McCloy, assistant secretary of war during World War II and holder of many important jobs in rebuilding Europe afterward; former CIA head John A. McCone; David Packard, deputy secretary of defense in 1969-71; Sol M. Linowitz, ambassador to the Organization of American States in 1966-69 and a negotiator of the Panama Canal treaties; and Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, national security adviser to President Gerald R. Ford.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A12

THE WASHINGTON POST  
28 September 1979

## Aide to Carter Challenges Ford On SALT Pact

Associated Press

President Carter's national security affairs adviser took issue yesterday with former president Gerald Ford's misgivings about the strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT II). Zbigniew Brzezinski said the treaty was better than the one Ford himself had proposed.

Brzezinski challenged Ford's statement Wednesday that the treaty should not be ratified "until and unless we can once again be certain of our strength."

Brzezinski said Carter "is the first president since World War II to succeed in raising defense spending for three straight years in peacetime."

By contrast, Brzezinski said, "defense spending in constant dollars declined in seven of the eight years of the Nixon-Ford administration." His comments came in remarks prepared for a meeting here of the School of International Affairs Alumni Association.

"There are two surprising aspects of President Ford's criticism of SALT II," Brzezinski said. "First, it is well known that much of the foundation of this agreement was, to his credit, negotiated during the Ford administration. Second, it is a simple fact that an issue-by-issue comparison between the SALT II treaty and the last SALT proposal of the Ford administration shows that on essentially every issue, the . . . treaty is on the same track or better than the last proposal of the Ford administration."

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28 September 1979

Jack Anderson

# Soviet Brigade Just Part of Cuba Threat

A Soviet brigade with armored equipment was engaged in maneuvers last month near Havana. The unsuspecting troops should have smiled: They were on candid camera. The U.S. satellite pictures were clear enough to identify which soldiers needed a shave.

This photographic evidence that a Soviet combat brigade was stationed in Cuba caused an uproar in the United States. And the uproar, according to intelligence accounts, caused perplexity in the Kremlin.

Apparently, the Soviet leaders can't understand the fuss. They assume U.S. intelligence agencies have known for years that Cuba has been transformed into a Soviet satrapy. The presence of 2,800 Soviet combat troops in Cuba is one of the lesser threats to U.S. security.

From classified intelligence reports, here's a rundown on some of the other unpleasant Soviet operations in Cuba:

- There is evidence, according to the Defense Intelligence Agency, that the Soviets have established "an independent fighter unit in Cuba." About 20 Soviet pilots turned up in Cuba in February 1976. They began flying Mig21 fighter planes, declares a secret report, "out of San Antonio de los Banos airfield, just south of Havana." Before long, they were conducting "mock combat sorties," the surveillance report states.

- Soviet pilots also have been flying regular reconnaissance missions from secret Cuban bases. Soviet re-

connaissance planes, operating out of Guinea and Cuba, have monitored U.S. naval movements in the Atlantic. An intelligence report explains that they have flown "round-robin missions over the central Atlantic ... staging from both Cuba and Guinea, performing coordinated flights to the mid-Atlantic." President Carter, meanwhile, called off U.S. reconnaissance flights over Cuba as a gesture of good will.

- The Soviets have established sophisticated communications facilities in Cuba capable of intercepting U.S. microwave telephone conversations. The Pentagon is security conscious and restricts military use of microwave telephones. But intelligence sources suggest that the Soviets may be more interested in monitoring the private conversations of U.S. scientists, industrialists, businessmen and technicians. The Soviets are eager to keep up with U.S. scientific, technological and commercial advances.

- The Soviet KGB directs Cuban intelligence operations throughout Latin America. The DGI, as Fidel Castro's intelligence agency is known, not only gathers intelligence but also spreads communist revolution in the Western hemisphere. The KGB and DGI are collaborating, for example, to undermine democracy in Puerto Rico. Hundreds of Puerto Rican activists have been trained in terrorism inside Cuba.

- For 17 years, the Soviets have been training and supplying the Cuban armed forces. The Soviet

Union maintains 40,000 Cuban soldiers in Africa. They are Cuban by birth only; everything else about them is Soviet. They wear uniforms, carry weapons and draw pay furnished by the Soviet Union. They are flown in Soviet transport planes; they are backed by Soviet naval power; they are supported by Soviet logistics.

This is described in stark detail in a top-secret summary of the joint Soviet-Cuban military operation in faraway Angola. Here are excerpts:

"Moscow's real-world deployments of naval and air assets to the West African littoral represent an increased willingness to direct military forces into areas far removed from the Soviet mainland, to support what the Soviet leadership considers to be key political objectives . . . .

"The eruption of the Angolan civil war presented Moscow with an opportunity to install a government favorable to its interests and intentions in South Africa. The USSR, unopposed, mounted and sustained a large air and seaborne resupply effort which, in conjunction with the introduction of large numbers of Cuban troops, turned the tide of battle in its client's favor.

"This open act of interference in an internal civil war apparently is viewed by Moscow as not inconsistent with its detente policy toward the West and is a clear demonstration of the USSR's determination to assist national liberation movements."

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# Carter Assembles Group of Advisers On Cuba Troops

By Edward Walsh

Washington Post Staff Writer

President Carter has assembled a group of senior "wise men" to advise him on the steps the United States should take in dealing with the presence of Soviet combat troops in Cuba, White House officials confirmed last night.

The bipartisan group, named earlier in the week, is headed by former defense secretary Clark Clifford and includes other former government officials with experience in advising presidents on foreign policy and intelligence matters, the White House officials said.

"We're doing what presidents usually do in a situation like this," said one official in confirming the appointment of the group, which was first reported by CBS. "You get in a group of wise men, give them a full briefing and ask their advice and obviously hope to build some consensus for your position."

Clifford could not be reached last night, nor could the names of the other members of the group be learned immediately.

The Clifford group began its task Tuesday when it was briefed at Central Intelligence Agency headquarters on the basis for the president's charge that the 2,500 Soviet troops in Cuba constitute a combat brigade. Soviet officials have denied the troops are a

combat unit and have accused the United States of spreading "falsehoods" and "propaganda" about the troops.

Carter turned to the panel for advice as negotiations with the Soviets over the troops issue appeared to be nearing an impasse. In a speech to the United Nations General Assembly Tuesday, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko suggested that the dispute should be considered closed. His comments came after he reportedly had offered no concessions in earlier private talks on the issue with Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance.

The president, meanwhile, has established an informal deadline for resolution of the dispute by negotiations. He said in New York Tuesday night that he will report to the nation in about a week on the steps he will take to resolve the troops issue.

"There are two ways to change the status quo," Carter said. "One is by the action of the Soviet Union. If the Soviets fail to act, then the other way to change the status quo is by action on the part of the United States, and I want to report to the nation probably within the next week after we get through with our negotiations with the Soviet Union [on] what action I will take . . ."

It is clear that by turning to a panel of outside, senior advisers, including Republicans, the president hopes to build the basis for broad, bipartisan support for whatever he decides. White House officials spoke in terms of "developing a consensus" on the troops issue, which has already seri-

ously jeopardized the chances for Senate approval this year of the strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT II) with the Soviet Union.

Carter took a somewhat similar step last December when the crisis in Iran began to deepen. In that case he turned for advice to George W. Ball, undersecretary of state in the Kennedy administration. Ball later reported that the United States should encourage the shah of Iran to move quickly toward a broadly based civilian government before he lost any chance of surviving as leader of that country.

Ball's report came at a time when the administration was giving full support to the shah, who was eventually toppled from his throne by rioting and discord that spread in succeeding weeks through Iran.

White House officials said the Clifford group reviewed U.S. intelligence data on the Soviet troops as a first step in advising the president and not as a check on the accuracy of the data.

The review, one official said, is not "a reflection on the CIA and not a reflection on the accuracy of any judgments we have made."

While Soviet officials have denied that the troops are a combat unit, Carter in recent days has grown more adamant in insisting that they are. In New York Tuesday night, the president said, "The Soviets deny that it has combat status. But it is a combat unit located in a country, in this hemisphere, that is totally dependent on the Soviet Union."

Carter added, as he has before, that "the status quo is not acceptable to us," a formulation that seems to suggest U.S. willingness to accept something less than total withdrawal of the troops.

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# Carter Creates Panel To Study Cuba Brigade

By Phil Gailey

Washington Star Staff Writer

President Carter has asked a group of "distinguished Americans" with backgrounds in national security to evaluate U.S. intelligence on the Soviet combat brigade in Cuba and offer its advice on what the American response should be.

White House press secretary Jody Powell confirmed yesterday that Washington attorney Clark Clifford, a former defense secretary, will head the group, which held its first meeting Tuesday at the CIA headquarters at Langley.

"We started making intelligence available to them this week," Powell told reporters at the Democratic Party's annual fund-raising dinner last night. "If you're going to ask for their advice, they have to know what intelligence information is available."

Powell said the president late last week decided "to ask a group of distinguished Americans with backgrounds in national security and intelligence" to sift through intelligence on the presence of 2,000 to 3,000 Soviet combat troops stationed in Cuba.

"The idea is to have them available for consultation and advice," added Powell, who said he did not know the names of the other members.

One White House official emphasized that the move should not be viewed as a reflection on the U.S. intelligence community, which was late in discovering the Soviet troops.

The president has promised to report to the nation within a week on the problem, and he wants the advice of Clifford's group before deciding on a course of action in what he considers a serious matter.

Carter has said repeatedly that the "status quo" is not acceptable to the United States. However, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, in a speech at the United Nations this week, dismissed the administra-

tion's concern as "artificial" and suggested that the matter be dropped.

U.S. officials say privately that Gromyko's tough speech suggests that the Soviets are not interested in a compromise settlement that would allow both sides to save face.

Despite the president's insistence that he will not accept a "cosmetic" solution, informed sources say the administration would settle for a change in the status of the brigade, such as having it give up its artillery and tanks so it would no longer have a combat capability.

At a "town meeting" in New York Tuesday night, Carter said he will take "appropriate action within a week" and explain his decision to the American people if the Soviets refuse to change the status of the brigade.

Before choosing among the options that are being considered, the president was waiting for a report on today's meeting between Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance and Gromyko, who is scheduled to return to Moscow at the end of the week.

U.S. military action is not among the options the president will choose from, officials said. Some of the measures under consideration include increasing U.S. troop deployments in the Caribbean, including the U.S. Naval base at Guantanamo Bay in eastern Cuba; restricting trade relations with the Soviets; barring the sale of technology the Soviet economy and military needs; and the sale of U.S. arms to China.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
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27 September 1979

# Carter asks new view of Cuba issue

## Intelligence experts to offer ways to end dispute with Soviet

Washington (AP)—President Carter, searching for a resolution of the dispute over Soviet troops in Cuba, has convened a blue-ribbon panel of United States intelligence experts to offer suggestions on the problem, officials said last night.

The panel consists of "senior experts in intelligence and national security affairs," said one White House official, who asked not to be identified. He said the group will "assist in evaluating what should be done in handling the question of Soviet combat troops in Cuba."

The head of the group, Clark Clifford, who was secretary of defense in the Johnson administration, said the seven-member panel spent "eight or nine hours" Monday at CIA headquarters in Langley, Va.

Mr. Clifford said last night the group was told to "get all the facts" about the Soviet troop controversy. He said Mr. Carter wanted the panel to question CIA officials and "to talk the whole thing over."

Mr. Clifford said the experts won't submit a written report, instead choosing to meet with Mr. Carter to discuss their conclusions. He called the CIA meeting "very thorough."

Mr. Clifford would not identify the other members of the panel. A White House official described the group as bipartisan, explaining that "the President wants to build a consensus" on what action to take.

Earlier yesterday, U.S. sources at the United Nations said Mr. Carter may take a personal role in the flagging U.S.-Soviet negotiations over the Soviet troops in Cuba.

Presidential intervention will depend heavily on the outcome of a session today between Cyrus R. Vance, the Secretary of State, and Andrei A. Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister.

Mr. Vance is expecting his next meeting with Mr. Gromyko to produce Soviet responses to U.S. proposals. These range from withdrawal of the brigade to ways of altering its combat capability.

The U.S. sources, who asked not to be identified, said there is no basis yet for expecting a settlement of the dispute over the 2,000 to 3,000 troops. The United States insists they form a combat brigade, while the Soviets say the troops have been on a training mission in Cuba for years.

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# Soviet Troops in Cuba Treading Heavily on SALT Prospects

By Robert G. Kaiser  
Washington Post Staff Writer

The most ardent—and until recently most optimistic—Senate supporters of President Carter's SALT II treaty see virtually no way now to revive its sagging prospects.

Both proponents and critics agree that the strategic arms limitation treaty with Moscow can be saved only by some turn of events as unexpected as the one that put the pact in its present difficulty—the discovery of Soviet combat troops in Cuba.

Even without optimism, though, the treaty's supporters retain hope—hope that the Cuba flap will somehow go away, that President Carter can somehow regain the initiative, or that Senate elders like Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.) and John C. Stennis (D-Miss.) can still save the day.

The only SALT consensus discernible today is that the treaty is in political trouble. When the first month of Senate hearings ended in early August, there were signs of an emerging agreement among a strong majority that SALT was a small but useful step, provided it was accompanied by rigorous defense programs and a firm foreign policy. If that notion now collapses along with the treaty, there is no evidence of a successor consensus that could take its place.

One Senate aide said this week that defeating or simply shelving the SALT treaty until after the 1980 elections could leave the United States without a broadly supported national security policy, and without a president capable of formulating or executing a national security policy. That is now the prospect.

Hard-line critics of SALT II and the country's defense posture in general are not upset at this prospect, of course. Many of them predict that Congress and the country will soon have to accept their view that the United States needs a much bigger, much more expensive defense program.

How this new situation developed may be of interest to historians for many years, but several important explanations can already be identified.

The Cuban flap is certainly the starting point. It is difficult to find anyone in or around the Senate who thinks the Carter administration reacted well to the discovery by its own intelligence agencies that a Soviet combat "brigade" has been operating for some unknown number of years in Cuba.

This discovery was provoked by the White House itself, which asked the intelligence community to conduct an intense investigation of the Soviet

presence in Cuba. The administration had months to prepare for the bad news that this intense review might produce, but apparently no preparations were made. Instead, when the analysts decided that there really were Soviet combat troops in Cuba, the White House had no plan for dealing with this discovery.

Eventually the third-ranking official in the State Department, David Newsome, telephoned several members of Congress to tell them the news. One he called was Frank Church (D-Idaho), the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who had argued for months that the SALT treaty should not be "linked" to other issues in Soviet-American relations.

Church took it upon himself to announce the intelligence community's new findings, arguing later that he

was trying to save the administration from its own folly by at least letting the announcement come from a "responsible" quarter. Many senators privately express wonderment that President Carter did not seize the initiative by personally making the initial announcement.

Instead, said one, Carter waited for days, then "announced that the status

quo was unacceptable before he knew what the status quo was."

For his part, Church suddenly became an advocate of linkage, declaring that the Soviets should withdraw their combat troops from Cuba, declaring that if they didn't, there was no prospect that the Senate would approve SALT II. With a pro-SALT liberal like Church in that posture, senators who wanted to establish a public position to the right of his could only make stronger pro-linkage statements, as many have.

As these events were unfolding, the administration was discovering that the hopes it had placed in Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga) to emerge as a principal advocate of the treaty would not be easily realized.

In late July Nunn announced that he could support the treaty, but only if it were accompanied by a significant increase in the defense budget—perhaps 5 percent a year for five years or more. The treaty itself, he added, looked all right to him.

The administration seized on his comments as the long-awaited indication that Nunn would support SALT. But the administration apparently felt that Nunn's conditions could be satisfied without any basic alteration in its own rhetoric or behavior. Nunn wanted more than that.

As weeks went by, and the press continued to report that the administration didn't think there was any sensible way to spend more than a 3 percent annual increase in the defense budget, Nunn got angry. He apparently came within a hair of announcing his probable opposition to SALT earlier this month, and was only dissuaded by a passionate personal plea from President Carter. Nevertheless, he is now described by intimates as profoundly distrustful of the administration's true intentions, and not at all likely to step forward as a defender of the SALT treaty.

Nunn enjoys a special status as a moderate southern expert on defense issues; many colleagues look to him to take a lead that they can follow. Without his support, the treaty's chances are negligible.

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Another development that has contributed—though less tangibly—to the current situation is the emergence of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) as a likely challenger to Carter's reelection. The initial impact of Kennedy's move toward a declared candidacy has been to emphasize the president's own political weakness. From the beginning, the SALT treaty has been a hostage to Carter's standing at the time the Senate finally votes.

For nearly two years, senators interested in SALT have been making the same point: faith in the commander-in-chief was bound to influence many senators' votes. Today faith in the commander-in-chief is virtually impossible to find on Capitol Hill. Senators who don't fault his strategies fault his tactics; almost no one rises publicly to defend Carter.

Today the strongest instinct in the Senate is to put off the SALT vote indefinitely, which effectively means until 1981, after the presidential election.

One important figure seems likely to challenge that mood, however. Robert Byrd, the majority leader, though he has not announced his position, has become an ardent supporter of SALT. In recent days he has received a stream of visitors, showing many of them his personally annotated copies of the July SALT hearings, telling them how important the treaty is, and declaring that its fate should not be tied to the Cuban issue or to Jimmy Carter.

Byrd seems to believe that the Senate—his Senate—must face up to its constitutional duty to consider the treaty. Byrd will reportedly fight any attempt to shelve the treaty, or to dispose of it with some sort of sense-of-the-Senate resolution that would fall short of either approval or outright rejection.

The White House knows about Byrd's attitude. The president's closest associates perceive an urgent need to reassert some direction and control in the SALT debate. Senior officials met in the White House last night to discuss how this might be done.

Supporters of SALT II in the Senate and senior administration officials insist nothing has changed the basic logic that in their view has always argued for the treaty.

Unless it is approved, they say, relations with Western Europe will be severely strained, defense policy at home will lack direction, and the pledge of non-proliferation will be forfeited, encouraging other nations to join the nuclear club.

For many months the White House has believed that the Senate would eventually have to face these and other consequences of rejecting SALT II, and therefore would finally approve it.

Opponents of the treaty have never agreed that the consequences of rejection would be so ominous. They profess willingness, sometimes eagerness, to live with whatever consequences follow rejection rather than accept a treaty they find unacceptable.

The hard-line opponent have argued for months that the United States has to be tougher in its dealings with the Soviet Union. This is an urge that has wide appeal in the Senate, and the Cuban flap seems to have exacerbated it.

"We seem to have this low-grade chauvinistic fever that we haven't been able to shake out of our system since Vietnam," a liberal senator said this week. "We're just spoiling for a fight, trying to regain our lost manhood."

Is SALT II now doomed? "Don't say that," a leading opponent said yesterday with a nervous laugh. "It can come back." But this same Senate aide admitted he couldn't see how it might come back.

Said a senior Carter adviser, gamely: "Just say we had a good first half and this is only the third quarter."

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# Sen. Warner Urges SALT II Delay Until Election

By Donald P. Baker  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Sen. John W. Warner (R-Va.) urged his Senate colleagues yesterday to postpone a decision on SALT II until after next year's presidential election so that ratification of the treaty can be a major campaign issue.

While Warner insisted that his call for delay did not mean he has decided to oppose the treaty, Senate Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.) told Warner that "delaying action on this treaty kills it."

Warner responded that he would "never be a part of using delaying tactics as a means to defeat the treaty." The debate should not stop, Warner said, but should become "one of the two or three major issues" of next year's campaign.

Warner, the fourth-ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, did not say what he would do if the treaty comes to a vote before then. The White House reportedly has hopes that Warner eventually will vote to ratify the second strategic arms limitations treaty.

His Virginia colleague in the Senate, Independent Harry F. Byrd Jr., has announced he will vote against the treaty.

Neither Maryland senator, Republican Charles McC. Mathias, nor Democrat Paul S. Sarbanes, has taken a position on ratification.

During a 43-minute Senate speech and discussion that followed it, Warner said yesterday that "fate of the treaty will determine, in large part, the course of our national defense policy for the next decade. Therefore, every effort should be made to gain widespread public support because . . . a clear perception is emerging that we must strengthen our national defenses across the board. This will require greater public support and funding for defense."

Warner also said public opinion polls "depicting an administration of steadily declining influence" make it questionable whether the Carter administration can either overcome senatorial objections to the treaty or will accept changes necessary to win its approval.

The presence of Soviet combat troops in Cuba has stalled deliberations, Warner said. He noted that there is no fixed date for either the Foreign Relations or Armed Services committees to wind up their consideration of the treaty, or for floor debate to begin.

If action doesn't occur soon, Warner said, the Senate will find itself trying to act on the treaty in a year "dominated by campaigns for the presidency as well as for a third of the Senate."

By delaying a vote until after the election, Carter "will be able to use the campaign as a forum for repairing his damaged credibility," Warner said.

"If he (Carter) wins reelection, he will have regained the strength and leadership he will need to bring about ratification of the SALT II treaty in some form acceptable to the Senate.

"If, on the other hand, some new president is in the White House in 1981, he will have arrived there on the basis of a campaign in which the SALT II treaty and the broader issue of national defense were major factors. He will be dealing from a position of mandated leadership and strength not only with the Senate, but with the Soviets as well," Warner concluded.

Majority Leader Byrd said SALT II "will be a campaign issue" regardless of when the vote on it occurs in the Senate. "Let's dispose of the treaty," Byrd told Warner. Delay, Byrd warned, will only permit Russia to build more weapons that would be banned by the treaty.

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# Gromyko, at U.N., Calls Concern Over Soviet Unit in Cuba Artificial

By BERNARD D. NOSSITER  
Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., Sept. 23 — Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko of the Soviet Union today dismissed as "artificial" the United States' concern over the Soviet brigade in Cuba and urged Washington to drop the matter.

Addressing the General Assembly, Mr. Gromyko denounced what he called the campaign of falsehoods over Moscow's relations with Havana. He did not directly mention either the Soviet troops or the United States, but the meaning of his remarks was unmistakable.

Mr. Gromyko's vigorous language gave no hint that the Soviet Union was prepared to make any concession to the United States on the troop issue, even though it now endangers Senate approval of the treaty limiting strategic weapons. Mr. Gromyko's tone ranged from the scathing to the scornful.

### Totally Without Foundation

He told the Assembly:

"What a huge number of spurious films, books, articles and speeches of politicians and quasi-politicians to make people believe the fictitious stories about the source of a threat to peace.

"One example is the campaign launched against Cuba in the course of which all sorts of falsehoods are being piled up concerning the policies of Cuba and the Soviet Union.

"But the truth is that this propaganda is totally without foundation in reality. It has no real basis and it is indeed based on falsehoods. The Soviet Union and Cuba have already so stated. And our advice on this score is simple: it is high time you admit this whole matter is artificial and proclaim it to be closed."

Later, Soviet officials seeking out reporters in corridors offered opposite interpretations of Mr. Gromyko's remarks. All the Soviet aides contend that the troop issue has been raised by opportunistic United States politicians and foes of the strategic arms treaty. But there the agreement ends.

Lower-level aides argue that Mr.

Gromyko should be read literally, that he has spoken just as firmly in private with Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance. In the view of these aides, Moscow cannot afford even a cosmetic concession over the troops that they say have been in Cuba for 17 years without any complaint, because this would only encourage the raising of new and equally "artificial" issues on which Washington would seek concessions as the price for ratification of the arms pact.

Higher-level Russians, however, pointed to a passage near the end of Mr. Gromyko's speech stressing that a durable, stable peace "depends to an important extent on the state of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States." This was interpreted to mean that Mr. Gromyko would make some gesture to allay American fears over the troops, perhaps on Thursday when he meets Mr. Vance again.

A year ago, the Soviet Foreign Minister was overcome by the hot lights in the Assembly Hall, could not finish his speech and had to be helped from the chamber. Today, at 70, he looked fit and spoke without apparent strain for three-quarters of an hour.

As he has for two decades here, Mr. Gromyko deplored the "sheer madness" of the arms race. But unlike the past, he offered no new plan to halt it. Instead, he emphasized that the pending treaty to curb strategic nuclear weapons "lays a bridge to further limitation and reduction of strategic arms."

"It also contains," he said, "a great potential for positively influencing other negotiations on the limitation of the arms race and on disarmament."

### Hussein Assails Israel

For the rest of this week and at least two more, the delegates from 152 nations will listen to speeches by foreign ministers and heads of state. Most will repeat well-worn themes; the more serious diplomatic business tends to be done in private between visiting foreign policy chiefs.

The first speaker today was King Hussein of Jordan, who delivered an orthodox, militant Arab view of the Middle East. The King observed what others have noted here, the slow erosion of Israel's support in Western Europe.

"Western Europe is overcoming the effects of Zionist control both in the mass media and in national parliaments," he said. "The European mind has been opened to the realities of the situation in the Middle East and to the aspirations

and sufferings of the Palestinian people."

The King accused Israel of refusing to treat Arabs as human beings "but as a human barrier which it must seek to demolish." He ridiculed the promise of autonomy for Palestinians adopted at the Camp David talks a year ago as "autonomy for the people but not the land." This, he said, is unacceptable and the Palestinians must be given the right to an independent state.

He received a standing ovation from nearly all in the chamber. The Israeli delegation sat quietly.

Later, Michael O'Kennedy, the Irish Foreign Minister, speaking for the nine members of the European Economic Community, criticized Israel for establishing settlements in its occupied lands and declared that Palestinians had a legitimate right to a homeland.

Britain's Foreign Minister, Lord Carrington, gave a cautiously optimistic reading of the London talks on Zimbabwe Rhodesia. Both the Government of Bishop Abel T. Muzorewa and its white allies as well as the guerrilla leaders, Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, have made concessions over a new constitution for the country, he said.

26 September 1979

# U.S. and Soviets Near Impasse on Cuba Troop Issue

By Don Oberdorfer  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, in a policy speech yesterday to the United Nations General Assembly, attacked "falsehoods" and "propaganda" about Russians and Cubans. He suggested that the United States should admit to creating an artificial issue and hinted that the dispute should be considered closed.

President Carter, in a "town meeting" last night in Queens, reiterated the U.S. contention that a Soviet force in Cuba is a combat unit, despite Soviet denials. Carter said he does not know if negotiations on the matter will be successful but declared he will take action "to change the status quo" and report to the nation, probably within the next week, if current talks fail.

He refused to say what action he is planning but said, "I believe you'll be satisfied when I make my report to the nation."

White House officials were unable to expand on Carter's plans for the report. The president also reiterated that the Soviet brigade does not pose a threat to U.S. security but said it is unacceptable to the United States.

In unusually strong language, Carter called Cuba "a puppet" and "a Soviet surrogate around the world" that acts completely in accord with Moscow's policies.

The airing of opposing and seemingly rigid positions came one day after Gromyko and Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance met here Monday in the sixth of a series of U.S.-Soviet discussion of the issue.

Informed sources said Gromyko offered no concessions in the private talks, which are scheduled to continue Thursday afternoon. It was unclear, however, whether his diplomatic posture and public statements of the past two days represent the final Soviet position.

State Department spokesman Hodding Carter would say only that "we are still in the midst of discussions with the Soviet Union on the Soviet brigade in Cuba." His statement on behalf of Vance suggested a continuing hope for a Soviet shift toward compromise in the forthcoming talks.

Gromyko had been scheduled to leave New York for home at the end of this week, and there was no word whether his stay will be extended. Failure to make progress toward a resolution of the dispute or to establish a negotiating path that holds promise of an eventual settlement would place Senate approval of the strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT II) in grave jeopardy as well as trigger U.S. compensatory actions.

Gromyko's General Assembly address today, like that of Vance in the same forum 24 hours before, included a brief section that addressed the Soviet brigade issue without explicitly saying so. Thus the Russian, like Vance, took a strong position without openly addressing the issue under discussion in secret talks of the nuclear superpowers.

Without mentioning the combat brigade, Gromyko charged that "all sorts of falsehoods are being piled up concerning the policies of Cuba and the Soviet Union."

"But the truth is that this propaganda is totally without foundation. It has no real basis and is indeed based on falsehoods. The Soviet Union and Cuba have already so declared."

Without saying to whom it was addressed, the top Soviet diplomat added: "Our advice on this score is simple: it is high time you honestly admit this whole matter is artificial and is proclaimed to be closed."

In Washington, reaction to the Gromyko speech was harsh. Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, recommended that his committee delay sending the SALT treaty to the Senate floor until something is done about the troops in Cuba.

Senate Republican leader Howard H. Baker of Tennessee said he was "astonished" by Gromyko's speech. "There is simply no basis for doubting that the Russians have a fully equipped, fully manned combat brigade in Cuba," he said.

Gromyko introduced his comments by saying that "a huge number of spurious films, books, articles and speeches of politicians and quasipoliticians are produced to make people believe the fictitious stories about the source of a threat to the peace."

The Soviet Union maintained in a front-page *Pravda* editorial two weeks ago that its troops constitute a long-standing "training center" for Cuban forces, not a combat brigade as the United States has charged. Gromyko is reported to have stuck to this Soviet position during his meeting with Vance late Monday.

State Department officials left open the possibility that Vance might shift his weekend travel plans and other appointments to accommodate more meetings with Gromyko if such action is justified by progress in their talks Thursday. Although there is no plan for Gromyko to see President Carter, as has been customary during the Soviet minister's visits to the United Nations, this too has not been ruled out if progress can be made on the Cuban troops issue.

U.S. officials denied a report that Washington has set a deadline of this weekend on negotiations over the brigade issue. There is "no commitment or basis for such a deadline," an official said.

Last Thursday, Vance presented several suggestions to the Kremlin through Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, ranging from withdrawal of the Soviet brigade to face-saving arrangements under which the Soviet force would be stripped of its "combat capability" even though individual soldiers remained.

In a separate section of his address, Gromyko stressed the importance of U.S.-Soviet ties, saying durability and stability of world peace depends "to an important extent on the state of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States."

CONTINUED

Soviet leaders seek normal and even friendly relations with the United States, Gromyko said. He added that this requires adherence to principles of "peaceful coexistence" and "noninterference in the affairs of others."

Gromyko declared, "We shall not allow anybody to meddle in our internal affairs. Concern for Soviet-American relations is a matter for both sides. It is only on this basis that the relations between the U.S.S.R. and the United States can develop successfully."

Gromyko praised SALT II as proof that it is possible for Washington and Moscow to agree on the most difficult questions "given the good will and readiness to take into account each other's legitimate interests." The qualifications appear to be still another indication of Soviet sensitivity about the U.S. posture at present.

Gromyko depicted the Soviet Union as a nation striving for disarmament despite impediments introduced by the United States and other Western powers in several sets of negotiations, including the nuclear test ban talks, U.S.-Soviet talks on demilitarization of the Indian Ocean and the Vienna talks on mutual force reductions in Europe.

He described East-West-detente as "the positive trend in international affairs" during the 1970s and said "the Soviet Union stood at its cradle."

Nonetheless, he added, "There still are people in the world today who make a wry face at the word detente like a hungry cat in a kitchen garden at the taste of cucumber."

As expected, Gromyko made blunt attacks on China, the Soviet Union's arch rival, charging that Peking committed aggression by invading Vietnam early this year. Nothing was said about the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia except that "the blood-thirsty and murderous regime of Pol Pot . . . has been done away with" and will not return.

Gromyko attacked "the artificially whipped-up propaganda campaign concerning IndoChinese refugees," saying it is directed against Vietnam.

He praised Soviet allies such as Cuba and Afghanistan and expressed the hope for continued development of Soviet relations with a long list of Western European and Third World countries.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 2THE WALL STREET JOURNAL  
26 September 1979

## Gromyko's Speech About Troops in Cuba Further Dims Chances of SALT Approval

By KAREN ELLIOTT HOUSE

*Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL*

WASHINGTON — Prospects for Senate ratification of the U.S.-Soviet arms limitation treaty dimmed further yesterday when the Soviet foreign minister all but ruled out any compromise on Russian troops in Cuba.

In an unusually harsh speech at the United Nations, Andrei Gromyko bluntly accused the U.S. of a false propaganda campaign against the Soviet Union and Cuba.

"Our advice on this score is simple," he said. "The artificiality of this entire question must be honestly admitted and the matter closed."

Mr. Gromyko's remarks privately caused despair among Senate supporters of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and raised concern in the Carter administration that Moscow may already have given up on SALT and therefore may have decided to stand firm. Such a decision would complicate President Carter's political and diplomatic problems, for he has said the status quo isn't acceptable.

Adding to White House worries is the expectation that former President Gerald Ford, in a speech today or tomorrow, will criticize SALT and urge the Senate to amend it sharply. That could add further momentum to the slide of SALT prospects in the Senate. And that could convince Moscow, if the Kremlin isn't already convinced, that SALT is too far gone to make concessions in Cuba worthwhile.

"The timing couldn't be worse," said one administration official about Mr. Ford's speech.

Administration officials say they haven't given up on securing some politically acceptable compromise with Moscow. They describe the first meeting Monday between

Mr. Gromyko and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance as "inconclusive" and they note the two are scheduled to meet again tomorrow.

"We're still in the midst of discussions with the Soviet Union on the brigade in Cuba and we aren't going to comment on (Mr. Gromyko's) speech," said a State Department spokesman.

But the harsh tone of Mr. Gromyko's statement clearly surprised U.S. officials. The Soviet Foreign Minister denied that Moscow has any combat troops in Cuba, calling them advisers instead. And he blasted the U.S. for a campaign to paint Moscow as the source of threats to peace.

"One example," he said, "is the campaign launched with regard to Cuba in the course of which all sorts of falsehoods are being piled up concerning the policies of Cuba and the Soviet Union."

Mr. Gromyko added that the Soviet Union wants to maintain "normal and what is more, friendly relations with the U.S." But, he added, Moscow won't tolerate U.S. interference in Soviet internal affairs.

If the U.S. and Moscow fail to work out an accommodation on the issue of Soviet troops in Cuba, Mr. Carter is being urged by National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski to take unilateral steps to remind the Kremlin there are costs to adventurous conduct.

Among the options under discussion are strengthening U.S. ties to Moscow's old rival, China, and perhaps even encouraging western European nations to sell arms to China. So far, the U.S. has declined to sell China military equipment and has remained noncommittal about European sales.

Whether these or other unilateral U.S. moves would be enough to revive SALT is doubtful.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A-24NEW YORK TIMES  
26 SEPTEMBER 1979

# Of Soccer, SALT and Sanity

What, we wonder, have those 2,700 Soviet noncombatant combat troops in Cuba been doing lately? They're confined to barracks, no doubt, at least in daylight when the U-2's can fly over to determine whether their boots are laced in parallel or diagonal patterns. There are 2,000 or so equally idle American servicemen at Guantanamo at the other end of the island, but they at least can pass the time at golf and baseball. As Henry Kissinger recalls in his new memoir, even a Soviet soccer field in Cuba would inflame American suspicions.

What those troops are doing, what they've done and what they will do are questions that lie near the heart of this ludicrous but sad affair. The only established fact seems to be that they've been in Cuba for years, maybe four, maybe twelve. They were probably sent to assure that Russian blood would be spilled in Cuba's defense if it is ever again invaded by the United States. But maybe they were training Cubans to fight in Africa or Russians to fight in subtropical weather. Maybe they were intended to guard Soviet bases that, at American insistence, were never built. President Carter doesn't seem to know much, or quite believe what the Russians tell him, about the troops' mission now or in years past.

For all we know, the whole trouble arose from an anxious commander's decision to keep his bored men out of trouble. U-2's and radio monitors, it is said, discovered them maneuvering in a new combat formation and guided by a headquarters not seen before. The Administration, having assured restive members of Congress that it was firmly on top of events in Cuba, then fed them this new information raw — and was trapped in a torrent.

The SALT II treaty is imperiled. The President has called the Russians liars. Unnamed officials threaten to annoy the Russians in comparable fashion unless

something unspecified is done about the troops. Andrei Gromyko says the affair is a fabrication that Americans ought simply to declare closed. Zbigniew Brzezinski seems to think it's time to write some broader rules about Soviet aid to Cuba and use of Cubans in Africa. The State Department says troops that do not threaten the United States can nonetheless threaten American interests, presumably including the political interests of a President and his party.

The problem continues to outrun the facts, many of which are still unknown. The Soviet brigade may have been flexing some muscle for diplomatic effect in unstable Central America. It may also have been going out on maneuvers to pass away the time — the military equivalent of soccer. The Soviet leaders may resent being made to play the dumbbell with which American politicians now flex their muscles. Mock us as they might, however, the Russians ought to remember the tremors that shook their political system when Jimmy Carter wrote a mere letter to a dissident Soviet physicist. To each his phantoms.

There are ways out of this imbroglio, if pride and politics will still permit. American leaders will finally have to concede the modesty of the Soviet challenge, even if doing so makes their first reactions appear alarmist. The Russians will have to concede some gain to Mr. Carter, even if they deem it undeserved, by denying their troops in Cuba even the appearance of a combat role and pledging that no combat forces will ever serve there.

If either side lacks the resilience for such concessions, a great many more important matters will be sacrificed. But in that case, the problem between the two powers will have been exposed as much greater than some Russian troops in Cuba.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 23THE NATIONAL GUARDIAN  
26 September 1979

## Carter, the cold war and Cuba

What is the rational political observer to make of the State Department's diplomatic dance around the "discovery" of a "Soviet combat brigade" in Cuba? For three weeks, Washington has been steadily escalating the confrontation to a point where the U.S. is now threatening a show of force in the Caribbean. Once again, the U.S. people have been led to believe that Cuba is harboring a Soviet dagger aimed at the U.S. All of Washington's aims and actions are not yet clear in the issue, but this much is certain: the allegation has the familiar odor of fabrication. Are we to take seriously the CIA-Pentagon claim that the brigade's probable 17-year presence in Cuba escaped their notice until a month ago?

The Soviet Union and Cuba have both said there are Soviet soldiers in Cuba, but that they have been there since 1962 as training instructors. That Cuba would invite instructors along with aid in the form of military equipment is the sovereign right of any nation. Lying 90 miles from the most aggressive nation on earth, Cuba understandably feels the need for such aid. Indeed, Washington has tacitly accepted it for 17 years, for it is a little difficult to argue the U.S. right to place troops on the Soviet perimeter, and inside Cuba at the Guantanamo naval base, while simultaneously charging Soviet-Cuban aggression.

Why then, the big uproar? The Carter administration is first of all looking over its right shoulder with an eye toward appeasing that section of the ruling class that seeks a more militant stance against the Soviet Union. Thus the issue has become intertwined with the SALT 2 debate. Carter undoubtedly sees the brigade issue as an opportunity to boost his anti-Soviet credentials, and thus be better positioned to argue for SALT. Secondarily, the timing of the revelation suspiciously coincided with U.S. attempts to pressure the Nonaligned Movement then meeting in Cuba.

### ANOTHER TONKIN GULF

There is another dimension to the events, however—the extent to which U.S. actions are aimed at threatening Cuba because of its support for people's struggles in various sections of the world.

To what extent is the Carter administration prepared to go in pursuing this adventurerist policy? The signals here are ominous. On Sept. 19 a State Department senior official told the news media that "a series of specific options," including "an increase in the American naval presence around Cuba" was now under consideration. The same day Brzezinski told reporters that the issue was only a part of the "larger problem" of Cuban and Soviet aid to national liberation movements.

The incident has some of the trappings of a Tonkin Gulf incident—where Washington fabricated the existence of a North Vietnamese attack on U.S. warships as a pretext for aggression.

The left must begin mobilizing now if it is to counter effectively this latest pretext for possible aggression against Cuba.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A-4NEW YORK TIMES  
26 SEPTEMBER 1979

# U.S. Report Says Soviet Attempts Deception on Its Nuclear Strength

By RICHARD BURT

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 25 — A report by the Carter Administration on Moscow's compliance with the 1972 strategic arms accord has concluded that in recent years the Soviet Union has made several apparent attempts to deceive the United States on the size and capabilities of its nuclear arsenal.

The report says that the United States has not charged Moscow with formal violation of the 1972 agreements, which bar deliberate concealment, and that, in most cases, questions of Soviet compliance have been resolved on a satisfactory basis. But critics of the new treaty on limitation of strategic arms contend that the report demonstrates that Moscow cannot be relied on to live up to the terms of the accord.

The discussion of Soviet attempts at deception appears in a secret report prepared by the National Security Council for use by the Senate Intelligence Committee in the debate over the new arms treaty. The report, which has been obtained by The New York Times, gives a list of 11 attempts by the Soviet Union to conceal various aspects of its missile and strategic submarine programs from American surveillance.

## Dummy Missile Sites Reported

Some of the Soviet efforts at deception, the report says, were under way before the negotiation of the 1972 arms accords, which, like the new treaty, prohibit "deliberate concealment measures" that could impede attempts to monitor compliance. For example, Moscow, since 1966, is said to have engaged in building dummy missile sites and dummy submarines to confuse American intelligence. In 1970, the report says, the Russians started construction of three tunnels at naval bases "apparently for submarine berthing to provide protection against attack and to deny information on readiness status."

The report says that while the Russians "have long practiced concealment and deception in the activities of their military forces," Moscow's efforts to hide details of their strategic programs "increased substantially" in 1974, two years after the conclusion of the first arms accords. During that year, the report says, the Government detected "broad efforts" by Moscow to conceal its mobile missile program, the construction of strategic submarines and the production of land-based rockets.

## Issue Raised at 1973 Meeting

The report says that American negotiators, disturbed by the Soviet activities, brought them up at a meeting in early 1973 of an American-Soviet commission on treaty compliance. Although the Ford Administration did not charge Moscow with violating the 1972 accords, the report says, American officials "proposed that the Soviet side cease these concealment activities." Moscow, according to the report, denied any effort to evade the arms accords. While the question was still under discussion, the report says, "careful analysis of intelligence data led American officials to conclude in April 1973 that Moscow had cut back on its concealment activities. As a result, the issue was dropped."

The report, which outlines several other exchanges with Moscow over treaty compliance, is said by Senate aides to have provided ammunition for both supporters and critics of the new arms treaty. Critics, noting that Soviet deception efforts appeared to have reached a peak after the 1972 accords were signed, contend that the report demonstrates Moscow's continuing willingness to evade the restrictions of arms agreements.

Since the new treaty goes much further than the 1972 agreements in imposing limits on the size and performance of missile and bomber forces, the opponents maintain that Moscow would have more opportunities to cheat.

However, supporters of the treaty maintain that the ability of the United States to detect possible Soviet cheating efforts, as documented by the report, provides proof that the new accord could be adequately monitored.

## 'Seven Years of Experience' Cited

This is clearly the conclusion of the report itself, which states that "the United States has had nearly seven years of experience in monitoring activities and verifying compliance with the provisions of the SALT agreement."

"During that period," it continues, "we have established and confirmed the effectiveness of a mechanism for reporting, analyzing and making policy decisions regarding compliance-related activities."

While it stresses that most questions over Soviet compliance have been resolved to the satisfaction of American officials, the report indicates that one long-standing issue concerning Moscow's activities has yet to be settled. This concerns whether Moscow has lived up to a complicated provision in the 1972 accords, which said that if the Soviet Union wished to deploy more than 740 submarine-launched missiles, it had to deactivate older, land-based rockets.

In 1976, it says, the United States discovered that the Soviet Union had deployed 791 submarine-launched missiles without fully deactivating 51 older, land-based rockets.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A2THE BALTIMORE SUN  
25 September 1979

# Troops show SALT need, Brown says

By CHARLES W. CORRODAY  
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—Harold Brown, the Secretary of Defense, argued yesterday that the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba is a reminder of the adversary relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union and a reason for approving the SALT II treaty rather than rejecting it.

In the face of possibly increasing treaty opposition because of the troops, Mr. Brown said arms competition between the adversaries must be bounded and regulated to head off an expansion that "could increase the incentive to resort to nuclear weapons in time of crisis."

As Secretary Brown spoke, at a meeting of the World Affairs Council of Boston, there was clear recognition in administration circles that little time remains to settle the Soviet troop issue.

Cyrus R. Vance, the Secretary of State, met on the matter with the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei A. Gromyko, in New York yesterday.

A sign of the mounting Senate pressures came from Senator Orrin Hatch (R., Utah) who demanded here yesterday that the administration impose an "immediate and total blockade of Cuba until the troops are removed."

Senator Hatch contended at a news conference that the 2,000-to 3,000-man brigade is an element not of the Red Army but of Soviet "internal troops" who serve as "the troubleshooters of the Soviet state." The purpose of the Cuba-based brigade, he said, is to train insurgent forces "from all over Latin America."

There appears to be a consensus in the Senate that the Russian troops issue must be resolved if the SALT treaty is to survive, but so far, only a few senators have joined Mr. Hatch in demanding a full withdrawal. Most Senators are awaiting the administration's next move.

In his Boston speech, Mr. Brown said the Soviet brigade in Cuba neither alters the strategic military balance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union nor shows "debilitating weakness" in American ability to police compliance with SALT.

Being able to count Soviet strategic weapons is quite a different intelligence matter, he said, "from identifying ground combat units as Cuban or Soviet."

Mr. Brown attacked Henry A. Kissinger, former secretary of state, without naming him, for raising questions about the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella over Western Europe now that there is strategic parity between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Mr. Kissinger recently questioned whether an attack on Europe would bring a U.S. strategic nuclear response because, he argued, it would mean mutual destruction of U.S. and Soviet populations.

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NEW YORK TIMES  
25 SEPTEMBER 1979

## Gromyko and Vance Discuss Soviet Cuban Brigade

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko of the Soviet Union met with Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance yesterday to respond to American suggestions for resolving the problem caused by the reported presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba.

After an hour-and-20-minute meeting at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations, Mr. Vance said that they "discussed the situation at hand" and would meet again on Thursday after both had reported to their respective governments.

Mr. Gromyko said "we talked on the substance of some matters" and that the talks would continue.

It was not immediately known whether the two sides were now actually negotiating a formula to resolve the situation or still arguing from previous positions.

### Vance Suggested Solutions

Last week, Mr. Vance offered a number of ideas, ranging from withdrawal of the unit to ways of altering its combat capability, to the Soviet Union, which until yesterday at least had maintained privately and publicly that its troops in Cuba were there solely as military advisers.

Mr. Vance, in New York for the United Nations General Assembly session, had

not expected to confer with Mr. Gromyko before Thursday on the Cuban situation, an issue that has dominated Soviet-American relations for the last few weeks. But just as he was about to speak, word was received that Mr. Gromyko was ready to meet at the Soviet Mission on East 67th Street.

In the speech, Mr. Vance did not allude specifically to the brigade issue. His only apparent reference was a line stating that "despite our emergence from the days of unrelenting hostility, the East-West relationship can deteriorate dangerously whenever one side fails to respect the security interest of the other."

The Vance-Gromyko meeting, their first since the Soviet-American summit meeting in Vienna in June, was regarded as important by Mr. Vance and his aides because President Carter already has indicated that failure by the Soviet side to make a good-faith effort to resolve the problem could cause a chill in relations.

### Adverse Effects Seen

Specifically, Administration officials have said that unless the combat capability of the 2,000 to 3,000-member brigade was demonstrably altered, the strategic arms treaty now before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee would probably fail to pass the Senate and tensions could rise between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Until yesterday, Mr. Vance conducted the discussions on the brigade question with Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin in Washington. Last Thursday, in their fifth

meeting during the last two weeks, Mr. Vance opened what Administration officials called "phase two" of the discussions by offering a set of ideas for resolving the situation.

According to officials, these included a range of possibilities from actual withdrawal of the troops to dismantling of its combat organization and transfer of the tanks and artillery to Cuban units.

During the first four sessions, Mr. Vance primarily asked specific questions of Mr. Dobrynin about the mission of the troops, their location and length of time in Cuba. Mr. Dobrynin was said to have responded promptly with answers from Moscow, but the thrust was to emphasize Moscow's contention that it had no combat forces in Cuba.

Mr. Carter, in a meeting with congressional leaders last week said that so far the Soviet Union has insisted that their forces in Cuba were there strictly as military advisers and that they had been there since 1962. This was the position made public by Pravda, the Communist Party paper, on Sept. 11 and apparently adhered to in private.

Over the weekend, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Mr. Carter's national security adviser, said that the brigade issue was "a serious problem in Soviet-American relations."

Officials have said that if nothing is done by Moscow to ease the problem, the Administration was considering a range of retaliatory actions, including stepped-up military activity in the Caribbean, increased political moves in Eastern Europe, and ending the evenhandedness toward Moscow and Peking, favoring the Chinese in trade and other matters.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A6THE WASHINGTON POST  
25 September 1979

# Gromyko Delivers Kremlin's Reply to Vance on Cuba Troops

By Don Oberdorfer  
Washington Post Staff Writer

NEW YORK, Sept. 24—Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance met Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko today to hear Moscow's reply to U.S. proposals for a negotiated settlement of the troops-in-Cuba dispute.

No details of the discussion were made public by either side. This was in keeping with the secretive pattern of the five previous U.S.-Soviet meetings on Washington's charges that a Soviet combat brigade is stationed in Cuba.

After the 75-minute meeting at the Soviet Mission here, the two ministers told reporters they will continue their talks at a previously scheduled session Thursday. "We touched the substance of some matters [but] we did not conclude," said Gromyko. Vance said they would be reporting to their respective presidents, Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev, before the Thursday meeting.

Pausing briefly before reporters as Gromyko escorted Vance to his limousine, the two men appeared solemn and tense—a far cry from their last meeting in Vienna in June when their nations celebrated the signing of the strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT II).

U.S. proposals for settlement of the brigade dispute were transmitted only last Thursday through Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin. The swiftness of the reply and its delivery through the Soviet Union's most senior diplomat underscored the gravity of the problem, which has jeopardized Senate approval of SALT II and threatens to damage over-all U.S.-Soviet relations.

Word that Gromyko was ready to meet reached Vance just before he took the podium this morning at the

United Nations General Assembly, where he warned in his annual policy address that "the East-West relationship can deteriorate dangerously whenever one side fails to respect the security interests of the other."

Asked how the "security interests" of the United States are affected by the Soviet brigade, State Department spokesman Hodding Carter said "nobody thinks they are going to invade the United States . . ."; they "do not represent a security threat." At the same time, he said broader U.S. security interests in the region are involved in the Soviet troops' presence.

President Carter told congressional leaders last Thursday morning that the U.S. objective in the negotiations is Soviet withdrawal of the combat brigade, but he also said such a definitive solution appears unlikely. The

U.S. proposals passed to Moscow later the same day include measures for a solution short of full withdrawal.

Reported to be among these are ways to eliminate the Soviet "combat capability" by dissolution of the brigade, reassignment of key Soviet personnel to advisory duty and distribution of its tanks and artillery to Cuban forces.

On Capitol Hill today, Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, told committee colleagues that he plans to begin marking up SALT II next month, but would not report it to the full Senate until the Cuban issue is resolved.

Church, who has said the Soviet combat troops must be removed if the Senate is to approve SALT II, has discussed the possibility of approving the treaty with a reservation that it not go into effect until the president can certify that there are no Soviet combat troops in Cuba.

Vance, in his U.N. speech, suggested that the argument over the brigade is part of a mixed pattern of U.S.-Soviet relations in an era of far-reaching change. At the end of the decade of the 1970s, he said, "the unrelenting hostility of the cold war has given way to a more complex relationship between East and West, with elements of both competition and cooperation."

He declared that "the simple notion of a bipolar world has become obsolete. Increasingly there is a profusion of different systems and allegiances, and a diffusion of political and economic power."

Much of his speech dealt with the "North-South" issues of interest to the developing countries which make up the great majority in the U.N. General Assembly.

Vance expressed U.S. concern about the economic, energy and food problems facing the world's poor countries and proposed establishing a goal that by the year 2000 "no person on this bountiful earth should have to go hungry." He said the United States will do all it can to prevent the development of a global food crisis, but he voiced only general suggestions about increased crop yields and lowered population growth.

Vance spent nearly 90 minutes this morning with King Hussein of Jordan in a discussion of the Middle East peace process. Officials said the meeting was "useful and cordial" but there was no indication that Hussein was ready to join the Israeli-Egyptian negotiations over the future of the West Bank of the Jordan River.

The secretary of state also discussed the situation in Southern Lebanon. He announced to the General Assembly that the United States is working toward the goal of "not only a cease-fire, but a broader truce" in the area and said that today's Israeli-Syrian dogfight underscored the fragility of the present cease-fire.

## SS-16 Deployment Raises Senate Questions

Washington—Deployment of approximately 40 SS-16 Intercontinental ballistic missiles by the Soviet Union is raising serious questions in the U. S. Senate over whether it is a violation of the yet-unratified second strategic arms agreement.

Not only have the Soviets deployed the 5,000-naut.-mi.-range, solid-propellant ICBM in fixed silos, but the Carter Administration had intelligence information of the Russian move and elected to ignore it in July, 1978, according to congressional officials.

The SS-16 is designed as a mobile ICBM, which is precluded from deployment under the SALT 2 agreement. "Technically, both sides are still operating under the terms of SALT 1 until the treaty now in the Senate is ratified. If the Soviets deployed the SS-16 in fixed silos and used them to replace solid-fueled SS-13 ICBMs as intelligence officials believe, it may not be a violation per se," one U. S. official said, "but it most certainly is a violation of the spirit of SALT 2, if not the treaty itself."

According to U. S. strategic weapons officials, there has been disagreement in the U. S. intelligence community for some time over whether the SS-16 has been deployed in fixed silos in the Novosibirsk area of the Soviet Union. "There is no disagreement about the fact that the Soviets have built about 50 SS-16s, only about the deployment," a congressional official close to intelligence activities said.

The evidence of the SS-16 deployment came from sensitive human intelligence sources on the ground. That sensitivity no longer exists, U. S. officials said. The Carter Administration knew about the intelligence information on the possible deployment of the SS-16, but gave the U. S. negotiating team in SALT instructions not to raise the issue explicitly with the Russians during negotiations because of the intelligence collection techniques used. "The prevailing logic at the time within the Administration was that even though there was some evidence of a deployment, it would not be prudent for the Soviets to make the deployment and risk detection of a glaring violation for a trivial gain, and so there was a tendency to dismiss and ignore the information," the congressional official said.

Questions already have been raised over the Soviet deployment of the SS-20 and its relationship to the SS-16. The Soviets have been deploying the SS-20 for the past year and now have more than 100 of the missiles in place. The Russians claim the SS-20 is an intermediate-range ballistic missile for use in Europe, and it has been excluded from SALT 2.

The questions center on the SS-20, which carries three multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles with nuclear warheads, and the SS-16 because the SS-20 uses the first two stages of the SS-16. The Soviets conceivably could upgrade the SS-20 to an ICBM by adding the third stage and payload.

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TIME  
1 October 1979

## Letters

### **Cuban Complex**

The Sept. 17 issue of TIME carries a photo of an alleged "Soviet-built intelligence station in Cuba." Quite the contrary, the photo is of an American-built telecommunications center that has been in Cuba, operated by an affiliate of ITT, since the late 1950s.

*Ramón Sánchez-Parodi, Head*

*Cuban Interests Section*

*Embassy of Czechoslovakia*

*Washington, D.C.*

*Ramón Sánchez-Parodi is correct. TIME's photograph was not of the Soviet-built intelligence-gathering communications equipment in Cuba. High-level sources erred in identifying the photo for TIME.*

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 100TIME  
1 October 1979

## Coping with the Soviets' Cuban Brigade

**S**eptember 1979 may well go down in diplomatic history as the month that the U.S. Government went a little bit haywire. Both the Executive and Legislative branches have over-reacted to the belated discovery of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba and have severely jeopardized rational consideration of the SALT II treaty. The events of the past four weeks provide a case study in the breakdown of constitutional process whereby the Administration and Congress are supposed to be partners in statesmanship.

The intelligence community, finally recovered from its obsession with Cuba of the 1960s, had recently consigned the island to its peripheral vision and focused instead on what seemed more important tasks, like monitoring the tests of new Soviet intercontinental missiles. Then, re-examining evidence that it had been sitting on for a long time, the CIA changed its opinion about the exact nature of Soviet military manpower in Cuba. Contrary to assurances that Secretary of State Cyrus Vance had already given the Senate, the agency concluded that about one-third of the 6,000 to 9,000 Russians on duty in Cuba are combat troops rather than advisers and technicians.

What upset the intelligence analysts was not that they had exposed some new and perfidious Soviet menace but that they had failed to notice a brigade that had been there for years. What upset the Carter Administration was not the intelligence failure but an acute political problem. Vance had inadvertently misled the Senate.

So the Administration decided to seize the initiative in the inevitable controversy. Rather than let Senator Henry Jackson exploit the issue to scuttle SALT or Senator Howard Baker to ingratiate himself with the Republican right, the Administration would give a senatorial ally, Idaho's Frank Church, a sneak preview of the information and thus offer him an opportunity to go public with it. That way, he might be a principal arbiter of an acceptable Soviet explanation for the brigade. But Church, facing tough conservative opposition to his re-election next year, panicked. The Senate would not ratify SALT, he proclaimed, until the Soviet brigade had been removed.

No way will the Soviets oblige. They are notoriously loath to let U.S. Senators beat them with sticks, no matter what the carrots. In 1974 the Kremlin made clear that it would rather live without most-favored-nation status than submit to "Scoop" Jackson's condition of increased emigration of Jews. Soviet sensitivities are a matter not only of international pride but also of intramural Kremlin politics. Nikita Khrushchev lost his job partly because the Kennedy Administration forced him to remove Soviet missiles from Cuba in 1962.

Almost everyone acknowledges that the Soviet brigade does not violate the 1962 Soviet-American agreement that ended the Cuban missile crisis. Nor does it come anywhere near as close to straining the spirit of that agreement as did the berthing of Russian atomic submarines in Cuba in 1970 (see Kissinger: *White House Years*) or the stationing of MiG-23s on the island in 1978.\* Nor is the brigade plausibly a strike force for an assault on Guatemala or Key West. Nor did it arrive recently enough to be a deliberate, mischievous test of Jimmy Carter's

\*After U.S. protests, the subs were pulled out, and U.S. intelligence confirmed that the MiGs were not rigged to carry nuclear weapons.

will. Nor does it have anything to do with the issues in SALT.

Henry Kissinger and some Senators have urged linking ratification of the treaty with a significant boost in the U.S. military budget to offset increased Soviet arms spending of the past five years. That is a creditable argument, since SALT must enhance U.S. defenses as well as help control arms. But there are no grounds for linking SALT to the Soviet brigade in Cuba. The Soviets say the unit has been there for 17 years, and U.S. intelligence sources concede it has been there for at least ten, so the brigade is not even symbolically part of the global Soviet buildup. A number of critics have argued for a kind of punitive linkage—withholding SALT if the Soviets misbehave around the world. But it is hardly logical to "punish" the U.S.S.R. for having not quite 3,000 soldiers in Cuba by allowing it to have an extra 3,000 nuclear warheads, the number that the Soviets could add to their intercontinental missiles unless the lower SALT II ceilings are adopted.

Of course Cuba is a fortress, and of course it is reinforced by the Soviets. It has been so for decades. There is legitimate, longstanding concern over the island's use as a training ground for Soviet-Cuban adventures in the Third World, including the Caribbean. But Castro's reprehensible conduct as a global mischief-maker bedeviled American foreign policy long before the ratification of SALT II or the re-election of Frank Church was an issue. Cuba's predatory military probably will continue to be a problem for a long time to come—until the U.S. recovers some measure of leverage on Cuba, possibly by restoring trade and diplomatic relations and thereby beginning the difficult process of prying Cuba out of the Soviet bear hug.

Even Cyrus Vance, in his attempt to pre-empt his critics, has called the presence of the brigade "a very serious matter" and said that the Administration "will not be satisfied with the status quo." Thus Vance contributed to the misimpression that the Soviet military presence in Cuba has been steadily and ominously growing.

In fact, that presence seems to have remained fairly steady since the mid-1960s—as has the U.S. military presence in Cuba, in the form of the large U.S. Navy base at Guantanamo Bay.

Now the issue has moved into intensive, private negotiations between Vance and Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin. Vance must persuade the Kremlin to alter the status quo so that the Administration can climb out of its hole—and Frank Church can climb out of an even deeper one. If Vance succeeds, and the Russians agree to tinker with the command structure, deployment and definition of the brigade, then Americans will have to live with the uncomfortable knowledge that in the overblown Cuban crisis of September 1979, Soviet flexibility rescued the U.S. Government from its own clumsiness. If Vance fails, there is a good chance that a sensible debate on the merits of the SALT treaty will be impossible. The treaty might well have to be shelved until the silly season of the 1980 elections is over.

Whatever the outcome, the Cuban affair not only casts still more doubt on the leadership of the Carter Administration but also raises a longer-term and more disturbing question about whether the Congress—recently so assertive about playing a bigger role in foreign policy—can help solve crises rather than manufacturing and aggravating them.

—Strobe Talbott



Secret Negotiators Vance and Dobrynin

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 23-24NEWSWEEK  
October 1979

## FROM CUBA WITH JOY

"Be of good cheer and may be near," Washington attorney John Wainwright cabled his client in mid-July. "Be of good cheer old news here," came the dispirited reply from Havana's Combinado del Este prison. After fourteen years in Cuban jails, onetime CIA agent Larry Lunt had learned not to get his hopes up. But last week, just ten days after President Carter freed four Puerto Rican terrorists, Cuba released Lunt along with fellow Americans Everett Jackson, Claudio Rodriguez Morales and Juan Tur, all of whom had been jailed in the 1960s on charges of espionage. "I'm in heaven," Tur exulted when the four arrived in Miami. "I'm happy, happy—three times happy."

There was no "package deal," U.S. officials insisted, although Castro had earlier said he would let the Americans go if Carter released the Puerto Ricans, who had been jailed since the early 1950s (NEWSWEEK, Sept. 24). "The offer by Castro may have played a role in the decision to release the Puerto Ricans," said a State Department spokesman, "but after that we just kept our fingers crossed." Actually, the Americans' release was the climax of a delicate diplomatic ballet. Castro told an American television interviewer last year that he would "favor the release" of all four Americans in return for the release of the four Puerto Ricans. "I am not suggesting an exchange," Castro later told a visiting congressman, Ben Gilman of New York. "There need be no negotiation or publicity." The diplomatic fiction turned out to be crucial to the plan's success, for any formal talks almost certainly would have broken down in the current controversy over Soviet combat troops in Cuba.

**VOLUNTEER:** Although all four men had been convicted of espionage, a former member of the CIA's Cuban Task Force said last week that only Lunt was a bona fide CIA agent. A cattle rancher who had bought a spread in Cuba's Pinar del Río Province in 1957, Lunt was one of a handful of Americans permitted to stay in Cuba after the revolution. He volunteered his services to the CIA in 1961 and, until his arrest four years later, provided aid and refuge to a small network of anti-Castro Cubans operating on the island.

Jackson, a Chicago-born ex-paratrooper, was caught by the Cubans in 1967 after parachuting into Las Villas Province in what he said was an attempt to photograph Soviet missile silos. He said he was working "indirectly" for the CIA, but agency

sources say he was operating on his own. Morales, a Puerto Rican, was captured smuggling refugees out of Cuba on his fishing boat in 1966. Tur, born of Cuban parents in Florida, was jailed in 1963 for counter-revolutionary activities.

Their early years in prison were "pure hell," Lunt told NEWSWEEK. At first, the Americans were put in La Cabaña, a 200-year-old fortress at the mouth of Havana Harbor, where they listened to the sounds of firing squads and were fed "a fish you would normally make fertilizer out of." Later, Lunt was transferred to a forced-labor camp on the Isle of Pines, where he worked nine-hour days breaking rocks with sledgehammers. Conditions improved a bit when he was brought back to the mainland; eventually all four wound up at Combinado del Este, Castro's "model prison" in Havana.

Mindful of the tension over reports of Soviet combat troops in Cuba, policy-makers in Washington were reluctant to find much significance in Castro's release of the four Americans. But it did seem to show that a big-power confrontation had not totally closed the channels of workaday diplomacy.

ALLAN J. MAYER with DAVID G. MARTIN  
in Washington and bureau reports.

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ON PAGE 17

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT  
1 October 1979

## Washington Whispers

*Some top CIA officials who claimed that Soviet troops in Cuba had a combat mission are reluctant to admit they now believe the troops may be there for training or another purpose. Such a disclosure would raise new questions about the agency's ability.*

★ ★ ★

Officials familiar with intelligence operations report a sharp step-up in Soviet activities on Capitol Hill, in large part through East European surrogates. What particularly worries them is the rapid growth in the number of congressional staff members with access to classified material.

★ ★ ★

American intelligence reports that the prospect of a strong Soviet military foothold in Afghanistan is alarming Indian military leaders so much that India may end its long flirtation with Russia and move closer to the U.S. and its former enemy, China.

★ ★ ★

*Risks faced by CIA agents overseas are getting so big—particularly at the hands of terrorist groups—that the agency wants Congress to approve special death benefits for families of those killed in the line of duty.*

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A23THE WASHINGTON POST  
24 September 1979

*Rowland Evans  
And Robert Novak*

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# Hard Or Soft On Cuba?

The fate of both Jimmy Carter's beleaguered presidency and U.S.-Soviet relations depends on whether the president sticks to the tone he himself sounded in this steely, closed-door rebuke of the Soviets on Sept. 20: "They're lying."

Such straightforward talk is unusual for Carter. He was not in a word-mincing mood as he outlined his hopes and fears that day before congressional leaders and administration officials. Six days earlier in another private White House briefing, he had used a similar phrase: "They lied to us."

Such talk, however, could prove misleading as the showdown over the Soviet combat brigade approaches. Nobody knows whether he will follow national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski's advice and order a balanced buildup of U.S. power in response to Moscow's intransigence or whether he will maneuver out of the crisis with a face-saving gesture, as the State Department would prefer.

This time, Carter cannot pick evenly between Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance as he did in his bifurcated Annapolis speech in June 1978. This time he must choose.

Some of Vance's lieutenants—and probably Vance himself—are counseling super-caution. Vance's Soviet expert, Dr. Marshall Shulman, was not at all happy when Vance laid down even the limited stricture to the Kremlin that "the maintenance of the status quo" is

unacceptable. To Shulman, even that cautious formulation restricted U.S. freedom of action to back down, in case the Soviet Union should refuse to change the status quo.

Shulman's inside counsel to Vance to risk nothing with Moscow that might upset the SALT II timetable was the exact opposite of the mood in the Cabinet Room when Carter and the congressional leaders assembled Thursday morning. Carter described what one White House aide called the "unrelievably tough attitude of the Soviets" toward the U.S. demand. Sen. Jacob Javits, the Senate's single strongest Republican supporter of SALT II, responded with a surprising appeal to postpone Senate consideration of the treaty.

Carter flatly rejected Javits' proposal to shelve it until the Russians remove their combat troops from Cuba. Nevertheless, there are clues pointing to a hardening presidential attitude.

Carter was furious when Undersecretary of State David Newsom, in a background briefing for newsmen, suggested the Soviet brigade might be in Cuba "to demonstrate large-unit tactics and field maneuvers to Cuban soldiers," not for combat. That argument made it seem the administration was looking for a way out.

"Jimmy Carter is a patient man who is losing his patience," one of Carter's senior aides, not associated with foreign policy, told us. That implies—but does not guarantee—that the president will line up with Brzezinski if the Soviets continue to stonewall. The aide guesses this will be Carter's course.

Brzezinski has presented Carter and the National Security Council with options to force a Soviet retreat: a buildup of U.S. naval forces in the Caribbean; breaking off U.S.-Soviet talks on demilitarizing the Indian Ocean and on force reductions in Central Europe; highly visible offers of the sale of Western arms to Communist China. Eventually, if there is no Soviet backdown, Washington could clamp down on U.S. exports of high technology desperately wanted by Moscow.

That is only the start of what Brzezinski wants. Spotting the contradictory advice that Carter has received from Vance and Brzezinski ever since he became president, Brzezinski is making a strong case for Carter to go beyond the Soviet combat brigade in his answer to Moscow and demand new restraints on Cuba's worldwide subversive role.

The Brzezinski NSC staff was angry with the State Department's Sept. 15 answer to questions about why another OSA-class vessel was being towed from the Soviet Union to Cuba (it is now traversing the Canary Islands). Not to worry, said the department; a "routine" transfer of military equipment to the Brzezinski apparatus, that official State Department reply undermined the formal U.S. protest to the Kremlin last December over the dispatch to Cuba of Soviet arms, including MiG23 aircraft.

Contradictory advice has marked every step of Jimmy Carter's foreign-policy course, with the president more often than not siding with Vance's State Department. The importance of how he reacts in the days ahead to the expected Soviet refusal to remove its combat brigade from Cuba dwarfs past choices.

Boldness could redeem the United States, however belatedly, in the struggle with Soviet power; too much caution will confirm the U.S. failure of will. Almost incidentally, Carter's slender chances for a second term will hang in the balance.

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ON PAGE E-5

WASHINGTON STAR  
23 SEPTEMBER 1979

James Reston

## Hidden messages in polite pronouncement

The United States and the Soviet Union are getting into a tight and even dangerous corner over that Soviet "combat brigade" in Cuba. President Carter has been using very careful words to express his concern, but it is important to know what they mean.

"We do have the right," he said the other day, "to insist that the Soviet Union respect our interests and our concerns if the Soviet Union expects us to respect their sensibilities and their concerns. Otherwise, the relations between our two countries will be adversely affected."

This is polite language, but as I understand it what it means is this:

1. Washington would prefer to avoid a major confrontation on this issue which has now become a subject of public and political dispute in the United States, and which if not resolved quickly will have serious consequences neither side wants.

2. If the Soviet Union will not "respect our interests and concerns" in the Western Hemisphere, the United States will not respect the Soviet Union's "sensibilities" in Eastern Europe and elsewhere.

3. This does not mean rejecting the Second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. — though the Senate of the United States will make its own judgment on the confirmation of that treaty — but it does mean that the United States will take counter-measures along the borders of the Soviet

Union if Moscow insists on defying U.S. concern about Cuba.

4. Specifically, if Moscow insists on causing Washington trouble in Cuba, Washington will step up its propaganda and its economic appeals to the communist countries of Eastern Europe, to the restless Ukrainians, and other nationalities within the U.S.S.R., and if necessary — though the Carter administration doesn't want to play this card — to increase U.S. trade with China, and in the extremity, even to give more economic, technological and particularly military aid to Peking.

The Soviet presence in Cuba is probably greater than any estimates made public so far. U.S. secret intelligence estimates are as follows:

1. The Soviet contingent in Cuba is the largest outside the Warsaw or Eastern European Communist pact: not merely a "combat brigade" of 3,000, but overall, 10,000 to 13,500.

2. Also, according to U.S. intelligence estimates, there are 4,000-5,500 Soviet military personnel in Cuba — 2,000-3,000 in a ground forces brigade, 500 to 1,000 in a military assistance group, and 1,500 in an intelligence collection installation at Lourdes — the largest known Soviet intelligence organization outside the U.S.S.R.

3. Soviet pilots were integrated into the Cuban Air Force in 1976 and 1978 as substitutes for Cuban pilots deployed to Africa, though no Soviet pilots have been observed by U.S. intelligence agents in this role since August of 1978.

4. Soviet economic assistance to Cuba has quadrupled since 1974, and amounted to a record high of \$3 billion in 1978, about one-fourth of the total Cuban Gross National Product.

Carter has been reporting about all this to the leaders of the Congress, but trying to keep the problem from getting out of hand. He met the other day privately with Secretaries Vance and Brown, Brzezinski of the National Security Council, Senators Goldwater, Stennis, Baker of Tennessee, and Jody Powell, among others.

He began by telling them that even in the early 1960s, President Kennedy, Secretary of Defense McNamara and Nelson Rockefeller had made public statements that the Soviets had "combat troops" in Cuba. The president asserted flatly, according to several witnesses at the meet-

## on Cuba

ing, that the Soviets had "lied to him" about the "combat nature" of the Soviet troops in Cuba, but he did not say what he might do if the Soviet troops were not removed.

It was clear, however, at least to the politicians in that meeting, that Carter felt he had to get some kind of cooperation from the Soviets about their troops in Cuba, or that he had to act against them, in ways he refused to discuss.

What is not clear is whether Secretary of State Vance, the president, or anybody else in the administration has told Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin or any other Soviet official that the Cuban problem is loitering down into a major crisis in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Vance is trying to cool the problem. But the president is clearly in deep political trouble, with the first test against Kennedy coming up next month in Florida, where the anti-Castro Cuban voters are likely to be a major faction in the vote.

It is very awkward, in this situation, for either of the major nuclear powers to withdraw from a public dispute which might have been avoided by a little forethought and common sense. But both are now drifting into deeper waters. The Soviets are insisting that they have a right to establish their power in the Western Hemisphere in defiance of the Monroe Doctrine, while insisting that the United States has no right to intrude upon the Soviet spheres of influence on its borders under the Brezhnev Doctrine.

So both sides are in a pickle. The Soviet argument will not be accepted by the American people, and certainly not by the politicians running for the presidency. Some compromise will have to be found, or there is no doubt that Carter will interfere in Moscow's sensitive areas of Eastern Europe and even China, unless Moscow pays attention to Washington's political sensitivities in Cuba and elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE C7THE WASHINGTON POST  
23 September 1979George W. Ball

# Diplomatic Grandstanding

To an ancient participant in the Cuban missile crisis, the current brouhaha over troops in Cuba recalls Karl Marx's aphorism about Napoleon III that history invariably repeats itself, "the first time as tragedy, the second as farce."

Our predicament 17 years ago was unquestionably high drama; the Soviet missiles on the soil of Cuba were being targeted on our cities. But the sudden discovery of 2,000 or 3,000 Soviet troops is clearly a farcical echo. What possible threat could such a Graustarkian army pose for America unless—and this is always a danger—the customs guards in Miami should be out on strike?

In 1962 we were able to negotiate a satisfactory solution to the Cuban missile crisis because both the executive and Congress behaved with grave responsibility. Today—as so often happens in a campaign year—we hear the authentic voice of radio's famous Senator Claghorn bellowing from Capitol Hill: "Damn it, sir, what are all them evil Roosters and pesky Cubans doin' off our shores? Drive 'em into the sea, I say."

It all began when the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee felt compelled to prove his toughness of fiber to the Idaho electorate by telling the world not only that Soviet combat units were in Cuba but that, unless they were pulled out, the Senate would not ratify SALT II. That inspired a vigorous competition in senatorial dérâches, with Sen. Henry Jackson outrunning the field by demanding not only the removal of the Soviet brigade but also all ground-attack aircraft. Nor should the Russians be permitted to provide Cuba any new submarines or naval forces. What he meant, he explained on television, was that the United States should not permit

the creation of a "Fortress Cuba"—a baffling thought since a fortress is, by definition, a defensive position and no one is yet proposing an invasion. Finally, Henry Kissinger, the inventor of linkage, suggested that we use the occasion to require the Soviets to stop employing Cuban surrogates and generally shape up. It was the kind of proposal I always find confusing, since I was taught as a lad in Iowa that "linkage" was another name for "baloney," and I have seen nothing since then to change that view.

Unhappily, this cacophony of congressional bluster, with its thunder and lightning—and particularly its wind—could

*The writer was formerly under-secretary of state.*

be interpreted only as an ultimatum. Either the Soviets took their troops out of Cuba or the United States would commit some undefined unpleasantness. The net effect was to violate every rule of diplomatic tactics. It converted a matter of purely symbolic interest into an issue of substance. It put the Soviets in a position where they could retreat only with loss of face. (Who thinks the current Soviet leaders have forgotten Khrushchev lost his job for withdrawing his missiles under pressure of the American "quarantine"? It confirmed the growing suspicion of our friends in other capitals that our foreign policy is idiosyncratic and, hence, unreliable. Finally, we fell into the trap of making public demands we had no clear plans for enforcing.

What happens now? Of course, the Senate could refuse to ratify SALT II and we could even block trade with the Soviet Union, but if Moscow should still persist in leaving its troops in place,

what then? Who wants to stand "eyeball to eyeball" over such a peripheral issue?

It is not even clear what action we wish the Russians to take. This is not a new problem, only a newly discovered one. Without doubt, a substantial number of Soviet troops have been in Cuba for years. Thus, the narrow issue is not the fact that Soviet forces are there but that they are in what is technically described as a "combat mode"—a distinction more metaphysical than real, since no one seems to know whom they would be likely to combat. So what should the Russian soldiers do? Change their uniforms? Break up their brigade formation? Take Cuban citizenship? It is reminiscent of earlier disputes when we wasted endless hours arguing whether particular weapons were "offensive" or "defensive" or whether American military advisers in Vietnam were performing combat roles when they flew on bombing missions with Vietnamese crews.

The basic weakness of our position is that we now maintain over 5,000 military personnel in Turkey, as well as a small number in Norway, and, until recently, we had over 1,000 in Iran—all countries not 90 miles from the Soviet border but contiguous to it. Moreover, we have over 2,000 troops in Cuba at Guantanamo.

No doubt the Soviets would be quite prepared to swap the withdrawal of their troops in Cuba for our agreement to pull ours out of the NATO countries on their border. But does anyone think that would be a good bargain?

"Dammit," says Senator Claghorn, "tell them pestiferous Cubans and Roosters that they got to clear out of that little island instantly. We've got the guns and, if they don't act fast, we'll show 'em; we'll shoot ourselves in the foot."

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 2NEW YORK DAILY NEWS  
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# Carter vows to act on Soviet in Cuba

Washington (News Bureau)—President Carter told a group of editors, in remarks released by the White House yesterday, that he would "take appropriate action" if the Soviet Union insists on keeping a combat brigade of 2,000 to 3,000 Russian troops deployed in Cuba.

Carter declined to say specifically what action he would order, contending that to do so would be "inappropriate" while the high-level talks between Secretary of State Vance and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin on the troops issue were still under way.

But in a separate meeting with the same group of editors on Friday, Zbigniew Brzezinski, the President's national security adviser, appeared to rule out the use of military force by the United States, stating that "it is a political problem, and we will seek a political solution to it."

#### Situation is "Unacceptable"

Carter and Brzezinski chose their words carefully in addressing the issue of Soviet troops in Cuba, making it clear that the United States regards the presence of the Soviet combat brigade in Cuba as "unacceptable," but declining to say precisely what Vance is asking the Russians to do about it and what Washington's response would be if the Soviets refuse to give any ground in the talks.

"I said this was a matter of great concern to us, that the status quo was

not acceptable and that we would be working with the Soviet Union to change the situation in a manner that would be acceptable to us," Carter said. "If this effort should unsuccessful, then I would have to take appropriate action, and I think, to go further into detail than that would be inappropriate."

Carter set no timetable for resolving the issue through negotiation, except to say, "I'll have to make a judgment on what to do about it within the near future."

#### "Copout" to reject SALT-2

Brzezinski sought to separate the troops issue from other U.S.-Soviet dealings, particularly on the strategic arms

limitation treaty (SALT-2) pending before the Senate, arguing that it would be a "copout" for the Senate to reject the treaty on the basis of the troop issue.

"In rejecting SALT, we punish ourselves as much, if not more than we punish the Soviet Union," Brzezinski said. "We do not impose a real cost on the Soviet Union for its disregard of our interests if we reject SALT."

The administration not only faces a problem in the Senate, where members of both parties have said that SALT-2 would not be ratified unless the troops issue is resolved, but among the public at large, where there is strong sentiment for Carter to demand that the Soviets get the combat brigade out of Cuba.

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ON PAGE A-2

WASHINGTON STAR  
23 SEPTEMBER 1979

# U.S. Options Limited on Cuba Troops

By Henry S. Bradsher  
Washington Star Staff Writer

The Carter administration is faced with severely limited options for retaliating against the Soviet Union if Moscow refuses to give satisfaction on its troops in Cuba, according to officials.

The limitations are partly created by U.S. apprehension over doing anything that might escalate the troop issue into a deterioration of Soviet-American relations, worsening the wide range of existing problems between the two superpowers. They also arise from difficulties in projecting U.S. power around the world.

Officials are still hoping to obtain satisfaction in the talks that Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance has been having with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin. Vance is scheduled to meet with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko in New York Thursday.

Vance and Dobrynin "are now talking about the framework for a solution" to the troop problem, an official says. This phase of talks began last Thursday, following four meetings to explore the problem.

The administration's goal of changing the combat status of the 2,000 to 3,000 Soviet troops has been carefully distinguished from saying the troops themselves must leave. It has left room for a solution that might only require them to give up their tanks and artillery.

This gets into the cloudy question of what is a substantive change in the situation, which Carter has said he is determined to achieve, and what is merely a cosmetic change, which he has promised Congress he will not accept.

Is turning over the unit's heavy armaments to the Cubans a substantive or a cosmetic change?

Some officials, who see this as the most likely achievable result of the diplomatic efforts, argue that it would be a real solution. But others fear that it would be denounced on Capitol Hill as merely cosmetic because the weapons would still be usefully close at hand.

Having the Soviets ship the weapons home, the way Soviet missiles were taken out of Cuba 1962 in view of U.S. Navy reconnaissance planes, is not a very workable solution. The Soviet Union provides tanks and artillery to the Cuban armed forces, and there is no limit on how many weapons they hold.

The most obvious result of a failure to obtain satisfaction would be the rejection by the U.S. Senate of the new strategic arms limitations treaty, SALT II. A number of senators have made their votes contingent upon getting rid of the combat brigade.

The possible failure of SALT is not categorized by the administration as retaliation, although some members of Congress who were already skeptical of the treaty would put it in that category. Despite the combat brigade problem, the administration continues to argue that SALT is in the U.S. interest and should not be linked to this issue.

One of the ideas for retaliation that has cropped up in public discussion is the placing of U.S. troops that are as sensitive to the Soviet Union as are Soviet troops in Cuba.

This is considered a non-starter by most officials. "It makes no sense," one commented. The problems include congressional reluctance to make new commitments of U.S. troops abroad and a lack of countries that are willing to provide bases for U.S. forces.

## U.S. Troops Abroad

Since World War II, the United States has had troops in some areas sensitive to the Soviets, such as South Korea. During the 1950s, U.S. troops went into other countries like Turkey and Pakistan as part of encircling the Soviets with air bases, missiles and monitoring sites.

But the Americans are now back out of Pakistan and other countries like Iran. Opportunities for U.S. military bases abroad are contracting, not expanding.

The United States might increase the number of military personnel at its base at Guantanamo Bay in eastern Cuba. At present there are about as many Americans there as Soviets in the combat brigade.

The U.S. Navy, which uses Guantanamo as a naval readiness testing and training base, has little need for more personnel there; however. And more U.S. troops on American territory in the Caribbean — the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico — would do nothing to offset the growing danger of Cuban influence and even intervention in independent Caribbean mini-states.

The administration is presently

undecided whether to waive a congressional limitation on trade with the Soviet Union that is tied to Jewish emigration. That decision on granting Moscow "most-favored nation" concessions, meaning a lowering of trade barriers, could be influenced by the troop problem.

A decision had been expected soon, but it might be put off. At one time the administration intended to grant the concessions to China and the Soviets together to avoid worsening Moscow relations by appearing to favor Peking. This link was broken last month, reducing pressure to decide.

The administration could also exert pressure on private banks to cut their loans to the Soviet Union. The Soviets are already borrowing in Western Europe to cover existing debt payments, and they need more credits. But the banks are hard to control, and so long as the Kremlin has access to European money it can get along without New York's.

The same argument applies to efforts to restrict the transfer of advanced technology and industrial equipment.

There are already strong voices in the administration arguing for tighter controls on the grounds that the United States is contributing to Soviet military strength. But, aside from major bureaucratic problems here in implementing controls, there is the leakage of technology through other countries. U.S. firms end up complaining that they lose the business to foreigners while the Soviets still get most of what they want.

Several times in recent years suggestions have been floated in Washington that the United States use its position as the main world supplier of grain to bring pressure on the Soviet Union, a major importer.

But every time the suggestion comes up, it is buried under U.S. political and economic realities. Midwestern farmers, who are now producing another bumper crop, depend on Soviet purchases to keep their prices up. No president has been able or willing to challenge that connection.

In addition, the United States depends on its agricultural exports to pay for a major part of its imports of oil and other things. Cutting off the Soviet money would worsen the already difficult American foreign trade position.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A2THE WASHINGTON POST  
23 September 1979

# A Small Soviet Brigade and Its Large Implications

## Carter Facing Chancy Negotiations, SALT Problems and Heightened Tensions

By Don Oberdorfer  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Three weeks of public maneuvering over Soviet combat troops in Cuba has led the Carter administration into a chancy diplomatic negotiation with the Russians, endangered Senate ratification of SALT II and threatens to inaugurate a new era of tension and confrontation between the nuclear superpowers.

The cause is a brigade of about 2,800 Russians, armed with rifles, field artillery and about 40 tanks. They and their predecessors may have been in Cuba as long as 17 years. Militarily, it doesn't amount to anything, President Carter is reported to have told congressional leaders Thursday. He added, "Politically, it is very important."

The startling disparity between the size of the problem and the scope of the ability of the Carter administration to manage the nation's affairs

Some of the administration's closest supporters on Capitol Hill are saying, more in sorrow than in anger, that the affair has been blown out of proportion and has been badly mishandled.

Few could disagree with the president about the political importance of the situation. It has reopened the old struggle within the administration and the American body politic about the nature of the Russians and the ways of dealing with them, giving new ammunition to those who fear the worst.

And it has created openings for Carter's rivals for power as the weakened president heads into a fight for political survival.

How all this came about is still mystifying some of those who are most deeply involved in the attempt to find a resolution. Among the elements were: growing strength and self-assurance of the Russians; irregular and insufficient attention of U.S. intelligence; a climate of official discipline in which embarrassing secrets leak quickly to politicians and the press; lack of political savvy and strength at the top of the Carter administration; eagerness of office-seekers to exploit foreign policy troubles in an era when Congress has greater information and control than before and the unfortunate fact that the trouble developed while half of official Washington was on vacation.

It is of fundamental importance that the Soviet brigade was uncovered and announced in the midst of the SALT II debate. At another time, the same revelations might have generated a different set of responses.

Looking forward is no easier than looking back at what has happened. Nonetheless, statements and hints of informed officials lead to these conclusions:

First, there appears to be a less-than-ever chance that the Soviet leadership will accommodate the United States with a diplomatic solution. The higher the United States demand in public and private, the slimmer is the chance for a negotiated solution.

While the withdrawal from Cuba of the Soviet brigade remains the United States objective, the Soviets have said at least once in the diplomatic talks that this is out of the question.

The United States has now presented to Moscow, through Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance's talks with Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, suggestions for solutions short of complete withdrawal. These are believed to include dissolution of the Soviet brigade, reassignment of key personnel to advisory duty and distribution of its artillery and tanks to Cuban forces.

The option would be the end of the Soviet "combat capability" which U.S. officials have said is crucial, even if most of the Russian soldiers remain for the time being.

The Soviets appear to be alternatively baffled, indignant and suspicious about the U.S. demands, and they have disseminated for Western consumption the view that they will not be intimidated in "brute" fashion. They have much to stake. The Soviet Union has been seen as the crowning achievement of Leonid Brezhnev's fading leadership, although SALT's value has been marked down to some degree by the U.S. arms hikes which the Senate has demanded to accompany the treaty, and by the lack of an aura of detente.

At the same time, Soviet relations with Fidel Castro, an increasingly valuable ally worldwide, are on the line in the resolution of the current problem. There is little doubt that the Russian troops are in Cuba under explicit arrangements with Castro.

Second, Carter has made it increasingly plain, as he told out-of-town editors in an interview released yesterday, that he will order "appropriate action" if the brigade issue cannot be resolved diplomatically.

White House officials have described these actions as "offsetting and compensatory" and said that they are not intended to be militarily threatening to the Soviet Union or to Cuba. There has been much discussion at high levels of these potential actions, but reportedly no final decisions.

One group of officials within the administration has counseled that the countermeasures should be tailored to the regional problem of Cuba. This would suggest a beefing up of the U.S. naval presence in the Caribbean and of U.S. troops at Guantanamo Bay, and possibly a resumption of U.S. spy plane overflights of Cuba.

Another type of counteraction under study involves economic and political penalties, such as reduced sales of U.S. high technology to Russia, continued denial of most favored nation trade treatment and the like. For domestic reasons, wheat sales seem to have been ruled out as a lever.

More controversial is a set of countermeasures directed to areas of vital interest and great sensitivity to Moscow. These include U.S. sales of arms or other militarily important items to China, the Soviet neighbor and arch-rival. Such moves have their backers within administration. They would be likely to provoke a sharp and strong reaction from the Russians.

Finally, there is no doubt that the SALT II treaty and the U.S.-Soviet relations on a broad front will be deeply affected by the way the dispute is resolved.

A negotiated solution, if unambiguous, could enhance the chances of SALT ratification and strengthen Soviet-American relations, at least from this end. A more ambiguous solution, which is more likely, would be controversial politically and probably positive in overall impact.

More serious would be the failure of negotiations and the imposition of U.S. countermeasures. Several senior lawmakers have said publicly that there is no chance for SALT II unless the Soviets take action to resolve the problem of the brigade. The defeat or limbo of SALT II would in turn gen-

erate major consequences in Moscow. Some high administration officials who advocate tough action against the Russians are dissenters from this line of thought. These officials argue that tough action would permit a politically strengthened Carter to tell the Senate that the Russian brigade has been neutralized, and to ask for the approval of SALT.

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The problem is that U.S. compensatory actions could generate an even stronger anti-Soviet climate at home as even deeds from the Kremlin. An action and reaction cycle of this sort would certainly doom the SALT treaty, in the view of experienced observers of the Senate.

More than that, such a cycle of challenge and response can feed upon itself in a free-for-all U.S. election season which coincides with a period of leadership transition in the Soviet Union. At that point, the argument over 2,800 troops will have generated tensions and troubles far more serious, than anyone foresaw at its outset three weeks ago.

THE NEW YORK TIMES  
23 September 1979

## Byrd Says Arms Pact Could Still Be Acted on in '79

By CHARLES MOHR

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 22 — Senator Robert C. Byrd, the majority leader, said today that the Senate could complete action on the strategic arms limitation treaty with the Soviet Union this year, but he warned that a delay until next year "could very well result in the defeat of the treaty."

A number of other senators and members of the Senate staff believe it is increasingly doubtful that the nuclear arms treaty can be brought to a vote this year or next.

There is disagreement as to whether the treaty can either achieve the two-thirds majority necessary for Senate approval or be brought to a vote.

At his regular weekly news conference today, Mr. Byrd said there was "plenty of time" for the Senate to debate and to act on the arms treaty this year. But in contrast to his earlier predictions that the Senate could do so and adjourn before Thanksgiving, the West Virginia Democrat said today: "We can be in session after Thanksgiving and will be if necessary. We may have to be here to Christmas."

Senator Byrd's optimism appeared to be based on another statement that full floor debate of the treaty should require less than six weeks.

Some Senate sources said that they had doubts about that estimate and could see problems for the treaty even if the debate was compressed.

Senator Byrd avoided giving a direct answer when asked whether he believed the Senate would approve the treaty even if President Carter failed to persuade the Soviet Union to withdraw what has been described as a brigade of combat troops from Cuba.

Stating a personal view, Senator Byrd said, "I don't believe the treaty should be held hostage to the Cuban situation," adding that it would damage American interests to defeat the treaty solely be-

cause of the Soviet troop presence in Cuba.

However, Senate sources said that it was unlikely that Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho and chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, would permit the committee to begin voting on the treaty until the White House has made public the details of any "resolution" of the troop issue reached with the Soviet Union. Although Senator Church favors the treaty, he believes it would be defeated if brought to the floor before the troop question is resolved.

As of now, the Foreign Relations Committee is scheduled to begin its "mark up" of the treaty on Oct. 8. The marking up process, which will involve the committee voting on amendments, reservations and understandings affecting the treaty, is expected to take about two weeks. Another week may be used in the preparation and printing of majority and minority reports.

If those time estimates are correct, the treaty could not reach the Senate floor until about Oct. 29. Because the Senate will recess for almost a week for Thanksgiving, there would be a maximum of seven weeks available for debate and voting on amendments in the full Senate.

However, that time could be eaten into if vital energy legislation and spending measures are not all completed within the next five weeks.

There is no mechanical or parliamentary impediment to voting on the treaty early in the next session of Congress, but Republican and some Democratic sources argued, "you can forget about SALT unless there is a vote this year."

Senator Byrd said at his news conference today that if the treaty was put over to next year it was likely to "get caught up in the emotion of the Presidential election campaign" and that such delay could "very well" kill it.

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## BRZEZINSKI CAUTIONS SOVIET ON CUBA UNIT

He Says Brigade Reflects 'Pattern  
of Disregard' of U.S. Interests

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 22 — Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security adviser, says that the reported Soviet combat brigade in Cuba stems from a Soviet "pattern of disregard" for American interests and he warns of possible retaliation if the Russians fail to cooperate in finding a solution.

There was no further word on a formula to settle the problem, but the State Department said Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance would meet with Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko of the Soviet Union in New York Thursday. Until now, Mr. Vance has been talking with Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin.

Senate approval of the arms treaty with Moscow has been imperiled by the issue. Senator Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia, the majority leader, said today that action on the treaty could be completed this year, but that delay till next year could result in its defeat. Others in the Senate consider it increasingly doubtful that the treaty can be brought to a vote this year or next. [Page 5.]

Mr. Brzezinski, in an interview with editors yesterday that was released by the White House today, said the issue of the brigade was "a serious problem in Soviet-American relations," and he renewed the White House assertion that unspecified actions would be taken if the status of the brigade was not altered.

Mr. Brzezinski, in discussing possible retaliation, seemingly ruled out a military response to the presence of the Soviet brigade in Cuba. In answer to a question, he appeared to eliminate the curtailment of grain sales to the Soviet Union. "We do not think that the profitable response to the Soviet Union is one which involves shooting oneself in the foot in the same process," he said.

THE NEW YORK TIMES  
23 September 1979

Administration officials said no decisions had been reached so far on how to respond in case the talks were unsuccessful. The Administration is awaiting a response to ideas given by Mr. Vance to Ambassador Dobrynin on Thursday.

But officials said that Mr. Brzezinski and his aides had raised the possibility of taking actions that would be as upsetting to Soviet political sensitivities as the Soviet presence in Cuba is to the United States. These would include a closer American relationship with China, ending the policy of evenhandedness with both Moscow and Peking in trade and other matters. It might mean also encouraging West European countries to sell military equipment to China. At the moment, the United States is showing indifference to such sales.

### Problem for Both Countries Is Seen

"We consider this to be a serious problem, which we want to solve because we think it is a problem both for us and for the Soviet Union, and we want to solve it in a way which is responsive to our genuine, and we feel, legitimate concerns," Mr. Brzezinski said.

"We feel that this respect for our genuine legitimate concerns has to be an integral part of any enduring relationship and, precisely because we feel that way, we respect the Soviet desire that we be respectful of their interests and sensitivities, but it is not going to be a one-way street."

On the issue of linking the issue of Soviet troops to Senate approval of the strategic arms treaty, Mr. Brzezinski said the Americans had to compete with the Russians and to reject the treaty would be "a cop-out from the world of competition."

"In rejecting SALT, we punish ourselves as much, if not more than we punish the Soviet Union," he said. "We do not impose a real cost on the Soviet Union for its disregard of our interests if we reject SALT."

Mr. Brzezinski's comments were consistent with those made by President Carter to a group of Congressional leaders on Thursday and by the White House spokesman, Jody Powell. But Mr. Vance has carefully limited his few public remarks on the subject to concern over the brigade and has seemed to seek to limit the debate to that subject.

Mr. Brzezinski said the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in the Western Hemisphere "is not an acceptable arrangement for us."

"Moreover, that brigade is present in a country which itself is using force around the world to promote its own ideological aspirations and uses that force occasionally, directly, or indirectly, against our interests," he said. "And finally that country is sponsored, supported by the Soviet Union and acts as a proxy for Soviet political and foreign policy objectives."

Mr. Brzezinski said the United States was not trying to humiliate the Russians but "we see this as a serious problem in American-Soviet relations which has arisen as a consequence of a pattern of disregard for our interests."

The Soviet Union says that the brigade, believed to be made up of 2,000 to 3,000 soldiers, serves only in a military training role, but Mr. Brzezinski said the force has "a definite combat character and capability." He left open the possibility that the force might have performed other functions, including acting as a demonstration unit for the Cuban military.

### West European View Dismissed

He scoffed at reports that West Europeans were disturbed by the way the United States had handled the problem, saying that they would have been equally upset if the United States had sought a dramatic confrontation.

Mr. Brzezinski's tone and approach underscored the continuing differences of approach within the Administration. He regards the Soviet brigade as part of a larger problem of Soviet aggressive activity around the world, insensitive to American interests. The State Department tends to look at issues in greater isolation and to see the brigade question in less universal terms.

President Carter, in a separate interview with editors, repeated that the issue was "of great concern to us" and that "the status quo was not acceptable."

If the effort to achieve a diplomatic solution was unsuccessful, "then I would have to take appropriate action," he said, but he declined to be more specific.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE E3THE NEW YORK TIMES  
23 September 1979

# Are the Russians Outspending U.S. On Weapons?

*Differing Views on the Defense Budget Could Affect SALT Agreement*

By RICHARD BURT

WASHINGTON — Last Tuesday, Senator Sam Nunn, the reigning Congressional expert on military affairs, delivered a gloomy message. After giving his colleagues a batch of complicated graphs and statistics, the Georgia Democrat announced that over the past decade, the Soviet Union had outspent the United States for military forces by \$104 billion.

The Carter Administration's original defense budget request totalled \$135 billion and this was "a large sum of money..." Mr. Nunn acknowledged. But he argued that the 1980 Pentagon budget "is less in real dollars than the defense budget of 1965, after inflation is taken into account." In almost every category — troops, ships, submarines and fighter planes — the United States was planning to buy fewer weapons than it produced 15 years ago. Mr. Nunn's statistics showed Moscow's military effort had consistently grown since 1965, to a defense budget as much as 50 percent greater than Mr. Carter was requesting. Spending 11 or 12 percent of its gross national product annually for defense, as compared with less than 5 percent for the United States, Moscow was on the verge of achieving a real degree of military superiority in both nuclear and conventional forces. (At the official exchange rate, the 500 billion ruble Soviet G.N.P. would equal \$694 billion, compared with the \$1.7 trillion United States G.N.P.)

Mr. Nunn's statistics seemed persuasive. The Senate agreed to add \$4 billion to the Administration's 1980 budget, which the Administration was ready to take, and to increase the 1981 and 1982 Pentagon budgets by a full 5 percent, which the Administration didn't want. At first, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown said that the 5 percent increases were not needed to maintain the military balance with Moscow. But evidently reacting to Mr. Nunn's clout in the debate over the strategic arms treaty, Mr. Brown changed his tune later and told the Foreign Relations Committee that future increases in the Pentagon budget beyond 3 percent would not be ruled out.

Mr. Nunn's influence, however, apparently did not extend to the House Appropriations Committee. In contrast to the Senate, it cut Mr. Carter's 1980 request by \$2.4 billion. The action laid the groundwork for a Congressional debate on defense spending whose outcome later this year could determine the fate of the SALT treaty. Underlying the Pentagon budget debate was a still more controversial question: Was the United States, as Senator Nunn charged, really falling behind in the spending race with Moscow?

Many listeners found Mr. Nunn's case for increasing military spending convincing because, for the most part, he relied on the Administration's own figures. However, critics of official estimates of the Soviet military effort argue that these should be approached with great caution. Analysts in organizations supporting arms control, such as the Center for Defense Information, make the following points:

• Soviet spending figures are suspect. Like the United States, the Soviet Union unveils an annual military budget. Last year, Moscow said it planned to spend roughly half as much as the United States for defense. However, intelligence analysts have never taken Soviet military budget figures seriously, arguing that Moscow regularly hides vast amounts for its military in budgets for science and industry. Accordingly, the Central Intelligence Agency has developed a complex — and controversial — system of estimates. In essence, it compiles lists of new Soviet weapons and then calculates how much these arms would cost to build in the United States. While its proponents argue that this approach gives a good picture of the Soviet economy's military burden, critics contend that it exaggerates actual spending. For example, because its labor costs are much lower than in the United States, Moscow is able to build many items for far less. "You can bet that it doesn't cost the Soviets \$1 million to build a tank like it does here," said one researcher.

• While there is little disagreement that their defense effort is expanding, Defense Secretary Brown and other Administration officials point out that the Soviet Union must cope with the Chinese military threat as well as with Western power. Indeed, recent C.I.A. reports maintain that much of the recent growth in the size of the Soviet Army can be accounted for by the buildup along the 2,000-mile border with China. Other officials argue that it is a mistake, in looking at the East-West military balance, to only focus on the two superpowers. These analysts contend that, in combined military budgets, the 15 members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization still are outspending the seven countries of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact.

• Critics of Soviet-American spending comparisons also argue that while Moscow appears to use its military budget to build more, the United States has tried to build better weapons. Thus Mr. Brown has repeatedly told senators that American defense policy relies on superior technology to deter large-scale conflict rather than trying to match the Soviet Union "man for man, or tank for tank."

This said, Mr. Nunn did appear to reflect a growing consensus in defense circles that the military balance is tilting toward Moscow. In part, this belief is based on a recognition that while maintaining its numerical edge in many areas, the Soviet military is catching up with the West in technical prowess. Thus, despite the controversy over spending comparisons, there was little dissent with Mr. Brown's statement last week that "a reasonable worldwide balance still exists because of our past efforts, but unless we act fast to increase our efforts, the difference in current effect would soon be reflected in an unacceptable imbalance."

ARTICLE APPEARED  
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22 SEPTEMBER 1979

CHARLESTON, S.C. — Americans should be concerned about what action the Government will take to offset the Soviet Union's large-scale military buildup in both nuclear and conventional forces. As I observe the SALT process, I conclude that the odds of providing for an adequate defense and encouraging international stability would be enhanced by rejection of SALT II and its protocol. At the same time, I suggest that we accelerate efforts toward achieving genuine nuclear disarmament.

It is not the exclusion of the Soviet Backfire bomber or the problems of compliance verification that concern me. Nor am I deeply disturbed by some inequity in numbers. I am concerned about the principle that the Russians be allowed 308 SS-18 heavy-missile launchers as we are prohibited from developing a similar capability. But my major concern is the restraint imposed by the treaty and particularly the protocol on the exploitation of our technology — an area where we have been pre-eminent.

Restraints on technology force us to follow a pattern that will probably not be the most economical way to provide a deterrent to nuclear war. Without the restrictions of the treaty and its protocol, a more effective and probably less-expensive system could be developed by the use of the now-restrained cruise-missile technology, the development of mobile land-based missiles, and the deployment of more launchers at sea.

Future Federal budgets will be strained because of the energy crisis, likely persistent inflation, and the rising cost of our "welfare state." So, inevitably, military budgets will be

# Reject SALT, But Seek Genuine Nuclear Disarmament

By William C. Westmoreland

under extreme pressure. Therefore, a national strategy must be developed that will provide adequately for our defense and be prepared to protect our global interest at lowest cost. The current treaty will not satisfy that requirement.

I doubt that our political system will have the wisdom and courage to resist the temptation to substitute SALT II for the cost of providing an adequate defense posture. Our political democracy will be more prone to react positively to global realities if not constrained by an agreement that is more cosmetic than constructive.

Specifically, if SALT II is ratified, there will be, and should be, political pressures to go to the limit of the agreement. However, that may not provide a military capability consistent with the several threats to our future national well-being. Thus, we could be competing in an arms race within boundaries controlled in considerable degree by an adversary. Full flexibility of action will be denied us.

In this connection, the SALT process has admirably served the psychological programs of the Soviet Union by giving dramatic visibility worldwide to its military might.

It should be obvious that there are military threats to our national interest that are more likely than nuclear war. There are large and well-armed forces of the Warsaw Pact threatening the security of Western Europe and our interests there. Our most vulnerable area in the long run is the growing problem of raw materials to stoke our industrial society. Hence, the arena of potential conflict is global and the means of dealing with it involves conventional military forces — land, sea and air — coupled with skillful diplomatic action.

The threat to our economic life is far more real than the threat of nuclear war or an attack against Western Europe; it is inevitable. SALT II establishes an overriding priority to forces that could have little influence on Soviet initiatives in areas of traditional interest to us. (Witness the most recent disclosure of Soviet troops in Cuba.) Therefore, in funding programs to reduce the risks of nuclear war, we must not neglect those forces that can influence a threat to our economic well-being — forces that are flexible in their use and become visible to both friend and foe. An element of Soviet strategy, it seems, is to divert us from attending to that area.

Before we can safely disarm, we must rearm. Before we dare negotiate further with the Soviet Union, we must put ourselves in a stronger military.

Meanwhile, the Senate should reject SALT II and its protocol with a mandate to the Administration to reopen talks designed genuinely to reduce nuclear weapons on an equitable basis. Such an overture could not credibly stamp us war-mongers. If the Soviet Union truly wants to decrease the possibility of nuclear war, it will accept such a proposal. If not, indeed its Government is to be viewed with even greater suspicion.

Concurrently, the Senate should commit itself to sponsoring military programs focused on the several threats facing our nation.

Finally, the Senate should set up a watchdog committee to monitor our military capability and report each year to the Administration and the public.

Soviet leaders are using the bargaining table as a weapon against us. They have been playing games with our political democracy — and winning. Myopic, vote-begging politicians have created for us a perplexing security problem. Only far-sighted statesmen who put the national interest above all else can right the situation.

William C. Westmoreland, U.S. Army, Ret., commanded United States forces in Vietnam from 1964 to 1968 and was later Chief of Staff of the Army and a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 27APHILADELPHIA BULLETIN  
21 September 1979

## Soviet slice-by-slice 'salami tactics' in Cuba

Richard S. Schweiker

The confirmed presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba confronts the U.S. with serious political implications which may be more significant than the immediate military issues.

Introduction of Soviet fighting forces, augmented by a steady flow of sophisticated military equipment, raises alarming questions which go considerably beyond determining Soviet motivations or what the brigade might be used for.

New signs of Soviet adventurism, and their timing, inevitably involve perceptions of America's willingness to make a forthright and sustained defense of its vital security interests. Moreover, doubts about the adequacy of our intelligence-gathering capabilities have now been increased.

The Carter Administration contends that the Soviet brigade, as presently configured, poses no imminent threat to the continental U.S. But the absence of a direct military threat does not diminish an unmistakable political challenge.

In fact, relative trends in the overall U.S.-Soviet military balance sharpen the political significance of this incident to a greater degree than might have been the case several years ago.

At a minimum, the Soviet combat presence in Cuba, whatever its potential operational role, focuses renewed attention on the pattern of the Kremlin's growing assertiveness in the Caribbean, once an indisputable American strategic preserve.

In recent months, the Russians have constructed docks in Cuba for non-nuclear submarines, deployed two diesel-powered, Foxtrot-class submarines, provided high-performance, nuclear-capable MiG-23 fighter bombers, and increased the visibility of their naval forces throughout the region. The impact of these actions on third parties, friend and foe alike, who view the superpower balance through their own perceptions, cannot be discounted or minimized.

The nature of this challenge is consistent with the Soviet Union's status as a global power seeking to expand its influence wherever possible at a tolerable price. The key question is not whether the troop presence actually violates previous, though ambiguous, U.S.-Soviet "understandings" regarding attempts to convert Cuba into a Soviet base in the Western Hemisphere. Legal technicalities notwithstanding, the overriding question is what political and strategic windfall the Soviet Union anticipates from this action which would justify placing at risk such high-priority Soviet interests as Senate ratification of SALT II.

Soviet military advisers and civilian technicians have long been stationed in Cuba, some reportedly with specific operational missions, including air defense, necessitated by dispatch of Cuban forces to Africa at Soviet behest. The introduction of combat forces, however, represents a new dimension in the pattern of Soviet hemispheric penetration.

Unfortunately, the mixed signals from the State Department are little help when trying to discern whether the Soviet troop deployment is a recent phenomenon or the result of an incremental buildup spanning a decade or more. If Soviet combat forces at brigade strength, or even their command structure, have been stationed in Cuba for some time, then why was the evidence provided by our intelligence capabilities prior to the August 1979 "reassessment" so "fragmentary," to use Secretary Vance's term? The Carter Administration's suspension of regular SR-71 reconnaissance overflights in 1977 as part of a "normalization" process with Cuba may have impaired our ability to monitor clandestine military activity on the island.

Conversely, if our monitoring facilities are adequate and did detect the combat troop presence, questions must invariably be raised about our political willingness to expose alleged infractions of existing agreements and enforce their provisions thoroughly. The questions thus raised about our technical ability and political resolve to verify Soviet compliance with SALT II, particularly with respect to qualitative restrictions on missile modernization, should be strikingly self-evident.

Several theories have been advanced about the potential role of the combat brigade. These range from suggestions that the combat units are providing defensive support for nuclear weaponry or sophisticated electronic monitoring installations in Cuba to intimations that these forces will ultimately be transferred to, or used in direct support of, insurgent elements in other Caribbean nations seeking to overthrow pro-Western governments. As such, the Soviet forces could serve a "trip-wire" function if the United States moved militarily to confront regional provocations by Havana.

Moscow's attitude on the troop issue will inevitably affect perceptions of the Soviet Union's reliability as a negotiating partner, and the extent to which the U.S. can reasonably anticipate Soviet adherence to agreements, such as SALT, designed to reduce tensions and limit the possibilities for achieving unilateral political and military advantages.

The Soviet Union denied the presence of organized combat forces in Cuba, claiming that the units in fact are part of a training mission deployed there since 1962. But reconnaissance confirmation of recent maneuvers belies this claim and further undermines the credibility of the Soviet contention that the current furor has been fomented by opponents of SALT ratification, or otherwise manufactured to coincide with Cuba's newly-assumed chairmanship of the "non-aligned" movement.

Whatever the reasons or timing behind this Soviet initiative, it is clear that continuation of such a precedent-setting situation is intolerable from the perspective of safeguarding our regional security interests. Acceptance of the status quo would transmit a dangerous signal throughout Latin America and elsewhere.

It might inadvertently encourage similar Soviet encroachments, or slice-by-slice "salami tactics," in other strategic areas, and foster the impression that an ascendant USSR was more inclined, as well as advantageously positioned, to exploit its growing military power for political ends.

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The Carter Administration should move forthrightly and responsibly to secure the timely withdrawal of these combat forces from Cuba. It is patently unrealistic to assume that the maintenance of a detente supposedly based on mutual restraint warrants a less than vigorous response to a provocation of this nature.

Like SALT, the issue of Soviet troops in Cuba must ultimately be assessed within the framework of competing global political strategies. Failure to appreciate this underlying relationship or to act on the basis of its realities could result in transforming a limited probe into a harbinger of future, and far deadlier, challenges to our national security.

*(Richard S. Schweiker, a Republican, is a U.S. senator from Pennsylvania.)*

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**Shevchenko on UN Spies**

**Much media interest in this, i.e., "How can we  
get in touch with him?"**

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ON PAGE A 19

THE WASHINGTON POST  
26 September 1979

Around the World

**U.N. Espionage Charges**

UNITED NATIONS—A U.N. spokesman said there was nothing new in charges made by former U.N. official Arkady Shevchenko that least half the Soviets working at the world organization were spies. Shevchenko made the charge Monday in a radio interview.

"This is not the first time we have heard the charges," said spokesman Rudolph Stajduhar. "But until details are provided, there is nothing we can do."

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 5NEW YORK DAILY NEWS  
26 SEPTEMBER 1979

# Poles arrest UN aide as spy; staffers here furious

By RUSS BRALEY  
Staff Correspondent of The News

United Nations—Poland has arrested Alecia Wesolowska, 35, a Polish citizen working for the UN Development Program, on charges of spying for a foreign power, a UN spokesman said yesterday.

UN staff employees, furious at UN officials for covering up the story for weeks, said the employees' Staff Committee will approach Pope John Paul on Wesolowska's behalf during his visit here next week. The arrest was made in Warsaw.

The employees, who had remained silent to give the UN administration time to get the woman released quietly, said the spy charges were absurd and that Polish authorities probably arrested her because she had remained outside Poland and taken UN employment without permission.

Her friends said she was arrested about Aug. 10 in Poland during a stopover to see her parents while en route to Ulan Bator, Mongolia. UN officials had no precise date of her arrest, and said the first word that she was missing came on Aug. 29, when Mongolia reported that she had not arrived there.

Her friends, who asked that their names not be used, charged that nobody has visited her in jail, and nobody has represented her legally as an international civil servant, as the UN is committed to do for employees in legal trouble.

Wesolowska, of 238 E. 50th St., reportedly came to the United States in 1971 on an exchange program, and on her own got a job as a girl guide at the UN. Three years ago she was employed as a clerk typist by the Development Program. Poland had given clearance for her employment, and had renewed her passport, but she was unique as an Eastern European hired locally. Her passport carried a UN (G4) visa.

She was assigned to Ulan Bator because she spoke Russian. The project director there is a Soviet citizen. She left New York July 13 and was scheduled to arrive in Mongolia Aug. 13 with a stopover in Poland to see her parents. In August she complained to a Czech employee at the UN Projects Office in Warsaw that the Polish police had lifted her UN laisse-passer. After that complaint, she was arrested by Polish military police on Aug. 10 and her Polish passport was confiscated, UN sources said.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A-8NEW YORK TIMES  
25 SEPTEMBER 1979

## Soviet Defector, on BBC, Says Moscow Agents

Special to The New York Times

LONDON, Sept. 24 — Arkady N. Shevchenko, the Soviet diplomat who defected last year, says that Soviet intelligence has made a "very substantial" penetration into the United Nations Secretariat.

Mr. Shevchenko, who was Under Secretary General of the United Nations, said in an interview broadcast here today that, because of the presence of the United Nations, New York had become "the most important base of all Soviet intelligence operations in the world."

He said that perhaps 300 professional officers of the State Security Committee, the Soviet intelligence agency, which is known by its Russian initials K.G.B., were stationed in New York, among them a special assistant to Secretary General Kurt Waldheim.

"Soviet intelligence officers have become a Trojan horse behind the wall of the United Nations," Mr. Shevchenko said, in his first substantial public interview since his defection in April 1978. "If

the United States or United Kingdom will not do anything against them, you give them a free hand. They would do, at liberty, what they want."

### Part of Program About Espionage

The interview with Mr. Shevchenko was broadcast by the British Broadcasting Corporation, as part of a 50-minute program about espionage. According to Tom Mangold, the reporter who conducted it, it took place about three weeks ago in the Washington area, where Mr. Shevchenko has been living in hiding and presumably undergoing questioning by the American intelligence officials.

Sitting on a flowered chair in a comfortably furnished living room, he seemed cheerful and relaxed as he described the Soviet espionage system, smiling good-naturedly from time to time. His American wife, whom he married near the end of last year, appeared on the screen briefly, but did not speak.

When he came to the allegation that Mr. Waldheim's assistant was a Soviet in-

## Have Penetrated the U.N.

telligence agent, he said that he would have found it embarrassing to inform the Secretary General of the man's identity. Now Mr. Waldheim can get the information from the broadcast, Mr. Shevchenko said.

He did not identify the alleged agent, but the narrator said the only Russian in the post of special assistant to the Secretary General was Viktor M. Lesovsky.

Another well-placed spy, Mr. Shevchenko said, is Geli Dneprovsky, the chief of personnel at the United Nations in Geneva, whom he described as "a high-level K.G.B. officer." Mr. Shevchenko said that, although all United Nations staff members were required to pledge loyalty to the world organization and not to take instruction from their home governments, the ones who come from the Soviet Union "totally disregard" that pledge.

The Soviet authorities, he said, have "its own rule of conduct for the Soviet nationals who are working at the United Na-

tions Secretariat."

"They ask them to come almost daily to the Soviet mission," Mr. Shevchenko said. "They give them instructions, to pursue some of the goals of Soviet foreign policy, not U.N. or something. In all the other respects they're actually not like the other nationals working in the U.N. Secretariat."

### U.N. Aides Decline Comment

Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., Sept. 24 — United Nations officials declined specific comment on Arkady Shevchenko's allegations, saying that they had not seen the text of the BBC broadcast, but they condemned the former Soviet aide generally as a renegade.

One spokesman said: "He was one of the members of the Secretariat who did not live up to the rules of his office. He broke them. So we have to take what he said with a great deal of care."

Viktor M. Lesovsky, Secretary General Waldheim's special assistant, declined to comment.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A1-7THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)  
25 September 1979

# Russian Says Spies Riddle U.N.

## Some in KGB Reported in Key Offices

From News Services

LONDON — Arkady N. Shevchenko, the former high-ranking United Nations official who defected last year, says that the Soviet intelligence apparatus has made a "very substantial" penetration into the U.N. Secretariat.

Shevchenko, who was the top-ranking Soviet official at the Secretariat, indicated in an interview broadcast by the British Broadcasting Corp. yesterday that perhaps 150 professional KGB or Soviet military intelligence officers are employed with the United Nations in New York.

Among them, he said, is a Soviet citizen who works as a special assistant to Secretary General Kurt Waldheim.

Shevchenko did not identify the alleged agent. But the narrator of the television program said that there was only one Russian with the title of special assistant to the secretary general, a man named Victor Lessiovsky.

Another well-placed spy, Shevchenko said, is Geli Dneprovsky, the chief of personnel at the United Nations in Geneva, whom he described as "a high-level KGB officer."

Britain and other Western delegations tried to block Dneprovsky's appointment, but it was put through under Soviet pressure, according to the program — a 50-minute documentary about espionage — that included the interview.

"Soviet intelligence officers have become a Trojan horse behind the wall of the United Nations," Shevchenko said in his first substantial public interview since his defection in April 1978. "If the United States or United Kingdom will not do anything against them, you give them a free hand. They would do at liberty, what they want."

Because of the presence of the United Nations, New York City has become "the most important base of all Soviet intelligence operations in the world," Shevchenko said.

Tom Mangold, the reporter who conducted the interview, said it took place about three weeks ago in the Washington area, where Shevchenko has been living in hiding, and presumably undergoing questioning by the American intelligence officials.

Sitting on a flowered chair in a comfortably furnished living room, the former U.N. undersecretary general for political and Security Council affairs seemed cheerful and relaxed as he described the Soviet espionage system, smiling good-naturedly from time to time. His American wife, whom he married near the end of last year, appeared on the screen briefly, but did not speak.

When he came to the allegation that a special assistant of the secretary general's was a KGB agent, he said he would have found it "embarrassing" to inform Waldheim of the assistant's other identity. But then he added with a smile that now his old boss would get the information "indirectly" from the broadcast.

Shevchenko said Soviet citizens are allotted about 250 professional posts in the U.N. and interpreters bring the total to about 300.

"I would say it would be a fair guess it would be the minimum that half are KGB or GRU officers," he said. The GRU is Soviet military intelligence.

"I do not say they have very many posts at a very high level," Shevchenko said. "Most of the posts which they have is a medium level post or junior post."

Shevchenko said that although all United Nations staff members are required to pledge to be loyal to the organization and not to take instruction from their home governments, the ones who come from the Soviet Union "totally disregard" that pledge.

The Soviet government, he said, has "its own rule of conduct for the Soviet nationals who are working at the United Nations Secretariat. They ask them to come almost daily to the Soviet Mission. They give them instructions to pursue some of the goals of Soviet foreign policy, not U.N. or something. In all the other respects they're actually not like the other nationals working in the U.N. Secretariat."

Shevchenko described how, when he was at the United Nations, the Russians cajoled him into accepting a KGB man as an assistant:

"They pleaded. They didn't force me, but they asked me and I cannot refuse. I said okay, you want him, he will work for a few months. But when I tried to transfer him after a few months, they resisted, and it was a struggle which lasted more than a year."

"But it was an extremely unpleasant thing. They'd be looking for all the documents in my office. I mean Xeroxing code cables and all this thing. It was very embarrassing for me. There would be a leak, I mean, how I'd look as impartial."

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ON PAGE 49

THE WASHINGTON POST  
25 September 1979

*Half of Soviets at U.N.  
Are Spies, Defector Says*

Reuter

LONDON, Sept. 24—Arkady Shevchenko, the senior Soviet diplomat who defected to the West, said in a television interview broadcast tonight that he believed at least half of the Soviet members of the U.N. Secretariat in New York are spies.

Shevchenko, 48, as undersecretary general at the United Nations, was granted U.S. asylum in April 1978. He told the BBC that the Soviet Union considered the United Nations "the tallest tower" in the West for its intelligence activities.

He said Soviet special assistant to Secretary General Kurt Waldheim was an officer in the KGB, the Soviet intelligence organization.

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Paisley -- The story lives on even if he doesn't

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE H-2

WILMINGTON NEWS JOURNAL

23 September 1979

# opinion

## Puzzles persist in Paisley case

Eight months ago the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence gave up on its investigation into the death or disappearance of John Paisley and turned to the Justice Department—read FBI—for help in unraveling the mysterious case of the former agent of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The Senate committee had tried, not very successfully, to get to the bottom of the case. Burdened with insufficient investigative resources and little cooperation from the CIA, the committee, for reasons which seemed both then and now, preposterous, turned to the FBI. It didn't take long for the FBI to tell the Senate Committee in a still secret report that there was nothing significant new in the case. Since the FBI had participated in the initial investigation of John Paisley's disappearance there was little surprise in this. It would have been extraordinary for the agency to conclude it had not done the job properly to begin with.

John A. Paisley was vaulted into the public eye a year ago. Ostensibly a retired CIA analyst, Paisley vanished on Sept. 24, 1979, while sailing on the Chesapeake Bay. Several days later, a badly decomposed body was taken from the bay. The man had been shot in the head and draped with diver's weights. The Maryland State Police with FBI assistance, identified the body as Paisley's and concluded that he was probably a suicide.

As the story in today's News Journal by Reporters Joe Trento and Richard Sandza indicates, the mystery surrounding John Paisley is far from resolved. Many of the questions that puzzled the members of the Senate committee last February persist. This is not just another stranger-than-fiction spy story. The CIA initially described Paisley as a low level analyst. But information uncovered by this newspaper and others in the last year gives a much different picture of the man.

Eight months ago we raised a number of questions about the Paisley affair that remain insufficiently answered. They bear repeating:

■ Who was John A. Paisley? What was his rank and status with the CIA, and his access to sensitive intelligence material? Is it possible that he knew of a high-ranking double agent in the intelligence community—or was he that agent?

■ Is John Paisley dead? If the body found in the bay was Paisley's, was it a suicide? (To believe that Paisley shot himself behind the left ear and fell overboard without leaving blood stains on the deck of his boat or that he shot himself in the water strains credibility.) Did the information or intelligence he held relate to his death?

■ Was there a connection between Paisley's death and the compromising of the K-11 spy satellite system by a series of security breaches past year and a half?

■ Finally, perhaps the most important question: Is there sufficient capability in our government for monitoring the secret agencies like the FBI and the CIA?

Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence claim the Paisley case is still under active investigation and that there are major revelations about John Paisley that still haven't been made public. The SALT II treaty is now getting center stage attention from the select committee, but when the debate on that is done can the Senate afford to leave the questions about John Paisley unanswered?

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ON PAGE H-1

WILMINGTON NEWS JOURNAL

23 September 1979

# Perspective

## Paisley's death — still a mystery

By RICHARD SANDZA,  
and JOE TRENTO

Had John A. Paisley been consulted, he probably would have chosen to die at sea.

For Paisley, an avid sailor who enjoyed the solitude of the Chesapeake Bay, dying aboard his sloop wouldn't have meant dying alone. His ham radio buddies were as close as the microphone in the cabin of his boat.

But, Paisley, the CIA officer who kept the nation's secrets and his role in them in the strictest confidence, would have liked to die quietly. He might even have requested that there be no obituary.

If he was in on his own disappearance last Sept. 24, he certainly didn't count on its becoming an international mystery that has left people at the highest levels of government asking each other: "What really happened to John Paisley? Did he really commit suicide as the official verdict reads?"

Their next question, inevitably is: "Do you think he's dead?" Followed by: "Was the body found in the bay really his?" And then: "Was he murdered?"

Good questions. After a year of investigating the disappearance of John Arthur Paisley, the answers to those questions remain elusive. What the investigation — which included hundreds of interviews in a dozen cities — produced was more questions.

John Arthur Paisley, a stooped-over 55-year-old retired CIA official, sailed out of Lusby, Md., aboard his sloop Brillig on a clear sunny Sunday morning. He chatted on the radio with a friend who sailed his sloop nearby. The friend, Michael Yohn, found the winds wouldn't provide enough sailing to entertain him as much as that afternoon's Redskins game, so he turned back to port, leaving Paisley sailing alone across the Chesapeake Bay.

Yohn is the last person known to have seen Paisley.

That afternoon, Paisley spoke on the radio to Yohn and to two other ham operators in the area. He was moored near Hoopers Light working on a report he was writing for the CIA.

The next day Paisley's boat ran aground about 24 miles to the south. No one was on board. The briefcase, with Paisley's report in it, was there, as were a number of personal and potentially sensitive materials. But Paisley was missing.

A week later a bloated, dungaree-clad body was found floating in the bay near Hooper's Light. The body had a bullet hole in the head; two diving belts were strapped around the body.

The way that body was handled raised the most pressing question: Is Paisley dead?

Dr. Russell S. Fisher, the Maryland state medical examiner, relied on the FBI and a man who claimed to be Paisley's dentist for his identification of the body. Because the FBI couldn't find more recent fingerprints, it used a set supposedly mailed in by Paisley in 1940. The

CIA claimed it had no prints for the man who served more than 20 years in secret intelligence service.

The dentist compounded the matter by saying he wasn't totally sure that the upper plate he was shown positively belonged to Paisley. He had destroyed Paisley's dental records. "It could have been a million people's denture," he admitted later.

The body was cremated — without anyone who knew Paisley having looked at it.

And, the Sunday News Journal found a full set of more recent prints for Paisley in the files of the U.S. Coast Guard. Those files were kept a few blocks from the FBI offices in Washington. The FBI and Fisher and the FBI refused to release the fingerprints used for that identification for comparison with the newly discovered prints.

The Paisley death was ruled a suicide by Fisher. Evidence that Paisley was distraught about his crumbling marriage and the departure of his mistress was trotted out to support that claim.

Police said that Paisley shot himself with his own gun while either hanging off the side of the boat — which was moving through the water — or shot himself in mid-air after jumping off the boat.

All of this took place while Paisley was wearing two diving weight belts he had strapped around his upper torso.

Fisher and the FBI refused to reconsider the identification.

Hope for finding the truth about Paisley was left in the hands of an understaffed Senate Select Com-

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mittee on Intelligence which opened a Paisley investigation shortly after the body was found. The Senate was concerned that Paisley may have been killed by a foreign agency — Russian KGB.

The mystery deepened with revelations that Paisley's apartment had been burglarized the very day he left for his fateful sail. Taken from the apartment were secret government documents and a series of tape-recorded interviews with Paisley's mother. On the tapes, Mrs. Paisley outlined the family history. Some intelligence experts believe that history would be helpful in creating a credible personal history for a spy planning to work undercover.

When the CIA arrived at the apartment — after the Brillig was found — agents removed more secret documents and a handwritten note which said, "Now, what about Shevchenko?" That note, which the CIA destroyed, lends credibility to the belief that Paisley dealt with Soviet defectors. Arkady N. Schevchenko was a top-ranking Soviet U.N. official who defected to the U.S. in April 1978.

When the CIA was asked about Paisley's connection to the agency, it said that he was retired and was no longer on the payroll. They described him as a low-level analyst.

In no time various investigations of John Paisley showed that the CIA had not been totally candid about his role in U.S. intelligence. Paisley was an important man to the CIA — and to the U.S. government.

In his years in government service he rose from a radio operator aboard merchant ships during World War II to the number two position in the CIA office of strategic research. But, because of some of his rare talents, Paisley's work was not confined to jobs listed under the duties of the deputy director of the office. Before he disappeared he had free access to CIA director Stansfield Turner.

He was somehow connected to Richard Nixon's team of leak stoppers called The Plumbers.

He worked with Soviet defectors. He had access to America's deepest military secrets.

Though much has been learned about Paisley's missions on behalf of his government, it is certain that he did more than is publicly known.

Paisley's first unusual mission was his job with the Ralph Bunche U.N. mission to Palestine in 1948. That group laid the ground work for the establishment of the nation of Israel. He was chosen because of his radio expertise; he used his knowledge to set up a means of intercepting messages between Middle-Eastern governments.

From there Paisley went off to college. He spent almost four years at the University of Chicago, studying international relations. He left in 1953, one course short of a bachelor's degree.

He joined the CIA soon thereafter in 1954. His sister, Katherine Lenahan, who now lives in Newport, Oregon, says that the family knew only that John had gone off to work for the State Department. They were told nothing about intelligence work.

John didn't talk much about what he was supposed to be doing for the State Department. But, Mrs. Lenahan said, the family knew that Paisley was doing something secret.

"We weren't officially allowed to say what he was doing, where he worked until he came out of the closet," Mrs. Lenahan said. She said that the family called Paisley's job "State Department work." She said he "did a lot of traveling, two or three trips a year."

In 1963, Paisley returned to the University of Chicago, to complete a master's degree in international relations. He did that without having to go through the normal course work. He was awarded the degree by taking only one course — and doing a dissertation called, "An Analysis of the Economic Growth of the Soviet Electronics Industry from 1940 to 1960 and a Comparison with the U.S. Industry."

A spokesman for the university said he had never heard of a degree being awarded under those circumstances.

Officially John Paisley never was assigned any undercover — covert — assignments, according to the CIA. But, some members of his family are convinced that he was working under an assumed name in clandestine work.

Actually, the CIA inadvertently acknowledged that at least once,

**Paisley was awarded a master's degree from the University of Chicago after taking just one course.**

Paisley was working under "light cover." That was in 1970 when he was assigned to the U.S. Embassy in London. Actually, he was attending the Imperial War College and doing some strategic surveillance work out of a U.S. Air Force base near there.

Paisley's assignments for the CIA brought him into contact with the nation's nuclear weapons arsenal, the assessments of the strength of Soviet armaments, the developments of U.S. satellites and other surveillance devices and, finally, in the SALT negotiations in Vienna and Helsinki in 1972.

Paisley was also used to talk with defectors. He was named as a contact man between the Nixon plumbers and the CIA. No one will say what his mission there was.

In 1972 he purchased the Brillig, a 31-foot sloop he registered at Wilmington, N. C., where he often stopped while sailing up and down the coast. The CIA has a safehouse in that city where Yuri Nosenko, one of the most famous Soviet defectors was kept in isolation.

In 1974 he officially retired from the CIA. He told his friends that he was growing disillusioned about the revelations that were coming out about CIA activities.

But he didn't leave intelligence work entirely. In 1976 the CIA called him back out of retirement to be liaison to a sensitive CIA group later called Team B. That group, made up of experts on Soviet military strength, was assembled by then-director George Bush to assess the value of the CIA's in-house analyses of the Soviet Union.

Paisley's role was to work with

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the group, providing them with whatever materials they wanted to look at in order to make their determinations. That role made it necessary for Paisley to be given access to the most sensitive secrets within CIA headquarters at Langley, Va.

Once that project was done, Paisley began looking for a full-time job. His marriage began to falter; he found his own apartment in Washington, D.C.

His choice of a nondescript building at 1500 Massachusetts Ave. for a home caused some consternation among his intelligence community friends. The building was a known residence for Soviet agents, and was under constant surveillance by the FBI.

He joined a therapy group called Lifespring. Then, in 1977 he found a job at Coopers and Lybrand, an international accounting firm.

That job surprised many of his friends. "John Paisley couldn't balance his own checkbook," a friend said. "What was he going to do for an accounting firm?" The firm is believed to have close connections with the CIA. Last year he was assigned by the CIA to do a report on the value of the Team B experience. He was working on the final draft of that report when he sailed off into the Chesapeake Bay one year ago.

It was the letters "CIA" on the pages of that report that led the Coast Guardsmen who boarded his abandoned sloop to figure that the master of the Brillig was somebody very important.

The mystery surrounding his death — exacerbated by the questionable identification process — was further deepened when his estranged wife, Maryann, hired a private investigator and flashy Washington lawyer to look into her fears that her husband may not be dead at all.

Mrs. Paisley, a former CIA employee herself, was concerned by the "lies they were telling about John" over at CIA headquarters a few miles from her home.

Her remarks slowed the payment of her husband's life insurance until the investigator, Kennard Smith, turned up two men who seemed to make the identification — and the fact that Paisley was dead — stick, but who blew the suicide theory right out the window.

Smith located Dr. George Weems, the Calvert County Coroner, who was called to pronounce the body dead. He took marina owner Harry Lee Langley Sr. with him to the nearby Naval Weapons Center to identify the body.

The two men saw the body, and remembered the state it was in. But they never said a word about it until nine months later — when Mrs. Paisley was having trouble collecting on a life insurance policy that contained a suicide clause.

Her lawyer, Bernard Fensterwald — who was an ace at grabbing headlines in the nation's biggest papers — called a press conference for Langley's marina in Solomons, Md., near where Paisley disappeared.

Weems and Langley were the stars of that show.

Langley went first. He told reporters — who had long since given up on the Paisley story — that he recognized the body he saw that afternoon in October. Paisley had been a customer at his marina.

Then Weems, a crusty physician who's been coroner in his home county for years, said that the body "looked like it had been hung" by the neck before it entered the water. There was a red ring around its neck. He said he didn't believe the death was a suicide.

"No," he said, "he didn't note the mark around the neck in his report to the medical examiner; he was sure the medical examiner would see it."

Both he and Weems said they kept silent because an officer at the Naval Weapons Center had told them to. "It was supposed to be all government, all secret," Langley said. "They told me that Mr. Paisley was CIA and they wanted to just... Put it this way: when I left there, nobody should know nothing," he said.

They came forth at Fensterwald's request because they heard that Mrs. Paisley was having trouble collecting the life insurance.

The insurance company paid off the day of the press conference.

Fisher and the Maryland State Police were unmoved. The investigation would remain dormant.

Just how important John Paisley is remains a mystery to the general public. The job was too big for the Senate Intelligence committee, which in February asked the FBI to

**The FBI has recommended that no further investigation be made in the Paisley case.**

look over what it had found. The committee cited "troubling questions" that remained unanswered about Paisley.

The FBI looked at the matter and returned a still-secret report that concluded that the Maryland State police were probably right in their contention that Paisley probably killed himself. The FBI recommended that the committee do no further investigation; none was warranted.

The committee angrily rejected that recommendation and reopened its own probe.

The Senate Intelligence Committee's investigation continues, though its work has been hampered by the time needed to consider the SALT II treaty now before the Senate for ratification.

Members of that committee have said that there are major revelations about Paisley that haven't been made public, despite dozens of stories in the News-Journal and other papers about Paisley and his role in the U.S. government.

The committee's spokesman said last week that the probe continues.

"It's still under active investigation," Spencer Davis said.

A member of the committee, Delaware's Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr., adds that the number of leads the committee has followed "would keep 5 million investigative reporters busy."

INQUIRY  
15 October 1979

# WHO KILLED JOHN PAISLEY?

**The CIA calls his death a suicide, but the evidence suggests that the former intelligence analyst was another casualty in the war over the Russian "mole" inside the CIA.**

By JEFF GOLDBERG

**T**WENTY-TWO-YEAR-OLD Eddie Paisley works as a waiter at a Virginia bar and grill just outside of Washington, D.C. His 55-year-old father, an important CIA analyst, was found dead, floating in the Chesapeake Bay, one year ago. The authorities ruled he had committed suicide. Eddie Paisley believes his father was murdered. "Somebody is plugging the case up and trying to befuddle it as best they can," he says. "That's what it seems like to me. Obviously something's up, but the CIA doesn't want anyone to know about it."

Eddie's father, John Arthur Paisley, left the CIA in 1974 after twenty-one years of service, for which he was decorated with the Distinguished Medal of Honor. Since 1969 he had been the deputy director of the CIA's Office of Strategic Research, the branch that deals with assessing Soviet nuclear capabilities. He was an important and respected expert on U.S. and Soviet atomic weapons and the CIA's computer and satellite systems. Since his "official" retirement five years ago, he had continued to work on top-secret agency projects as a \$200-a-day consultant—until he disappeared.

On Sunday, September 24, 1978,

Paisley sailed off from Lusby, Maryland, on his 31-foot sloop *Brillig* for a day on the bay. He was an expert sailor who loved the time he spent on his boat. He apparently planned to work alone that day, evaluating a sensitive CIA report on Soviet nuclear strength.

Late in the afternoon Paisley radioed ashore to friends to say he would be staying out late on the *Brillig*. He asked for the dock lights to be left on for him. It was the last time anyone is known to have heard from him.

The next morning the Coast Guard discovered the abandoned *Brillig* when a crab boat reported being almost hit by it. After boarding the boat, the Coast Guard quickly identified Paisley as its owner, and they noted the CIA documents in his briefcase. The CIA's security office was immediately notified.

After a delay of some twelve hours, the CIA called Maryann Paisley at her McLean, Virginia, home. The Paisleys had separated a year earlier after twenty-five years of marriage and he had just recently moved into a new apartment in downtown Washington. Maryann Paisley had herself worked for the CIA in 1974 as a contract employee and was still bound by the agency's security oath. She understood the CIA's concern for securing his sensitive papers, so late that night she drove out to the Maryland shore, accompanied by her daughter

Diane, and CIA officials. They searched the *Brillig*, but apparently removed nothing. However, there were indications that other CIA security representatives had already been there, because Paisley's sophisticated radio gear (antennas and transmitters) were gone.

The next morning, Maryann Paisley sent her son Eddie to check his father's apartment. He discovered the apartment had already been entered—papers were in disarray and a camera, tape recordings, and a Rolodex were missing. Some nine-millimeter bullets were strewn on a closet floor. It was later determined that CIA representatives had already been there also. The police later complained that these searches had contaminated much of the evidence.

At this point there was no trace of Paisley. Since he was a strong swimmer, his family hoped he was still alive on one of the bay's small islands. The Coast Guard made a helicopter and boat search of the area, but there was no police investigation because a missing-person report had not been filed. For a week Paisley's disappearance went publicly unreported.

Then on October 1, a bloated, badly decomposed body was pulled from the bay several miles from where the *Brillig* had run aground. The victim, shot once behind the left ear with a nine-millime-

JEFF GOLDBERG is codirector of the Washington-based Assassination Information Bureau.

CONT'D

ter bullet, was wearing two belts containing thirty-eight pounds of diving weights. The body, made buoyant by gases trapped inside, had floated to the surface. No gun was recovered.

The next day, Maryland's chief medical examiner, Dr. Russell S. Fisher, identified the body as Paisley's and ruled the cause of death as a gunshot.

## "Paisley never was not involved in something big," says a source.

wound in the head. The coroner classified the manner of death as "undetermined."

The Maryland State Police now entered the case and assigned it a very high priority. But since the boat and apartment had already been "cleaned out" by the CIA, a police spokesman says, "We had to play catch-up ball during the entire investigation." Nevertheless, three weeks later the police ruled the death an "apparent suicide," although their files remain open and, like the coroner, they officially classify the manner of death as "undetermined."

Indeed this was not to be an open-and-shut case. Doubts and questions began to surface from the prodding of Paisley's family and a small group of reporters from Wilmington, Baltimore, and Washington. The uncertainties spawned a wide range of theories: It was not Paisley's body that had been found, he was alive on a secret CIA mission, he was alive in Moscow as a defector, he was the celebrated KGB mole in the CIA, or he was killed by the KGB for discovering the mole.

John Paisley's violent death is now a full-blown, year-old spy mystery becoming more puzzling and complex with each new revelation. Despite official pronouncements that nothing is amiss, the case is full of tantalizing suggestions, misdirections, and double meanings that just don't add up and won't go away. "This is the mystery story of the decade," says an unidentified police investigator to a Baltimore reporter. "You and I will probably be dead and gone long before they close the files on this one."

Besides the unusual circumstances of Paisley's death, which we will come to later, what made this case so provocative was the CIA's attitude toward Paisley and the swirl of events that coincided with his death, including fierce accusa-

tions of "moles" in the CIA, an intense debate over SALT verification, and a security breach involving a top-secret spy-satellite manual ["Poisoning SALT," May 1, 1979, p. 11].

But from the beginning the CIA's public position was that there was "no evidence whatsoever" of foul play in Paisley's death. Agency officials claimed no

comparing them with outside evaluations (Team B). Paisley was not a member of the B team, but as its executive director he had access to the most highly classified intelligence materials on the Soviet Union.

After four months of work, in December 1976, Team B concluded the CIA had underestimated Soviet military strength. Their report was then leaked to the *New York Times* in an attempt to pressure the CIA into taking a harder line. Apparently Paisley disagreed, sticking with the Team A analysis. One of the more hawkish Team B members, Daniel Graham, former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, has called him a "weepy liberal."

Paisley was working on his evaluation of Team B's performance during his last sailing excursion.



**MARYANN PAISLEY** and her two children initially followed CIA procedures and kept silent after the body was recovered. She had sought advice from the agency and had asked a CIA-approved attorney to represent her. However, she soon began to doubt that the body was her husband's, and became upset with the unsatisfactory answers and the lack of cooperation she was receiving from the agency.

In January, she sent a bitter letter to CIA Director Turner, writing that "the CIA attitude toward me has been a betrayal of my husband's devotion and unquestioned loyalty to the Agency." She was so angered by what she felt was a CIA cover-up that she hired a new attorney, Bernard Fensterwald, Jr., and a private investigator, Ken Smith, and told them, "Find out what the hell happened to my husband."

Fensterwald, a longtime friend of the Paisley family, is an experienced and well-known Washington attorney. He served as a Senate committee counsel in the 1960s, and since then he has represented such noted clients as convicted assassin James Earl Ray and Watergate conspirator James McCord. For many years he has worked to uncover the JFK assassination conspiracy by directing a private, Washington-based research organization called the Committee to Investigate Assassinations.

In April, Fensterwald told reporters he was "pretty well convinced" the body found was not Paisley's. He cited discrepancies between the height, weight, and waist size of the corpse and those of Paisley. Paisley was 5 feet 11 inches tall,

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weighed 170 pounds, and had a 34-inch waist. The corpse was originally measured as 5 feet 7 inches, 144 pounds, with a 30-inch waist. In November, Fisher, the state coroner, revised the height of the corpse to 5 feet 11 inches, saying it "was originally recorded in error as 5 feet 7 inches." Inexplicably, Fisher made this correction seven weeks after the body had been cremated.

In fact, it is not clear how Fisher made his identification at all; he had no fingerprints or dental records, no family member or friend on hand to examine the body, and a body so decomposed that all of the hair was gone, including the thick beard Paisley grew. There was not even any blood left to be typed. Later, in a terse but cryptic remark about the identification, the police would only say, "We were under tremendous pressures."

Fisher said the body was so grotesque it would be "out of the question" for family members to view it. After his identification, he allowed the body to be cremated in a CIA-approved funeral home. Mrs. Paisley had consented to the cremation on the advice of Fisher, CIA officials, and the CIA-approved attorney who was then counseling her. Her approval was given, however, before she learned about what she called "the multitude of physical discrepancies." Later, when she was finally allowed to see photos taken at the autopsy, she could not make an identification and was not satisfied the body was her husband's.

For nine months the identification remained in dispute as Paisley's family refused to admit the cremated body was his. Then, in June, two men who saw the body when it was first brought ashore by the Coast Guard came forward to question the suicide finding. The two said they had seen distinct markings around the throat that indicated "soul play." Dr. George Weems, the county coroner for twenty years, and Harry Lee Langley, the owner of the marina where Paisley gassed up his sloop, spoke to reporters at a press conference arranged by Fensterwald on behalf of Mrs. Paisley.

Weems, the first doctor to see the body, said he had noticed markings on the neck indicating it had "been squeezed or had a rope around it. . . . They were the type of things you see when people are strangled." He said the marks appeared to have been made before Paisley was killed, and not afterwards, when the body was in the water.

Langley said it was either "a helluva rope burn" or "the throat had been slashed, because a bad gash ran from

ear to ear." Langley said he had seen Paisley around the marina and was sure the body he saw was Paisley's. He said he was told to keep quiet about what he had witnessed, but despite repeated questioning he could not remember who had told him to remain silent.

Weems conducted only a twenty-minute preliminary observation before sending the body, and a report, on to Baltimore, where the autopsy was performed the next day. Fisher's autopsy report does not mention any markings on Paisley's throat, and when he was reached by reporters later, he denounced Weems's comments, saying that one of his subordinates should not be "spouting off about things he doesn't know about." "They had no way of observing the body adequately," said Fisher. "The marks around the neck were caused by skin slippage." Weems, recontacted after these comments, stuck to his conclusion, saying, "I know what I saw."

Why had Weems and Langley waited nine months to come forward? Langley said he finally contacted Mrs. Paisley after hearing news reports that she might not be able to collect on her husband's life insurance policies. Paisley's CIA insurance policy paid off right away, but two other insurance companies questioned the identification of the body and the cause of death. (One company, Mutual of Omaha, has a special clause in its policy: it doesn't pay off on a suicide. The other company, Mutual of New York, was not sure the body was

pects to sue them. If the company still refuses to pay, once the suit is filed, a jury trial would follow later this year. To win, Mutual of Omaha would have to prove suicide, a difficult task with no witnesses, no suicide note, and little evidence. If Mutual of Omaha were to lose, Mrs. Paisley and her attorney would have a legal verdict of murder, which they hope would prompt a new investigation. But more important, the discovery proceedings of a trial would allow Fensterwald to ask for documents and question the CIA about Paisley.

**I**F THE BODY PULLED FROM the Chesapeake Bay was indeed Paisley's, had he been murdered? "Jumping off a boat with a gun in hand, pulling the trigger while in the water, is, to be charitable about the matter, a weird way to commit suicide," says Fensterwald. "And there was no suicide note. I'm told that 95 percent of suicide cases have left a note." The attorney cites other factors that argue against suicide:

■ There were no signs of a shooting aboard the *Brillig*. No trace of blood or brain tissue were found on the sloop. Thus, a suicide verdict requires a finding that Paisley either shot himself while standing on the edge of the boat—so that the shell casing, pistol, blood, and brain fragments all fell overboard with him—or that he shot himself in the water while wearing thirty-eight pounds of diving weights.

## "Jumping off a boat with a gun is a weird way to commit suicide."

Paisley's.) Langley told Mrs. Paisley what he had seen and then urged Weems also to come forward.

Because Langley had known Paisley previously, and because, after nine months, Paisley had not turned up alive, the family and their attorney, as a matter of convenience, now reluctantly concede it was his body, though they still have doubts.

Soon after the June press conference, Mutual of New York (with no suicide clause) agreed to make good on its \$95,000 policy. A MONY spokesman said, "Our doubts have been resolved that it was Paisley's body." Mutual of Omaha (with the special clause) will not honor its policy and Fensterwald ex-

■ Ballistics experts have assured Mary-ann Paisley that a nine-millimeter gun held behind the ear and fired at closer than arm's length will send a bullet in one side of the skull and out the other. This did not happen to Paisley. The corpse had a lead slug lodged in the brain and no exit wound.

■ According to Mrs. Paisley, when she first boarded the boat she noticed "a table had been pulled away from the wall. Several screws had been pulled loose, and it was tilted at an angle which would have made it impossible to use." This raised the question of struggle aboard the boat, since Paisley was working on the Team B report and the table

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was the only writing surface aboard.

A week after the Langley-Weems press conference, two former state prosecutors who had worked on the Paisley case said it had not been properly investigated and should be reopened. The two men, Naji P. Maloof (the county attorney when the body was found) and Lawrence Lampson (Maloof's successor and now a district court judge) said their work was hampered by the CIA's refusal to cooperate with the state police. "Some people just don't want the truth about this case out," said Maloof.

**MARY ANN PAISLEY** says her husband was not just a paper-pushing analyst, despite the CIA's insistence that he never worked for the clandestine side of the agency. She wrote to Admiral Turner that Paisley's CIA activities "over the years were, as you know, certainly not confined to the overt side." She has said privately that Paisley served as a CIA contact for Nixon's White House "Plumbers." Also, investigator Ken Smith found the code-name "NASH" scribbled among some of Paisley's papers. "NASH" stands for North Arlington Safe House," says Smith. "Nosenko was kept there at one time."

The Nosenko controversy is at the center of a secret struggle that divides the CIA. The question is, Is there a "mole"—a KGB plant—inside the CIA's top staff who has compromised our intelligence system? Paisley was apparently a man in the middle of this "mole war," which is being fought in public by former CIA officials James Angleton and

became wary of Nosenko's bona fides. Their doubts increased with time. The timing of Nosenko's arrival was too convenient, his message too pat. Nosenko revealed he was the KGB man in charge of all of Lee Harvey Oswald's KGB records—including Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union in 1959 and his dealings with the Soviet embassy in Mexico City in 1963. With this complete knowledge, Nosenko assured both American intelligence and the Warren Commission, which was then beginning its deliberations, that Oswald was of "no interest" whatsoever to the KGB and had had no contact with the Soviet spy agency. Oswald, though, had told the U.S. embassy in Moscow that he had agreed to give the Russians U-2 spy-plane secrets. (As a marine radio operator, Oswald had been stationed at a major U-2 base in Japan.) Tennant Bagley, former deputy chief of the CIA's Soviet bloc division and an Angleton ally, now says he found Nosenko's explanation "unbelievable." Angleton went so far as to conclude Oswald was a KGB sleeper agent when he returned to the United States, and was later activated to kill Kennedy.

But to others in the CIA and to J. Edgar Hoover, Angleton was just paranoid. To Hoover's FBI, which had primary responsibility for investigating the assassination, Nosenko brought the best possible news. It was not in Hoover's interest to have the Soviets involved in the assassination. His most trusted Soviet intelligence source, a prized Russian double agent at the UN code-named "Fedora," had given Hoover the same assurances that Oswald had no KGB ties. The Soviet source also vouched for

Two years before Nosenko, came another Soviet defector, Anatoli M. Golitsin, code-named "Stone," held the United States there was a KGB mole who had penetrated the highest echelons of the CIA. When Nosenko defected, Stone at once suspected him. But both he and Nosenko-Fedora couldn't be right. (Stone is today a top CIA consultant whose word is accepted by agency counterintelligence.)

Angleton's side agreed with Stone and they tried to break Nosenko. He was placed under "hostile interrogation" at a specially constructed CIA safe house and psychologically tortured for more than three years. According to Bagley, Nosenko was the only defector to receive such treatment, which included solitary confinement, constant visual observation, and sophisticated techniques designed to disorient him. Serious contradictions and omissions developed in his story, but Nosenko refused to crack.

Still unconvinced, Angleton and Helms finally decided in 1968 that their doubts couldn't be resolved definitively. In an effort to diffuse the problem and get Nosenko out of their hair, they gave him a new identity and shipped him off to North Carolina for "rehabilitation." A 900-page report from the CIA's Soviet branch that year summed up their considerable doubts. But an 18-page rebuttal, written later in 1968 by the Office of Security, disputed each and every conclusion of the Angleton side. There the matter was to have ended.

But then came the major power shift within the CIA. In 1973 Helms was sent off to Iran and William Colby took over as director. By 1974, Angleton and his top aides were also out—forced to resign by Colby. Then came Colby's airing of twenty-five years of agency dirty laundry before the Senate—including foreign assassinations, mind-control projects, and illegal domestic operations. Helms and Angleton, the old-guard leaders, were blamed for many of these past crimes, and were chided for their anti-Soviet biases. (Colby, responsible for one of the worst CIA abuses, the "Phoenix" project of Vietnam executions, remained unscathed.) Colby also allowed the Nosenko defenders to welcome back Nosenko as a top consultant to CIA counterintelligence.

Until last year the whole Nosenko matter had smoldered in secret. However, the publication of Edward Epstein's book, *Legend*, changed that; there was a sensation in Congress, the media, and intelligence circles when it was learned that Angleton was a primary source for

## "Some people just don't want the truth about this case out."

Richard Helms on one side, representing the "old guard," and William Colby and Stansfield Turner on the other side, representing the new wave.

Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko, now 51, was a KGB agent who began feeding information to the CIA in June 1962. In January 1964—two months after the Kennedy assassination—he defected to the United States. To that point he was the highest-ranking KGB catch ever for American intelligence.

James Angleton, then chief of CIA counterintelligence, and his allies in the CIA's Soviet bloc division immediately

Nosenko's legitimacy. If Nosenko was a double agent, then Fedora must also be a mole. And if Fedora was lying, it meant Hoover's counterintelligence system was severely compromised. More important, the Nosenko message got Hoover's G-men off the hook for not having spotted Oswald as a potential assassin. Hoover reasoned that if Oswald had documentable ties to the KGB—whether or not he was their assassin—Hoover would have to explain to the Warren Commission why his men didn't know about it. So he embraced Nosenko and Fedora.

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 The book laid out publicly, for the first time, Angleton's opposition to Nosenko and his contention that the defector was a KGB plant sent to dupe the CIA. Masterspy Angleton, now out in the bitter cold, was saying, through Epstein, that the CIA had been turned "inside out" by the KGB. Colby was blamed for handing over the "family jewels" of past CIA illegalities to the Senate and destroying CIA counterintelligence. Angleton also hinted that maybe Colby was the "mole."

Apparently Colby's allies felt the same way about Angleton. Last May it was reported Angleton had been the subject of a 1972 CIA investigation into his loyalty. The investigation was terminated in 1974 because of lack of evidence. But now a second probe targeting Angleton is said to be underway. Ordered by Admiral Turner, this new investigation will reportedly blame Angleton for his failure to protect the CIA from Soviet penetration.

In the face of this attack, the Angleton-Helms side has been bolstered by the recently released report of the House Assassinations Committee, which substantiates their view of Nosenko. The committee interviewed everyone concerned, including Nosenko five times. The report concludes Nosenko "lied about Oswald" either "to the FBI and CIA in 1964 or the committee in 1978, or perhaps both." The committee found Oswald "quite likely" had been interviewed by the KGB and had been the subject of extensive KGB surveillance. One former committee staffer says, "We hammered away at Nosenko for six hours one day and totally broke him and his whole story shattered." Nosenko completely reversed his story and admitted to the committee that all of Oswald's mail was intercepted, his phone was tapped, his apartment bugged, and his movements watched by undercover KGB agents.

Adding weight to Nosenko's revised story, the committee's polygraph expert found that Nosenko's first two lie detector tests, which were administered by the Angleton team and showed Nosenko to be lying, were the "most valid." A later test, used by Nosenko's defenders to exonerate him, was judged by the committee's expert to be "atrocious."

Despite the committee's finding on Nosenko, the CIA officially sticks by him. The agency chose John Clement Hart, a twenty-four-year CIA veteran who wrote yet another positive CIA evaluation of Nosenko in 1976, to explain its current

demanded the CIA interrogation of Nosenko as the shabbiest he had ever seen. Then, in a classic stonewall, he refused to testify about Nosenko and Oswald—though this was the main reason the committee had called him. He refused to even acknowledge that questions exist about Nosenko. Hart would only say, "I would ignore the testimony of Mr. Nosenko on Oswald. I would not use it." But he said this did not imply a "bad faith" act by Nosenko, only that he had

what they tell us from one day to the next."

In April the FBI reported that the facts of the case did not warrant a counterintelligence investigation, but gave no details. The Senate committee remained "troubled" by the Nosenko angle and continued a limited investigation. (Their report should be ready this month, but is due to remain classified.) The CIA, for its part, has adamantly denied Paisley had any connection to Nosenko. Information from several

## "There isn't much we can do if the CIA lies to us," says a senator.

been misinformed or was boasting about his knowledge to get better treatment from the CIA.

Helms and Bagley were unimpressed. Since Nosenko had lied about Oswald, said Helms, "this tends to sour all other opinions he maintained. I don't know how one resolves this bone in the throat." "We cannot simply slide over this as easily as CIA does," said Bagley. "It is a serious possibility, not a sick fantasy. In fact, it is hard to avoid. It is irresponsible to expose clandestine personnel to this individual." Angleton has remained silent.

**W**HAT DOES ALL OF this have to do with Paisley? Apparently a lot. Paisley debriefed and befriended Nosenko; Maryann Paisley thinks her husband's death may be related to Nosenko; the Senate was so concerned it has investigated the matter for a year; and, in a remarkable coincidence, Paisley disappeared from the *Brillig* a few days after John Hart and Richard Helms testified to the Assassinations Committee about Nosenko.

In January, at the request of Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, the FBI began a counterintelligence analysis of the Paisley case. "A number of troubling questions remain," said Bayh. The Nosenko connection was high on the list, but the committee, whose function is oversight, claimed it lacked the manpower for a full investigation. "There isn't much we can do if the CIA lies to us," said a Senate spokesman. One senator anonymously added, "The CIA has lied so often about Paisley that they

sources indicates this is yet another CIA stonewall.

Reportedly, Paisley regularly interrogated and evaluated Soviet dissidents and political defectors. In particular, according to reporter Tad Szulc, who wrote about the Paisley case in January for the *New York Times Magazine*, Paisley, working closely with Angleton, interrogated Nosenko about Soviet strategic capabilities when Nosenko was held at a Virginia safe house in the mid-1960s. The two men later became friends, say Szulc's sources, and Paisley frequently visited Nosenko at his North Carolina home where he lived after 1968. The last visit was in the spring of 1978.

Admiral Turner says Nosenko "has no recollection of ever meeting Paisley." Angleton told *Look* last spring, "To my knowledge Paisley was never involved in the clandestine side. I have doubts that he saw Nosenko." But Angleton also denied ever meeting Paisley. Fensterwald, for one, doesn't trust Angleton's answer. He says, "I don't believe it's possible that in their long CIA careers, both involved in Soviet counterintelligence, that they never met." Angleton's denial could be viewed as self-serving. It is not inconceivable that Paisley, after 1974, was keeping tabs on Nosenko for the original Angleton group.

Maryann Paisley is sure her husband was part of the 1964-67 hostile interrogation team that condemned Nosenko. She says he told her he was. In her private letter to CIA Director Turner, she wrote, "You know that John Paisley was deeply involved in Nosenko's indescribable debriefing. It has crossed my mind and that of others, that my husband's fate might somehow be connected with the Nosenko case. John's death and/or

CONTINUED

disappearance coincided with Nosenko headlines in every newspaper and news broadcast nationwide. Katherine Hart or Len McCoy will tell you that I am not a fool."

Turner, a relative newcomer to the Nosenko question, has nevertheless continued the Colby policy. In her letter, Mrs. Paisley was asking him to listen to two current senior CIA officials, Hart and McCoy, who are on the pro-Nosenko side—his side. To persuade Turner to look into the matter, Maryann Paisley was relying not on people who were anti-Nosenko and therefore prejudiced in Turner's eyes, but on people who would be credible to him.

Katherine Hart is the wife of John Hart, whose Assassinations Committee testimony came nine days before Paisley disappeared. Mrs. Hart was Maryann Paisley's immediate supervisor when Mrs. Paisley worked for a year as a CIA bookkeeper in 1974 and Mrs. Hart was a senior officer in the Requirements Division, which handles requests for funds for clandestine operations by overseas CIA stations. Apparently she had a professional relationship with Paisley, since her CIA phone number was written in his secret phone book, recovered among his effects.

Leonard McCoy, according to Epstein's book *Legend*, was an officer in the CIA's Reports Section who championed

any hard evidence or proof that he was a double agent or a mole or any of these things. There have been a lot of stories hinting this or that but they're not based on anything you can prove." Fensterwald agrees that Paisley was loyal to the CIA, but this still leaves weighty and complex questions for the Senate (and the CIA) to answer:

■ Is there a mole in the CIA and was Paisley working to uncover him? One theory is that Paisley was murdered by the Soviets because he was about to expose their mole or because the Soviets wanted to teach the CIA a lesson. According to this theory, Paisley was being offered to the Russians as a double agent, when he was actually still loyal to the CIA. Fluent in Russian, having a top clearance, separated from his wife, living in an apartment building populated with Soviet embassy employees (read KGB), Paisley appeared to be a tailor-made defector. But the Soviets figured out it was too good to be true—a setup. So, the theory goes, they killed him to intimidate the Americans.

In fact, it has been reported that Paisley was approached by KGB agents during the early stages of the second round of SALT talks in Helsinki. He was asked to become a double agent on the subject of the U.S. negotiating position at the talks. Paisley immediately passed on the

(apparently the same investigation that looked into Angleton's performance). A report on this project was given to then CIA Director Colby in 1974, and soon after, Paisley was retired, Angleton was ousted, and Shadrin disappeared. One intelligence source theorized to the *Sun*, "Paisley may have gotten caught in the middle. Maybe he learned who the mole was. Or maybe he stumbled across some piece of information which might have led to the mole—and which made him an instant liability."

■ Why did Paisley retire from the CIA at 50, only to continue his top-secret work from the outside? Was his 1974 retirement voluntary or was he an anti-Nosenko loser, eased out of counterintelligence action with the rest of the Angleton side? According to the *Wilmington News Journal*, a former CIA official who was involved in Watergate recently said, "You have to examine that retirement very closely. He no more retired in 1974 than did E. Howard Hunt. The key to the Paisley case is the retirement."

■ What does it mean that the CIA embraces Nosenko?

The least horrifying possibility is that the Colby-Turner-Hart faction knows Nosenko lied, but thinks he lied to tell the truth. If this was the case, he was not a bona fide defector, but a hand-picked KGB messenger, trained in his message, and then sent to say, "We didn't kill Kennedy." But the Russians' ploy failed to convince Angleton, who is still persuaded that Oswald was a KGB-controlled agent.

It is an innocuous, but complicated explanation: The Russians didn't kill Kennedy—Angleton was wrong; Nosenko was a plant—Angleton was right. But there is no other mole—Nosenko, was, in effect, the mole. The CIA rupture has been caused by an internal conflict over how to interpret the data. The leaders who gained control in 1974 have decided to cover the whole thing up to save the CIA and the nation from an embarrassing misunderstanding.

The worst case would be that the CIA is totally infested with moles who have turned things inside out.

As for the Paisley case, Fensterwald now sums it up this way: "Anyone who looks at the facts is hard pressed to believe it was a suicide. And it was not a 'jealous husband' type of murder. It seems to be an intelligence murder. And if it was, the chances of solving it are very slim. Everything that happens in those kinds of cases is shrouded in mist."

*"Everything that happens in this kind of case is shrouded in mist."*

Nosenko and protested his mistreatment and the suppression of the information he had provided. After Angleton was purged in 1974, McCoy, according to Epstein, was appointed the new research head of counterintelligence, and "Nosenko himself was then appointed as a consultant to this newly constituted counterintelligence staff."

It is not known if Turner spoke to Hart or McCoy, but in February he did send Mrs. Paisley a brief reply, expressing his sympathy and concluding, "I do want you to know that our careful review of the evidence to date . . . has convinced us that it was John's body which was found and that problems or questions raised by you in your letter can be resolved." He gave no specifics.

One Senate source warns, "I would take it easy on Paisley's reputation and integrity. We have not been able to get

contact to his CIA superiors and was advised to take the offer. He fed information to the KGB with CIA approval, although it is not known whether it was accurate.

And there is also the case of Nicholas George Shadrin, a Soviet naval commander who defected to the United States in 1959 and became a consultant to the Office of Naval Intelligence. Sources confirmed to the *Baltimore Sun* that Paisley had interrogated and evaluated Shadrin. In 1966, Shadrin became a double agent working with the KGB, but under joint CIA-FBI control. In 1975, after nine years in this role, Shadrin flew to Vienna for a meeting with KGB operatives, then disappeared without a trace. His fate is still unknown and the CIA won't discuss the matter.

Five years ago, Paisley was involved in the agency-wide search for the mole

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ON PAGE 1

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL  
24 September 1979

Security clearance for sensitive government jobs should be tightened, a House intelligence subcommittee report said. As an example of laxness, it cited the case of a low-level CIA employe who obtained a top-secret manual for U.S. spy satellites. The report said clearance standards vary widely among agencies.

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Hill Report on Clearance Procedures

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A3THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)  
24 September 1979

# Intelligence Agencies Need to Improve In Spotting Security Risks, Hill Panel Says

By Robert Pear  
Washington Star Staff Writer

The CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies do not have any consistent, reliable procedures for screening out security risks among job applicants, a congressional subcommittee said today.

As a result, the panel said, there have been a number of espionage cases involving Americans with top security clearances such as William Kampiles, the CIA employee convicted of espionage charges last year.

The oversight subcommittee of the House Intelligence Committee found a hodgepodge of security clearance procedures being used by the CIA, State Department, Defense Department and National Security Agency, an arm of the Pentagon that tries to intercept international communications with highly sophisticated equipment.

"There is a need for greater uniformity in investigative procedures and standards, and there is a need for improved access to pertinent information" about job applicants, the subcommittee concluded in a report released today.

Rep. Les Aspin, D-Wis., chairman of the subcommittee, said security investigation procedures are "weak" and "there is no real system." "Each agency goes off in its own direction," Aspin said.

The director of central intelligence has established minimum standards for access to highly classified data known as "sensitive compartmented information." But the standards are not uniformly applied in the intelligence community, Aspin's panel reported.

The report urges the executive branch to consider setting up a single agency to handle pre-employment security investigations for all intelligence agencies.

Rep. John M. Ashbrook, R-Ohio, ranking minority member of the

subcommittee, said that "as long as the FBI is prevented from collecting intelligence on most subversive groups, as a result of the attorney general's guidelines, we can have little faith in any federal employee security program."

FBI officials say they no longer use the term "subversive." Publicly, at least, they say the current investigative standards are adequate and proper.

CIA security clearance procedures appear to be "the most comprehensive and stringent," the report said. But the agency that conducts most background investigations for the Defense Department, the Defense Investigative Service (DIS), was found to have many problems.

The report does not mention the case of Lee Eugene Madsen, a 24-year-old Navy enlisted man indicted last month on charges of espionage and stealing top-secret documents from the Pentagon. But the allegations illustrate the very problem described in the report.

Shortcomings in the performance of the Defense Investigative Service were underscored last year, according to the report, when it was learned that DIS did an extensive background investigation on a person who had applied to the Defense Department under an assumed identity. The probe failed to detect the false identity and the individual was cleared for access to highly classified information.

In another case described by Aspin's subcommittee, an Air Force man was cleared for access to secret information although it was later learned that he too had been using a false name.

Officials of both the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency told the subcommittee they were dissatisfied with the information they were getting on job applicants investigated by DIS.

The study found wide variation among agencies in use of the polygraph as a pre-employment screening device.

The subcommittee said that despite its widespread use, the accuracy of the polygraph had not been adequately demonstrated. It calls on the director of central intelligence to conduct a study to determine the accuracy of the polygraph.

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ON PAGE A4

THE WASHINGTON POST  
24 September 1979

## Tighter Security Screening Urged

Associated Press

Citing recent gaps in U.S. security, a House intelligence subcommittee yesterday urged the Carter administration to tighten procedures for clearing applicants for the nation's most sensitive jobs.

"The procedures used are weak," said Rep. Les Aspin, (D-Wis.), chairman of the House intelligence oversight subcommittee. "We find a patch-work quilt that indicates a lack of consistency."

The panel cited a recent case in which a low-level Central Intelligence Agency employee obtained and sold a top-secret manual on the operation of a U.S. spy satellite.

Aspin said the wide differences in how the government's security-related agencies review applicants sometimes leads to "a person [getting] a clearance from one agency while he would be denied the same clearance by another."

The subcommittee's report noted that agencies seek different information during background investigations and have varying policies on the use of polygraph, or lie-detector, tests.

The report said that while the CIA uses polygraph tests across the board in screening job applicants, the intelligence-monitoring National Security Agency requires them only for civilian applicants and the State and Defense departments do not use them at all.

The value of polygraph tests are widely debated by experts. However, the subcommittee's report noted that the tests are a factor in refusing clearance to 75 percent of those the CIA turns down and 90 percent of those rejected by the NSA.

The subcommittee's report recommended that common criteria be developed on the agencies' use of polygraph tests. It also proposed that a single agency be set up to handle security background investigations.

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**Miscellaneous**

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE II-7LOS ANGELES TIMES  
21 SEPTEMBER 1979

# Spying: the Invisible War

## Soviet Union and United States Make Widespread Use of Advanced Technology

BY CONSTANTINE CHRISTOPHER MENGES

Warren M. Christopher, the deputy secretary of state, received an unusual telephone call after being appointed to the post by President Carter in 1976. The caller was a woman who insisted on talking directly with him about a matter of national security. She said that all the telephone conversations from his official car were coming through on her short-wave radio at home. She was worried that sensitive information might be picked up by Soviet and other foreign agents.

Her concern was not far-fetched. Indeed, her experience was another example of the use of advanced technology in the spy-versus-spy competition between the superpowers.

In fact, since 1975 it has been publicly admitted that the Soviet Union engages in widespread electronic bugging in Washington and elsewhere in the United States. Such eavesdropping includes the interception, tape-recording and selective analysis of "interesting" government limousine radio-telephone conversations, as well as ordinary citizens' local and long-distance telephone calls. Just to make this task easier, the Soviet Union will build its new embassy on the highest ground in Washington so that its pickup antennas can look down on those of the White House, the Pentagon and the CIA.

According to a report of the 1975 Rockefeller Commission on Intelligence, the system is both simple and complex. For ordinary local calls and mobile car-telephone circuits, a combination of radio-wave pickup and telephone-line tapping is used to tune in on conversations. Since most long-distance calls are transmitted by electronic pulses sent across relay towers rather than by cable, the job of interception is easier.

An ordinary car or van can carry the equipment needed to "catch" all communications between any two points. These are recorded on tape, which is then played at high speeds through computers that sort out conversations of interest.

Sorting criteria might include: calls between important people—such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's national-security adviser, and Stansfield Turner, the director of the CIA—and calls in which issues such as strategic forces, wheat production or intelligence information are discussed. There is strong evidence that the Soviets' bugging of both government and business people helped them outmaneuver the United States in the wheat deals of 1972.

The Soviets' ornate mansion on the crest of Connecticut Avenue "looking down" on the White House is believed to be the place where much of this electronic work is done. Not unexpectedly, the embassy of the People's Republic of China is prudently located farther "uphill" from the Soviet "revisionists." Of course, senior U.S. officials have "secure" telephones that use special codes and circuits. Nevertheless, during a recent flight on the President's jet, White House officials were afraid to discuss sensitive matters on the "secure" radio-phone because they feared possible Soviet interception and decoding.

For years the U.S. Embassy in Moscow has been bombarded with high-intensity electromagnetic rays to foil monitoring equipment. In addition, the KGB has planted so many bugs within the American Embassy—including a recently discovered secret passageway inside the walls—that a room with transparent plastic walls was considered the only safe place to talk.

So far, despite the protests of Sen. Daniel P.

Moynihan (D-N.Y.) and others, Washington has been reluctant to take electronic or other countermeasures to disrupt Soviet electronic spy equipment in the United States.

Although these technological contests may seem remote, they have a significant effect on the international power structure. America's success in breaking Japanese and Nazi codes helped the Allied cause enormously during World War II. Today, much of the argument that the strategic arms limitation treaty can be "adequately verified" rests on confidence in our spy technology. But some experts maintain that the United States no longer has a technological edge over the Soviet Union.

For example, the SALT II agreement, currently under consideration by the U.S. Senate, explicitly states that neither side may interfere with "national means of verification." Yet two years ago Moscow did just that by putting the data radioed back from its missile tests into code. Rather than demanding that this stop or replying in kind, the Carter Administration has accepted Soviet assurances that any information needed to verify SALT will not be coded. This "compromise" amounts to letting the fox count the number of chickens in the coop before and after his visit.

Perhaps the most dramatic question that depends on effective use of spy technology is which superpower will make the breakthrough to a workable antiballistic missile defense system.

Sen. Jake Garn (R-Utah) has analyzed the evidence obtained by U.S. spy techniques, and he concludes that the Soviet Union is clearly far ahead. He notes that huge new radar installations have been built, and that thousands of the more than 12,000 Soviet antiaircraft missiles have been tested and upgraded so that they could destroy incoming missiles. Tests demonstrate that radar waves could be used to melt the trigger mechanisms of attacking hydrogen bombs, and thereby render them harmless. Is that why the Soviet Union has built and operated 6,500 military radar sites, as compared with only 55 such installations in the United States?

Every day the invisible technological war continues. As the spy agencies on both sides sift through the daily "take" of millions of electronic communications, they are looking for answers to basic questions of political intentions, diplomatic strategy and military power. The competence and seriousness with which the United States competes will directly affect the nation's future welfare. □

Constantine Christopher Menges, a former staff member of the Rand Corp., is a writer in Washington.

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# The Federal Diary By Mike Causey

Association of Former Intelligence Officers will hold its fifth annual convention Oct. 5 and 6 at the Sheraton Conference Center in Reston. Old boys, and old girls, from various cloak-and-dagger operations will meet and hear from the current chiefs of CIA, NSA and DIA about new trends in intelligence gathering. Package price for the Friday-Saturday sessions, including food, is \$68.50. Call (703) 790-0320 for details.